Estate of Willie May Turnage v. Quincy Hall ( 2024 )

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARCUS L. DAVID, also known as MARCUS L. UNPUBLISHED
DAVIS, as Personal Representative of the ESTATE August 15, 2024
OF WILLIE MAY TURNAGE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 367950
Muskegon Circuit Court
QUINCY HALL and TOTAL CARE LC No. 2022-002291-NI
TRANSPORTATION, LLC,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and YOUNG, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of
defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(10), concluding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the
decedent suffered a “threshold injury” under MCL 500.3135 such that plaintiff could not maintain
his third-party lawsuit against defendants. However, because there were genuine issues of material
fact whether the decedent’s injury impaired her ability to lead a normal life, the trial court erred
when it granted defendants’ motion, and we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 17, 2019, the decedent, Willie May Turnage, was being transported for dialysis
treatment by defendant Quincy Hall, who was employed by defendant Total Care Transportation,
LLC. The decedent required assistance getting to dialysis because she had been in a wheelchair
since 2018 after experiencing weakness in her legs for several months, had previously been
diagnosed with dementia, and had three strokes in 2018 and 2019. On the return trip from the
dialysis center, Hall encountered a railroad track and brought the transportation van to a stop. Hall
claimed that as he was applying the breaks, he heard a noise from the back of the van and turned
to see the decedent “sloped” out of her wheelchair and noticed the security strap had worked itself
from her waist to underneath her armpits. Hall stated that he was able to resecure the decedent,
who did not complain of any injury, and returned her to her home.
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Plaintiff, the decedent’s grandson, testified however that when Hall and the decedent
returned to the house, Hall told plaintiff that he forgot to secure the strap around the decedent “and
she fell forward out of her wheelchair . . . .” Plaintiff stated that shortly after returning home, the
decedent complained of leg pain as plaintiff was placing her in her bed. It was then discovered
that the decedent’s left femur was broken. The decedent was immediately taken to the hospital
and underwent surgery. The decedent made a full recovery after approximately two months but
later died from complications related to COVID-19.
Plaintiff subsequently brought suit on behalf of the decedent’s estate, seeking to hold
defendants liable under theories of negligence and vicarious liability. Defendants moved for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that because the decedent was already
wheelchair-bound and suffering from dementia, plaintiff could not show that the injury to the
decedent’s leg impaired her ability to lead a normal life. The trial court agreed, stating:
She was in the wheelchair. When she was at home she could do the—There
was no indication that her hands or that—that she couldn’t do the puzzles because
of the broken femur. She’s in a hospital. She’s doing therapy. She’s doing what
she needs to do. She’s on pain medication.
* * *
Because she had a broken femur, it didn’t stop from visiting and having
communications with family and friends and that form of her life. And because,
you know, it’s the dementia is there, and she’s had that, and it goes back and forth,
I just—Reading and looking at the affidavit and all of the information that I have,
I just don’t see that it has met that threshold of a [sic] impairment of a bodily
function.
After the trial court entered its written order granting defendants’ motion, plaintiff moved
for reconsideration, which the trial court also denied. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.
Hastings Mut Ins Co v Grange Ins Co of Mich, 319 Mich App 579, 583; 903 NW2d 400 (2017).
“A motion for summary disposition made under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency
of the complaint.” Lockport Twp v Three Rivers, 319 Mich App 516, 519; 902 NW2d 430 (2017)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). “Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is
appropriate when, ‘[e]xcept as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law.’
” Id., quoting MCR 2.116(C)(10).
This Court also reviews de novo issues of statutory interpretation. Hastings Mut, 319 Mich
App at 583. When interpreting a statute, the Court’s goal is to “discern and give effect to the intent
of the Legislature.” Id. at 584 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “If the language of a statute
is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be enforced as written and no further judicial
construction is permitted.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
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III. ANALYSIS
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it granted defendants’ motion for
summary disposition because there was a genuine issue of material fact whether the decedent’s
injury affected her ability to lead a normal life. We agree.
An individual is “ ‘subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his or her
ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death,
serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.’ ” Patrick v Turkelson,
322 Mich App 595, 606; 913 NW2d 369 (2018), quoting MCL 500.3135(1). The term “serious
impairment of body function” means under the statute that the “impairment that satisfies all of the
following requirements”:
(a) It is objectively manifested, meaning it is observable or perceivable from
actual symptoms or conditions by someone other than the injured person.
(b) It is an impairment of an important body function, which is a body
function of great value, significance, or consequence to the injured person.
(c) It affects the injured person’s general ability to lead his or her normal
life, meaning it has had an influence on some of the person’s capacity to live in his
or her normal manner of living. Although temporal considerations may be relevant,
there is no temporal requirement for how long an impairment must last. This
examination is inherently fact and circumstance specific to each injured person,
must be conducted on a case-by-case basis, and requires comparison of the injured
person’s life before and after the incident. [MCL 500.3135(5).]
See also McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180, 195; 795 NW2d 517 (2010) (“[T]hree
prongs . . . are necessary to establish a ‘serious impairment of body function’: (1) an objectively
manifested impairment (2) of an important body function that (3) affects the person’s general
ability to lead his or her normal life.”).
