In Re Christopher Bibbs Jr ( 2023 )

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re CHRISTOPHER BIBBS, JR., Minor.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED
September 28, 2023
Petitioner-Appellee,
V No. 362217
Wayne Circuit Court
CHRISTOPHER BIBBS, JR., Family Division
LC No. 2016-522864-DJ
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and M.J. KELLY and CAMERON, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals by right the trial court’s May 27, 2022 judgment of sentence, which
revoked an earlier order delaying sentence, and imposed a sentence of 50 to 120 months’
imprisonment, with credit for 1,489 days served, for a 2016 carjacking conviction, MCL
750.529a.1 For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In two separate incidents in the summer of 2016, respondent, then 14 years old, and another
juvenile allegedly committed carjackings. The prosecution filed two petitions, each alleging that
respondent committed one count of carjacking, MCL 750.529a, and one count of armed robbery,
MCL 750.529. The petitions asserted that respondent came within the jurisdiction of the family
division of the circuit court under MCL 712A.2.2 Pursuant to MCL 712A.2d(1), the prosecution
1
As used in this opinion, “trial court” or “court” refers to the family division of the circuit court
unless a different tribunal is specified. See MCR 3.903(4); MCL 712A.1(e).
2
Under MCL 712A.2(a)(1), “The court has jurisdiction over a juvenile 14 years of age or older
who is charged with a specified juvenile violation only if the prosecuting attorney files a petition
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designated respondent to be tried as an adult.3 Respondent and his juvenile codefendant eventually
pleaded guilty to one count of carjacking in one petition in exchange for dismissal of the other
counts and the other petition. The trial court accepted respondent’s plea and entered a judgment
of conviction.
In October 2016, the trial court held a dispositional hearing4 and formulated a sentence of
35 to 180 months’ imprisonment for respondent’s carjacking conviction. However, the trial court
delayed imposing the sentence, and ordered that respondent be subject to juvenile probation in a
level-two (out-of-home) placement. See MCL 712A.18(1)(o).5 The terms of his probation
included that respondent not violate the criminal law of any unit of government.
Respondent was thereafter placed in a secure level-two residential facility, where he
received therapeutic and educational services. By February 2018, he successfully completed the
program requirements, and the trial court, pursuant to a petition, deescalated respondent to
placement in a nonsecure facility.6 In September 2018, after completing the nonsecure facility’s
in the court instead of authorizing a complaint and warrant.” Carjacking, MCL 750.529a, is a
specified juvenile violation. See MCL 712A.2d(9)(a); MCR 3.903(D)(8)(k).
3
Under MCL 712A.2d(1), “In a petition or amended petition alleging that a juvenile is within the
court’s jurisdiction under [MCL 712A.2(a)(1)] for a specified juvenile violation, the prosecuting
attorney may designate the case as a case in which the juvenile is to be tried in the same manner
as an adult.” See also MCR 3.903(D)(6).
4
“A dispositional hearing is conducted to determine what measures the court will take with respect
to a juvenile . . . once the court has determined following trial or plea that the juvenile has
committed an offense.” MCR 3.943(A). Following a conviction of a violation of a designated
offense, including carjacking, MCL 750.529a, the trial court must enter a disposition or impose
sentence. MCL 712A.2d(8); MCR 3.955(A).
5
Under MCL 712A.18(1)(o), “[t]he court may delay imposing a sentence of imprisonment . . . for
a period not longer than the period during which the court has jurisdiction over the juvenile . . . by
entering an order of disposition delaying imposition of sentence and placing the juvenile on
probation upon the terms and conditions it considers appropriate . . . .” See also MCR 3.955(D).
If the court orders a delayed sentence, it retains jurisdiction to impose an adult sentence. See MCL
712A.18i(1). The court may commit the juvenile to a “public institution, county facility, institution
operated as an agency of the court or county, or agency authorized by law to receive
juveniles . . . .” MCL 712A.18(1)(e).
6
A trial court with jurisdiction over a juvenile must hold periodic dispositional review hearings.
See MCR 3.945(A); MCL 712A.18d. Additionally, under MCL 712A.18i, which applies if the
trial court delays imposing sentence, MCL 712A.18(1)(o), the court is required to periodically
review the juvenile’s probation, including the services provided, placement, and progress, and to
determine whether the juvenile has been rehabilitated or presents a serious risk to public safety.
