Janey M Grier v. Township of Koylton ( 2024 )

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JANEY M GRIER, UNPUBLISHED
August 29, 2024
Petitioner-Appellant,
v No. 366221
Tax Tribunal
TOWNSHIP OF KOYLTON, LC No. 22-002774-TT
Respondent-Appellee.
Before: REDFORD, P.J., and GADOLA, C.J., and RIORDAN, J.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner Janey Grier appeals as of right the Tax Tribunal’s May 3, 2023 final opinion and
judgment setting the value of the subject property for tax year 2022 at $290,000 true cash value
(TCV), $145,000 state equalized value (SEV), and $145,000 taxable value (TV). 1 On appeal,
petitioner argues that the Tribunal erred by rejecting her contentions of $222,000 TCV, $111,000
SEV, and $111,000 TV for the subject property. Respondent Koylton Township participated
below and on appeal. For the reasons set forth, we affirm.
I. FACTS
On July 23, 2022, petitioner filed her petition in the Tribunal, alleging that “[t]he current
assessed value and taxable value for 2022 are too high because they do not reflect the true cash
value of our property. There are unusual conditions for the area, the values do not take into account
our location, topography, historic use, and type of land.” Petitioner explained that the subject
1
To be precise, the subject property consists of two adjacent parcels, a 40-acre parcel and a 41.13-
acre parcel. The Tribunal set the values for the former parcel at $144,000 TCV, $72,000 SEV,
and $72,000 TV, while it set the values for the latter parcel at $146,000 TCV, $73,000 SEV, and
$73,000 TV. For ease of discussion, we will treat the two parcels as being singularly valued unless
otherwise appropriate.
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property, which is in Tuscola County, currently had a TV of $137,900 for tax year 2022, but she
believed that it should have a TV of $111,000.
On August 5, 2022, respondent answered the petition, alleging as follows:
The property was purchased in August, 2021 for $290,000 for both parcels,
totaling 81.13 acres. The two parcels together are assessed for a cash value of
$275,800. They are assessed for less than they were just purchased for on the open
market. The assessments are consistent with other similar property in the township.
Respondent urged the Tribunal to affirm the board of review’s assessment of the subject
property at $137,900 TV. This amounted to a TCV of $3,400 per acre.
On March 7, 2023, petitioner filed her hearing brief and exhibits in support. In relevant
part, petitioner identified 10 comparable sales between September 2019 and June 2021 of
properties between 70 and 80 acres. According to petitioner, when her purchase of the subject
property in August 2021 was added to the list of comparable sales, the average price per acre was
$2,823.46. Petitioner argued that in light of the comparable sales, as well as the fact that the subject
property was near “blight” and a loud bed-and-breakfast, the current TCV of $3,400 per acre
should be reduced to $2,750 per acre.
Respondent filed its hearing evidence a few weeks later. The appraisal, which was
prepared for the Tribunal proceedings, used seven comparable sales between August 2020 and
December 2021 of properties between 40 and 102 acres. The average sales price per acre ranged
between $2,750 and $5,103. Given these comparable sales, respondent valued the subject property
at $3,500 per acre, for a total of $284,000, as of December 31, 2021.2
Petitioner filed supplemental evidence shortly before the hearing to rebut respondent’s
evidence. The supplemental evidence included photographs of a storage shed, cabin, and water
well on the subject property, as well as additional documentation about some of respondent’s
comparable sales in its appraisal.
The Tribunal held a hearing on April 3, 2023, during which the parties argued consistently
with their respective briefs and evidence. Relevant for this appeal, respondent noted that during
its investigation of the subject property for these proceedings, it discovered that the subject
property was improved with various structures:
[Petitioner] also went through and said several times in the rebuttal that her
parcel has no improvements. And that is factually untrue. You can talk about the
quality of construction and how much value they had in your opinion, but there are
improvements on your property. There is a well. There is a storage shed, and there
is a second building.
2
As explained infra, the increase in TCV by respondent apparently was due to the fact that it
discovered improvements on the land while these proceedings were ongoing.
