People of Michigan v. Anthony Edward Lamar ( 2016 )


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  •                          STATE OF MICHIGAN
    COURT OF APPEALS
    PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                  UNPUBLISHED
    December 20, 2016
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v                                                                 No. 328729
    Kalkaska Circuit Court
    ANTHONY EDWARD LAMAR,                                             LC No. 14-003676-FH
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and SAWYER and MARKEY, JJ.
    PER CURIAM.
    Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of resisting and obstructing a police
    officer, MCL 750.81d(1), and possession of marijuana, MCL 333.7403(2)(d). He appeals by
    right solely challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. For the
    reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    This case arises from a stop effectuated by Michigan State Police Trooper Karen Roy of
    defendant’s vehicle for a “defective loud exhaust.” Trooper Roy was assigned “to the 7th
    District Hometown Security Team (HST).” She explained that law enforcement personnel
    assigned to HST are “out looking for drug activity, guns, any criminal activity.” According to
    Trooper Roy, “[w]e look for vehicles that have equipment problems, make patrol stops based on
    that.”
    On the day defendant was stopped, Trooper Roy was stationed in her patrol car “right on
    the edge of the highway, sitting in a private drive,” when she heard the muffler of defendant’s
    vehicle as he drove past. Upon approaching defendant’s vehicle, Trooper Roy “detected a strong
    odor of marijuana inside the car” and asked defendant to exit the vehicle. Eventually, defendant
    consented to a search of his vehicle. Trooper Roy testified at trial that the search produced “a
    grinder,” which was later determined to contain marijuana.
    After a suppression hearing, the trial court found that “it is likely the exhaust on the
    Defendant’s truck was functioning properly on the day of the traffic stop,” considering the
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    testimony of the witnesses defendant produced at the hearing.1 However, the trial court denied
    defendant’s motion to suppress, reasoning that “[w]hether or not the Defendant’s truck actually
    had a malfunctioning exhaust at the time is not relevant to the question of whether Tpr. Roy had
    reasonable cause to initiate a traffic stop.” The trial court summarized Trooper Roy’s testimony
    and surmised that “the Defendant is asking this Court to essentially find that Tpr. Roy
    deliberately lied under oath at the preliminary examination and her police report.” The court
    found no basis to make such a finding.
    II. ANALYSIS
    On appeal, defendant challenges whether the trooper had objective, articulable reasons
    for effectuating the stop of defendant’s motor vehicle.
    We review a trial court’s factual findings in a suppression hearing for clear error, which
    occurs when the Court is “left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made.”
    People v Lewis, 
    251 Mich. App. 58
    , 67; 649 NW2d 792 (2002). But “the lower court’s ultimate
    ruling with regard to the motion to suppress is reviewed de novo because the application of
    constitutional standards regarding searches and seizures to undisputed facts is entitled to less
    deference.” 
    Id. at 67-68
    (citations omitted).
    “[B]oth the United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution guarantee the right
    of persons to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.” People v Hyde, 285 Mich
    App 428, 438; 775 NW2d 833 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). That
    right flows from the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, § 11 of
    the Michigan Constitution. People v Levine, 
    461 Mich. 172
    , 178; 600 NW2d 622 (1999).
    “[A]bsent compelling reasons, art 1, § 11 provides the same protection as the Fourth
    Amendment.” 
    Id. “A traffic
    stop for a suspected violation of law is a ‘seizure’ of the occupants of the
    vehicle and therefore must be conducted in accordance with the Fourth Amendment.” Heien v
    North Carolina, ___ US ___, ___; 
    135 S. Ct. 530
    , 536; 
    190 L. Ed. 2d 475
    (2014). “An automobile
    stop is thus subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be ‘unreasonable’ under the
    circumstances.” Whren v United States, 
    517 U.S. 806
    , 810; 
    116 S. Ct. 1769
    ; 
    135 L. Ed. 2d 89
    (1996). “In order to effectuate a valid traffic stop, a police officer must have an articulable and
    reasonable suspicion that a vehicle or one of its occupants is subject to seizure for a violation of
    law.” People v Williams, 
    236 Mich. App. 610
    , 612; 601 NW2d 138 (1999). “[O]n reasonable
    1
    At the suppression hearing, the vehicle’s former owner testified that she had the vehicle’s
    exhaust repaired in January 2013 and that she sold the vehicle to defendant in March 2014. The
    mechanic who performed that repair testified that the vehicle’s exhaust was in “good working
    order” and not emitting “excessive or unusual noise” after the repair. A mechanic who inspected
    defendant’s vehicle less than two weeks after the traffic stop testified that the vehicle’s exhaust
    system was not emitting defective noise and that there was “no evidence of any recent exhaust
    repairs.”
    -2-
    grounds shown, a police officer may stop and inspect a motor vehicle for an equipment
    violation.” 
    Id. “Reasonable suspicion
    entails something more than an inchoate or unparticularized
    suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause.” People v
    Champion, 
    452 Mich. 92
