Richard M Ward v. Michael Wesley Filarski ( 2019 )


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  •             If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
    revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
    STATE OF MICHIGAN
    COURT OF APPEALS
    RICHARD M. WARD, LINDA K. WARD, and                                UNPUBLISHED
    WARD ENTERPRISES, INC.,                                            September 17, 2019
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,
    v                                                                  No. 340707
    Genesee Circuit Court
    MICHAEL WESLEY FILARSKI,                                           LC No. 13-100022-CZ
    Defendant-Appellant,
    and
    TROY WOOLLEY,
    Defendant.
    Before: MURRAY, C.J., and METER and FORT HOOD, JJ.
    PER CURIAM.
    Defendant, Michael Wesley Filarski, appeals as of right the trial court judgment awarding
    damages, including attorney fees, to plaintiffs, Richard M. Ward (Richard), Linda K. Ward
    (Linda), and Ward Enterprises, Inc., based on the trial court grant of summary disposition to
    plaintiffs on the issue of liability, in this dispute over the sale of land.1 For the reasons that
    follow, we affirm the trial court judgment, in part, regarding the grant of summary disposition to
    plaintiffs and the amount of attorney fees awarded to plaintiffs, but we reverse the trial court
    judgment, in part, with regard to the total amount of damages awarded based on the improper
    value of the plaza used to calculate the total net judgment.
    1
    Plaintiffs’ claims against defendant Troy Woolley were settled in bankruptcy proceedings, and
    he is not a party to this appeal.
    -1-
    I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    In April 2011, plaintiffs entered a purchase agreement with defendant and Troy Woolley
    for the sale of property containing a small plaza (the plaza parcel), and the sale of adjoining
    property containing a restaurant (the restaurant parcel). The purchase agreement was executed
    contemporaneously with a land contract for the plaza parcel, a land contract for the restaurant
    parcel, and a management agreement that allowed defendant and Woolley to operate the
    restaurant before Ward Enterprises transferred its liquor license.
    In March 2013, plaintiffs filed a complaint, alleging breach of the plaza land contract
    because defendant and Woolley failed to make monthly principal, interest, and debt servicing
    payments. In their answer to the complaint, defendant and Woolley asserted that the plaza land
    contract was void because Richard and Linda lacked capacity to enter the contract in their
    individual capacities because they had quitclaimed their interest in the plaza parcel to Ward
    Enterprises in 2006.
    In May 2013, Richard and Linda assigned their rights and obligations under the plaza
    land contract to Ward Enterprises. All of the parties then filed motions for summary disposition
    under MCR 2.116(C)(10). The court granted summary disposition to plaintiffs regarding
    liability, and denied defendant and Woolley summary disposition. Thereafter, Woolley filed a
    petition for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, and plaintiffs’ claims against Woolley were resolved by
    bankruptcy court order. The bankruptcy court separated the plaza land contract and the
    restaurant land contract into two claims, and allowed Woolley to assume the restaurant land
    contract, and reject the plaza land contract.
    The court then held a bench trial on the issue of damages for breach of the plaza land
    contract. The court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs in the amount of $245,101.39. This
    included the balance owed under the plaza land contract ($250,304.34), and attorney fees and
    costs accrued by plaintiffs’ previous counsel ($41,218.80) and plaintiffs’ current counsel
    ($16,578.25), totaling $308,101.39, minus the value of the plaza per the 2016 sheriff’s deed and
    appraisal ($63,000).
    II. ANALYSIS
    A. SUMMARY DISPOSITION
    Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in granting plaintiffs summary disposition
    because genuine issues of material fact exist regarding defendant and Woolley’s liability on
    plaintiffs’ breach-of-contract claim.
    “This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary
    disposition.” Loweke v Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition Co, LLC, 
    489 Mich. 157
    , 162; 809 NW2d
    553 (2011). “A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests whether there is
    factual support for a claim,” and granting the motion is appropriate when there is no genuine
    issue concerning any material fact. Universal Underwriters Group v Allstate Ins Co, 246 Mich
    App 713, 720; 635 NW2d 52 (2001). When deciding a motion for summary disposition under
    MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court must consider all pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other
    documentary evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cowles v Bank West,
    -2-
    
    476 Mich. 1
    , 32; 719 NW2d 94 (2006). “Whether a statute of frauds bars enforcement of a
    contract is a question of law that we review de novo.” Kloian v Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 273 Mich
    App 449, 458; 733 NW2d 766 (2006). The interpretation of a contract is also a question of law
    reviewed de novo. 