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The question is, is it a shed, is it a cabin, is it what -- I don't know exactly,
and that’s in the eye of the beholder. But to suggest or to say that there are no
improvements is factually untrue. So it’s important that we realize that there are
improvements on the property that have not been referenced on the assessor roll in
years past because there were not permits and I had no access to the property.
On May 3, 2023, the Tribunal issued its final opinion and judgment, determining as
follows. First, the Tribunal rejected petitioner’s supplemental evidence, explaining:
Petitioner’s supplementary documentary evidence and testimony is not
consistent or persuasive. As noted in the Findings of Fact, the subject’s contiguous
adjoining parcel is not landlocked; this parcel adjoins the parcel that has road
frontage and road access on English Road. Second, the subject property is
improved with a one room structure that has a wall mounted space heater (as shown
on the Realcomp MLS submitted by Respondent). The MLS listing described a
property that has woods, a lake and semi-privacy for recreational enthusiasts. The
subject parcels are more than just vacant land. Third, the Tribunal is not persuaded
that the subject parcels are located in an area of alleged blight. Again, description
of the subject property as well as the sales data presented by both parties indicates
that the subject market area is positively influenced by residential, recreational, and
agricultural development. Fourth, articles referencing marijuana grow operations
(electrical use) for proposed township ordinances in the future are not relevant to
the December 31, 2021 tax day. Moreover, the issue of marijuana growers in the
township does not appear to have deterred Petitioner from the purchase of the
subject parcels in August 2021. Fifth, the unpublished MTT opinion (Docket No.
19-000567) was presented without any application or analysis to the present case.
Other than that FOJ involving a property in Tuscola County, the Tribunal is unable
to ascertain or assume the application of that case in this present tax appeal matter.
For these reasons, Petitioner’s ancillary documentation is given no weight or
credibility in the independent determination of market value for the subject
property. [Footnotes omitted.]
Second, the Tribunal rejected most of petitioner’s comparable sales, explaining:
Regarding Petitioner’s summary of Tuscola County vacant land sales
(Petitioner’s Exhibit E), the sales data is a customary presentation. However, the
sales data has limitations. First, as challenged by Respondent, Petitioner’s sales
were not adjusted to the subject. Said differently, the sales were not compared or
contrasted to the subject through qualitative or quantitative analysis. Petitioner’s
conclusory statements for her sales data pale in comparison to Petitioner’s rebuttal
analysis of Respondent’s comparable sales. Second, Petitioner’s 2019 and 2020
sales are too far removed from the December 31, 2021 tax day. Again, without any
adjustments or explanatory narration, these sales are not relevant for analysis.
Third, Petitioner’s remaining sales occurring in 2021 are similar to the subject in
acreage and location. However, the sale located on McGregory Road involved
conservancy land and was not analyzed relative to the subject’s characteristics and
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amenities. Fourth, Petitioner derived an average from sale prices, acres, and net
acres to an average $/acre. Reconciliation of data is more than a calculation. . . .
Third, the Tribunal largely accepted respondent’s appraisal, explaining:
Respondent’s sales comparison approach is a conventional framework for a
comparative analysis. Contrary to Petitioner’s challenges, this comparative
analysis is the most reliable and credible valuation evidence in this tax appeal
matter. First, [Respondent’s] comparative analysis includes adjustments for note
differences between the comparable sales and the subject property. Petitioner’s
dislike for Respondent’s alleged lack of adjustments is disingenuous given the fact
that Petitioner did not develop a comparative analysis with any adjustments.
Second, Respondent’s comparative sales include four sales with tillable acreage
and three sales without tillable acreage. Moreover, Respondent has adjusted those
superior tillable acreage sales downward to the subject. Again, comparing and
contrasting characteristics and amenities is acceptable valuation methodology.
Three, in like fashion, Respondent has analyzed sales with superior and inferior
acreage to the subject. Sales 1 and 2 are similar to the subject in acreage; sales 3,
5, 6 and 7 have smaller acreage; and sale 4 is superior to the subject in acreage.
