People of Michigan v. Joseph John Blair Jr ( 2019 )


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  •             If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
    revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
    STATE OF MICHIGAN
    COURT OF APPEALS
    PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                  UNPUBLISHED
    October 29, 2019
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v                                                                 No. 347885
    Berrien Circuit Court
    JOSEPH JOHN BLAIR, JR.,                                           LC No. 2018-016211-FH
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and GLEICHER and M. J. KELLY, JJ.
    PER CURIAM.
    The question presented is whether the police constitutionally seized and searched
    defendant Joseph Blair’s car after arresting him for driving with a suspended license. The trial
    court denied Blair’s motion to suppress the evidence found during the search, ruling that the
    community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement authorized the police to impound
    the car and to perform an inventory search of its contents.
    Blair’s car was legally parked in a Walmart parking lot and was not impeding traffic.
    Nor was it impounded for a reason related to any community-caretaking function. We reverse.
    I
    While on road patrol at 1:30 a.m., Berrien County Sheriff’s Deputy Jared Phillips spotted
    a vehicle with its license plate light dangling in front of the plate. The vehicle drove into a
    Walmart parking lot and Phillips followed. Phillips turned on his flashing lights and the car
    pulled into a parking space at the farthest end of the lot, a considerable distance from the
    customer entrance. The large parking lot was “very empty,” Phillips later testified.
    As Phillips approached the vehicle, defendant Joseph Blair immediately rolled down the
    driver’s side window and announced that his license was suspended. He produced an
    identification card issued by the Department of Corrections. On Phillips’s command, Blair
    submitted to a pat-down search yielding only a pocket knife. Blair then accompanied Phillips to
    the patrol car. Blair sat in the back seat while Phillips confirmed Blair’s license suspension.
    -1-
    Phillips also learned that there were two outstanding warrants for Blair’s arrest. Before placing
    Blair in handcuffs, Phillips asked for permission to search Blair’s car. Blair refused.
    Phillips returned to the vehicle and engaged its female passenger in conversation; among
    other things, he inquired whether there was “anything illegal in the car.” She denied knowledge
    of contraband. “What kind of drugs does Joseph do? . . . He’s got a couple of drug charges,”
    Phillips persisted. The passenger’s license, too, was suspended, and Phillips allowed her to walk
    away. Phillips returned to the patrol car and informed Blair, “We are probably going to search
    the vehicle, okay, because you have a suspended license, okay, out of Michigan. And she’s also
    suspended.”
    Another deputy arrived on the scene. Phillips repeatedly entreated Blair to consent to a
    search: “Do you mind if we just double check the vehicle to make sure there’s nothing in there?”
    was followed by “I’m asking for consent,” and “If I tow the vehicle I have to search.” Blair
    declined each invitation. Phillips also tried, “Joseph, what’s in the car?” After Blair’s second
    refusal, Phillips commented to the other deputy, “So there’s probably something in the car that
    shouldn’t be.”
    The officers impounded and searched Blair’s car. They found a variety of illegal
    narcotics, a pistol, and a loaded Colt revolver. The prosecutor charged Blair with
    delivery/manufacture of methamphetamine, MCL 333.4701(2)(b)(i); delivery/manufacture of a
    Schedule 4 controlled substance, MCL 333.4701(2)(c); two counts of carrying a concealed
    weapon in an automobile, MCL 750.227; one count each of possession of a firearm by a felon,
    MCL 750.224f; receiving and concealing a stolen firearm, MCL 750.535b; and possession of a
    firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b.
    II
    Blair filed a motion to suppress the weapon and drug evidence, contending that the search
    violated the Sheriff’s Department policy governing vehicle impoundment and towing.
    Additionally, Blair argued, the search was pretextual and Phillips acted in bad faith. The circuit
    court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which only Phillips testified.
    The prosecution implicitly conceded that the deputies lacked probable cause or
    reasonable suspicion to search Blair’s automobile, and instead justified the car’s impoundment
    and search on the community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement; the prosecution
    maintains that position on appeal. The community-caretaking doctrine permits the police to
    seize vehicles for reasons related to public and police safety, to prevent the car from impeding
    the flow of traffic, and to reduce the risk that a car left unattended might be vandalized and the
    public jeopardized or the police held responsible. The United States Supreme Court has
    described the following reasonable bases for an impoundment:
    In the interests of public safety and as part of what the Court has called
    “community caretaking functions,” automobiles are frequently taken into police
    custody. Vehicle accidents present one such occasion. To permit the
    uninterrupted flow of traffic and in some circumstances to preserve evidence,
    disabled or damaged vehicles will often be removed from the highways or streets
    -2-
    at the behest of police engaged solely in caretaking and traffic-control activities.
