George Whitney v. Grange Insurance Company of Michigan ( 2022 )


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  •              If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
    revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
    STATE OF MICHIGAN
    COURT OF APPEALS
    GEORGE WHITNEY,                                                       UNPUBLISHED
    November 10, 2022
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v                                                                     No. 357982
    Washtenaw Circuit Court
    GRANGE INSURANCE COMPANY OF                                           LC No. 20-000064-NF
    MICHIGAN,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: MURRAY, P.J., and CAVANAGH and CAMERON, JJ.
    PER CURIAM.
    Defendant, Grange Insurance Company of Michigan, appeals by leave granted an order
    granting partial summary disposition in favor of plaintiff, George Whitney, on the issue of whether
    plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of a body function caused by the at-issue motor-vehicle
    accident.1 We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    I. BACKGROUND FACTS
    On January 21, 2020, plaintiff filed his complaint arising from a motor vehicle accident
    that occurred on December 7, 2017, when the van he was driving was struck by a vehicle that
    failed to stop at an intersection.2 In relevant part, plaintiff sought underinsured insurance benefits
    from defendant, the insurer of the van that plaintiff was driving. Plaintiff averred that he suffered
    serious and permanent injuries, including to his neck, back, chest, left shoulder, and left hand, as
    well as possible aggravation of preexisting conditions.
    1
    Whitney v Grange Ins Co of Mich, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered December
    2, 2021 (Docket No. 357982).
    2
    The driver of the vehicle that failed to stop had been a named defendant in this action, but was
    dismissed by stipulated order dated May 6, 2020 following a settlement being reached.
    -1-
    On February 8, 2021, plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary disposition on the issue
    of serious impairment of a body function under MCL 500.3135. Plaintiff explained that at the
    time of the accident, he was driving a vehicle owned by his employer and the driver’s side was
    struck, and crushed, when the other vehicle ran a stop sign. Plaintiff went to the emergency room
    the day after the accident, on December 8, 2017, and was found to have two broken ribs (anterior
    left 5th and 6th ribs), and soreness in his left hand and chest. Plaintiff further explained that he
    had no primary care physician but eventually went to McLaren Industrial Health for pain in his
    chest, neck, right arm, left hand, and left hip, as well as muscle wasting in his right upper extremity.
    Plaintiff averred that he was eventually diagnosed with neck issues, including nerve impingement,
    stenosis, and disc herniation involving C4-C7—for which he underwent neck surgery in August
    2018. Plaintiff averred that he remained disabled from his occupation as a carpenter and had been
    awarded social security disability, allegedly because of his accident-related injuries. Plaintiff
    alleged that there was no material factual dispute as to the nature and extent of his injuries, and
    thus, he was entitled to partial summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) on the issue whether
    he suffered a serious impairment of a body function caused by the accident. In support of his
    motion, plaintiff attached medical records from his visits to the emergency room, McLaren
    Industrial Health, and other medical providers, as well as his social security award letter and the
    transcript of his deposition testimony.
    On May 12, 2021, defendant filed a response to plaintiff’s motion and a request for
    judgment in defendant’s favor under MCR 2.116(I)(2) because plaintiff sustained no serious
    impairment caused by the accident. Defendant noted that when plaintiff went to the emergency
    room the day after the car accident, he denied any head, neck, or back pain. He was diagnosed
    with rib fractures, took two weeks off of work for those to heal, and then returned to work and his
    regular activities. Plaintiff did not see a doctor again until months later, on March 19, 2018, and
    he claimed to notice weakness in his right arm. However, defendant argued, there was no proof
    that plaintiff’s neck, arm, and headache issues are related to the accident. In other words, defendant
    argued, plaintiff had to establish there was no material factual dispute that his medical conditions
    were proximately caused by the accident and he wholly failed to do so. In fact, he returned to
    work full-time in January and to his regular activities without restrictions and had no need to see
    a physician for months. Then, when plaintiff sought medical treatment over three months later,
    the diagnostic reports only showed chronic, degenerative changes—not traumatic injuries. That
    is, the cervical MRI showed multilevel degenerative changes and a left hip MRI showed no
    significant findings. Plainly, there were no traumatic injuries identified. Although plaintiff had
    neck surgery in August 2018—despite a lack of significant symptoms—his surgery was related to
    chronic degenerative changes. Further, by April 2019, the surgeon noted that plaintiff had zero
    neck pain and he was released from care by July 2019. Defendant relied on plaintiffs’ medical
    records, as well as a report from a physician who examined plaintiff with regard to his worker’s
    compensation claim, Dr. Wilbur Boike, a neurologist. Dr. Boike concluded that it “would be
    extremely peculiar for [plaintiff] to have sustained significant cervical spine injuries in the
    December 7, 2017 motor vehicle accident and to have not experienced any consequences from that
    pathology for three months thereafter.” Dr. Boike also could not definitively relate plaintiff’s
    headache complaints to the accident. In summary, defendant argued, plaintiff failed to establish
    anything but a temporal connection between the accident and his health problems which was
    insufficient evidence of proximate cause; thus, plaintiff’s motion for partial summary disposition
    must be denied and defendant was entitled to summary disposition. In support of its brief,
    -2-
    defendant attached several exhibits, including plaintiff’s medical records and excepts from
    plaintiff’s deposition testimony.