Valuation practice does not mandate that comparable sales must have exact and
precise features. Perfect comparable sales are always preferred but comparable
sales are not always perfect to a subject property. Fourth, as a matter of fact, the
subject’s improvements were properly analyzed by Respondent. As noted, the
subject’s MLS listing and photographs are detailed (interior and exterior
photographs) of the subject cabin. Respondent’s photographs evidence is more
persuasive than Petitioner’s photographs (which exclude interior photographs) of
the subject’s cabin. Sales 1, 3, 5, 6, and 7 are adjusted upward to the subject. Sales
2 and 4 are adjusted downward to the subject. . . .
Accordingly, as noted, the Tribunal set the value of the subject property for tax year 2022
at $290,000 TCV, $145,000 SEV, and $145,000 TV.
This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for Tax Tribunal cases is multifaceted. Where fraud
is not claimed, this Court reviews the tribunal’s decision for misapplication of the
law or adoption of a wrong principle. We deem the tribunal’s factual findings
conclusive if they are supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence
on the whole record. But when statutory interpretation is involved, this Court
reviews the tribunal’s decision de novo. [Wexford Med Group v City of Cadillac,
474 Mich 192, 201-202; 713 NW2d 734 (2006) (quotation marks and citations
omitted).]
III. VALUATION
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Petitioner argues that the Tribunal erred by determining that the subject property’s TCV
was $290,000 for tax year 2022 and, relatedly, that the SEV and TV were incorrectly determined
as well. In support of this argument, petitioner raises four specific contentions. First, petitioner
contends that the Tribunal failed to recognize that the proper date of valuation for the 2022 tax
year was December 31, 2021. Second, petitioner contends that the Tribunal erred by relying on
respondent’s appraisal because the appraisal “combined both residential and agricultural real
property classifications as a basis for its independent determination of the Subject Property’s true
cash value.” Third, petitioner contends that the Tribunal erred by failing to treat her comparable
sales in the same manner as respondent’s comparable sales because, according to petitioner,
respondent failed to properly adjust its comparable sales to account for differences with the subject
property. Fourth, petitioner contends that the Tribunal erred by determining that the subject
property’s sale price in 2021 equaled its TCV. We disagree with each of the petitioner’s
contentions.
“With respect to general valuation principles in the Tax Tribunal, the petitioner has the
burden to establish the true cash value of property.” President Inn Props, LLC v City of Grand
Rapids, 291 Mich App 625, 631; 806 NW2d 342 (2011). “Nevertheless, because Tax Tribunal
proceedings are de novo in nature, the Tax Tribunal has a duty to make an independent
determination of true cash value.” Id.TCV is “the usual selling price of a given piece of property between a willing buyer and a
willing seller . . . .” Meadowlanes Ltd Dividend Housing Ass’n v City of Holland, 437 Mich 473,
484; 473 NW2d 636 (1991) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The sales-comparison
approach indicates true cash value by analyzing recent sales of similar properties, comparing them
with the subject property, and adjusting the sales price of the comparable properties to reflect
differences between the two properties.” Id. at 485 n 19. In any event, “the final value
determination must represent the usual price for which the subject property would sell.” Id. at 485.
The Tribunal’s finding that the TCV of the subject property was $290,000 for tax year 2022
was supported by substantial evidence. Initially, while the fact that the subject property was
purchased by petitioner for $290,000 in August 2021 in an arm’s-length transaction does not
conclusively establish that the TCV is $290,000, it does provide a helpful starting point. Moreover,
as the Tribunal correctly noted, respondent’s appraisal, which identified a slightly lower figure of
$284,000, reasonably considered comparable sales. The few comparable sales that consisted of
agricultural land were substantially adjusted downward to match the residential nature of the
subject property. Respondent made other adjustments as well, including, for example, whether the
comparable property had an improved driveway. We ultimately agree with the Tribunal that “the
subject’s purchase price is commensurate with the subject market . . . .”
