Karlene Lehman v. S & S Acquisitions LLC ( 2022 )


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  •             If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
    revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
    STATE OF MICHIGAN
    COURT OF APPEALS
    KARLENE LEHMAN,                                                    UNPUBLISHED
    December 22, 2022
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v                                                                  No. 360412
    Ingham Circuit Court
    S&S ACQUISITIONS GROUP, LLC,                                       LC No. 21-000550-CH
    Defendant-Appellee,
    and
    CHARTWELL CONDOMINIUM HOMEOWNERS
    ASSOCIATION,
    Defendant.
    Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and BORRELLO and YATES, JJ.
    PER CURIAM.
    Defendant S&S Acquisitions Group, LLC, purchased plaintiff Karlene Lehman’s
    condominium unit at a foreclosure auction. After the redemption period expired and S&S filed
    possession proceedings, Lehman brought the instant action to set aside the foreclosure sale, among
    other claims. The trial court granted summary disposition to S&S, determining that the alleged
    invalid lien that resulted in foreclosure did not warrant setting aside the sale and any claim
    regarding the lien must be pursued against the condominium association. Lehman then dismissed
    defendant Chartwell Condominium Homeowners Association from the case without prejudice and
    brought this appeal, challenging the grant of summary disposition to S&S. For the reasons stated
    in this opinion, we affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Plaintiff has been the record owner of a unit in Chartwell Condominium since 2002. The
    records provided by the parties show that since at least 2014 Lehman has paid the monthly
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    assessment fees via an electronic funds transfer from her checking account. In addition to the
    monthly assessment, amounts were deducted toward a balanced owed for a roof assessment.
    On April 29, 2019, Chartwell recorded a lien on plaintiff’s unit for unpaid assessments in
    the amount of $1,065.36. On the same day, plaintiff e-mailed Chartwell’s property manager, Janet
    Harmon, stating her understanding that Chartwell had not been withdrawing the “quarterly
    assessments” from her account, requesting a ledger explaining the amounts that were being
    deducted, and authorizing Harmon to withdraw from her checking account “whatever special
    assessment fees are currently due.” Despite plaintiff’s authorization, no additional funds were
    withdrawn to address the amount owed under the lien. Amounts stopped being deducted from
    plaintiff’s account altogether in October 2019.
    By June 2020, plaintiff had an outstanding balance of about $8,000 in assessments. After
    letters were sent to plaintiff to set up a payment plan and avoid foreclosure, in October 2020,
    Chartwell commenced foreclosure proceedings on plaintiff’s condominium unit. S&S purchased
    the property at a foreclosure auction in November 2020 for $12,286.31. According to plaintiff,
    the property is valued at over $192,000. In an affidavit, plaintiff averred that she was in Florida
    caring for her ailing mother at all pertinent times with respect to the foreclosure, and that she had
    no knowledge of the foreclosure or sale.
    After the redemption period expired on June 28, 2021, S&S filed a complaint for
    possession of the property in district court.1 Plaintiff then filed the instant action, raising various
    claims against S&S and Chartwell.2 Plaintiff alleged, in part, a wrongful foreclosure because
    notice of the foreclosure sale had not been posted in a conspicuous place on the property as
    required by MCL 600.3208. In its motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and
    (C)(10), however, S&S produced an affidavit from an Ingham County Sheriff’s Deputy attesting
    to personally posting notice of the foreclosure sale on the property. Accordingly, S&S argued
    that there was no defect in the foreclosure proceedings that would warrant setting the sale, and
    even if there was such a defect, plaintiff could not show prejudice. In response, plaintiff now
    argued that the lien placed on her property was invalid and should not have been recorded when
    she had made timely assessment payments for years.
    At the motion hearing, plaintiff’s counsel reiterated that the central issue in this case was
    whether the lien was valid when it was recorded. The trial court granted summary disposition to
    S&S, determining that S&S was a bona fide purchaser and any claim pertaining to the alleged
    valid lien could not be relied on to set aside the foreclosure sale and instead must be pursued
    1
    According to the parties, S&S received a judgment of possession in the district court and appealed
    to the circuit court, which stayed the judgment of possession pending the outcome of this appeal.
    2
    Plaintiff initially obtained an ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO) in this case against S&S
    staying the district court proceedings. After a show-cause hearing, the circuit court lifted the stay
    and denied the TRO.
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    against Chartwell. As noted, plaintiff then voluntarily dismissed Chartwell from this case without
    prejudice, and this appeal followed.
    II. DISCUSSION
    Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition before allowing
    further discovery pertaining to the validity of the lien. We disagree.3
    Courts are “generally disinclined to set aside a foreclosure and sale in the absence of fraud,
    accident, mistake, or significant irregularities.” Ypsilanti Charter Twp v Kircher, 
    281 Mich App 251
    , 285; 
