People of Michigan v. James Drake ( 2024 )


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  •               If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision
    until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
    STATE OF MICHIGAN
    COURT OF APPEALS
    PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
    August 15, 2024
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v                                                                    No. 366053
    Berrien Circuit Court
    JAMES DRAKE,                                                         LC No. 2022-002514-FH
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and YOUNG, JJ.
    PER CURIAM.
    Defendant appeals by leave granted1 from the trial court’s judgment of sentence entered after
    pleading guilty to possession of methamphetamine and possession of less than 25 grams of fentanyl.
    Defendant was sentenced to serve 3 to 10 years in prison for possession of methamphetamine and 72 days
    in jail for possession of fentanyl. Because we agree that 50 points were improperly assessed for offense
    variable (“OV”) 15 and 15 points were improperly assessed for prior record variable (“PRV”) 5, and
    because correction of the score results in a change to the applicable sentencing guidelines ranges, we
    vacate defendant’s sentences and remand for resentencing.
    I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    In August 2022, officers performed a traffic stop on defendant’s vehicle and controlled substances
    and paraphernalia were found in it during an inventory search. The substances found included three
    individually-wrapped plastic bags and two unlabeled pills. Officers also found a large quantity of empty
    plastic bags, a digital scale, and three cellular telephones. Defendant, an Indiana resident, was initially
    charged with possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine, MCL 333.7401(2)(b)(i), and possession
    with intent to deliver heroin, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv). Ultimately, defendant pleaded guilty to possession
    of methamphetamine, MCL 333.7403(2)(b)(i), and possession of less than 25 grams of fentanyl, MCL
    333.7403(2)(a)(v).
    1
    People v Drake, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered June 15, 2023 (Docket No. 366053).
    -1-
    During sentencing, the prosecutor argued that defendant should be assessed 15 points for PRV 5
    (prior misdemeanor convictions and juvenile adjudications), rather than the five points recommended in
    the presentence investigation report (“PSIR”), because defendant had five prior scorable misdemeanors:
    two Michigan offenses that were listed in the PSIR and already scored; one Indiana offense that was listed
    in the PSIR but not scored; and two Indiana offenses that were not listed in the PSIR and not scored.
    Defendant conceded that the Indiana conviction that was listed but not scored in the PSIR should have
    been but objected to the scoring of the two unlisted convictions.
    The two convictions that were not listed were for operating while intoxicated (“OWI”) and
    carrying a handgun without a license. Defense counsel objected, contending that the offenses were, to his
    knowledge, pending charges but had “not been processed in any way” and that he had “not been convicted
    of those.” In response, the prosecutor submitted a “MyCase” printout from Indiana to the trial court that,
    according to the prosecutor, demonstrated that defendant pleaded guilty to “carrying a handgun without a
    license and was sentenced to a jail term of 150 days, suspended 60 days.” The prosecutor stated that the
    “document also contains the OWI conviction.” After reviewing the printout, the trial court concluded that
    PRV 5 should be scored at 15 points rather than five points, which raised the total PRV score from 20
    points to 30 points and placed the PRV Level at D for both offenses.
    The prosecutor also requested that OV 15 (aggravated controlled substance offenses) be scored at
    50 points for both of defendant’s convictions because the conduct involved “traveling from another state
    into this state while in possession of a mixture containing a controlled substance, Schedule I or II, with
    the intent to deliver that mixture in this state.” Although the prosecutor conceded that the amount
    defendant was found with “might be a personal use amount,” there was nothing found to suggest personal
    use. Defense counsel objected, arguing that defendant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine
    and possession of a controlled substance, and he did not make any “admission of guilt in regards to
    whether he was going to distribute the drugs.”
    After an adjournment, the trial court concluded that OV 15 was properly scored at 50 points. The
    trial court acknowledged that the amount was small, but stated that it believed that the “the legislature
    intended there to be a harsh penalty for, for lack of a better word, out-of-state drug dealers.” With these
    changes, defendant’s total PRV score was 30 points and his total OV score was 50 points, and his
    recommended minimum sentencing guidelines ranges were 29 to 57 months for possession of
    methamphetamine, MCL 777.65; and 2 to 17 months for possession of fentanyl, MCL 777.68. The trial
    court sentenced defendant to 36 to 120 months in prison for possession of methamphetamine and 72 days
    in jail for possession of fentanyl, and this appeal followed.