    , 98; 549 NW2d 849 (1996) (citation omitted). A reasonable suspicion
    is established “when a law enforcement officer has a particularized and objective basis for
    suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Navarette v California, ___ US
    ___; 
    134 S. Ct. 1683
    , 1687; 
    188 L. Ed. 2d 680
    (2014). “[W]hether there was reasonable suspicion
    to justify a stop must be made on a case-by-case basis, evaluated under the totality of the
    circumstances, and based on common sense.” People v Dillon, 
    296 Mich. App. 506
    , 508; 822
    NW2d 611 (2012).
    Defendant’s main arguments on appeal center on his assertions that the trooper’s
    assessment as to why she stopped defendant was a mere pretext. Additionally, defendant argues
    that because the trooper had no formal training relative to the proper decibel level of vehicle
    exhaust systems, her testimony was tantamount to either a fabrication of the truth or mere
    speculation.
    The issues of pretextual stops have long been decided. In Whren v United States, 
    517 U.S. 806
    , 
    116 S. Ct. 1769
    , 135 L Ed2d 89 (1996) plainclothes police officers patrolling a high drug and
    crime area in an unmarked vehicle observed a truck driven by the defendant waiting at a stop
    sign for an unusually long time. Suddenly, the truck turned without signaling, and one of the
    officers stopped the vehicle to warn the driver about the traffic violation. While approaching the
    vehicle, the officer observed crack cocaine in defendant’s hands. Defendant argued that the
    traffic stop was pretextual and that the evidence should therefore be suppressed. The United
    States Supreme Court disagreed, holding that police officers with probable cause to believe that a
    traffic violation has occurred may stop a vehicle even though the stop is a prextext to search for
    evidence of other, more serious crimes, stating, in relevant part: “Subjective intentions play no
    role in ordinary probable-cause Fourth Amendment 
    analysis. 517 U.S. at 813
    . It is important to
    note, however, that pretext is irrelevant only when sufficient legal cause exists to effectuate the
    stop. Hence defendant’s next argument is that the trooper lacked sufficient legal cause to
    effectuate the stop.
    On this issue, defendant argues that Trooper Roy did not have a reasonable suspicion that
    he was violating the law because she did not demonstrate knowledge of the specific noise
    limitations for motor vehicles contained in § 707c(1) of the Michigan Vehicle Code (MVC),
    MCL 257.1 et seq., and she did not have equipment or training to corroborate her suspicion that
    his vehicle was emitting a sound in excess of those limits. Defendant’s argument presumes that
    Trooper Roy suspected he was violating MCL 257.707c(1), but she made no mention of the
    statutory noise limits at the preliminary hearing. Rather, she testified that she heard defendant’s
    muffler as he passed, which was not “normal for a vehicle that . . . has a functioning muffler,”
    and initiated a traffic stop for “a defective loud exhaust.” While a loud exhaust may run afoul of
    the noise limitations found in MCL 257.707c(1), there are other provisions of the MVC that
    govern mufflers and exhaust systems that do not reference those limitations. For example, MCL
    257.707 requires that a motor vehicle “be equipped with a muffler in good working order and in
    constant operation to prevent excessive or unusual noise and annoying smoke” and “be equipped
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    with a properly operating exhaust system . . . .” MCL 257.707(1) and (3). Similarly, MCL
    257.707c(3) prohibits a person from “operat[ing] a vehicle on a highway or street if the vehicle
    has a defect in the exhaust system which affects sound reduction, is not equipped with a muffler
    or other noise dissipative device, or is equipped with a cutout, bypass, amplifier, or a similar
    device.”
    Trooper Roy testified that even though there were other vehicles on the road, she was
    “certain” that it was defendant’s vehicle making the loud noise “[b]ecause I watched him go by
    me. I could hear the vehicle as it passed my location.” That there were other vehicles in the area
    providing a contrast in sounds when Trooper Roy made an auditory observation of defendant’s
    vehicle demonstrated “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting” the trooper’s suspicion
    that defendant was in violation the MVC. 
    Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687
    . As this Court has noted
    in numerous decisions, an ordinary traffic stop is governed by the same standards as any other
    stop. “A traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment . . . if the police officer has
    reasonable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring.” United
    States v Botero-Ospina, 71 F3d 783, 787 (10th Cir 1995). Here the testimony of the trooper
    makes clear that she had reasonable suspicion to believe that the exhaust system of the vehicle
    operated by defendant was defective. And, to the extent she may have been wrong in terms of
    pin-pointing the exact decibel level necessary to constitute a violation, such a “mistake” does not
    diminish the legality of the stop. See 
    Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 536
    . (“[S]earches and seizures based on
    mistakes of fact can be reasonable.”) Additionally, and as previously stated, “[t]he subjective
    intent of the police officer is irrelevant to the validity of the stop.” 
    Dillon, 296 Mich. App. at 508
    -
    509.
    Affirmed.
    /s/ Stephen L. Borrello
    /s/ David H. Sawyer
    /s/ Jane E. Markey
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Document Info

Docket Number: 328729

Filed Date: 12/20/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021