In Re gibson/murphy Minors ( 2023 )

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
In re GIBSON/MURPHY, Minors. September 14, 2023
No. 364216
Van Buren Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 21-019474-NA
Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and O’BRIEN and FEENEY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-mother appeals as of right the trial court order terminating her parental rights
to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions of adjudication continue to exist),
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) (child
will be harmed if returned to the parent). On appeal, respondent raises a single argument—that
the trial court clearly erred by terminating her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). Yet
petitioner was only required to establish one ground for termination, see In re Powers Minors, 244
Mich App 111, 119; 624 NW2d 472 (2000), so even if the trial court clearly erred by terminating
respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) as respondent argues, that would not
entitle her to relief. For thoroughness, however, we have reviewed the record and conclude that,
regardless of whether the trial court clearly erred by terminating respondent’s parental rights under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), the trial court did not clearly err when it terminated respondent’s parental
rights under MCL 712A.19(3)(c)(i). Accordingly, we affirm.
“A court may terminate a respondent’s parental rights if one or more of the statutory
grounds for termination listed in MCL 712A.19b(3) have been proven by clear and convincing
evidence.” In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). We review
the trial court’s determination for clear error. Id. “A trial court’s decision is clearly erroneous if
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. at 41 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). We give “deference to the trial court’s special opportunity to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.” In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 459; 781 NW2d 105 (2009).
Under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), a trial court may terminate parental rights if it finds by
clear and convincing evidence that “182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial
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dispositional order” and “[t]he conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is
no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering
the child’s age.” In this case, the trial court entered an initial dispositional order in
September 2021, and the termination hearing occurred in November 2022. Therefore, more than
182 days had elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order as required by
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c).
At adjudication, it was revealed that respondent had an extensive history of substance
abuse, unstable housing, improper supervision, physical and medical neglect, emotional
instability, and domestic violence relationships. The primary barrier underlying the adjudication
in this case was respondent’s extensive history of substance abuse. At the adjudication hearing,
respondent admitted to having “an extensive history of substance abuse including
methamphetamines,” that she tested positive for methamphetamine three times in the last ten
months, and that she refused two other drug screens in the days leading up to the filing of the
petition.
Ample evidence supports that this condition continued to exist at the time of termination.
Following the initial dispositional hearing on November 23, 2021, respondent tested positive for
methamphetamine on January 4, 2022 and February 9, 2022, and on August 4, 2022, respondent
tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. Respondent otherwise refused to
participate in random drug screenings,1 and there is no record evidence of a negative drug screen.
Respondent also failed to participate in substance-abuse counseling, despite such counseling being
a recommended service.2 At one point during the proceedings, respondent took positive strides
towards addressing her issues with substance abuse by enrolling in a 30- to 90-day inpatient
program, but she unfortunately chose to leave the program after only 3 days. Based on the
foregoing, “the totality of the evidence amply supports that [respondent] had not accomplished
any meaningful change in the conditions existing by the time of the adjudication.” In re Williams,
286 Mich App 253, 272; 779 NW2d 286 (2009).
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) further requires the trial court to find that respondent would be
unable to rectify the conditions that led to adjudication within a reasonable time considering the
children’s ages. At the time of termination, the children were 13 years old, 12 years old, and one
year old. Respondent had over a year after the initial dispositional order in this case to rectify the
conditions that led to adjudication, yet she made no progress towards meaningfully addressing her
issues with substance abuse. Given respondent’s utter lack of progress, we are not definitely and
firmly convinced that the trial court erred when it found by clear and convincing evidence that
1
While respondent testified that she did not report for random drug screenings because she had
issues with transportation, others testified that the program had transportation to get respondent to
the drug screens and that respondent was informed of this service.
2
At the preliminary hearing, it was established that respondent had previously participated in
substance-abuse counseling for 12 sessions, but respondent’s counselor reported that respondent
would not meaningfully engage in the counseling and that she was not “honest with self-reporting.”
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respondent would be unable to rectify the conditions that led to adjudication in a reasonable time
considering the children’s ages.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err when it found by clear and
convincing evidence that petitioner established a ground for termination under MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i). Because petitioner was only required to establish one ground for termination,
see In re Powers Minors, 244 Mich App at 119, we decline to address the alternative grounds
found by the trial court.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
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