MCL 712A.18i(2) (“The court may order changes in the juvenile’s probation based on the review
including but not limited to imposition of the sentence.”) and (3) (“[T]he court shall conduct a
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program requirements, respondent was further deescalated to placement in his mother’s home,
with continued services in place.7
Beginning in December 2018, respondent began testing positive for marijuana. Several
months later, he stopped complying with drug screens altogether and was no longer meeting with
his case manager. In November 2019, respondent, who was then 17 years old, “went AWOL”
(absent without leave of the court) in violation of his probation after failing to appear at two court
hearings and a psychiatric evaluation. In response to a petition filed by respondent’s case manager,
the trial court authorized level-two probation for inpatient substance abuse treatment.
Subsequently, the court ordered that respondent be apprehended and detained. Respondent
remained AWOL for approximately 16 months.
During his AWOL status, respondent was arrested in Detroit, in March 2021, and charged
with domestic violence, which, according to respondent’s mother, stemmed from an altercation
between respondent and the mother of his child. Respondent’s arrest resulted in adult felony
charges in Wayne Circuit Court, including two counts of felonious assault, MCL 750.82, and two
counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b.8
Additionally, in December 2020 or January 2021, respondent was arrested in Ohio on other felony
charges.
In August 2021, the trial court held a hearing to determine whether to extend its jurisdiction
over respondent until he turned 21.9 At that time, respondent, then 19 years old, remained detained
on the felony charges pending in Wayne Circuit Court, and also had a “writ of apprehension” for
the outstanding Ohio charges. Respondent’s attorney moved to dismiss his juvenile case on the
basis that he had attained age 19 and had pending matters in adult court, while the prosecution
asked the court to extend its jurisdiction over respondent and impose a sentence under MCL
712A.18i(3) and (7). The trial court extended its jurisdiction over respondent until he reached age
21, explaining that respondent “was adjudicated on a serious offense, carjacking, he did not
complete probationary services, he went AWOL from court jurisdiction, and has incurred multiple
police contacts and 2 arrests[.]” The trial court further contended that respondent “ha[d] not been
rehabilitated and continue[d] to present a serious risk to public safety.” The trial court did not
review hearing to determine whether the juvenile has been rehabilitated and whether the juvenile
presents a serious risk to public safety.”). See also MCR 3.956(A)(1)(a)(i).
7
Pursuant to MCL 712A.18(1)(b), the trial court may “[p]lace the juvenile on probation, or under
supervision in the juvenile’s own home or in the home of an adult who is related to the juvenile.”
8
A subsequently filed Presentence Investigation Report indicates that these offenses occurred on
October 15, 2020, in which case respondent would have been 18 years old.
9
In a designated case such as this one, the trial court’s jurisdiction may be extended until a juvenile
reaches age 21. See MCR 712A.2a(5).
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immediately decide whether to impose a sentence of incarceration, but continued the proceedings
for a hearing on a probation-violation petition.10
In February 2022, respondent, pursuant to his guilty plea to the pending felonious-assault
and felony-firearm charges, was sentenced in Wayne Circuit Court as a youthful trainee under the
Holmes Youthful Trainee Act (HYTA), MCL 762.11 et seq., to serve 14 months’ to 4 years’
imprisonment for the felonious-assault conviction, and two years’ consecutive imprisonment for
the felony-firearm conviction, with credit for 324 days served.
In May 2022, following several continuances, the trial court held the hearing on the
probation-violation petition. Respondent’s case manager testified that, although respondent was
initially compliant with his probation terms and did everything asked of him, he ultimately failed
to comply when he “went AWOL” in November 2019, incurred additional criminal charges, used
marijuana, and stopped his regular school attendance. Respondent’s case manager opined that 2
to 4 years in prison was sufficient “for the time he has served at juvenile[.]” She recommended
that respondent’s juvenile case be terminated, because he could not receive attendant services
while he was in the custody of the Department of Corrections on the adult charges.
The prosecution asked the trial court to sentence respondent as an adult for his 2016
carjacking conviction. Respondent’s attorney asked the trial court instead to close out the juvenile
case and “just let him serve out” his current HYTA sentence, on the grounds that respondent would
have the opportunity to benefit from services, including earning his GED and learning a trade,
while serving the HYTA sentence.