    761 NW2d 761
     (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In Kircher, “the
    irregularities . . . were fundamental defects that went to the very validity of the purported lien
    itself.” We held that the foreclosed-upon lien in that case “was entirely unauthorized by law. And
    because the lien was void, ‘there was nothing upon which foreclosure proceedings could operate.’
    ” 
    Id.,
     quoting Fox v Martin, 
    287 Mich 147
    , 153; 
    283 NW 9
     (1938). Accordingly, we set aside the
    foreclosure and sale. 
    Id.
    Given Kircher and the caselaw it relied upon, we conclude that the trial court erred to the
    extent it held that plaintiff could not challenge the foreclosure sale on the basis of an alleged invalid
    lien. However, we conclude that summary disposition in favor of S&S is nonetheless appropriate
    because plaintiff has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact regarding the validity of the
    lien or that there is a “fair likelihood that further discovery will yield support for the nonmoving
    party’s position.” Liparoto Const, Inc v Gen Shale Brick, Inc, 
    284 Mich App 25
    , 33; 
    772 NW2d 801
     (2009).
    It is clear that the lien in this case was authorized by law. Under the Condominium Act,
    MCL 559.101 et seq., “[s]ums assessed to a co-owner by the association of co-owners that are
    unpaid . . . constitute a lien upon the unit or units in the project owned by the co-owner at the time
    of the assessment . . . .” MCL 559.208(1). “The lien may be foreclosed by an action or by
    advertisement by the association of co-owners in the name of the condominium project on behalf
    of the other co-owners.” MCL 559.208(1). Further, plaintiff’s individual assessment ledger shows
    that she had unpaid assessments at the time the lien was recorded. Plaintiff argues that instead of
    recording the lien, Chartwell should have withdrawn the amount owed from her checking account,
    as she authorized Harmon to do. We make no comments at this time on the merits of any claim
    3
    We review de novo motions for summary disposition. See Spiek v Dep’t of Transp, 
    456 Mich 331
    , 337; 
    572 NW2d 201
     (1998). The trial court did not specify under which subrule it granted
    summary disposition. Because the parties submitted documentary evidence in connection with the
    motion, we will construe it as having been granted under MCR 2.116(C)(10). See Cuddington v
    United Health Servs, Inc, 
    298 Mich App 264
    , 270; 
    826 NW2d 519
     (2012). When reviewing
    motions under this subrule, “[t]he court must consider the affidavits, pleadings, depositions,
    admissions, and other documentary evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable
    to the party opposing the motion.” Liparoto Const, Inc v Gen Shale Brick, Inc, 
    284 Mich App 25
    ,
    29; 
    772 NW2d 801
     (2009). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the
    benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable
    minds might differ.” West v Gen Motors Corp, 
    469 Mich 177
    , 183; 
    665 NW2d 468
     (2003).
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    plaintiff may have against Chartwell. However, plaintiff has not cited any legal authority
    supporting the proposition that a lienholder’s failure to withdraw the amount owed from the
    debtor’s checking account renders the lien invalid.
    Moreover, we note that plaintiff had knowledge of the lien, and despite authorizing
    additional withdrawals from her account, she could reasonably infer from the absence of those
    withdrawals that Chartwell did not take funds from her account to pay off the lien. We also note
    that Chartwell’s last withdrawal from plaintiff’s checking account was made in September 2019
    and foreclosure was not initiated until October 2020. To the extent that plaintiff claims the unpaid
    assessments were the result of accounting errors, she does not support that contention with citations
    to the record or specific arguments based on the facts of this case, referring only to Chartwell’s
    “shoddy accounting practices” without further detail. Nor does plaintiff adequately explain what
    further discovery she seeks or how it would support her claim.
    For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court correctly declined to set aside the
    foreclosure and sale on the basis of an invalid lien and that no further discovery would support
    voiding the foreclosure.
    Although plaintiff initially alleged that the statutory notice requirements were not met in
    this case, she has not pursued this claim since S&S produced an affidavit from a deputy attesting
    to compliance with MCL 600.3208’s posting requirement. Accordingly, there is no alleged
    statutory defect in the foreclosure proceedings to analyze under the framework established by Kim
    v JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, 
    493 Mich 98
    ; 
    825 NW2d 329
     (2012). See also Diem v Sallie Mae
    Home Loans, Inc, 
    307 Mich App 204
    , 210-211; 
    859 NW2d 238
     (2014). And because plaintiff
    does not identify a defect in the foreclosure proceedings, it is unnecessary for us to address her
    secondary argument that S&S was not a bona fide purchaser for value. See In re Gerald L Pollack
    Trust, 
    309 Mich App 125
    , 154; 
    867 NW2d 884
     (2015) (“This Court generally does not address
    moot questions or declare legal principles that have no practical effect in a case.”).
    Affirmed.
    /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
    /s/ Stephen L. Borrello
    /s/ Christopher P. Yates
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Document Info

Docket Number: 360412

Filed Date: 12/22/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/23/2022