in Re B M Struble Minor ( 2015 )


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  •                             STATE OF MICHIGAN
    COURT OF APPEALS
    UNPUBLISHED
    In re B.M. STRUBLE, Minor.                                            March 31, 2015
    No. 323345
    Calhoun Circuit Court
    Family Division
    LC No. 2014-000995-NA
    Before: JANSEN, P.J., and METER and BECKERING, JJ.
    PER CURIAM.
    Respondent father appeals by right the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to
    the minor child at the initial dispositional hearing pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (h),
    (j), (k)(ii) and (n)(i). We affirm.
    The proceedings in this case stemmed from respondent’s convictions, on March 11, 2013,
    of two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c(1)(a), for acts
    perpetrated upon the minor child, his biological daughter. On April 8, 2013, respondent was
    sentenced to concurrent terms of 36 to 180 months’ imprisonment. Thereafter, on April 3, 2014,
    a petition seeking jurisdiction over the minor child and termination of respondent’s parental
    rights was filed. A preliminary hearing was held on May 1, 2014, followed by a combined
    adjudication trial and dispositional hearing on July 30, 2014. At the July 30 proceedings, a
    Children’s Protective Services (CPS) worker testified regarding respondent’s convictions and
    opined that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests despite
    the fact that the child was placed with her mother.1 The trial court subsequently issued its ruling
    on the record, finding clear and convincing evidence to prove the statutory grounds listed above
    because respondent was convicted of criminal sexual conduct perpetrated against the child. The
    trial court further found that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s best
    interests. An order terminating respondent’s parental rights was entered following the hearing.
    Respondent now appeals.
    “In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing
    evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been
    met.” In re VanDalen, 
    293 Mich. App. 120
    , 139; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). We review for clear
    1
    The child’s mother was not a respondent in this case.
    -1-
    error the trial court’s determination that a statutory ground has been proven by clear and
    convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(K). “ ‘A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing
    court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to
    the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.’ ” In re Moss, 
    301 Mich. App. 76
    ,
    80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013) (citation omitted). “Once a statutory ground for termination has been
    proven, the trial court must find that termination is in the child’s best interests before it can
    terminate parental rights.” In re Olive/Metts, 
    297 Mich. App. 35
    , 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012).
    “[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proven by a
    preponderance of the evidence.” In re 
    Moss, 301 Mich. App. at 90
    . The trial court’s finding in
    this regard is also reviewed for clear error. MCR 3.977(K).
    Respondent first argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding that at least one of the
    statutory grounds for termination was proved by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree.
    At the outset, we note that while respondent challenges the trial court’s determinations with
    respect to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (h), (j), and (k)(ii), he offers no challenge to the trial
    court’s determination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(n)(i). Because termination of parental rights
    need only be supported by a single statutory ground, In re HRC, 
    286 Mich. App. 444
    , 461; 781
    NW2d 105 (2009), respondent’s failure to challenge the trial court’s findings with respect to
    MCL 712A.19b(3)(n)(i) precludes appellate relief with respect to the existence of a statutory
    ground for termination, see In re JS & SM, 
    231 Mich. App. 92
    , 98-99; 585 NW2d 326 (1999),
    overruled in part on other grounds by In re Trejo, 
    462 Mich. 341
    , 353; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). In
    any event, upon a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by
    relying on that statutory ground for termination. That statute provides that termination is proper
    when the parent has been convicted of one or more enumerated felonies and the trial court
    determines that continuation of the parent-child relationship “would be harmful to the child.”
    MCL 712A.19b(3)(n)(i). The uncontradicted evidence in this case showed that respondent was
    convicted of two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c, an
    enumerated felony under MCL 712A.19b(3)(n)(i). Moreover, the trial court plainly found that
    continuing the parent-child relationship would be injurious to the child because of the likely
    harm the child would suffer if returned to respondent’s care. Because only one statutory ground
    need be proved, In re 
    HRC, 286 Mich. App. at 461
    , we do not address the additional grounds
    relied upon by the trial court.
    Respondent additionally argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding that
    termination of his parental rights was in the child’s best interests. See MCL 712A.19b(5). We
    disagree. In this case, the CPS worker testified that, in his opinion, termination was in the
    child’s best interests because of respondent’s criminal sexual conduct convictions and the likely
    harm the child would suffer if returned to respondent’s care. The worker maintained this opinion
    even though the child was currently placed with her mother. The guardian ad litem concurred
    with this opinion. We conclude that the trial court’s best-interests determination was supported
    by a preponderance of the evidence. The fact that respondent was convicted of two counts of
    second-degree criminal sexual conduct for acts perpetrated against the child, standing alone, was
    clearly sufficient to prove that termination was in the child’s best interests. The trial court was
    clearly aware that the child was placed with her mother, but nonetheless determined that severing
    respondent’s parental rights would be in the child’s best interests. We perceive no error in this
    determination. See In re 
    Moss, 301 Mich. App. at 80
    .
    -2-
    Affirmed.
    /s/ /Kathleen Jansen
    /s/ Patrick M. Meter
    /s/ Jane M. Beckering
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 323345

Filed Date: 3/31/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021