The trial court revoked the delayed sentence and imposed a sentence of 50 months’ to 10
years’ imprisonment, with credit for 1,489 days served,11 to run concurrently to his felonious-
assault sentence. The court recognized that respondent was a “very young person,” but “had
numerous difficulties while on delayed sentence status,” including being AWOL for 16 months,
and having police contact in both Ohio and Wayne County, the latter being where he incurred the
felonious-assault and felony-firearm charges in violation of his probation. The court further
recognized that it did not have “a lot of options” because respondent was incarcerated on the adult
charges at the time. In imposing imprisonment, the court explained that respondent “clearly
violated the delayed sentence,” but that “he has a lot of potential,” and that “the adult court did
give him some opportunity by allowing him to have HYTA status.” The court further explained
that “on a practical level [his sentence] isn’t going to add any . . . significant amount of time to the
sentence that he’s serving for the felonious assault because the felonious assault is 14 . . . months to
4 years,” and the instant “minimum on this sentence is going to be barely above the credit that he’s
10
MCL 712A.18i(9) and (10) permits the trial court to impose sentence where a juvenile violates
probation. See also MCR 3.956(B)(1) and (2). MCR 3.944(C) governs the probation violation
hearing. See MCR 3.956(B)(3).
11
Under MCL 712A.18i(11), a juvenile must receive credit for time served on probation.
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entitled to on this sentence.” The court added, however, that the new sentence’s maximum of 10
years would extend the period during which respondent would be subject to supervision.
II. ANALYSIS
Respondent argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his delayed
sentence and imposing a sentence of imprisonment. We disagree.12
Pursuant to MCL 712A.18(1)(o), the trial court initially delayed sentencing respondent as
an adult for his carjacking conviction and ordered juvenile probation. MCL 712A.18i applies
where the trial court delays sentencing. See MCL 712A.18(1)(o). Under MCL 712A.18i(1), the
trial court retains jurisdiction to sentence a juvenile as an adult any time during the delayed
sentence.
MCL 712A.18i(3) governs review hearings in delayed-sentence cases:
If the court entered an order of disposition under section 18(1)(o) of this
chapter delaying imposition of sentence, the court shall conduct a review hearing
to determine whether the juvenile has been rehabilitated and whether the juvenile
presents a serious risk to public safety. If the court determines that the juvenile has
not been rehabilitated or that the juvenile presents a serious risk to public safety,
jurisdiction over the juvenile shall be continued or the court may impose sentence.
In making this determination, the court shall consider the following:
(a) The extent and nature of the juvenile’s participation in education,
counseling, or work programs.
(b) The juvenile’s willingness to accept responsibility for prior behavior.
(c) The juvenile’s behavior in his or her current placement.
(d) The prior record and character of the juvenile and his or her physical
and mental maturity.
12
“This Court reviews sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion.” People v Skinner, 502
Mich 89, 131; 917 NW2d 292 (2018). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s
decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes.” People v Coleman, 327 Mich App 430,
443; 937 NW2d 372 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court reviews a
sentencing court’s findings of fact for clear error. People v Fawaz, 299 Mich App 55, 60; 829
NW2d 259 (2012). “Clear error is present when the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm
conviction that an error occurred.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court reviews
de novo the interpretation and application of statutes and court rules. People v Parker, 319 Mich
App 664, 669; 903 NW2d 405 (2017).
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(e) The juvenile’s potential for violent conduct as demonstrated by prior
behavior.
(f) The recommendations of any institution or agency charged with the
juvenile’s care for the juvenile’s release or continued custody.
(g) Other information the prosecuting attorney or juvenile may submit.
See also MCR 3.956(A)(4)(a) (providing that, before the trial court may continue jurisdiction over
a juvenile or impose a sentence, the prosecuting attorney must demonstrate by a preponderance of
evidence that the juvenile has not been rehabilitated or presents a serious risk to public safety, in
light of the same factors).
Further, MCL 712A.18i(7) requires the trial court in a delayed-sentence case to conduct a
final review hearing as follows:
The court shall conduct a final review of the juvenile’s probation not less
than 3 months before the end of the probation period. If the court determines at this
review that the best interests of the public would be served by imposing any other
sentence provided by law for an adult offender, the court may impose the sentence.