    Police will also frequently remove and impound automobiles which violate
    parking ordinances and which thereby jeopardize both the public safety and the
    efficient movement of vehicular traffic. The authority of police to seize and
    remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and
    convenience is beyond challenge. [South Dakota v Opperman, 
    428 US 364
    , 368-
    369; 
    96 S Ct 3092
    ; 
    49 L Ed 2d 1000
     (1976) (citation omitted).]
    When a car is constitutionally impounded, the police may perform an inventory search of
    its contents. The justifications for a search and inventory differ from those legitimizing the
    impoundment itself. The Opperman Court explained that when vehicles are impounded, the
    police “generally follow a routine practice of securing and inventorying the automobiles’
    contents.” 
    Id. at 369
    . These police procedures serve “three distinct needs”: protecting the
    vehicle owner’s property while the vehicle remains in police custody; protecting the police
    against claims for lost or stolen property, and protecting the police from possible danger. 
    Id.
    Our Supreme Court has echoed that the impoundment must be proper to justify a
    warrantless search of a car. The validity of an inventory search of a vehicle depends on whether
    the vehicle was lawfully impounded and the search was conducted by the police in accordance
    with standardized departure procedures. People v Toohey, 
    438 Mich 265
    , 284-285; 475 NW2d
    16 (1991). The Court emphasized in Toohey that inventory searches of impounded vehicles are
    reasonable to the extent they conform to standard police procedures and the principles
    underlying the community-caretaking function. 
    Id. at 275-276
    .
    The community-caretaking function is distinct from another law enforcement purpose:
    the investigation of crime. “To be constitutional, an inventory search must be conducted in
    accordance with established departmental procedures, which all police officers are required to
    follow, and must not be used as a pretext for criminal investigation.” 
    Id. at 284
     (emphasis in
    original). “The goal is to prevent inventory searches from being used as ‘a ruse for general
    rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence’ and, therefore, the applicable policy
    ‘should be designed to produce an inventory.’ ” People v Poole, 
    199 Mich App 261
    , 266; 501
    NW2d 265 (1993), quoting Florida v Wells, 
    495 US 1
    , 4; 
    110 S Ct 1632
    ; 
    109 L Ed 2d 1
     (1990).
    The United States Supreme Court, too, has underscored that the community-caretaking function
    affords an officer with discretion to impound and search a vehicle “so long as that discretion is
    exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of
    evidence of criminal activity.” Colorado v Bertine, 
    479 US 367
    , 375; 
    107 S Ct 738
    ; 
    93 L Ed 2d 739
     (1987).
    MCL 257.252d governs the ability of a police agency to remove vehicles from public and
    private property. The impoundment policy of the Berrien County Sheriff’s Department
    incorporates this statute. MCL 257.252d(1) provides in relevant part:
    A police agency or a governmental agency designated by the police
    agency may provide for the immediate removal of a vehicle from public or private
    property to a place of safekeeping at the expense of the last-titled owner of the
    vehicle in any of the following circumstances:
    -3-
    * * *
    (e) If the vehicle must be seized to preserve evidence of a crime, or if there
    is reasonable cause to believe that the vehicle was used in the commission of a
    crime.
    * * *
    (g) If the vehicle is hampering the use of private property by the owner or
    person in charge of that property or is parked in a manner that impedes the
    movement of another vehicle.
    The Berrien County Sheriff Policy and Procedures governing motor vehicle towing and
    impounding states:
    III.   TOWING MOTOR VEHICLES
    A.     [MCL] 257.252d of the Michigan Vehicle Code gives police
    officers the authority to immediately remove vehicles from private or public
    property.
    B.     This Section also describes the circumstances, which must be
    present in order to invoke this portion of the vehicle code. Below, in abbreviated
    terms, are those circumstances:
    * * *
    5.      If the vehicle must be seized to preserve evidence of a crime, or
    when there is reasonable cause to believe the vehicle was used in the commission
    of a crime. In order to invoke this portion of the section, officers should
    remember that you must establish that a crime has occurred or in [sic] occurring.