    On May 14, 2021, plaintiff filed a reply to defendant’s response in opposition to plaintiff’s
    motion for partial summary disposition, arguing that defendant failed to raise a genuine issue of
    material fact on the issue of serious impairment. Plaintiff argued that his treating physicians related
    his medical conditions to the car accident and there was no evidence to the contrary. And
    defendant’s reliance on Dr. Boike’s report was misplaced because Dr. Boike could not
    conclusively determine the cause of plaintiff’s injuries and their presentation; instead, he offered
    speculation and conjecture. In fact, plaintiff continued to receive worker’s compensation benefits
    for the injuries he sustained in this motor vehicle accident. Accordingly, plaintiff argued, he was
    entitled to partial summary disposition on the issue of serious impairment of body function. In
    support of his reply, plaintiff attached records from the worker’s compensation case manager,
    medical records, and disability certificates.
    On May 20, 2021, after hearing oral arguments on plaintiff’s motion for partial summary
    disposition on the issue of serious impairment of body function under MCL 500.3135, the trial
    court granted plaintiff’s motion. The trial court explained its rationale as follows:
    First, the Court taking into account any and all legal and logical inferences that can
    be drawn from the evidence is supportive of the determination of a serious
    impairment. Specifically in the brief the diagnosis with regard to cervical nerve
    impingement, muscle atrophy, the wasting, cervical stenosis, anterior cervical - - I
    don’t have to repeat what counsel both knows, a very detailed identification of a
    whole variety of medical issues which as the Court heard by way of argument
    believes there is a relationship with cervical injuries that the IME doctor
    specifically identifying the injury and putting some context to that injury even Dr.
    Boike who may testify. . . .
    And the argument that in reliance on part of Dr. Boike that the injury is not
    related to the auto accident I don’t believe, at least based on this record, it’s
    supportive of that request. Specifically under MCL 500.3135 on the issue of serious
    impairment of a body function must be objectively manifested. And I believe it is
    clearly as in most cases like this one can make the argument that the serious
    impairment is not objectively manifested and circumstances unlike this in which
    the evidence is frankly overwhelming from that standpoint. It’s an impairment of
    an important body function. Clearly, the fact that the Plaintiff is unable to go to
    work based on determination of social security and workers’ comp and not just
    relying on that sole issue but clearly the injuries that have been identified and set
    forth clearly identify what is in fact an important bodily function, and affects the
    injured person’s general ability to lead his normal life. The evidence that he can’t
    go to work even for light duty beyond any and other complaints that the Plaintiff
    may have as a result of injuries that are a result all lead the Court to the conclusion
    that there’s no general issue of material fact and therefore no valid defense on the
    issue of the serious impairment of a body function. And as a result the Court will
    grant the motion.
    -3-
    After the trial court denied defendant’s motion for reconsideration, defendant sought leave
    to appeal which this Court granted as set forth above.
    On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion for
    partial summary disposition because a genuine issue of material fact existed on the issue of
    proximate cause, i.e., whether plaintiff sustained a serious impairment of a body function that was
    caused by the motor-vehicle accident.3 We agree.
    II. ANALYSIS
    We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Spiek v
    Dept of Transp, 
    456 Mich 331
    , 337; 
    572 NW2d 201
     (1998). A motion brought under MCR
    2.116(C)(10) “tests the factual support of a plaintiff’s claim.” 
    Id.
     The moving party must identify
    the matters that have no disputed factual issues, and has the initial burden of supporting its position
    with documentary evidence. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 
    451 Mich 358
    , 362; 
    547 NW2d 314
    (1996). The party opposing the motion must then establish by evidentiary materials that a genuine
    issue of disputed fact exists. 
