People of Michigan v. George Edward Wright ( 2017 )


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  •                           STATE OF MICHIGAN
    COURT OF APPEALS
    PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                   UNPUBLISHED
    May 11, 2017
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v                                                                  No. 330827
    Wayne Circuit Court
    GEORGE EDWARD WRIGHT,                                              LC No. 15-000375-01-FC
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Before: TALBOT, C.J., and K. F. KELLY and BORRELLO, JJ.
    PER CURIAM.
    The trial court convicted defendant at a bench trial of first-degree home invasion,
    MCL 750.110a(2), and assault and battery, MCL 750.81(1). In April 2015, the trial court
    sentenced defendant to 3 to 20 years in prison for the home invasion conviction and 93 days for
    the assault and battery conviction. In August 2015, defendant filed a motion for resentencing,
    seeking relief pursuant to our Supreme Court’s decision in People v Lockridge, 
    498 Mich. 358
    ;
    870 NW2d 502 (2015). The trial court agreed that defendant was entitled to relief under
    Lockridge, granted defendant’s motion for resentencing, and resentenced defendant to a reduced
    prison term of 1 to 20 years for the home invasion conviction. The prosecution appeals as of
    right, arguing that Lockridge does not apply to defendant’s case because defendant’s original
    sentence was not affected by judicial fact-finding, and therefore, defendant’s original sentence
    was valid and the trial court lacked the authority to modify it. For the reasons set forth in this
    opinion, we affirm.
    First-degree home invasion is a Class B felony subject to the legislative sentencing
    guidelines. MCL 777.16f. The guidelines as scored for defendant’s conviction established a
    minimum sentence range of 36 to 60 months. It is undisputed that no judicial fact-finding was
    involved in scoring defendant’s guidelines because defendant was not assessed any points for the
    offense variables. At the time of sentencing, the trial court was required to impose a minimum
    sentence within the guidelines range unless it “has a substantial and compelling reason” to depart
    from the guidelines. MCL 769.34(2) and (3). The trial court found that the guidelines were “a
    bit harsh,” but that defendant had not shown a substantial and compelling reason for a downward
    departure. It therefore sentenced defendant within, but at the bottom of, the guidelines range,
    imposing a minimum sentence of 36 months.
    -1-
    After defendant was sentenced, our Supreme Court decided Lockridge, in which it held
    that the guidelines are unconstitutional “to the extent they require judicial fact-finding beyond
    facts admitted by the defendant or found by the jury to score the offense variables . . . that
    mandatorily increase the floor of the guidelines minimum sentence range[.]” 
    Lockridge, 498 Mich. at 364
    (emphasis in original). To remedy the constitutional violation, the Court severed
    MCL 769.34(2) “to the extent that it is mandatory and str[uck] down the requirement of a
    ‘substantial and compelling reason’ to depart from the guidelines range in MCL 769.34(3).” 
    Id. at 391.
    The Court held that the guidelines “are advisory only.” 
    Id. at 399.
    Defendant thereafter moved for resentencing on the ground that the trial court erred in
    treating the guidelines as mandatory, rather than advisory. The prosecutor opposed the motion,
    arguing that Lockridge did not apply because no judicial fact-finding was involved and thus the
    sentencing guidelines were mandatory as applied to defendant. The trial court disagreed and
    ruled that it would have imposed a materially different sentence had it not been constrained by
    the mandatory application of defendant’s guidelines range at the time of sentencing. It therefore
    resentenced defendant and imposed a reduced sentence of 1 to 20 years’ imprisonment.
    Plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court lacked the authority to resentence defendant
    because his original sentence was valid. See MCR 6.429(A). Plaintiff contends that because
    judicial fact-finding did not increase the floor of defendant’s sentencing guidelines range, the
    guidelines were not unconstitutional as applied to defendant and the trial court properly
    sentenced him within the guidelines range at the original sentencing hearing.
    This Court recently considered and rejected this same argument in People v Rice, ___
    Mich App ___; ___NW2d ___ (2017) (Docket No. 329502). In that case, the defendant was
    sentenced shortly after Lockridge was decided. Id. at ___; slip op at 1. The guidelines
    recommended a minimum sentence range of 72 to 240 months and the scoring “did not involve
    any fact-finding.” The trial court departed from the guidelines and imposed a minimum sentence
    of 48 months. Id. at ___; slip op at 1-2. “The prosecution argued that the trial court was
    mandated to apply the sentencing guidelines because Rice’s case did not involve constitutionally
    impermissible judicial fact-finding and, therefore, Lockridge did not apply.” Id. at ___; slip op at
    2. This Court held that “the Lockridge Court rewrote MCL 769.34(2) and (3) without exception,
    rendering the guidelines advisory in all cases.” Rice, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 2. Both
    Lockridge and Rice are precedentially binding and must be followed. People v Strickland, 
    293 Mich. App. 393
    , 402; 810 NW2d 660 (2011); MCR 7.215(J)(1). Because the trial court has
    authority to correct an invalid sentence, MCR 6.429(A), a sentence is invalid when it is based on
    a misconception of the law, People v Miles, 
    454 Mich. 90
    , 96; 559 NW2d 299 (1997), and the
    trial court committed an error of law at the original sentencing hearing by treating the guidelines
    as mandatory rather than advisory, the trial court did not err in granting defendant’s motion for
    resentencing.
    Affirmed.
    /s/ Michael J. Talbot
    /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
    /s/ Stephen L. Borrello
    -2-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 330827

Filed Date: 5/11/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021