    Id. at 452.
    Defendant first argues that plaintiffs’ breach-of-contract claim was barred by the
    applicable statute of frauds. Specifically, defendant argues that Richard and Linda had no
    interest in the plaza property to sell. Defendant also argues that the subsequent assignment and
    assumption agreement was void because Richard and Linda had no interest in the plaza property
    to assign.
    In Zurcher v Herveat, 
    238 Mich. App. 267
    , 291; 605 NW2d 329 (1999), this Court defined
    a land contract:
    The term “land contract” is commonly used in Michigan as particularly referring
    to “agreements for the sale of an interest in real estate in which the purchase price
    is to be paid in installments (other than an earnest money deposit and a lump-sum
    payment at closing) and no promissory note or mortgage is involved between the
    seller and the buyer.” 1 Cameron, Michigan Real Property Law (2d ed), § 16.1, p
    582.
    Under a land contract, the “vendor retains legal title until the contractual obligations have been
    fulfilled, the vendee is given equitable title, and that equitable title is a present interest in realty
    that may be sold, devised, or encumbered.” Graves v American Acceptance Mtg Corp (On
    Rehearing), 
    469 Mich. 608
    , 614; 677 NW2d 829 (2004). Equitable title only passes to the
    vendee upon proper execution of the land contract. 
    Zurcher, 238 Mich. App. at 291
    .
    The sale of land is governed by the statute of frauds, MCL 566.106 and MCL 566.108.
    Lakeside Oakland Dev, LC v H & J Beef Co, 
    249 Mich. App. 517
    , 524; 644 NW2d 765 (2002).
    MCL 566.106 provides:
    No estate or interest in lands, other than leases for a term not exceeding
    [one] year, nor any trust or power over or concerning lands, or in any manner
    relating thereto, shall hereafter be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or
    declared, unless by act or operation of law, or by a deed or conveyance in writing,
    subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the
    same, or by some person thereunto by him lawfully authorized by writing.
    MCL 566.108 provides, in relevant part:
    Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than [one] year, or for
    the sale of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void, unless the contract, or
    some note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and signed by the party by
    whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by some person thereunto by him
    lawfully authorized in writing . . . .
    -3-
    Thus, to satisfy a challenge under the statute of frauds, a contract for the sale of land must: “(1)
    be in writing and (2) be signed by the seller or someone lawfully authorized by the seller in
    writing.” 
    Zurcher, 238 Mich. App. at 277
    .
    “The substance of a binding contract for the sale of land is a subject separate from its
    sufficiency under the statute of frauds and one that is governed by” general contract law. 
    Id. at 279.
    Defendant’s challenge is made under the statute of frauds. The statute of frauds requires
    that the writing sufficiently set forth the essential terms of the agreement and render the contract
    enforceable. Opdyke Investment Co v Norris Grain Co, 
    413 Mich. 354
    , 369; 320 NW2d 836
    (1982).2 There is no dispute that the plaza land contract set forth the essential terms of the
    agreement. The plaza land contract identified Richard and Linda as the sellers of the real
    property. Both Richard and Linda signed the land contract. Sufficient writings existed to satisfy
    the statute of frauds.3
    Defendant also argues that the plaza land contract, when read in conjunction with the
    purchase agreement, is ambiguous and, therefore, summary disposition of the breach-of-contract
    claim was improper.
    This Court’s “primary goal in interpreting any contract is to give effect to the parties’
    intentions at the time they entered into the contract.” Bank of America, NA v First American
    Title Ins Co, 
    499 Mich. 74
    , 85; 878 NW2d 816 (2016). The parties’ intent is determined “by
    interpreting the language of the contract according to its plain and ordinary meaning.” 
    Id. at 85-
    86. “[U]nless a contract provision violates law or one of the traditional defenses to the
    enforceability of a contract applies, a court must construe and apply unambiguous contract
    provisions as written.” Rory v Continental Ins Co, 
    473 Mich. 457
    , 461; 703 NW2d 23 (2005).
