Iere Atun Bey Trust v. County of Wayne ( 2023 )

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TRINI ATUN EL BEY, Trustee of the IERE ATUN UNPUBLISHED
BEY TRUST, May 25, 2023
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 361586
Wayne Circuit Court
COUNTY OF WAYNE, WAYNE COUNTY LC No. 21-005175-CZ
TREASURER, WAYNE COUNTY REGISTER OF
DEEDS, WAYNE COUNTY EXECUTIVE,
WAYNE COUNTY SHERIFF, and WAYNE
PROBATE JUDGE FREDDIE BURTON, JR.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: RICK, P.J., and SHAPIRO and O’BRIEN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this matter involving a property tax delinquency, plaintiff, proceeding in propria
persona, appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of
defendants. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In April 2021, plaintiff filed the complaint giving rise to this action. Plaintiff alleged
therein that he made three money-order payments to defendant Wayne County Treasurer, all of
which included the statement, “Full Satisfaction of Claim.” A fourth money order, also made out
to the Wayne County Treasurer, was notated, “Under Duress.” The complaint characterized these
payments as “offers to contract.” Plaintiff claimed that, because of the notations, “payment
disputes” (referring to owed property taxes) for 2016, 2017, 2019, and 2020 should have been
discharged under MCL 440.3311 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), MCL 440.1102 et seq.
Plaintiff sought $12,000 in compensatory damages and $56 million in punitive damages for
“breach of contract, fraud, pain and suffering, undue enrichment, harassment, emotional distress
and dishonor.”
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In lieu of answering the complaint, defendants moved for summary disposition, arguing
that dismissal was proper under MCR 2.116(C)(4), (7), (8), and (10). As relevant to this appeal,
defendants argued that they were entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) because
the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff responded to the
motion by asserting, in relevant part, that jurisdiction was proper under Michigan’s 1850
Constitution. Plaintiff also filed a competing motion for summary disposition, seeking judgment
in his favor under MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (10).
At a hearing in front of the trial court, the court agreed with defendants on all grounds and
granted summary disposition in their favor. As relevant to this appeal, the court found that
summary disposition was proper under MCR 2.116(C)(4) because the Michigan Tax Tribunal had
exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Odom v
Wayne Co, 482 Mich 459, 466; 760 NW2d 217 (2008). Summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(4) is proper when “[t]he court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter.” “In reviewing a
motion under MCR 2.116(C)(4), it is proper to consider the pleadings and any affidavits or other
documentary evidence submitted by the parties to determine if there is a genuine issue of material
fact.” Toaz v Dep’t of Treasury, 280 Mich App 457, 459; 760 NW2d 325 (2008). “[T]his Court
must determine whether the affidavits, together with the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and
documentary evidence, demonstrate . . . [a lack of] subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. (quotation
marks and citation omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
“Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to act and authority to hear and
determine a case.” Forest Hills Coop v City of Ann Arbor, 305 Mich App 572, 617; 854 NW2d
172 (2014). Under MCL 600.605, “[c]ircuit courts have original jurisdiction to hear and determine
all civil claims and remedies, except where exclusive jurisdiction is given in the constitution or by
statute to some other court or where the trial courts are denied jurisdiction by the constitution or
statutes of this state.” (Emphasis added.) The jurisdiction of the Michigan Tax Tribunal is set
forth in MCL 205.731. That provision states that the Tax Tribunal has “exclusive and original
jurisdiction” over all of the following:
(a) A proceeding for direct review of a final decision, finding, ruling,
determination, or order of an agency relating to assessment, valuation, rates, special
assessments, allocation, or equalization, under the property tax laws of this state.
(b) A proceeding for a refund or redetermination of a tax levied under the
property tax laws of this state.
(c) Mediation of a proceeding described in subdivision (a) or (b) before the
tribunal.
(d) Certification of a mediator in a tax dispute described in subdivision (c).
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(e) Any other proceeding provided by law. [MCL 205.731.]
Accordingly, the question we must address in this appeal is whether plaintiff’s complaint
is of the kind that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal. If so, then the trial
court was deprived of jurisdiction. See MCL 600.605.
“The Tax Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hold statutes invalid or to consider constitutional
matters; only the circuit court may do so.” In re Petition of Wayne Co Treasurer for Foreclosure,
286 Mich App 108, 112; 777 NW2d 507 (2009). Accordingly, “if a challenge to a tax assessment
rests solely on an argument that the tax assessment was made under authority of an illegal statute,
the circuit court would have jurisdiction over the matter.” Id. “But merely phrasing a claim in
constitutional terms will not divest the Tax Tribunal of its exclusive jurisdiction.” Id.Before turning to the substantive analysis, we recognize that, at all times, plaintiff has been
proceeding in propria persona. As a general rule, we allow leniency to such litigants. See Haines
v Kerner, 404 US 519, 520; 92 S Ct 594; 30 L Ed 2d 652 (1972); Hein v Hein, 337 Mich App 109,
115; 972 NW2d 337 (2021). That leniency is not without limitation, however. See Bachor v City
of Detroit, 49 Mich App 507, 512; 212 NW2d 302 (1973). With these principles in mind, we turn
to the plaintiff’s complaint and argument.
