People of Michigan v. Christopher Paul Saul ( 2018 )


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  •                           STATE OF MICHIGAN
    COURT OF APPEALS
    PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                    UNPUBLISHED
    August 2, 2018
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v                                                                   No. 335426
    Wayne Circuit Court
    CHRISTOPHER PAUL SAUL,                                              LC No. 16-004981-01-FH
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: SERVITTO, P.J., and GLEICHER and STEPHENS, JJ.
    PER CURIAM.
    Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted Christopher Saul of third-degree fleeing
    and eluding, MCL 257.602a(3), and sentenced him to one year of nonreporting probation with 80
    hours of community service. Saul sought a new trial or to reopen the proofs based on new found
    evidence that he suffered from an autism spectrum disorder that explained his behavior during
    his police encounter. He also asks this Court to remand for an evidentiary hearing concerning
    new evidence that the arresting officer did not follow protocol and had motive to lie. We affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    On March 10, 2016, Taylor Police Officer Brian Wojtowicz, who was patrolling in a
    fully marked police vehicle, pulled over 19-year-old Saul for driving 45 miles an hour in a 35
    zone. Saul pulled over, but the street was busy with traffic and did not have shoulders.
    Wojtowicz honked his horn several times in an attempt to communicate that he wanted Saul to
    pull his vehicle out of the road and into a nearby driveway. After approximately five seconds,
    Saul slowly moved his vehicle forward. He drove for two miles as Officer Wojtowicz followed
    directly behind him, with emergency lights and siren still activated. At that point, backup arrived
    and surrounded Saul’s vehicle. Saul was then taken into custody.
    At trial, Saul testified that he understood that when a driver hears an emergency vehicle
    siren, he is “supposed to stop for the police,” pull over to the side of the road, and remain
    stationary until the emergency vehicle passes. Saul explained that he did not comply because he
    was confused when the officer honked his horn. Saul interpreted the honking to mean that he
    should not have stopped his car at all, and that the officer wanted him to move “out of his way
    and keep going.” When the officer honked his horn again after Saul moved forward, Saul
    thought that “maybe he wanted me to move maybe he wanted me to pull into that driveway
    there. I wasn’t sure.” Saul was also confused by a siren sound that he had never heard before.
    -1-
    In addition to the “traditional siren” sound, he also heard a series of fast beeping sounds.
    Although Saul drove past many parking lot entrances, driveways, and side streets with Officer
    Wojtowicz following immediately behind him with his lights and siren activated, it “never
    occurred” to Saul to pull into any of them.
    At the trial, the court also heard testimony from Officer Wojtowicz and viewed the dash
    cam footage of the entire transaction. The trial court noted that “minimal circumstantial
    evidence is sufficient to establish defendant’s state of mind” under the statute and that “fleeing
    and eluding is a general intent crime and only requires the intent to do the physical act” of
    fleeing and eluding. The court found, based on the testimony and video evidence, that Saul
    knew the officer was following him and directing him to stop. The court also found sufficient
    evidence that Saul “did more than simply fail to submit,” because there were “several places
    where [he] could have pulled off the road,” and he “did not voluntarily stop for the officer but
    only stopped because another police officer’s vehicle stopped his car.” The court therefore
    found Saul guilty of one count of third-degree fleeing and eluding.
    At the sentencing hearing, the court heard Saul’s motion for a new trial under MCR
    6.431(B) and to reopen proofs under MCR 6.431(C), or in the alternative, to vacate his
    conviction and enter an order convicting Saul “of a cognate lesser offense . . . [of] resisting and
    obstructing.” In support of his motion, Saul offered testimony from psychologist Carissa Gaden,
    who would testify that she evaluated Saul and found “him to be very high functioning, but still
    on the autism spectrum,” which could “explain the genuine confusion” he experienced during the
    traffic stop and pursuit in this case. The court ultimately denied the motion.
    Saul filed a claim of appeal and moved this Court to remand for a hearing requesting a
    new trial, asserting newly discovered evidence in the form of two expert witnesses—psychiatrist
    Andrew David Maltz and Thomas C. Berry, a former Detroit Police officer with 45 years of law
    enforcement experience who would testify that Wotjtowicz should have used his loudspeaker to
    instruct Saul. Saul also offered newly discovered evidence of Officer Wojtowicz’s involvement
    in several lawsuits concerning “allegations of police misconduct and/or excessive force,” as well
    as evidence that Wojtowicz was the “subject of an internal affairs investigation.” This Court
    denied Saul’s motion. People v Saul, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July
    14, 2017 (Docket No. 335426).
    II. NEW TRIAL
    We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision on a motion for new trial.
    People v Lemmon, 
    456 Mich 625
    , 648 n 27; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). An abuse of discretion
    occurs when the court’s decision “falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.”