    * * *
    7.      If the vehicle hampers the use of private property or impedes the
    movement of another vehicle.
    * * *
    Miscellaneous
    * * *
    3.     If improper use of registration plates is determined, the officers
    must remember that even though they have seized the registration plate from a
    vehicle as evidence, and the vehicle is no longer licensed, one of the
    circumstances outlined in [MCL] 257.252d of the Michigan Motor Vehicle Code
    must be present before an impound can be justified. If the vehicle is legally
    -4-
    parked and does not create a hazard, or fall within any of the other circumstances
    necessary to justify an impound, an impound cannot be effected.
    4.     The same principles apply to situations where a driver is arrested.
    An arrest does not automatically justify an impound. The outlined criteria as
    found in [MCL] 257.252d of the Michigan Motor Vehicle Code must still be met.
    Unusual Situations
    In a situation where:
    1.       a vehicle was stopped for improper plates
    2.       the driver of a vehicle is arrested and an officer cannot legally impound
    the officer shall immediately tag the vehicle for 48 hours and treat the vehicle as
    any other abandoned vehicle that has been tagged for 48 hours.
    V.     EXCEPTIONS TO TOWING AND IMPOUNDING
    A.      It may not be necessary to tow and/or impound a vehicle when there is
    another driver that the owner is willing to release the vehicle to and the vehicle is
    in operational condition. This person:
    1.      Must be a licensed driver and have a valid driver’s license in
    his/her possession.
    2.      Must be present at the scene or able to arrive within a reasonable
    length of time.
    3.      Should not appear to be intoxicated.
    4.      Should not be involved in the arrest of the driver.
    B.      It may not be necessary to tow and/or impound, depending on the
    circumstances of the investigation, when the vehicle is within the immediate
    vicinity of the owner’s home or business.
    C.     It may not be necessary to tow and/or impound if other acceptable
    arrangements are made by the owner such as:
    1.     Wrecker called by owner or driver prior to officer’s arrival at the
    scene.
    2.     Wrecker must arrive within a reasonable amount of time.
    D.     It may not be necessary to impound if the vehicle is, or can be, legally
    parked and does not create a hazard to traffic.
    E.    Impoundment may not be necessary to preserve the desired evidence. For
    example, photographs may suffice and thus eliminate the need for impoundment.
    F.    The above alternatives to impounding shall be considered and/or
    implemented whenever reasonable under the circumstances.
    -5-
    In the trial court, the prosecution contended that two sections of Berrien’s policy
    authorized Phillips to impound and search Blair’s car: that the vehicle was “used in the
    commission of a crime” under III(B)(5), and that it “hamper[ed] the use of private property”
    under III(B)(7).
    The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the vehicle was properly
    impounded pursuant to MCL 257.252d(1)(g). The court explained:
    The Court does find that in this instance the vehicle driven by Mr. Blair
    and ultimately parked on private property in a parking lot did hamper the use of
    that property. The language in the Berrien County Sheriff’s Department policy
    does not qualify was [sic] to significant hampering or slight hampering. It simply
    says hamper. And it’s just common sense that when there’s a vehicle parked in
    your parking lot that’s not a business invitee and it could be there for, as Ms.
    Wainwright [the prosecutor] put it out a significant period of time. That would
    create a hampering of the use of that private property.
    The Officer further pointed out that he was there in the middle of the
    night. The level of hampering of the use of that private property would likely be
    enhanced during normal, regular, daylight, business hours, when the store would
    naturally be more – more busy. Other types of activities occurred in parking lots
    like this there clear [sic] within the discretion and control of the owner of the
    property.
    So I do find that the inventory search was properly conducted pursuant to
    a routine administrative policy.
    Prompted by the prosecutor, the judge also found that MCL 257.252d(1)(e) “potentially”
    authorized impoundment because “the vehicle was being used to commit a crime, driving with a
    suspended license.” The court noted, however, that subparagraph 7 provided the “strongest”
    support for the impoundment. We granted Blair’s application for leave to appeal. People v
    Blair, Jr, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 25, 2019 (Docket No.
    347885).