The four contrary arguments raised by petitioner are meritless. First, the Tribunal complied
with MCL 211.2(2) by determining the TCV for tax year 2022 by identifying the TCV as of
December 31, 2021. This is shown by the fact that the Tribunal repeatedly referenced December
31, 2021, as the relevant “tax day,” as well as the fact that the appraisal expressly reflected
December 31, 2021, as the relevant valuation date.
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Second, while the appraisal submitted by respondent did include comparable sales for both
agricultural and residential land, as noted, the agricultural land was adjusted downward to reflect
the reality that the subject property is residential in nature.3 Thus, no error occurred in this regard.
Third, the Tribunal reasonably considered the comparable sales submitted by both parties
but concluded that the ones submitted by respondent were more credible. The Tribunal was correct
that only respondent adjusted its comparable sales. Moreover, the Tribunal also was correct that
most of petitioner’s comparable sales were from 2019 and 2020, rendering them minimally
relevant for the tax date of December 31, 2021. The Tribunal was within its discretion to consider
these facts and accord more weight to respondent’s appraisal than petitioner’s unadjusted list of
land sales in the area.
Fourth, the Tribunal did not conclusively determine that the TCV of the subject property
was its sale price. See Antisdale v City of Galesburg, 420 Mich 265, 278; 362 NW2d 632 (1984)
(“The rule in Michigan, as in many other states, is that the selling price of a particular piece of
property is not conclusive as evidence of the value of that piece of property.”). The Tribunal
instead considered the sale price as a relevant fact, and then considered other evidentiary items,
such as respondent’s appraisal and the photographs of the subject property submitted by the parties,
to reach its ultimate conclusion. In other words, while the Tribunal is prohibited from
3
In separate proceedings, petitioner argued in the state tax commission (STC) that the subject
property should be classified as “agricultural real,” not “residential real.” The STC disagreed,
reasoning that the record does not show that petitioner was “actively farming currently,” and “a
majority of the land is wooded.” This Court recently affirmed that finding in an unpublished
opinion, stating as follows:
Given our limited scope of review, we find that the STC’s determination
that the subject property be classified as residential real for the 2022 tax year was
authorized by law. Grier’s evidence of agricultural use focused on activities in
2022 (which is the 2023 tax year), not 2021 (which is the 2022 tax year). Grier
failed to satisfy her burden to demonstrate that the property should be classified as
agricultural for the 2022 tax year pursuant to MCL 211.34c(2)(a). The STC’s
decision that there was not adequate evidence to support an agricultural
classification of the subject property for the 2022 tax year followed the lawful
procedure set forth in MCL 211.34c(6), was not in violation of a statute, and was
within the STC’s authority and jurisdiction. . . . [Grier v State Tax Comm’n,
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 23, 2024
(Docket No. 365849), at 10.]
Given that petitioner has taken seemingly inconsistent positions—arguing that the subject property
is residential in nature for the purposes of this case but arguing that the subject property is
agricultural in nature for the purposes of the separate case—it is understandable that respondent’s
appraisal included comparable sales for both residential land and agricultural land.
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automatically assuming that a property’s TCV is equal to its sale price, it is not prohibited from
considering all of the evidence to reach that same conclusion. No error occurred.
For these reasons, we conclude that the Tribunal did not misapply the law or adopt a wrong
principle when it determined the taxable value of the subject property, and its decision in this
regard was supported by substantial evidence.
IV. JURISDICTION
Petitioner argues that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to add the value of the previously
unidentified structures to the TCV of the subject property for tax year 2022. According to
petitioner, under MCL 211.154, only the STC has jurisdiction to add omitted real property to a tax
valuation. Alternatively, petitioner argues that the structures are not an improvement to the subject
property because they are not “annexed to the realty.” We disagree.
MCL 211.154 provides, in relevant part:
(1) If the state tax commission determines that property subject to the
collection of taxes under this act . . . has been incorrectly reported or omitted for
any previous year, but not to exceed the current assessment year and 2 years
immediately preceding the date the incorrect reporting or omission was discovered
and disclosed to the state tax commission, the state tax commission shall place the
corrected assessment value for the appropriate years on the appropriate assessment
roll. The state tax commission shall issue an order certifying to the treasurer of the
local tax collecting unit if the local tax collecting unit has possession of a tax roll
for a year for which an assessment change is made or the county treasurer if the
county has possession of a tax roll for a year for which an assessment change is
made the amount of taxes due as computed by the correct annual rate of taxation
for each year except the current year.