In making its determination, the court shall consider the criteria specified in
subsection (3) and all of the following criteria:
(a) The effect of treatment on the juvenile’s rehabilitation.
(b) Whether the juvenile is likely to be dangerous to the public if released.
(c) The best interests of the public welfare and the protection of public
security.
See also MCR 3.956(A)(4)(b) (providing the same criteria).
Finally, MCL 712A.18i(9) and (10) govern violations of probation in delayed-sentence
cases:
(9) If a juvenile placed on probation under an order of disposition delaying
imposition of sentence is found by the court to have violated probation by being
convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for more than
1 year, or adjudicated as responsible for an offense that if committed by an adult
would be a felony or a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for more than 1
year, the court shall revoke probation and sentence the juvenile to imprisonment
for a term that does not exceed the penalty that could have been imposed for the
offense for which the juvenile was originally convicted and placed on probation.
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(10) If a juvenile placed on probation under an order of disposition delaying
imposition of sentence is found by the court to have violated probation other than
as provided in subsection (9), the court may impose sentence . . . .[13]
See also MCR 3.956(B)(1) and (2).
Initially, the trial court held that MCL 712A.18i(9) did not mandate imprisonment for the
carjacking conviction as a result of his charges of felonious-assault and felony-firearm incurred
during his delayed-sentence status, because, although he pleaded guilty to those charges, he was
assigned HYTA status, which is not a “conviction.” The court thus relied on MCL 712A.18i(7)
and (10).
There is no dispute that respondent violated his probation, thus permitting the trial court to
revoke his probation and impose imprisonment. See MCL 712A.18i(10); MCR 3.956(B)(2). The
court found that respondent experienced “numerous difficulties while on delayed sentence status”
and clearly violated his probation terms by being AWOL for approximately 16 months, during
which he incurred additional criminal charges in Michigan and Ohio. These findings were amply
supported by the record.
The same facts likewise support the trial court’s imposition of an adult sentence under
MCL 712A.18i(7) and MCR 3.956(A)(4). The court determined that respondent had not achieved
rehabilitation and thus presented a serious risk to public safety.14 See MCL 712A.18i(3), (7)(a),
and (7)(b). It is evident that the trial court appropriately considered the pertinent statutory factors.
Specifically, the court found that respondent initially made progress and complied with services,
but eventually “completely stopped” services, went AWOL from November 2019 to March 2021,
until he was apprehended on a writ, and did not complete his probation. See MCL 712A.18i(3)(a)
13
Alternatively, MCL 712A.18i(10)(a) through (g) provide that the trial court may order a change
of placement, community service, substance use disorder counseling, mental health counseling,
participation in a vocational-technical education program, incarceration in the county jail for not
more than 30 days, or other participation or performance as the court considers necessary. As the
trial court noted, these options were largely precluded because respondent was serving his HYTA
sentence.
14
The trial court made these findings at the required review hearing to determine whether to extend
its jurisdiction over respondent, but did not impose a sentence at that time. See MCL 712A.18i(4);
MCR 3.956(A)(1)(a)(iii). Instead, the court extended its jurisdiction over respondent until he
reached age 21 and adjourned its hearing on the probation violation concerning whether to resort
to imprisonment. See MCL 712A.2a(5) (a court exercising jurisdiction over a juvenile in a
designated case may continue that jurisdiction until age 21). Again, respondent was AWOL when
he turned 19 in March 2021, resulting in several adjournments of the required review hearing and
the probation-violation hearing. In deciding whether to continue jurisdiction over a juvenile, the
trial court is similarly tasked with determining whether the juvenile has been rehabilitated or
presents a serious risk to public safety. MCL 712A.18i(3); MCR 3.956(4)(a). See also MCR
3.945(B)(4).