    Id.
     After considering the documentary evidence submitted in the
    light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court determines whether a genuine issue of
    material fact exists to warrant a trial. Walsh v Taylor, 
    263 Mich App 618
    , 621; 
    689 NW2d 506
    (2004). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable
    doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.”
    West v Gen Motors Corp, 
    469 Mich 177
    , 183; 
    665 NW2d 468
     (2003). Summary disposition
    pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2) is properly granted if it is clear that “the opposing party, rather than
    the moving party, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rataj v Romulus, 
    306 Mich App 735
    , 747; 
    858 NW2d 116
     (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
    This is a claim for underinsured motorist benefits. Such a claim allows a plaintiff to obtain
    coverage from a defendant “to the extent that a third-party claim would be permitted against the []
    at-fault driver.” Rory v Continental Ins Co, 
    473 Mich 457
    , 465; 
    703 NW2d 23
     (2005). Under the
    no-fault act, that means a plaintiff must prove noneconomic loss caused by the ownership,
    maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle, as well as a threshold injury of death, serious impairment
    of a body function, or permanent serious disfigurement. MCL 500.3135(1); McCormick v Carrier,
    
    487 Mich 180
    , 192-193; 
    795 NW2d 517
     (2010). The primary dispute in this case is not whether
    plaintiff has a threshold injury, i.e., a serious impairment of a body function. Plaintiff primarily
    claims that he suffered a neck injury and it appears that defendant does not contest that plaintiff
    has a cervical spine condition for which he had surgery. Rather, defendant argued in the trial court
    and argues here on appeal that there is, at minimum, conflicting evidence on the issue of causation,
    i.e., whether the car accident caused plaintiff’s degenerative cervical condition or aggravated a
    preexisting, degenerative cervical condition.
    3
    Defendant also claims the trial court erred by relying on inadmissible evidence, including
    document’s authored by a case manager related to plaintiff’s worker’s compensation claim and
    social security records. However, it is not apparent from the trial court’s ruling that such records
    were considered and relied upon in any regard, but particularly with regard to the court’s
    conclusion on the issue of causation. Accordingly, defendant’s claim is without merit.
    -4-
    Proximate cause must be established in a negligence action. Patrick v Turkelson, 
    322 Mich App 595
    , 616; 
    913 NW2d 369
     (2018). And the issue of causation is generally an issue for the
    factfinder unless there is no dispute of material fact. 
    Id.
     “To establish proximate cause, the
    plaintiff must prove the existence of both cause in fact and legal cause.” Weymers v Khera, 
    454 Mich 639
    , 647; 
    563 NW2d 647
     (1997). In other words, establishing causation requires plaintiff to
    show that the other driver’s conduct was a cause in fact and a legal cause of his injuries. Wilkinson
    v Lee, 
    463 Mich 388
    , 391; 
    617 NW2d 305
     (2000). Cause in fact “requires the plaintiff to present
    substantial evidence from which a jury may conclude that more likely than not, but for the
    defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff’s injuries would not have occurred.” Patrick, 322 Mich App at
    617 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Meanwhile, “legal causation” has been described as
    “that which operates to produce particular consequences without the intervention of any
    independent, unforeseen cause, without which the injuries would not have occurred.” Helmus v
    Mich Dep’t of Transp, 
    238 Mich App 250
    , 256; 
    604 NW2d 793
     (1999). Mere speculation is
    insufficient to support a finding of causation and the fact that a condition follows an event in time,
    i.e., there is a temporal connection, is not in itself evidence of causation. Craig v Oakwood Hosp,
    
    471 Mich 67
    , 87; 
    684 NW2d 296
     (2004); West v Gen Motors Corp, 
    469 Mich 177
    , 186; 
    665 NW2d 468
     (2003).
    We conclude that the trial court erred when it held there was no genuine issue of material
    fact that plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of body function caused by the car accident, and
    thus, granted plaintiff’s motion for partial summary disposition. There was, at minimum,
    conflicting evidence on the issue of causation, particularly with regard to plaintiff’s cervical spine
    condition. A brief review of plaintiff’s medical records follows.