    III
    We review the trial court’s findings of fact for clear error, and consider de novo both
    questions of law relevant to the suppression motion and the judge’s ultimate decision. People v
    Unger, 
    278 Mich App 210
    , 243; 749 NW2d 272 (2008); People v Darwich, 
    226 Mich App 635
    ,
    637; 575 NW2d 44 (1997). In assessing the constitutionality of the search and seizure of Blair’s
    car, we must examine “all the facts and circumstances” to determine whether the police acted
    reasonably. People v Krezen, 
    427 Mich 681
    , 684; 397 NW2d 803 (1986) (BOYLE, J.) (quotation
    marks and citations omitted).
    The trial court clearly erred in finding that Blair’s car was “hamper[ing]” the use of
    private property, as no evidence supported this finding. The trial court also erred in determining
    that the vehicle had to be seized “to preserve evidence of a crime,” or because the car “was used
    -6-
    in the commission of a crime.” These grounds for impoundment are unrelated to a community
    caretaking rationale. The Berrien County Sheriff Policy and Procedures and the circumstances
    surrounding Phillip’s decision to impound the car demonstrate that the purpose of the seizure
    was instead investigational. And because the officers lacked probable cause or reasonable
    suspicion to seize the car, the resulting search contravened the Fourth Amendment.
    A
    Blair’s vehicle was legally parked in a designated parking space in a section of the
    Walmart parking lot located at a considerable distance from the store’s entrance. Phillips
    speculated that employees parked in the same area, but no evidence supported that the area was
    actually designated for employee-only parking. Phillips admitted that the car “didn’t create a
    hazard or obstruct traffic or anything like that,” and conceded that at the time of Blair’s arrest,
    the policy’s “hampering” provision did not provide authority for his impoundment decision.
    Moreover, the police remained with the vehicle for 20 minutes before searching it, and a
    significant time after. During that interval no one associated with Walmart requested the
    vehicle’s removal. And the Berrien County Sheriff’s Department policy expressly provides for
    tagging a vehicle parked on private property and reported as abandoned, permitting
    impoundment only after 48 hours have thereafter elapsed.1 Accordingly, section III(B)(7) did not
    authorize the impoundment of Blair’s vehicle.
    B
    Phillips asserted that he impounded the car based on section III(B)(5) of the Berrien
    County policy, which states:
    If the vehicle must be seized to preserve evidence of a crime, or when there is
    reasonable cause to believe the vehicle was used in the commission of a crime. In
    order to invoke this portion of the section, officers should remember that you
    must establish that a crime has occurred or in [sic] occurring.
    Because Blair had committed the crime of driving with a suspended license, Phillips testified, the
    policy permitted the vehicle’s impoundment.
    We begin with the observation that an officer’s decision to impound a car pursuant to a
    departmental policy does not automatically dictate that the seizure is reasonable under the Fourth
    Amendment. A state or local government may promulgate policies governing searches and
    seizures of private property, but may not “authorize police conduct which trenches upon Fourth
    Amendment rights, regardless of the labels which it attaches to such conduct.” Sibron v New
    York, 
    392 US 40
    , 61; 
    88 S Ct 1889
    ; 
    20 L Ed 2d 917
     (1968). When reviewing a state-authorized
    search and seizure of private property, we must nevertheless determine whether the
    government’s actions were “reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Just as a search
    1
    This portion of the policy reflects that generally, it is a private property owner’s prerogative to
    seek removal of an unattended vehicle.
    -7-
    authorized by state law may be an unreasonable one under that amendment, so may a search not
    expressly authorized by state law be justified as a constitutionally reasonable one.” 
    Id.
    The United States Supreme Court has authorized noninvestigative seizures and searches,
    but has “never implied in any way that searches and seizures conducted according to
    standardized criteria prescribed by departmental policies are reasonable within the meaning of
    the Fourth Amendment for that reason alone.” People v Brown, 415 P3d 815, 819, 
    2018 CO 27
    (CO, 2018). “An impoundment must either be supported by probable cause, or be consistent
    with the police role as ‘caretaker’ of the streets and completely unrelated to an ongoing criminal
    investigation.” United States v Duguay, 93 F3d 346, 352 (CA 7, 1996). Even when related to a
    criminal investigation, the United States Supreme Court strictly cabined the power of the police
    to conduct warrantless automobile searches in Arizona v Gant, 
    556 US 332
    , 351; 
    129 S Ct 1710
    ;
    
    173 L Ed 2d 485
     (2009):
    Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the
    arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of
    the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the
    offense of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee’s
    vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show that another
    exception to the warrant requirement applies.