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and (c); MCR 3.956(A)(4)(a)(i) and (iii) (directing the court to consider participation in services
and behavior in the current placement); MCL 712A.18i(7)(a); MCR 3.956(A)(4)(b)(i) (directing
the court to consider the effect of treatment on rehabilitation). Again, the court noted that
respondent had incurred multiple arrests with criminal charges while AWOL, including other
felony offenses involving firearms, and characterized his prior carjacking offense as a “very
serious charge” involving “violent contact.” See MCL 712A.18i(3)(d) and (e); MCR
3.956(A)(4)(a)(iv) and (v) (directing the court to consider the juvenile’s record, character,
maturity, and potential for violent conduct); MCL 712A.18i(7)(b) (directing the court to consider
whether the juvenile is likely to be dangerous to the public if released). Consistent with the case
manager’s testimony regarding respondent’s probation violations, and her recommendation to
terminate respondent’s juvenile case because her agency could no longer service him in any
capacity, the court noted that it did not have many options left because respondent was currently
in the custody of the Department of Corrections, given his sentences for felonious-assault and
felony-firearm. See MCL 712A.18i(3)(f); MCR 3.956(A)(4)(a)(vi) (directing the court to consider
the recommendations of the agency charged with the juvenile’s care). These findings—that
respondent was not rehabilitated, continued to participate in violent criminal activity, continued to
present a danger to public safety, and, as the court found in its written order, that the public’s best
interests would be served by sentencing respondent as an adult—were well supported by the
record.
Overall, the record demonstrates that the trial court appropriately considered the factors set
forth in MCL 712A.18i and MCR 3.956 in deciding to sentence respondent as an adult.15 Given
respondent’s clear rehabilitation failures and probation violations, we see no abuse of discretion
in the court’s decision to revoke his juvenile probation and impose a sentence of imprisonment
under MCL 712A.18i.
Respondent, however, argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to give due
consideration to his adolescence. He asserts that youthful offenders differ from adult offenders
for purposes of sentencing, that youth is a mitigating factor, and that courts must consider the
opportunity to rehabilitate. According to respondent, because his HYTA sentence adequately met
15
Although the trial court did not make specific findings on the record regarding respondent’s
willingness to accept responsibility for his behavior, pertinent information was before the court
because respondent stated, “I made plenty of mistakes and I take accountability for them.” Further,
the court recognized that respondent was a young person with much potential.
In People v Petty, 469 Mich 108, 116-118; 665 NW2d 443 (2003), the Supreme Court,
addressing the statutory criteria for determining whether to enter an order of disposition, impose a
delayed sentence, or impose an adult sentence under MCL 712A.18(1)(o)(i) through (vi), held that
trial courts are not required “to undertake a mechanical recitation of the statutory criteria. Rather,
a court must logically articulate on the record why it has chosen one alternative over the other two,
in light of the criteria articulated” in the statute. Petty, 469 Mich at 117. Likewise, a trial court
should not be required to mechanically recite each of the factors in MCL 712A.18i(3) and (7). The
trial court in this case reasonably explained why it imposed imprisonment on respondent in light
of the pertinent criteria.
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those rehabilitative goals, the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a term of imprisonment.
We disagree.
Respondent first directs this Court to Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460, 465; 132 S Ct 2455;
183 L Ed 2d 599 (2016), where the United States Supreme Court held “that mandatory life without
parole for those under age 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ ” This Court summarized Miller’s import as
follows:
Miller’s holding is grounded in the propositions that “children are con-
stitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing,” “have diminished
culpability and greater prospects for reform,” and “are less deserving of the most
severe punishments.” Id. at 471 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The “dis-
tinctive attributes of youth” render the customary penological justifications for
harsh sentencing—retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation—far less relevant in
the context of minors. Id. at 472-473. Rather than focusing on that traditional trio
of sentencing factors, Miller requires judges to bear in mind that youth “is a time
of immaturity, irresponsibility, impetuousness[,] and recklessness.” Id. at 476(quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original). These qualities, the
Court stressed, are almost always “transient.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted). [People v Bennett, 335 Mich App 409, 415; 966 NW2d 768 (2021).]
Respondent further directs this Court to the Supreme Court’s holding in People v Parks,
510 Mich 225, 255; 987 NW2d 161 (2022), that “mandatorily subjecting 18-year-old defendants
to life in prison, without first considering the attributes of youth, is unusually excessive imprison-
ment and thus a disproportionate sentence that constitutes ‘cruel or unusual punishment’ under
Const 1963, art 1, § 16.” The Court recognized “the clear consensus” that late adolescence, in-
cluding the age of 18, is a “key stage of development characterized by significant brain, behavioral,
and psychological change” relevant to criminal culpability. Parks, 510 Mich at 249.
