People of Michigan v. Neil Andrew Trapp ( 2020 )


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  •             If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
    revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
    STATE OF MICHIGAN
    COURT OF APPEALS
    PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     FOR PUBLICATION
    December 17, 2020
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v                                                                    No. 345293
    Macomb Circuit Court
    NEIL ANDREW TRAPP,                                                   LC No. 2017-004415-FH
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and BECKERING and GLEICHER, JJ.
    SWARTZLE, P.J. (concurring).
    I concur in the result only. During oral argument, defense counsel rhetorically asked
    whether we can be safe from warrantless entry in “our” homes. I have serious doubts whether
    defendant was in “his” home or that he otherwise had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
    trailer where he encountered the officers. Even setting this aside, the appeal should be resolved
    on the basis of existing law, rather than reaching a novel question of constitutional law. Given the
    posture of this appeal, however, I cannot dissent.
    At the time of sentencing, the judgment of sentence listed defendant’s residence as being
    on Doepfer Road in Warren, while the address of the trailer identified during the preliminary
    examination was on Ready Road, a little over 2-1/2 miles away. Though it is possible that
    defendant moved residences between the dates of arrest and sentencing, there is nothing in the
    appellate record confirming that defendant actually resided on Ready Road on the date of arrest.
    Prior to approaching the trailer, the officers had information that a male with a firearm had
    caused a disturbance earlier in the evening, and the male might be a trespasser. The park manager
    told the officers that the only person who lived in the trailer was a female. Thus, whether defendant
    was a trespasser, a mere short-term/transient guest, or, instead, a social/overnight guest who had a
    legitimate expectation of privacy in the trailer, depends on “the totality of the circumstances.”
    People v Lombardo, 
    216 Mich. App. 500
    , 504; 549 NW2d 596 (1996); 68 Am Jur 2d, Searches and
    Seizures, § 11, p 120. It is the defendant’s burden to show that he had a legitimate expectation of
    privacy to challenge a warrantless entry under the Fourth Amendment. Lombardo, 
    216 Mich. App. -1-
    at 505. With all of that said, the prosecutor did not challenge defendant’s standing to raise the
    Fourth-Amendment defense.
    Our Supreme Court ordered this Court on remand to answer three specific questions, as the
    majority notes. I agree with the majority that, in the abstract, the constructive-entry doctrine should
    be recognized in Michigan, and I further agree that there were not exigent circumstances when
    officers commanded the occupants to exit the trailer. As to whether the facts of this case fall within
    the doctrine, I reiterate my doubts on whether defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in
    the trailer. These officers had reason to believe that there was an armed trespasser in or near the
    premises, and they issued a simple, relatively calm command to the male occupants to exit the
    trailer—a far cry from the shows of force and “overbearing tactics” found in other constructive-
    entry situations. United States v Thomas, 430 F3d 274, 277 (CA 6, 2005) (collecting cases).
    Nonetheless, these officers did issue a command, not a request, and assuming arguendo that
    defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the trailer, I agree with my colleagues that the
    officers constructively entered the trailer.
    I would have preferred not to have reached the constructive-entry question, however,
    because as the majority recognizes, the arrest was without probable cause in any event. A court
    should not address novel questions of constitutional law when the case can be resolved on settled
    law, see Nat’l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 
    471 Mich. 608
    , 614-615; 684 NW2d
    800 (2004), rev’d on other grounds by Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Ed, 
    487 Mich. 349
    ;
    792 NW2d 686 (2010), but our Supreme Court ordered this Court to address specific questions, so
    the questions must be addressed.
    Accordingly, I concur in the result only.
    /s/ Brock A. Swartzle
    -2-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 345293

Filed Date: 12/17/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/18/2020