***
(7) A person to whom property is assessed under this section may appeal
the state tax commission’s order to the Michigan tax tribunal.
MCL 211.154 “confer[s] administrative jurisdiction on the STC to correct erroneous
property tax assessments in specific limited circumstances. Specifically, the STC may correct an
assessment value that results in an assessment change.” Superior Hotels, LLC v Mackinaw Twp,
282 Mich App 621, 630; 765 NW2d 31 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). That is, it
confers “jurisdiction to correct assessment values for any previous year, but not to exceed the
current assessment year and 2 years immediately preceding the date the incorrect reporting or
omission was discovered and disclosed to the state tax commission.” Id. (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
In this case, the Tribunal briefly referenced “the subject’s improvements” in its final
opinion and judgment. From that reference, petitioner infers that the Tribunal increased its TCV
of the subject property on the basis of the newly discovered storage shed, cabin, and water well,
which apparently had existed on the subject property for several years without respondent’s
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knowledge. Petitioner argues that under MCL 211.154, only the STC had jurisdiction to consider
that omitted property.
This argument misses the mark. It is true, as petitioner asserts, that MCL 211.154 provides
that the STC has jurisdiction to correct a tax roll when property “has been incorrectly reported or
omitted.” MCL 211.154(1). However, this statute concerns situations in which a previous tax roll
has been underreported on the basis of omitted property. In Superior Hotels, for example, the
municipality sought to retroactively correct the taxable value of commercial real estate for tax
years 2001 to 2003. Superior Hotels, 282 Mich App at 623. This case, in contrast, simply concerns
the most recent tax year available before the Tribunal, tax year 2022. Thus, there was no tax roll
to be corrected; rather, the tax roll was to be determined in the first instance. As a result, the
Tribunal did not exceed its jurisdiction by deciding this case.4
Petitioner alternatively argues that the storage shed and cabin cannot be taxed because they
are on blocks and, therefore, are not attached to the land. Under MCL 211.2(1)(a), “[f]or the
purpose of taxation, real property includes . . . [a]ll land within this state, all buildings and fixtures
on the land, and all appurtenances to the land, except as expressly exempted by law.” We are
inclined to agree with petitioner that the storage shed and cabin are not “fixtures on the land”
because they are not annexed to the realty. See Morris v Alexander, 208 Mich 387, 390; 175 NW
264 (1919). However, the storage shed and the cabin satisfy any reasonable definition of
“building.” And, this Court has explained that a “building” may be taxable under MCL 211.2(1)(a)
regardless of whether it is affixed to the soil. See Schultz v Denton Twp, 252 Mich App 528, 532;
652 NW2d 692 (2002) (“We note that neither MCL § 125.1041 nor MCL § 211.2a makes a mobile
home’s attachment to the soil an issue in determining its status as real property for purposes of
taxation.”). In any event, a review of the Tribunal’s decision indicates that its valuation was almost
exclusively based upon the comparable sales discussed by the parties, and that it did not accord
significant weight to the value of these outdated structures.
V. SUPPLEMENTAL EVIDENCE
Petitioner argues that the Tribunal erred when it determined that her supplemental evidence
was not “consistent or persuasive.” Petitioner asserts that each of the five reasons identified by
the Tribunal in this regard was factually erroneous, and that the Tribunal should have considered
her supplemental evidence to reduce the subject property’s tax valuation. We disagree and will
address each reason identified by the Tribunal and discussed by petitioner in turn.
First, the Tribunal stated that “the subject’s contiguous adjoining parcel is not landlocked;
this parcel adjoins the parcel that has road frontage and road access on English Road.” This is a
correct statement. While the north parcel itself does not have direct access to a public road, the
south parcel does have such access. And, because petitioner purchased the two parcels together,
it was reasonable for the Tribunal to consider the entire subject property as having access to a
public road.