    “A contract is ambiguous if its words may reasonably be understood in different ways.” UAW-
    GM Human Resource Ctr v KSL Recreation Corp, 
    228 Mich. App. 486
    , 491; 579 NW2d 411
    (1998) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Defendant first argues that an ambiguity existed because the plaza land contract stated
    that the purchase price for the plaza parcel was $215,000, but the purchase agreement indicated
    that the purchase price for the real estate, which was defined in the purchase agreement as both
    the plaza parcel and the restaurant parcel, was $115,000. He maintains that “it is impossible to
    reconcile the plaza land contract with the purchase agreement.”
    Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of contract related to the plaza land contract. The plaza land
    contract clearly stated that “full consideration for the sale of the above described premises to the
    2
    Although this Court is not required to follow cases issued before November 1, 1990, MCR
    7.215(B)(4), published decisions have precedential effect under the rule of stare decisis, MCR
    7.215(C)(2).
    3
    To the extent that defendant is arguing that the plaza land contract was not valid because Ward
    Enterprises was not a party to the land contract, the record reveals that Ward Enterprises
    assumed the rights and obligations under the plaza land contract.
    -4-
    Purchasers is Two Hundred Fifteen Thousand and no/100 ($215,000) Dollars.” There is nothing
    ambiguous about the purchase price in the plaza land contract. Indeed, both defendant and
    Woolley testified that the purchase price of the plaza parcel was $215,000.
    Defendant also argues that the plaza land contract was ambiguous because a number of
    items set forth in the purchase agreement that related to “closing matters” never occurred.
    Defendant’s argument, which is difficult to discern, pertains to the purchase agreement. He has
    not pointed out any ambiguity within the plaza land contract.
    Lastly, defendant argues that Linda and Richard made fraudulent representations to
    defendant and Woolley to induce them into entering into the plaza land contract, thereby
    rendering the contract voidable, so defendant and Woolley chose to void the plaza land contract.
    Defendant raised the affirmative defenses of “fraud-actual and/or constructive,”
    misrepresentation of material facts, “including but not limited to ownership, tenants’ status and
    rental income,” and “misrepresentation of the rental income and the status of the tenants on April
    12, 2011.” Although defendant did not raise fraudulent misrepresentation in his motion for
    summary disposition or in response to plaintiffs’ motion for summary disposition, defendant
    recited some of the above facts in the statement of the facts sections of his motion for summary
    disposition and his response to plaintiffs’ motion for summary disposition. Defendant did argue
    at the hearing on the cross-motions for summary disposition that plaintiffs’ attorney
    misrepresented to them that they needed to sign the plaza land contract to have the liquor license
    transferred to defendant, but did so in the context of arguing that defendant and Woolley did not
    intend to sign the land contract and be bound by its terms at the time they signed the purchase
    agreement. This argument is not properly preserved. Peterman v Dep’t of Natural Resources,
    
    446 Mich. 177
    , 182-183; 521 NW2d 499 (1994) (an issue is preserved if it is raised in the lower
    court and pursued on appeal). An unpreserved nonconstitutional claim of error is reviewed for
    plain error affecting substantial rights. Veltman v Detroit Edison Co, 
    261 Mich. App. 685
    , 690;
    683 NW2d 707 (2004).
    The essential elements of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim are as follows:
    “(1) the defendant made a material representation; (2) the representation was
    false; (3) when the defendant made the representation, the defendant knew that it
    was false, or made it recklessly, without knowledge of its truth as a positive
    assertion; (4) the defendant made the representation with the intention that the
    plaintiff would act upon it; (5) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon it; and (6) the
    plaintiff suffered damage.” [M & D, Inc v McConkey, 
    231 Mich. App. 22
    , 27; 585
    NW2d 33 (1998) (citations omitted).]
    Further, an action for fraud must be predicated upon a false statement relating to a past or
    existing fact; promises regarding the future are contractual and will not support a claim of fraud.
    Hi-Way Motor Co v Int’l Harvester Co, 
    398 Mich. 330
    , 336; 247 NW2d 813 (1976).
    Additionally, to establish a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, the plaintiff must have
    reasonably relied on the false representation. Nieves v Bell Industries, Inc, 
    204 Mich. App. 459
    ,
    464; 517 NW2d 235 (1994). “There can be no fraud where a person has the means to determine
    that a representation is not true.” 