    The day after the accident, on December 8, 2017, plaintiff presented to the emergency room
    complaining of chest and left hand pain; he denied “headache, neck pain or any back pain.” He
    also stated that he had no lower extremity injuries and was able to walk without difficulty. His
    neck and back examinations revealed full range of motion and there was no tenderness or swelling
    noted. X-rays revealed “fractures of the anterior left fifth and sixth rib.” It appears that plaintiff’s
    next medical visit was March 19, 2018, at McLaren Industrial Health, where he stated that he had
    some neck soreness, continued left hand pain, and “wasting of muscles” of the right shoulder, arm,
    and forearm, as well as left hip pain. It appears he was diagnosed with a left hip contusion and
    acute cervical strain. X-rays of the cervical spine on March 19, 2018 showed no fracture, but
    “grade 1 anterolisthesis of C4 and C5, likely degenerative in nature,” and “moderate multilevel
    degenerative disc disease resulting in neural foraminal stenosis bilaterally at C3-C6 on the right
    and C4-C7 on the left appearing mild to moderate degree.”
    Plaintiff returned to the Industrial Health clinic on April 9, 2018, complaining of left hip
    and neck pain as well as weakness of his right arm with muscle mass loss. An MRI of plaintiff’s
    left hip showed “no acute posttraumatic finding.” An MRI of plaintiff’s cervical spine performed
    on April 24, 2018 showed a “reversal of normal cervical curvature with multilevel degenerative
    changes as detailed above.” Plaintiff returned to the Industrial Health clinic on April 26, 2018,
    and the diagnoses included “contusion of left hip” and “sprain of ligaments of cervical spine.”
    Plaintiff saw Dr. Richard Ilka for an occupational medicine evaluation on May 7, 2018, and Dr.
    Ilka’s assessment stated: “There are diffuse disc protrusions in the cervical spine and these may
    have caused the weakness in his right arm. It is unclear whether there has been an aggravation
    related to the motor vehicle accident. The signs of weakness in the right arm are suggestive of
    -5-
    cervical root impingement.” Dr. Ilka’s plan stated: “The need for both further evaluation and
    treatment is due to conditions that arose out of the motor vehicle accident, however his nicotine
    abuse was likely causative in his cervical spine spondylosis. It is not clear whether the accident
    has aggravated that in any way.”
    Plaintiff saw Dr. Geoffrey Seidel, a physical medicine and rehabilitation physician, on June
    11, 2018. Physical examination revealed visible atrophy of plaintiff’s shoulder girdle, arm, and
    forearm musculature; full flexion and extension of the neck with no active radicular component
    produced; full range of motion of shoulders and hips; normal gait; and complaints of pain in the
    wrist but full movement without swelling. The plan included electrodiagnostic testing of both
    upper extremities and lower extremities. On June 22, 2018, electrodiagnostic testing was
    conducted and the impressions included “RUE C6 radiculopathy vs plexopathy,” as well as
    “sensory and motor peripheral polyneuropathy.” On August 13, 2018, plaintiff underwent an
    anterior cervical discectomy and fusion surgery involving C4 to C7, performed by Dr. Kanwaldeep
    Sidhu. Apparently, by October 2018, plaintiff developed headaches and was given medication
    and referred for possible occipital nerve block. By January 2019, the surgeon indicated that
    “[t]here are no major restrictions at this stage.”
    On August 19, 2020, plaintiff saw Dr. Wilbur Boike, a neurologist, for an insurance
    medical evaluation related to his worker’s compensation claim. At that time, plaintiff complained
    of having headaches, neck pain, and right arm weakness and tremor. After review of plaintiff’s
    medical records and a physical examination, Dr. Boike’s impressions included that plaintiff’s
    “clinical course is confusing.” Dr. Boike noted that plaintiff went to the emergency room the day
    after the accident—complaining only of chest pain and left-hand discomfort—and then did not
    seek medical treatment for over three months. Dr. Boike noted: “It seems highly unusual that
    [plaintiff] would not have sought medical evaluation during those months, if he had in fact, been
    experiencing severe headaches or progressive upper extremity weakness.” Further, he opined: “It
    would be extremely peculiar for [plaintiff] to have sustained significant cervical spine injuries in
    the December 7, 2017 motor vehicle accident and to have not experienced any consequences from
    that pathology for three months thereafter.” And Dr. Boike stated: “I cannot definitively relate his
    cervical spine pathology to the motor vehicle accident.” Dr. Boike also did not identify any right
    arm tremor and concluded that, if it existed, it was not the result of any injury sustained in the
    accident. Moreover, Dr. Boike continued: “Given that headaches do not appear to have been part
    of his original constellation of complaints when seen in the emergency department, and given that
    he appears to have not sought medical evaluation for a number of months subsequent to the motor
    vehicle accident, I am not able to definitively relate his headache complaints to the motor vehicle
    accident.”