    People v Unger, 
    278 Mich App 210
    , 217; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). To warrant a new trial based
    on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must show that “(1) the evidence itself, not merely its
    materiality, was newly discovered; (2) the newly discovered evidence was not cumulative; (3)
    the party could not, using reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence at
    trial; and (4) the new evidence makes a different result probable on retrial.” People v Cress, 
    468 Mich 678
    , 692; 664 NW2d 174 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
    -2-
    The evidence presented by Saul in his trial court motion for a new trial, and his remand
    request in this Court, either was not “newly discovered” or could have been discovered before
    trial “using reasonable diligence.” “ ‘[M]otions for a new trial on the ground of newly-
    discovered evidence are looked upon with disfavor. . . .’ ” People v Rao, 
    491 Mich 271
    , 279-
    280; 815 NW2d 105 (2012), quoting Webert v Maser, 
    247 Mich 245
    , 256; 
    225 NW 635
     (1929).
    “[I]n fairness to both parties and the overall justice system, the law requires that parties secure
    evidence and prepare for trial with the full understanding that, absent unusual circumstances, the
    trial will be the one and only opportunity to present their case.” Rao, 491 Mich at 280. To that
    end, “[i]t is the obligation of the parties to undertake all reasonable efforts to marshal all the
    relevant evidence for that trial. Evidence will not ordinarily be allowed in installments.” Id.
    (emphasis in original).
    Evidence that Saul was on the autism spectrum could have been uncovered with
    reasonable diligence before trial. Saul conceded below that prior to trial, “obviously there were
    some . . . potentially, some indicators that” he may have had a “more expansive, a more
    significant mental health issue,” but that he did not investigate this issue until after his
    conviction. The trial court noted that defendant’s “challenges” were known to him and his
    family before the trial. Saul was assessed “by a neurologist, endocrinologist, and nutritionist in
    his early years,” and had been prescribed Adderall since the fourth grade. With reasonable
    diligence, Saul could have investigated his potential mental health issues, and could have
    discovered his autism disorder prior to trial. Accordingly, Dr. Gaden’s assessment was an
    insufficient ground for the trial court to grant a new trial. And Dr. Maltz’s potential expert
    testimony does not warrant a remand for reconsideration of the lower court’s decision.
    Saul also could have earlier developed evidence regarding the proper procedure to notify
    a car to move to a safer location during a traffic stop. Even if Saul’s counsel was unaware of the
    circumstances previously, he was notified by the officer’s testimony at the June 1, 2016
    preliminary hearing that the officer had honked at Saul in an attempt to communicate his intent
    that Saul should pull over in a safer location. Saul had ample time to investigate whether this
    was proper procedure. Instead, Saul waited until his June 16, 2017 motion to remand filed in this
    Court to suggest an expert who would challenge Officer Wojtowicz’s methods. Again, this
    evidence could have been developed prior to trial and we decline to remand for a new
    evidentiary hearing on this basis.
    Finally, Saul contends for the first time on appeal that newly discovered evidence of
    Officer Wojtowicz’s less than stellar service record warrants at least a remand for
    reconsideration of his motion for a new trial. Appellate counsel’s paralegal discovered
    information “[d]uring the course of a routine internet search” that Officer Wojtowicz “was
    involved in many lawsuits concerning acts of misconduct against him” and had been “the subject
    of an internal affairs investigation.” In his motion to remand to take a second bite at his new trial
    motion, Saul contended that he required additional discovery from the prosecutor to develop this
    evidence into a claim that Wojtowicz was motivated to make himself look better in the current
    situation and falsely accuse Saul of fleeing and eluding, rather than admitting he employed
    confusing and unclear techniques that could have been misinterpreted.
    However, with reasonable diligence, Saul and his counsel could have questioned the
    appropriateness of the officer’s actions before trial. The “routine internet search” could have
    -3-
    been conducted at any time with reasonable diligence, including before trial. Although we
    sympathize with Saul’s plight, he simply has not presented any newly discovered evidence that
    warrants a new trial.
    III. ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
    Saul further asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate his
    mental condition and its impact on his actions before trial. Although attorneys are protected by
    the strong presumption that their decisions are “born from a sound trial strategy,” they have a
    duty to formulate that strategy after “reasonable investigation[]” or after making “a reasonable
    decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” People v Trakhtenberg, 
    493 Mich 38
    , 52; 826 NW2d 136 (2012). It would only have been reasonable for defense counsel in this
    case to investigate Saul’s competency if his client or his client’s parents brought this issue to the
    attorney’s attention. There is no record indication that Saul’s attorney should have suspected
    that his client was on the autism spectrum and could not process environmental cues during the
    traffic stop. Indeed, despite previous childhood assessments, no one had diagnosed Saul with
    autism spectrum or Asperger’s disorder before this incident. Accordingly, Saul cannot establish
    that counsel acted deficiently.
    We affirm.
    /s/ Deborah A. Servitto
    /s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
    /s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 335426

Filed Date: 8/2/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2018