Respondent also refers this Court to People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171; 987 NW2d 58 (2022),
in which the Supreme Court recognized that “special consideration must be paid to youthful
offenders before the harshest sentences may be imposed,” id. at 185, and decreed, “consistent with
the [United States] Supreme Court’s repeated recognition of youth’s effect on sentencing and our
own sentencing jurisprudence, that in all sentencing hearings conducted under MCL 769.25 or
MCL 769.25a, trial courts are to consider the defendant’s youth and must treat it as a mitigating
factor.” Boykin, 510 Mich at 189.16
The foregoing caselaw concerned adolescents who committed first-degree murder and
were thus potentially subject to nonparolable life sentences, which is not at issue here. Still, the
16
In enacting MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a, the Legislature provided for “a sentencing scheme
that eliminated mandatory life without the possibility of parole for all individuals who were
convicted of specific crimes, including first-degree murder, for acts committed while they were
juveniles.” Boykin, 510 Mich at 180.
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caselaw emphasizes the special importance of rehabilitation as a goal in sentencing adolescents,
and, “[g]iven that youth is a mitigating factor, it will inevitably factor into” the four basic
sentencing considerations, Boykin, 510 Mich at 189, meaning “(1) ‘reformation of the offender’;
(2) ‘protection of society’; (3) ‘disciplining of the wrongdoer’; and (4) ‘deterrence of others from
committing like offenses,’ ” Boykin, 510 Mich at 188, quoting People v Snow, 386 Mich 586, 592;
194 NW2d 314 (1974). Pertinent here, “[r]ehabilitation is a specific goal of our criminal-
punishment system[,]” Parks, 510 Mich at 265, and “18-year-olds, much like their juvenile
counterparts, are generally capable of significant change and a turn toward rational behavior that
conforms to societal expectations as their cognitive abilities develop further.” Id. at 258.
Contrary to respondent’s argument, the record indicates that the trial court appropriately
considered respondent’s adolescence throughout the proceedings, and afforded him ample
opportunity to rehabilitate. Again, in 2016, following respondent’s carjacking conviction when he
was 14 years old in this adult-designated case, the trial court delayed imposing an adult sentence
and ordered juvenile probation. Yet, despite significant rehabilitative efforts during his delayed
status, respondent, as discussed, eventually absconded from probation when he was 17 years old,
remained AWOL until he was apprehended on a writ 16 months later, and committed additional
crimes during that time when he was 18 years old. In revoking his juvenile probation and imposing
an adult sentence, the trial court noted respondent’s difficulties while on probation, and specifically
considered his youth, stating this was “a very unfortunate case because [respondent] is a very
young person,” and recognized it was obliged “to consider that he’s a young person, that he has a
lot of potential, [and] that the adult court did give him some opportunity by allowing him to have
HYTA status.”
Further, the trial court did not deprive respondent of a rehabilitative opportunity. The
court’s sentence of 50 months’ to 10 years’ imprisonment, with credit for 1,489 days served,
indicates that the court attempted to fashion a sentence that accounted for his youth. The court
stated that the sentence, in light of the credit for time served, would not “add any significant
amount of time” to the sentence respondent was currently serving under the HYTA, because the
50-month minimum was “barely above the amount of credit he’s entitled to on this sentence,” but
that the 10-year maximum would provide respondent with an additional supervisory period.17
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court’s sentencing decision adequately
recognized the gravity of respondent’s carjacking offense, in light of his failure to achieve
rehabilitation during a lengthy period of juvenile probation, and that the court afforded respondent
properly-individualized consideration of the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, and
discipline, while still providing respondent the opportunity to demonstrate maturity and
rehabilitation to expedite his release. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision to impose an adult
sentence on respondent, and the sentence actually imposed, fell within the range of principled
17
A sentencing court should not refer to the maximum sentence as a mere “supervisory period”
because defendants are not guaranteed parole prior to the completion of the maximum sentence.
However, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court’s failure to appreciate that fact does
not amount to an abuse of discretion.
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outcomes, and so did not constitute an abuse of discretion. See People v Coleman, 327 Mich App
430, 443; 937 NW2d 372 (2019).
Affirmed.
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
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