    Thus, a statute or policy cannot authorize an otherwise unconstitutional search and
    seizure. That the police followed the statute and a written policy does not automatically shield
    police action from Fourth Amendment scrutiny, and cannot override Constitutional protections.
    And here, the Berrien County Sheriff Policy and Procedures itself casts doubt on Phillip’s ability
    to impound Blair’s car based on his commission of the crime of driving with a suspended
    license.2
    Section III of the policy addresses “towing motor vehicles.” Paragraph 3 of this section
    reinforces that the inability to drive a car from the scene of a traffic stop does not, standing alone,
    supply a ground for seizure of the vehicle, even when the car cannot be driven because it lacks a
    valid license plate:
    If improper use of registration plates is determined, the officers must remember
    that even though they have seized the registration plate from a vehicle as
    evidence, and the vehicle is no longer licensed, one of the circumstances outlined
    in [MCL] 257.252d of the Michigan Motor Vehicle Code must be present before
    an impound can be justified.3 If the vehicle is legally parked and does not create
    2
    Driving with a suspended license is a misdemeanor. MCL 257.904(3). For the first violation
    of this law, a person is subject to “imprisonment for not more than 93 days or a fine of not more
    than $500, or both[.]” MCL 257.904(3)(a).
    3
    The improper use of a registration plate is a misdemeanor “punishable by imprisonment for not
    more than 90 days, or by a fine of not more than $100, or both.” MCL 257.256(2).
    -8-
    a hazard, or fall within any of the other circumstances necessary to justify an
    impound, an impound cannot be effected. [Emphasis added.]
    Nor does the driver’s arrest routinely require impoundment:
    4.      The same principles apply to situations where a driver is arrested. An
    arrest does not automatically justify an impound. The outlined criteria as found
    in [MCL] 257.252d of the Michigan Motor Vehicle Code must still be met.
    [Emphasis added.]
    Section V of the policy sets forth “Exceptions to Towing and Impounding.” Among
    them are the following pertinent provisions:
    D.     It may not be necessary to impound if the vehicle is, or can be, legally
    parked and does not create a hazard to traffic.
    E.    Impoundment may not be necessary to preserve the desired evidence. For
    example, photographs may suffice and thus eliminate the need for impoundment.
    F.    The above alternatives to impounding shall be considered and/or
    implemented whenever reasonable under the circumstances.
    These provisions counsel that impoundment is unnecessary and contraindicated if based
    solely on a driver’s arrest for having committed a crime, even if the vehicle “was used in the
    commission of a crime” and may constitute “evidence” of the crime. And subsection F mandates
    consideration of leaving a car in place “if it is reasonable to do so.” These restraints counsel that
    even though a car cannot be driven at the time of arrest, if the vehicle is legally parked and
    otherwise presents no risks, the vehicle’s owner must be afforded an opportunity to tow or
    license it, or to retrieve its contents.
    The Berrien County Sheriff Policy and Procedures aside, to pass constitutional muster an
    impoundment conducted pursuant to the community-caretaking function must actually serve a
    community-caretaking function. The first clause of the first sentence of section III(B)(5) (“If the
    vehicle must be seized to preserve evidence of a crime”) advances a criminal investigation goal
    rather than community caretaking. This provision corresponds to the automobile exception to
    the warrant requirement, which authorizes officers to conduct “a warrantless search of an
    automobile, based upon probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of crime in
    the light of an exigency arising out of the likely disappearance of the vehicle[.]” California v
    Acevedo, 
    500 US 565
    , 569; 
    111 S Ct 1982
    ; 
    114 L Ed 2d 619
     (1991). Rather than encapsulating a
    community-caretaking purpose, the first sentence of section III(B)(5) codifies an entirely
    different exception.
    The second clause of the first sentence of Section III(B)(5) (“when there is reasonable
    cause to believe the vehicle was used in the commission of a crime”) authorizes the
    -9-
    impoundment and search of a vehicle any time the driver is arrested for a crime involving the use
    of the vehicle.4 As applied to the facts of this case, however, the second clause is unrelated to
    the community-caretaking function.