Under the first prong—whether there is an objectively manifested impairment—the
plaintiff must present evidence of “actual symptoms or conditions that someone other than the
injured person would observe or perceive as impairing a body function.” McCormick, 487 Mich
at 196; see also MCL 500.3135(5)(a). The second prong—whether the impairment is of an
important bodily function—is “an inherently subjective inquiry that must be decided on a case-by-
case basis, because what may seem to be a trivial body function for most people may be
subjectively important to some, depending on the relationship of that function to the person’s life.”
Id. at 199; see also MCL 500.3135(5)(b). And under the third prong:
[T]he common understanding of to “affect the person’s ability to lead his or her
normal life” is to have an influence on some of the person’s capacity to live in his
or her normal manner of living. By modifying “normal life” with “his or her,” the
Legislature indicated that this requires a subjective, person- and fact-specific
inquiry that must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Determining the effect or
influence that the impairment has had on a plaintiff’s ability to lead a normal life
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necessarily requires a comparison of the plaintiff’s life before and after the incident.
[Id. at 202.]
See also MCL 500.3135(5)(c).
In Piccione v Gillette, 327 Mich App 16, 17; 932 NW2d 197 (2019), the injured claimant,
a three-year-old boy, was in a motor vehicle accident in which he broke his left shoulder. The boy
was given a sling and medicine for the pain, and “physically recovered” after three or four months.
Id. The trial court entered summary disposition in favor of defendants, concluding that because
the boy was able to make a full recovery, the injury “did not rise to the level of a serious impairment
to a body function.” Id. at 18. This Court reversed, stating that “a jury could conclude that
Gavino’s general ability to lead his normal life was affected by the impairment.” Id. at 22. We
noted:
In this case, Gavino was a three-year-old child at the time he suffered the
impairment. His parents testified that as a result of the impairment, he was unable
to go to school for approximately two weeks and that when he did return to school
he was unable to use the play equipment. Additionally, they testified that after the
accident they had to help him go to the bathroom, including by carrying him to the
bathroom. His father testified that before the accident, Gavino could dress himself,
but afterward he could not. There was also testimony that Gavino needed help
going up and down stairs because his balance was negatively affected by his
impairment. Further, at times, his ability to sleep without pain was also
compromised; his father testified that on occasion Gavino would wake up
complaining about shoulder pain. The record also reflects that before the accident
Gavino liked to color, but after the accident he did not want to do so. And before
the accident he rode his bicycle, played soccer, and played with his scooter in the
basement, but after he was injured he was unable to do so. His mother testified
that, generally, Gavino was “cautious” about physical activities after the accident.
[Id. at 21-22.]
The Court also highlighted that “a person’s ability to lead his or her general life does not have to
be destroyed in order to constitute a threshold injury; it only needs to have been affected . . . .” Id.
at 23 (emphasis added). Thus, the fact that the boy made a full recovery did not foreclose his
ability to recover under the statute. Id.As in Piccione, in this case there was a question of fact whether the decedent was able to
lead a normal life after the injury. Although it is undisputed that the decedent was in a wheelchair
and was generally immobile before the accident, the evidence presented by plaintiff showed that
after the accident, the decedent’s life was negatively affected. The decedent’s daughter, Susie
Davis, stated that before the accident, the decedent was able to get out of bed under her own power
but, as a result of the accident, could no longer move herself without assistance. Similarly, plaintiff
testified that the decedent had difficulty doing her exercises and was not as “engaged” as she was
before the accident. Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion that the injury “didn’t affect . . . her
life” because both before and after the accident, “she still was in a wheelchair and she wasn’t up
running around,” the testimony from both plaintiff and Susie raised an issue of fact whether the
accident “affected” the decedent’s mobility and general life after the accident. Similarly, the trial
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court erred when it concluded that “[b]ecause [the decedent] had a broken femur, it didn’t stop
[her] from visiting and having communications with family and friends and that form of her life.”
To the contrary, Susie claimed that the decedent was confined to her bed and could not spend time
with her family or outdoors as she did before the accident, both because of her need to be
hospitalized and the “extreme[] difficult[y]” moving her.
Defendants appear to make the argument that because the decedent was able to make a
complete recovery, her ability to lead a normal life was not affected. This argument is
unpersuasive, however, because the fact that the decedent was able to make a recovery within two
months of the accident is not dispositive. MCL 500.3135(5)(c) (“Although temporal
considerations may be relevant, there is no temporal requirement for how long an impairment must
last.”); see also Piccione, 327 Mich App at 23 (“[A] person’s ability to lead his or her general life
does not have to be destroyed in order to constitute a threshold injury; it only needs to have been
affected, and here the evidence allows for an inference that Gavino’s general ability to lead his
normal life was affected even though it was not completely destroyed.”). Defendants also argue
that the evidence that the decedent was suffering from a variety of complications and illnesses
before the accident required entry of summary disposition on their behalf. While it is true that
before the accident the decedent was wheelchair-bound and had general lower extremity weakness
that required physical therapy, there was also evidence that the issues worsened as a result of the
accident. Both plaintiff and Susie described the decedent’s decrease in energy and inability to
accomplish basic tasks, such as getting out of bed, as a result of the accident. Although defendants
argue these impacts are de minimis, the statute simply requires that the injury “affected” the
decedent’s ability to lead a normal life. See MCL 500.3135(5)(c).
In sum, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact
whether the decedent’s injury affected her ability to lead a normal life, and the trial court erred
when it granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition on the issue.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction. Plaintiff, as the prevailing party, may tax costs. MCR 7.219(A).
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Adrienne N. Young
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