    II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    “Under the sentencing guidelines, the circuit court’s factual determinations are reviewed for clear
    error and must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” People v Lampe, 
    327 Mich App 104
    ,
    111; 
    933 NW2d 314
     (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Preponderance of the evidence
    means such evidence as, when weighed with that opposed to it, has more convincing force and the greater
    probability of truth.” People v Cross, 
    281 Mich App 737
    , 740; 
    760 NW2d 314
     (2008) (quotation marks
    and citation omitted). “Clear error exists when the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm
    conviction that a mistake was made.” Lampe, 327 Mich App at 111 (quotation marks and citation
    omitted). Finally, “[w]hether the facts, as found, are adequate to satisfy the scoring conditions prescribed
    -2-
    by statute, i.e., the application of the facts to the law, is a question of statutory interpretation, which an
    appellate court reviews de novo.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
    III. ANALYSIS
    A. OV 15
    On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it assessed 50 points for OV 15 because
    the court considered conduct that was beyond the elements of the sentencing offenses when the court
    scored the variable. We agree.
    A defendant is entitled to be sentenced on the basis of accurately scored sentencing guidelines.
    People v Francisco, 
    474 Mich 82
    , 89 n 8; 
    711 NW2d 44
     (2006). In scoring the variables that form the
    basis of the sentencing guidelines, the trial court may consider all record evidence, including the PSIR,
    plea admissions, and testimony at a preliminary examination or trial. People v Johnson, 
    298 Mich App 128
    , 130-131; 
    826 NW2d 170
     (2012). In addition, “[t]he trial court may rely on reasonable inferences
    arising from the record evidence to sustain the scoring of an offense variable.” People v Horton, ___
    Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 360726); slip op at 2 (quotation marks and
    citations omitted). At the sentencing hearing, the court must “give each party an opportunity to explain,
    or challenge the accuracy or relevancy of, any information in the presentence report, and resolve any
    challenges in accordance with the procedure set forth in [MCR 6.425(D)(2)].” MCR 6.425(D)(1)(b).
    Either party may challenge the accuracy or relevancy of any information contained in the presentence
    report. MCL 771.14(6); MCR 6.425(E)(1)(b); People v Lloyd, 
    284 Mich App 703
    , 705-706; 
    774 NW2d 347
     (2009). If presented with a challenge to the factual accuracy of information, a court has a duty to
    resolve the challenge. People v Uphaus, 
    278 Mich App 174
    , 183-184; 
    748 NW2d 899
     (2008).
    OV 15 relates to “aggravated controlled substance offenses.” MCL 777.45(1). Fifty points are
    assessed for OV 15 when “[t]he offense involved traveling from another state or country to this state while
    in possession of any mixture containing a controlled substance classified in schedule 1 or 2[2] . . . with the
    intent to deliver that mixture in this state.” MCL 777.45(1)(d). For purposes of OV 15, “ ’[d]eliver’
    means the actual or constructive transfer of a controlled substance from 1 individual to another regardless
    of remuneration.” MCL 777.45(2)(a).
    “Offense variables must be scored giving consideration to the sentencing offense alone, unless
    otherwise provided in the particular variable.” People v McGraw, 
    484 Mich 120
    , 133; 
    771 NW2d 655
    (2009). MCL 777.45 does not otherwise provide such consideration. See People v Gray, 
    297 Mich App 22
    , 32; 
    824 NW2d 213
     (2012). Accordingly, when assessing OV 15, a sentencing court may examine
    only conduct related to the sentencing offense. 
    Id.
     Therefore, OV 15 “requires a court to separate the
    conduct forming the basis of the sentencing offense from the conduct forming the basis of an offense that
    was charged and later dismissed or dropped, regardless of the sequence in which the conduct transpired . . .
    .” Id. at 33-34. In other words, a trial court may not consider conduct resulting in dismissed charges that
    are not part of the sentencing offense when assessing points for OV 15 because “it would be fundamentally
    2
    Methamphetamine is a Schedule 1 controlled substance as defined by MCL 333.7212. See MCL
    333.7212(1)(h). Fentanyl is a Schedule 2 controlled substance as defined by MCL 333.7214. See MCL
    333.7214(b).
    -3-
    unfair to allow the prosecution to drop . . . a charge while brokering a plea bargain, then resurrect it at
    sentencing in another form.” See id. at 32 (quotation marks and citations omitted; citation clean up).
    The trial court below erred when it concluded that it was proper to assess 50 points for OV 15 on
    the basis of defendant’s intent to deliver controlled substances in this state. The offenses involved for
    purposes of OV 15 are the offenses to which defendant pleaded guilty, i.e., possession of
    methamphetamine and possession of less than 25 grams of fentanyl. Intent to distribute is not an element
    of either sentencing offense. See MCL 333.7403(1) (stating that a person “shall not knowingly or
    intentionally possess a controlled substance . . . .”); People v Hartuniewicz, 
    294 Mich App 237
    , 242; 
    816 NW2d 442
     (2011) (“MCL 333.7403(1) proscribes the knowing or intentional possession of a controlled
    substance unless obtained directly through a valid prescription or valid doctor’s order.”). Indeed, the
    original charges of possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine, MCL 333.7401(2)(b)(i), and
    possession with intent to deliver heroin, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), were dismissed as part of defendant’s
    plea agreement. Because a sentencing court must separate the conduct constituting the sentencing offense
    from the conduct constituting any counts that were dismissed under a plea bargain, Gray, 
    297 Mich App at 32
    , the trial court erred when it considered the conduct concerning defendant’s dismissed charges of
    possession with intent to deliver when scoring OV 15. See McGraw, 
    484 Mich at 133
    ; Gray, 
    297 Mich App at 32
    .