    Inventory searches are exempt from the warrant requirement precisely because they are
    “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the
    violation of a criminal statute.” Cady v Dombrowski, 
    413 US 433
    , 441; 
    93 S Ct 2523
    ; 
    37 L Ed 2d 706
     (1973). See also Opperman, 
    428 US at
    370 n 5 (discussing the “noncriminal context” of
    inventory searches and their “noninvestigative” nature); Gant, 
    556 US at 345
     (observing that a
    rule permitting the police to search a car’s passenger compartment and every container within it
    “whenever an individual is caught committing a traffic offense, when there is no basis for
    believing evidence of the offense might be found in the vehicle, creates a serious and recurring
    threat to the privacy of countless individuals. Indeed, the character of that threat implicates the
    central concern underlying the Fourth Amendment—the concern about giving police officers
    unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a person’s private effects”). The seizure of
    Blair’s car cannot be justified on community caretaking grounds, however, as according to
    Phillips it was accomplished for the purposes related only to Blair’s “crime” of driving on a
    suspended license.
    The prosecution has not offered a rationale for seizing a vehicle based on the driver’s
    lack of a valid driver’s license other than that the car possesses some evidentiary value. But this
    ground for overcoming Blair’s Fourth Amendment right was rejected in Gant. “Gant was
    arrested for driving with a suspended license—an offense for which police could not expect to
    find evidence in the passenger compartment of Gant’s car.” 
    Id. at 344
    . Obviously, the
    prosecution did not need to possess the vehicle itself to prove that Blair drove on a suspended
    license. Under the facts presented, the car itself had no evidentiary value. A different result
    would obtain if, for example, the car was used in a hit-and-run and was a potential source of
    forensic evidence, if the car was stolen, or if the police articulated a community-caretaking
    purpose for seizure unrelated to a criminal investigation. Phillips’s testimony establishes that
    the car’s impoundment had nothing to do with protecting the public or the police, and instead
    was intended to advance the criminal case against Blair. And “evidence may not be introduced if
    it was discovered by means of a seizure and search which were not reasonably related in scope to
    the justification for their initiation.” Terry v Ohio, 
    392 US 1
    , 29; 
    88 S Ct 1868
    ; 
    20 L Ed 2d 889
    (1968).
    We stress that our ruling does not imply that Phillips acted in bad faith. To the contrary,
    Phillips acted in conformity with a written procedure. But Phillips’ good faith is not relevant to
    the determination of whether the impoundment of Blair’s car was constitutionally permissible.
    Rather, “it is the caretaking function which legitimizes an inventory.” State v Kunkel, 455
    NW2d 208, 211 (ND, 1990). See also State v Leak, 
    2016-Ohio-154
    , P37; 
    47 NE3d 821
     (Ohio S
    Ct, 2016) (“The fact that the arresting officer used established police procedure to conduct the
    4
    As discussed above, the policy carves out an exception to this rule for improper use of a
    registration plate.
    -10-
    inventory search does not overcome the unlawfulness of the impoundment in the first place.
    This is precisely the type of governmental intrusion the Fourth Amendment seeks to prohibit.
    Permitting the evidence to be used against Leak under the good-faith exception to the
    exclusionary rule would eviscerate the purpose of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against
    unreasonable searches and seizures.”).5
    In a case presenting a Fourth Amendment question, the ultimate answer usually turns on
    reasonableness. The community-caretaking function supplies a reasonable ground for the police
    to impound cars that might otherwise threaten public or police safety. No such threat was
    presented here. Blair’s car was legally parked and was seized for reasons that are fundamentally
    inconsistent with community caretaking.         Accordingly, impoundment of the car was
    unreasonable and the search contravened the Fourth Amendment.
    We reverse the circuit court’s order denying Blair’s motion to suppress, and remand for
    further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.
    /s/ Brock A. Swartzle
    /s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
    /s/ Michael J. Kelly
    5
    Phillips’s repeated and unsuccessful efforts to obtain consent to search the vehicle reinforce
    that it was impounded for a purpose unrelated to community caretaking. “An inventory search
    must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence. The
    policy or practice governing inventory searches should be designed to produce an inventory.
    The individual police officer must not be allowed so much latitude that inventory searches are
    turned into ‘a purposeful and general means of discovering evidence of crime.’ ” Florida v
    Wells, 
    495 US 1
    , 4; 
    110 S Ct 1632
    ; 
    109 L Ed 2d 1
     (1990).
    -11-