In Re L Meirthew Minor ( 2023 )

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
In re L. MEIRTHEW, Minor. December 28, 2023
No. 366298
Calhoun Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2023-000126-NA
Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and SWARTZLE and PATEL, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner removed the child from respondent’s care after petitioner received reports that
respondent was sexually assaulting the child’s siblings and was involved in domestic violence
incidents with the child’s mother. The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights to the
child. We affirm.
The child was living with her mother, her siblings, and respondent when petitioner received
a report that respondent was sexually assaulting two of the child’s siblings. (Respondent is the
biological father of the child, but not the siblings of the child.) One of the child’s siblings testified
that respondent repeatedly sexually assaulted her by touching her “private parts,” and a forensic
interviewer testified that another one of the child’s siblings disclosed that respondent had sexually
assault him by repeatedly touching his “private area.” It was reported that both siblings had
considered respondent to be a parental figure during the time that he was living with them.
Additionally, the siblings reported that they witnessed the mother bleeding after a violent
physical altercation with respondent, and one of the child’s siblings reported that he witnessed
respondent hit his mother with a hammer. Petitioner reported that there was also an incident in
which respondent fired a gun toward the house that the children were in, while arguing with the
mother.
In an attempt to reunify respondent with the child, petitioner offered a parenting treatment
plan that included services intended to rectify respondent’s barriers to reunification. Respondent
did not sign that treatment plan, did not complete the recommended parenting classes, did not sign
up for medical insurance, and did not begin counseling. Respondent also missed a scheduled
psychological evaluation, and petitioner reported that respondent refused to cooperate with any of
the services that he was offered.
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The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights to the child under MCL
712A.19b(3)(b)(i) and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) after finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that
two of the child’s siblings were sexually assaulted by respondent, respondent had physically
assaulted the mother in front of the children, and respondent failed to engage with his parenting
treatment plan. After citing In re Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 323; 964 NW2d 881 (2020), the trial
court found that there was a reasonable likelihood that the child would be harmed if returned to
respondent’s care. Further, the trial court found that the termination of respondent’s parental rights
was in the child’s best interest, even though the trial court acknowledged that respondent had a
good relationship with the child, because respondent repeatedly failed to engage with petitioner’s
parenting-treatment plan, and he often attempted to blame the mother for the repeated acts of
domestic violence.
Respondent now appeals.
Respondent first argues that the trial court erred when it found statutory grounds to
terminate his parental rights to the child. “This Court reviews for clear error the trial court’s factual
findings and ultimate determinations on the statutory grounds for termination.” In re White, 303
Mich App 701, 709; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). “A finding is clearly erroneous if although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 91; 763 NW2d 587 (2009)
(cleaned up).
The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights to the child under MCL
712A.19b(3)(b)(i), which states:
The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court
finds, by clear and convincing evidence . . . [that] [t]he child or a sibling of the child
has suffered physical injury or physical or sexual abuse . . . [and] [t]he parent’s act
caused the physical injury or physical or sexual abuse and the court finds that there
is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer from injury or abuse in the
foreseeable future if placed in the parent’s home.
In this case, one of the child’s siblings testified that respondent repeatedly sexually
assaulted her, and a forensic interviewer testified that one of the child’s siblings disclosed
additional sexual abuse as well as incidents of domestic violence in which respondent hit the
mother with a hammer and shot a gun at the house that the children were in.
Respondent argues that there was no evidence that he had sexually assaulted the child in
this case, and the termination of his parental rights to this child was improper when no allegation
involving this child was presented. Respondent ignores that this Court has held that the “doctrine
of anticipatory neglect provides that how a parent treats one child is probative of how that parent
may treat other children.” In re Mota, 334 Mich App at 323 (cleaned up). Further, similar to the
facts in In re Mota, even though the siblings that respondent sexually assaulted were not
biologically related to him, the siblings considered respondent to be a parental figure when he
sexually assaulted them and they were living in the same house with the child. Respondent has
not provided any evidence to demonstrate that he was not a danger to the child, and he failed to
engage in the parenting treatment plan that would have otherwise attempted to rectify his barrier
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to reunification. Thus, the trial court did not err in finding that there was a reasonable likelihood
that the child would suffer injury if placed in respondent’s care.
Because one statutory ground for termination is established, “we need not consider whether
the other grounds cited by the trial court also supported the termination decision.” In re Foster,
285 Mich App 630, 633; 776 NW2d 415 (2009).
Lastly, respondent argues that the termination of his parental rights was not in the child’s
best interest. “Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find
that termination is in the child’s best interests before it can terminate parental rights.” In re
Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). “[W]hether termination of
parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the
evidence.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). The trial court’s ruling
regarding best interests is reviewed for clear error. In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 408; 890
NW2d 676 (2016).
The trial court acknowledged that respondent had a bond with the child, but the trial court
also found that respondent had committed egregious acts of domestic violence and sexual abuse.
Notwithstanding the close relationship that respondent has with the child, we are not left with a
definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred in finding that it was not in the child’s best
interest to be left in respondent’s care given that there remains a reasonable likelihood that the
child would be injured. Furthermore, respondent’s unwillingness to take consistent steps to engage
with the parenting treatment plan, seek counseling, and benefit from the services that were
provided by petitioner, demonstrates that termination was in the child’s best interest. See In re
Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 41-42. Therefore, the record supports that the trial court did
not clearly err when it found by a preponderance of evidence that termination of respondent’s
parental rights was in the child’s best interest.
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Sima G. Patel
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