While plaintiff’s complaint makes vague assertions that the challenged assessments
violated “various constitutional provisions,” he never challenges the constitutional validity of the
authorizing statute, i.e., the General Property Tax Act (GPTA), MCL 211.1 et seq. Moreover,
even under the most generous reading of plaintiff’s complaint, he fails to identify which, if any, of
his constitutional rights were violated. Consequently, despite alluding to “various constitutional
provisions” in his complaint, we do not read plaintiff’s complaint as raising any type of
constitutional claim. Rather, the crux of plaintiff’s claim as stated in his complaint—and
developed in subsequent pleadings—is that his partial payments sufficed as an accord and
satisfaction under the UCC, such that his partial payments extinguished the remainder of the tax
liability and satisfied plaintiff’s tax burden for the year in question. Plaintiff’s complaint also
states that he “filed a complaint with the Michigan Consumer Protection Agency,” but he does not
elaborate any further. However, reading plaintiff’s complaint leniently and in conjunction with
his other filings, we interpret this statement in his complaint as alluding to a claim under the Fair
Debt Collection Act by classifying the attempt to collect delinquent property taxes as a debt
requiring a written contact.
Having reviewed plaintiff’s complaint, and keeping in mind that, at all times, plaintiff has
been proceeding in propria persona, we conclude that the only reasonable interpretation of
plaintiff’s claim is that he seeks a “redetermination” of the taxes he owes by requesting that his
tax liability be extinguished. Under these circumstances, plaintiff’s challenge is nothing more than
a direct challenge to the tax assessment. Plaintiff’s complaint, therefore, is squarely within the
Tax Tribunal’s exclusive jurisdiction as a “proceeding for a refund or redetermination of a tax
levied under the property tax laws of this state.” MCL 205.731(b). It follows that, as a matter of
law, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the substance of plaintiff’s
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complaint. Accordingly, we conclude that summary disposition was proper under MCR
2.116(C)(4).1
On appeal, plaintiff cites Const 1850, art 18, § 2 and “A.P.A. of 1946” as “the proper
jurisdiction,” but he never develops an argument for how these authorities granted the trial court
subject-matter jurisdiction. While we are sympathetic to the fact that appellant is proceeding in
propria persona, there is no amount of leniency with which we could read plaintiff’s brief on
appeal as sufficiently presenting the issue for review. As our Supreme Court has recognized:
It is not sufficient for a party simply to announce a position or assert an error and
then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or
unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to
sustain or reject his position. [Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d 100(1998) (quotation marks and citation omitted).]
Accordingly, because plaintiff has failed to explain why the authorities he cites in his brief vest
jurisdiction in the trial court, we deem plaintiff’s argument abandoned.2
The remainder of plaintiff’s arguments on appeal are perfunctory and, at best, difficult to
follow. Plaintiff’s main contention seems to be that the trial court erred by failing to consider
plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition and plaintiff’s evidence, as opposed to (allegedly)
accepting as evidence statements made by defense counsel. None of these claims warrant relief.
First, there is no merit to plaintiff’s claim that the trial court erred by not considering
plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition. Implicit in the trial court’s grant of summary
disposition for defendants was a denial of plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition. In other
words, the trial court did consider plaintiff’s motion, just not in the explicit manner plaintiff would
have preferred. This course of action was not error; courts are vested with the power to “manage
their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Persichini v
William Beaumont Hosp, 238 Mich App 626, 639; 607 NW2d 100 (1999). It follows that the court
was not bound to manage the case in the manner that plaintiff would have preferred.3
1
Because the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, it lacked the authority to consider
whether dismissal was proper under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10), and we decline to consider
those alternative grounds.
2
Even if we attempted to address plaintiff’s argument in this respect, we would conclude that it is
without merit. Const 1850, art 18, § 2 pertains to compensation for the taking of private property
and is irrelevant to the question of the trial court’s jurisdiction. For plaintiff’s other citation, it is
unclear what authority plaintiff is referring to when he cites “A.P.A. of 1946.”
3
Plaintiff seems to suggest that the trial court’s failure to explicitly address his motion for summary
disposition is a ruling that the “Organic Michigan Constitutions” are invalid, specifically Const
1850, art 6, § 27 and Const 1850, art 18, § 2. This constitution has been superseded, however, so
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Next, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by allowing defense counsel to enter
hearsay testimony while not under oath. In his brief on appeal, however, plaintiff does not identify
where in the lower court file defense counsel provided such testimony,4 and, having reviewed the
lower court file ourselves, we can find nothing to support plaintiff’s contention that defense
counsel was allowed to testify. As near as we can tell, plaintiff is taking issue with defense
counsel’s opportunity to present oral argument before the trial court, but that is obviously
permissible, and it is clearly not testimony.
For similar reasons, plaintiff fails to establish error requiring reversal with respect to his
arguments that trial court erred by not determining the validity of the affidavits and by not
following the rules of evidence. Plaintiff fails to provide any references to the relevant portions
of the record to support the factual basis for his claims, and our review of the record confirms that
his claims have no factual basis. Accordingly, plaintiff is not entitled to appellate relief on these
claims.5
Affirmed.
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
there is no way the trial court could have violated it. See City of Gaylord v Beckett, 378 Mich 273,
314; 144 NW2d 460 (1966).
4
Plaintiff cites “Exhibit K,” but that exhibit is a legal case.
5
Plaintiff raises two additional issues—whether the trial court erred by deciding the summary
disposition motion when defendants were not present and whether the trial court erred by stating
that plaintiff lacked standing—but he does not address these issues in the analysis portion of his
brief. Accordingly, these issues are abandoned. See Peterson Novelties, Inc v City of Berkley, 259
Mich App 1, 14; 672 NW2d 351 (2003).
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