    Id. -5- Defendant
    is asserting fraud as a defense to plaintiffs’ breach-of-contract action. He first
    argues that plaintiffs’ attorney falsely represented to Woolley that all four documents—the
    purchase agreement, the two land contracts, and the management agreement—needed to be
    signed so that the liquor license could transfer, and that the false representation was intended by
    the attorney to induce defendant and Woolley to sign the four documents. However, defendant
    had the means to determine whether the representation was true. This allegation of fraud is
    without merit. 
    Id. at 464.
    Next, defendant argues that Linda falsely represented to Woolley that the liquor license
    transfer would take only one week when, in fact, it took several months. Again, defendant had
    the means to determine whether the representation was true. Further, an action for fraud must be
    predicated upon a false statement relating to a past or existing fact. Hi-Way Motor 
    Co, 398 Mich. at 336
    . Any representation regarding the amount of time that it might take for the Michigan
    Liquor Control Commission to process the transfer of the liquor license was not a statement
    relating to a past or existing fact.
    Means also existed for defendant to determine whether Linda falsely represented that
    there were several tenants in the plaza parcel with current and active leases, and that the lease
    payments would cover the payment for the plaza land contract and the property taxes. Woolley
    admitted that he failed to speak to any of the tenants before signing the land contract, he did
    “nothing” to determine whether the leases were active and current, he proceeded with signing the
    land contract despite his claim that he did not receive all of the documentation related to the
    tenants, and that even after signing the land contract, he failed to speak with the tenants.
    Defendant testified that he never asked plaintiffs about the terms of the tenant leases, he never
    asked plaintiffs about the tenants before signing the plaza land contract, he was not aware of any
    documents related to the tenants that he or Woolley asked for but did not receive, he never spoke
    with any of the tenants before signing the land contract, he failed to look at any financial
    information for the plaza parcel before signing the land contract, and it was merely a “bad
    business decision” to purchase the plaza parcel. Additionally, defendant’s allegation with
    respect to Linda’s representation that the tenants’ rent would cover defendant’s monthly payment
    on the plaza land contract does not pertain to an allegedly false statement relating to a past or
    existing fact, and does not support a claim of fraud. 
    Id. Lastly, defendant
    alleges that Linda falsely represented to Woolley that she intended to
    purchase one of the businesses in the plaza after she learned that the business would be vacating
    the plaza. Again, this allegation does not pertain to an allegedly false statement relating to a past
    or existing fact, and does not support a claim of fraud. 
    Id. In sum,
    defendant has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact with respect to his
    claim that the plaza land contract was void. Therefore, summary disposition in favor of plaintiffs
    was proper.
    B. DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY FEES
    Defendant next argues on appeal that should this Court affirm summary disposition in
    plaintiffs’ favor, the trial court erred in its calculation of damages against him.
    -6-
    This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s factual findings, including the calculation
    of damages. See Alan Custom Homes, Inc v Krol, 
    256 Mich. App. 505
    , 512; 667 NW2d 379
    (2003). “A finding is clearly erroneous where, after reviewing the entire record, this Court is left
    with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” 
    Id. The parties
    agree that the proper measure of damages in an action for breach of a land
    contract, where the seller did not tender the deed to the purchaser, as in this case, is the
    difference between the amount due on the land contract and the value of the property at the time
    of the breach. See McColl v Wardowski, 
    280 Mich. 374
    , 376; 
    273 N.W. 736
    (1937); St John v
    Richard, 
    272 Mich. 670
    , 675; 
    262 N.W. 437
    (1935). “[W]here a vendor seeks to recover damages
    from the vendee pursuant to a contract for the transfer of real property, the measure of damages
    is the difference between the contract price and the market value of the land.” In re Day Estate,
    
    70 Mich. App. 242
    , 246; 245 NW2d 582 (1976), citing Calamarai and Perillo, Contracts, § 231, p
    365. Market value means the market value as of the date of the breach as opposed to the price
    the vendor later obtained on resale. 
    Id. at 246-247.
    “Where there is some evidence of the market
    value of the property around the time of the breach, the fact finder should weigh all the evidence
    in an effort to make a reasonable determination of market value and, hence, damages.” McNeal
    v Tuori, 
    107 Mich. App. 141
    , 147; 309 NW2d 588 (1981). However, if “evidence of resale price
    is the only evidence of market value, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that resale
    occurred within a reasonable time, at the highest price obtainable, under terms as favorable as the
    original contract, and that there has not been a decline in market value.” 