    Reducing defendant’s score for OV 15 to zero points results in a change in the applicable
    sentencing guidelines ranges. See MCL 777.65; MCL 777.68. Accordingly, defendant is entitled to
    resentencing on the basis of conduct related to the sentencing offense only. Francisco, 
    474 Mich at
    89 n
    8.
    B. PRV 5
    Defendant also argues that the trial court erred when it assessed 15 points for PRV 5 in reliance on
    the Indiana “MyCase” printouts purporting to show that defendant had two state misdemeanors from
    Indiana that were not listed in the PSIR, in addition to the three misdemeanors that were listed in the
    PSIR.3 We agree.
    PRV 5 addresses a defendant’s “prior misdemeanor convictions or prior misdemeanor juvenile
    adjudications.” MCL 777.55(1). Fifteen points are assessed for PRV 5 when “[t]he offender has 5 or 6
    prior misdemeanor convictions or prior misdemeanor juvenile adjudications.” MCL 777.55(1)(b). PRV
    5 is scored at 10 points when “[t]he offender has 3 or 4 prior misdemeanor convictions or prior
    misdemeanor juvenile adjudications.” MCL 777.55(1)(c). A prior misdemeanor conviction or prior
    misdemeanor juvenile adjudication should be considered “if it is an offense against a person or property,
    a controlled substance offense, or a weapon offense,” MCL 777.55(2)(a), or if it is an offense “for
    operating or attempting to operate a vehicle, vessel, ORV, snowmobile, aircraft, or locomotive while under
    the influence of or impaired by alcohol, a controlled substance, or a combination of alcohol and a
    controlled substance,” MCL 777.55(2)(b). Qualifying convictions or adjudications from other states
    3
    The “MyCase” printout is not part of the record and the transcript does not fully describe what “MyCase”
    is. It is likely that the prosecutor was referring to https://mycase.in.gov, which is the public court record
    database for the state of Indiana.
    -4-
    constitute prior misdemeanor convictions or adjudications for purposes of scoring PRV 5.               MCL
    777.55(3).
    The PSIR in this case did not include the two purported convictions from Indiana that the
    prosecutor believed should have been included when calculating the score for PRV 5. And while the trial
    court may rely on all record evidence when fashioning a sentence, Johnson, 
    298 Mich App at 130-131
    , it
    is not at all clear to this Court whether the MyCase printouts relied on by the prosecutor and trial court
    were official court records from a court in Indiana, as they are not part of the record transmitted from the
    trial court to this Court and were only shown to defendant and his attorney for the first time on the day of
    sentencing. The record does show that the prosecutor represented to the trial court that the printouts
    showed the criminal cases as in a “pending” status despite the purported convictions because, according
    to the prosecutor, “it appears it’s pending for a show cause for payments . . . .” (Emphasis added.) To
    the extent the prosecutor was relying on abstracts from https://mycase.in.gov, doing so would be improper
    as that site specifically cautions: “Information displayed on this site is not to be considered or used as an
    official court record and may contain errors or omissions. Accuracy of the information is not warranted.
    Official records of court proceedings may only be obtained directly from the court maintaining a particular
    record.” MyCase: Indiana Courts Case Search <https://mycase.in.gov> (accessed July 30, 2024). In light
    of the fact that the Court is otherwise remanding the case for resentencing defendant concerning OV 15,
    and given the ambiguities regarding the MyCase printouts submitted to the trial court, we also vacate
    defendant’s sentence to allow the parties to present record evidence concerning defendant’s criminal
    history in Indiana for the purpose of scoring PRV 5.
    C. PRV 6
    Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by scoring PRV 6 on the basis that he was on
    probation for one of the Indiana offenses not listed in the PSIR. A trial court should assess five points for
    PRV 6 when “[t]he offender is on probation or delayed sentence status or on bond awaiting adjudication
    or sentencing for a misdemeanor.” MCL 777.56(1)(d). The PSIR demonstrates that, at the time of
    defendant’s sentencing, he was on probation for leaving the scene of an accident, an offense that was listed
    in the PSIR and that defendant conceded should have been scored. Therefore, defendant has failed to
    establish a factual basis for his assertion that PRV 6 was improperly scored on the basis of his two Indiana
    offenses not listed on the PSIR. People v Carbin, 
    463 Mich 590
    , 600; 
    623 NW2d 884
     (2001).
    Defendant’s sentences are vacated and the case is remanded for resentencing consistent with this
    opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
    /s/ Brock A. Swartzle
    /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
    /s/ Adrienne N. Young
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 366053

Filed Date: 8/15/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/16/2024