    During these proceedings in the trial court, plaintiff argued in his motion for partial
    summary disposition that no factual dispute existed—he suffered a serious impairment of body
    function caused by the accident. His medical conditions, including neck and right arm issues, were
    diagnosed and treated after the accident. However, plaintiff did not definitively establish a causal
    link between the accident and his medical conditions. To determine whether injuries were caused,
    or preexisting conditions aggravated, by the accident, we must look to medical expert opinions.
    Lay testimony from plaintiff stating that there is a causal link is insufficient to establish that there
    is a causal link between the accident and his claimed injuries. See, e.g., Howard v Feld, 100 Mich
    -6-
    App 271, 273; 
    298 NW2d 722
     (1980).4 The fact that plaintiff received medical treatment for his
    degenerative cervical spine condition—as it was termed in several medical reports—after the
    accident does not necessarily mean the condition was caused, or aggravated, by the accident.
    Plaintiff has directed us to no medical opinion that establishes a definitive causal link between the
    accident and his claimed injuries. While plaintiff self-reported that he suffered injuries in the
    accident and has various issues, none of his physicians present a definitive opinion on medical
    causation. As the moving party, plaintiff had the initial burden of supporting his causation
    argument with documentary evidence. See Quinto, 
    451 Mich at 362
    . And in considering a motion
    for summary disposition, evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to defendant as the
    nonmoving party. See Walsh, 
    263 Mich App at 621
    . Plaintiff simply failed to establish that no
    factual dispute exists on the issue of causation for the trier of fact to resolve. Moreover, questions
    regarding preexisting conditions, and the potential aggravation of the same, are generally left to
    the jury. See Wilkinson, 
    463 Mich at 397-398
    .
    And in granting plaintiff’s motion for partial summary disposition, the trial court relied on
    the report by Dr. Boike to conclude that there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect
    to causation. But that report does not support the trial court’s conclusion. Notably, the report
    repeatedly states that plaintiff’s case was “confusing” and “peculiar,” given that the onset of
    plaintiff’s cervical spine condition was delayed several months after the accident. According to
    Dr. Boike, it was “highly unusual” that plaintiff would not have sought medical treatment for
    several months after the accident if he had in fact suffered from severe headaches and right arm
    issues. And it “would be extremely peculiar” for plaintiff not to have experienced any
    consequences, for months, if he had in fact sustained significant cervical spine injuries in the
    accident. Dr. Boike stated that he could not conclude that plaintiff’s claimed headaches were
    definitively related to the accident and his right arm tremor, if it existed, was not caused by the
    accident. Dr. Boike appeared to give somewhat contradictory statements regarding causation of
    the cervical spine injury. He first stated, “I cannot exclude the possibility that [plaintiff] sustained
    a cervical spine injury,” but then he concluded his report by stating, “I cannot definitively relate
    [plaintiff’s] cervical spine pathology to the motor vehicle accident.” This last statement is contrary
    to the trial court’s conclusion that Dr. Boike’s opinion directly linked the accident to the cervical
    spine injury. On summary disposition review, the court must construe the evidence in a light most
    favorable to the non-moving party. See Walsh, 
    263 Mich App at 621
    . Here, that means construing
    the evidence, including Dr. Boike’s statements, in a light most favorable to defendant—which
    leads to the opposite conclusion of that reached by the trial court.
    In summary, the trial court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion for partial summary
    disposition on the issue of whether plaintiff sustained a serious impairment of a body function that
    was caused by the motor-vehicle accident. Plaintiff provided no medical opinion that establishes
    a definitive causal link between the accident and his claimed injuries. Considering Dr. Boike’s
    somewhat equivocal conclusions, and other statements made in plaintiff’s medical records, the
    issue whether plaintiff’s claimed medical conditions were caused by the accident should be
    4
    Cases decided before November 1, 1990 are not binding, but we may consider them persuasive
    authority. See In re Stillwell Trust, 
    299 Mich App 289
    , 299 n 1; 
    829 NW2d 353
     (2012).
    -7-
    resolved by the trier of fact, and not as a matter of law. See Wilkinson, 
    463 Mich at 397-398
    ;
    Holton v A+ Ins Assoc, Inc, 
    255 Mich App 318
    , 326; 
    661 NW2d 248
     (2003).
    Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
    jurisdiction.
    /s/ Christopher M. Murray
    /s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
    /s/ Thomas C. Cameron
    -8-