    Id. In In
    re Day 
    Estate, 70 Mich. App. at 242
    , the defendants executed an offer to purchase
    real estate, and subsequently signed a land contract for the purchase of the real estate on May 15,
    1973. 
    Id. at 243.
    On June 8, 1973, the defendants informed the real estate broker that they did
    not intend to proceed with the purchase of the home. 
    Id. at 244.
    Over a year later, on August 15,
    1974, the home was sold for $40,000. 
    Id. The plaintiff
    filed an action seeking to have the
    defendants held liable for the $10,000 difference between the contract price and the subsequent
    sale price, among other things. 
    Id. The trial
    court found that the plaintiff had not failed to
    mitigate his damages, and was entitled to judgment against the defendants in the sum of
    $16,526.56, which included the $10,000 difference between the contract price and the
    subsequent sale price. 
    Id. at 245.
    This Court found that the trial court erred in its calculation and
    its awarding of damages. 
    Id. at 246.
    Specifically, this Court opined as follows:
    In the case at bar the trial judge apparently adopted the plaintiff’s calculations of
    damages which included the $10,000 difference between the contract price and
    the sale price of the property approximately one year after the breach, as well as
    consequential damages involving the maintenance of the property for the interim
    period. We hold that the trial judge properly considered consequential damages
    such as were incurred in the maintenance of the property since these damages
    were reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of the breach. The record is not
    clear, however, concerning whether the trial judge found as a fact that the
    difference between the fair market value and the contract price at the time of the
    breach was or was not $10,000. If the trial judge merely assessed damages for the
    difference in the sale price and the contract price, he was in error. The judge may
    properly consider a sale price, albeit one year later, as some evidence of the fair
    market value at the time of breach, but he would be required to take into account
    -7-
    possible differences in the market as might be occasioned by intervening
    economic conditions. We are thus required to remand for further proceedings
    wherein the trial judge shall make findings of fact in support of his assessment of
    damages. The damages in the case at bar shall consist of the difference between
    the fair market value of the property at the time of the breach and the contract
    price as well as consequential damages reasonably foreseeable by the parties at
    that time. [Id. at 247.]
    Similarly, the trial court adopted plaintiffs’ calculation of damages, which incorporated
    the amortization schedule provided in the testimony of Scott Fraim, an attorney specializing in
    business-related matters. Plaintiffs’ calculation of damages made no mention of the date that the
    contract was allegedly breached. However, the amortization schedule applied the default interest
    rate of 6.5% as of June 1, 2011, which suggests that a breach of the contract occurred as of that
    date.4 Further, plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the plaza land contract required
    defendant to pay $1,744 per month commencing June 1, 2011, and that defendant had not made
    the payments. Accordingly, the record suggests that plaintiffs were seeking damages for a
    breach of contract that occurred on June 1, 2011, and the parties agreed at oral argument that this
    was when the breach occurred.
    The trial court did not, however, specifically make findings regarding when the breach
    occurred. Further, Fraim’s calculation merely calculated the difference between the balance
    owed under the contract “as of August 16, 2016,” and the sale price of the property at a
    foreclosure sale on May 25, 2016. Fraim did not utilize the contract price in determining
    damages, but rather, utilized the contract price as a starting point in his amortization schedule.
    Fraim then subtracted the sale price of the property nearly five years after the breach from the
    “balanced owed under the contract.” Thus, it appears that the trial court, by adopting Fraim’s
    calculations, did not utilize the appropriate measure of damages—that is, the difference between
    the contract price and the market value of the land at the time of the breach. Nor did the court
    appear to take into consideration the evidence presented to establish fair market value at the time
    of the breach.
    While the court may properly consider a sale price as some evidence of the fair market
    value at the time of breach, there is no indication that the court took into account the passage of
    five years, or the evidence of intervening economic conditions, loss of tenants, and the fact that
    the sale occurred in the context of a foreclosure proceeding. Because the court failed to use the
    appropriate measure of damages, and failed to make findings of fact in support of its assessment
    of damages, the judgment of damages is reversed in part, and the case is remanded for a proper
    4
    Fraim’s amortization schedule calculated the amount due monthly, beginning with the loan
    amount of $215,000 on April 12, 2011; the schedule credited all payments on the restaurant land
    contract over $1,000 and rent received, and debited taxes and insurance paid by plaintiffs on
    behalf of defendant, and included interest at the nominal annual rate of 6.5%. The calculations
    were made through August 16, 2016, when Fraim applied an overpayment on the restaurant land
    contract to the plaza land contract.