4
Petitioner suggests that the Tribunal erred under MCL 211.27a as well. We disagree. Because
the TV of the subject property equaled its SEV, the Tribunal complied with MCL 211.27a(3).
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Second, the Tribunal stated that “[t]he subject parcels are more than just vacant land.” This
also is a correct statement. The subject property has woods and a lake, as well as structures that
may be used, at a minimum, for storage. While petitioner suggests that the structures actually
devalue the subject property because they are so dilapidated as to require removal, the Tribunal
was within its discretion to find otherwise in light of the pictures submitted by both parties.
Third, the Tribunal stated that it was “not persuaded that the subject parcels are located in
an area of alleged blight.” This was a reasonable finding. While petitioner submits some
photographic evidence indicating that a property across the street from the subject property has
older vehicles on the lawn, these photographs do not demonstrate that the entire area is blighted,
such that a reduction in valuation is warranted.
Fourth, the Tribunal stated that “articles referencing marijuana grow operations (electrical
use) for proposed township ordinances in the future are not relevant to the December 31, 2021 tax
day.”5 According to petitioner, the Tribunal erred because it “focused on the proposed ordinance,
rather than the reason for the ordinance.” Petitioner explains that she “provided evidence of
unusual pricing activity and unusual buyer demand due to an influx of marijuana growers.” We
struggle to follow this argument. If it is true, as petitioner suggests, that respondent and other
nearby areas are having land purchased by marijuana growers, it would seem that marijuana
growers, given the recent growth of the marijuana industry within our state, would be providing
an upward force on prices, not a downward force on prices. Alternatively, if petitioner is
concerned that the proposed ordinance would have a downward force on prices because marijuana
growers would be driven away, we agree with the Tribunal that the proposed ordinance was too
attenuated from the December 31, 2021 tax day to be accorded significance.
Fifth, the Tribunal stated that “the unpublished MTT opinion (Docket No. 19-000567) was
presented without any application or analysis to the present case.” We have reviewed that opinion,
which was presented to the Tribunal in the instant case, and find it irrelevant to the issues at hand.
The Tribunal did not err by disregarding it.
Accordingly, the Tribunal did not err by determining that petitioner’s supplemental
evidence “is not consistent or persuasive.”
VI. UNPRESERVED ISSUES
Finally, petitioner argues that respondent violated her procedural due-process rights when
it failed to preserve and produce minutes from the board of review meeting, and that respondent
violated various statutes and constitutional provisions when it failed to properly respond to her
request to have the subject property reclassified from residential to agricultural. However, we
decline to address these issues for the same reasons that the panel declined to address similar issues
in the related case:
5
Petitioner submitted to the Tribunal a January 2022 news article indicating that respondent was
considering a “proposed ordinance governing electrical use above 200 amps” to limit large-scale
electrical use for illegal marijuana growing operations.
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Finally, because Grier did not raise the constitutional due process or equal
protection issues before the STC or the circuit court, those issues are not preserved
and we are not obligated to consider them. Tolas Oil & Gas Exploration Co v Bach
Servs & Mfg, LLC, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No.
359090); slip op at 2-3 (“In civil cases, Michigan follows the ‘raise or waive’ rule
of appellate review.”) (cleaned up). We will generally decline to address
unpreserved issues unless the failure to do so would result in manifest injustice, the
issue involves a question of law and the facts necessary for its resolution have been
presented, or resolving the issue is necessary to properly determine the case. Id. at
___; slip op at 3. Our Supreme Court has cautioned that this discretion should be
exercised sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances. Napier v Jacobs, 429
Mich 222, 233-234, 414 NW2d 862 (1987). We decline to exercise our discretion
here. [Grier v State Tax Comm’n, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of
Appeals, issued May 23, 2024 (Docket No. 365849), at 11.]
Simply put, because the issues raised by petitioner are unpreserved, we decline to address them.
VII. CONCLUSION
There were no errors in the Tribunal proceedings below. Therefore, we affirm.
/s/ James Robert Redford
/s/ Michael F. Gadola
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
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