    -8-
    calculation of damages. The damages should consist of the difference between the fair market
    value of the property at the time of the breach and the contract price, as well as consequential
    damages reasonably foreseeable by the parties at that time.
    Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in its award of attorney fees and costs.
    Specifically, defendant argues that the trial court awarded the total amount of fees and costs
    sought by plaintiffs without any inquiry or findings of fact with respect to whether the fees were
    reasonable in light of the services rendered. Plaintiffs maintain that the statements that they
    submitted from their prior and current counsel detailing the time and costs incurred relating to
    this matter were sufficient for the court to determine an award of attorney fees and costs without
    an evidentiary hearing.
    This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s award of attorney fees and
    costs. Smith v Khouri, 
    481 Mich. 519
    , 526; 751 NW2d 472 (2008). “An abuse of discretion
    occurs when the trial court’s decision is outside the range of reasonable and principled
    outcomes.” 
    Id. “As a
    general rule, attorney fees are not recoverable as an element of costs or damages
    absent an express legal exception.” Fleet Business Credit v Krapohl Ford Lincoln Mercury Co,
    
    274 Mich. App. 584
    , 589; 735 NW2d 644 (2007). Attorney fees are recoverable if expressly
    provided for by a contract between the parties. 
    Id. In this
    case, the purchase agreement
    constituted a contract between the parties. Under ¶ 12.1 of the purchase agreement, “In the event
    of default in any respect of this Agreement . . . , all actual attorney fees and costs incurred by the
    Sellers in enforcing its terms or pursuing damages shall be paid by the Purchasers.”
    We note that defendant fails to cite any authority indicating that Michigan courts should
    construe contract language providing for the recovery of “actual attorney fees” to mean
    “reasonable attorney fees.” Where a contract merely provides for the recovery of “attorney fees”
    or “legal fees,” without more, this language is construed to mean reasonable attorney fees. See
    Zeeland Farm Servs, Inc v JBL Enterprises, Inc, 
    219 Mich. App. 190
    , 195-196; 555 NW2d 733
    (1996); Papo v Aglo Restaurants of San Jose, Inc, 
    149 Mich. App. 285
    , 299; 386 NW2d 177
    (1986). However, where, as here, the plain language of the contract unambiguously provides for
    the recovery of “actual attorney fees,” this contract language must be enforced as written.
    Mahnick v Bell Co, 
    256 Mich. App. 154
    , 158-159; 662 NW2d 830 (2003).
    Plaintiffs attached to their proposed judgment copies of the billing statements from their
    former and current counsel for the months of June 2016 through November 2016. Plaintiffs
    sought $41,218.80 in attorney fees and costs for their former counsel, and $16,578.25 in attorney
    fees and costs for their current counsel. In its written judgment, the trial court adopted plaintiffs’
    “determination of damages,” including these exact amounts. Defendant argues on appeal that the
    trial court erred in accepting the figures that plaintiffs submitted, and found “plaintiffs’
    submission to be correct,” without making findings to determine whether the costs were
    reasonable. However, because the purchase agreement explicitly provided for the award of “all
    actual attorney fees and costs incurred by the Sellers,” the court was not required to make
    findings regarding reasonableness, and did not abuse its discretion in making this award.
    Therefore, the judgment granting plaintiffs damages is affirmed, in part, in regard to the amount
    awarded to plaintiffs in attorney fees.
    -9-
    III. CONCLUSION
    The trial court judgment is affirmed, in part, to the extent that it grants plaintiffs summary
    disposition and denies defendant summary disposition, and the amount of actual attorney fees
    awarded is affirmed. The trial court judgment is reversed, in part, regarding the value of the
    plaza used to calculate the total net judgment, and this matter is remanded for further
    proceedings regarding the correct amount of damages to be awarded plaintiffs. We do not retain
    jurisdiction.
    /s/ Christopher M. Murray
    /s/ Patrick M. Meter
    /s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
    -10-