In Re patridge/freestone Minors ( 2023 )


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  •             If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
    revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
    STATE OF MICHIGAN
    COURT OF APPEALS
    UNPUBLISHED
    In re PATRIDGE/FREESTONE, Minors.                                   October 26, 2023
    No. 365984
    St. Joseph Circuit Court
    Family Division
    LC No. 2023-000191-NA
    Before: RICK, P.J., and SHAPIRO and YATES, JJ.
    PER CURIAM.
    Respondent-mother appeals as of right the trial court order removing the minor children
    from her care and custody. We affirm.
    I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    A petition was filed in this case in March 2023, stating that mother had recently been
    housed at a domestic-violence shelter in Three Rivers, Michigan, but that she and her children
    were now homeless because she had been asked to leave the shelter. The petition stated that “[a]
    Child Protective Services (CPS) investigation was opened on February 28, 2023 after receiving
    allegations of neglect and improper supervision.” According to CPS and staff at the domestic-
    violence shelter, mother “would allow [MP] to wander the building unsupervised for several hours
    before looking for him,” and had to be reminded multiple times to change [MH]’s diaper. The
    petition further alleged that at one point, mother left the domestic-violence shelter with HF and
    MF, but left MP in the care of another resident, who in turn asked her sister to watch MP. MP
    ended up at a local hotel with the resident’s sister. Mother later came back to pick up MP.
    The petition also alleged that mother has a history with methamphetamine and that her
    parental rights to two other children were terminated in 2013 after methamphetamine was found
    in her home and she failed to benefit from substance abuse services. The petition further indicated
    that mother’s substance abuse issues had affected the physical health of MP, HF, and MF: MP was
    born addicted to methadone, HF’s meconium tested positive for amphetamines, methadone, and a
    methadone metabolite after her birth, and MF was born positive for amphetamines and spent time
    in the neonatal intensive care unit for methadone withdrawal.
    -1-
    A preliminary hearing was held in this matter, but mother did not appear for the hearing.
    Amie Mourey, an investigator at the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS),
    explained:
    We’ve tried to reach [mother] by phone. She did report to the Three Rivers
    Police Department yesterday and [said] she was going to bring the kids there last
    night, which she, unfortunately, did not. She did have contact with her Families
    First worker yesterday, and they have another appointment scheduled for today and
    she was told that she does need to bring the children. So we’re hoping that she will
    show up with them . . . .
    The trial court adjourned the preliminary hearing. Mother attended a continued preliminary
    hearing later in the same month. At the hearing, Mourey testified that the DHHS received an initial
    intake in this case in late February 2023. When asked what concerns led to the initial referral,
    Mourey explained:
    There was a concern that mom was going to be homeless because she was
    staying at a shelter that her time had run up—run out on, and she was going to have
    to move by March 10th. And she—there were allegations of an unexplained bruise
    or scratch on [MP]’s face, and there was a concern for physical abuse, as well as
    some things that she had said to him that were found to be, potentially, mentally
    harming [MP].
    Mourey verified that services were offered to mother through an organization called Families First.
    Mother attended an initial appointment, but failed to attend a second follow-up appointment,
    leading the organization to close services.
    Mourey attested that she had several other concerns regarding mother’s parenting skills
    throughout her investigation. For instance, Mourey overheard mother call MP a “liar,” and when
    Mourey asked mother what MP lied about, mother could not tell her. Mourey observed that mother
    was not very observant of the children, and stated that the staff at the domestic violence shelter
    was concerned about the children because mother would leave the children unattended for “long
    periods of time.” Additionally, mother surrendered the children to petitioner’s temporary custody
    on March 16, 2023, at which point she tested positive for amphetamines and marijuana. Regarding
    mother’s parenting time, Mourey stated that the DHHS supported supervised parenting time.
    After the close of testimony, the trial court made the following preliminary findings:
    Well, the court, based on the testimony that we heard from Ms. Mourey today, can
    find that custody of the children with the mother . . . would present a substantial
    risk of harm toe [sic] the children’s life, physical health, or mental well-being.
    There were problems, [o]f course, that caused DHHS to get involved. Maybe the
    initial issue was an imminent lack of housing at the domestic shelter. The agency
    did meet with mom and attempted to arrange services that would address that
    imminent lack of housing.
    Unfortunately, the services that would have been available and were—and
    that [mother] was informed of, that would have rectified that homelessness—
    -2-
    homelessness situation were not followed through with by mom. The—instead, the
    mother simply left—well, she didn’t have any real options. She was facing an
    imminent last day of being able to stay there, anyway.
    But leaving and not keeping in touch with DHHS about the services that
    could have been offered, that would have rectified that homelessness situation. And
    then, leaving [MP] in the presence—or in the custody actually, [of] some other
    person at the shelter who didn’t have any authority—any legal authority. Had
    medical attention been needed, had any other kind of services for [MP] . . . been
    needed, that person would not have had any authority to obtain those services.
    * * *
    Other services could, potentially, have been available to adequately
    safeguard the children from the risk, that risk being the homelessness, the indicia
    of illegal drug abuse by the mother, the lack of follow-through with medical
    appointments that the agency was able to discover. There were—there was an
    attempt to provide services, other than removal, to address those concerns, but mom
    didn’t attend a meeting with [Families First] that would have addressed and allowed
    for services to be provided. Mom simply left with the children without maintaining
    contact with DHHS for a week. So, the services that could have been implemented
    weren’t working and the only option left to the agency was removal of the children.
    * * *
    So, because of those reasons, continuing the children’s residence in the
    home, and—mom, you’re going to have an opportunity to follow through with
    DHHS about your present living circumstances and whether those circumstances
    might be appropriate. But at least as of now, the agency doesn’t even know what
    home residence would be for the children, so there’s no option for continuing the
    children’s residence in the mother’s home as the agency knows about, at this point
    in time.
    * * *
    And given the fact that that foster home is licensed, the Court can presume
    that those conditions are adequate to safeguard the health and welfare of the
    children. So, based on those findings, the Court will authorize the petition for
    filing.
    The trial court entered an order authorizing the children’s removal from mother’s custody and
    ordered that mother be allowed supervised parenting time pursuant to DHHS policy. This appeal
    followed.
    -3-
    II. ANALYSIS
    Mother argues that insufficient evidence was presented to the trial court to justify the
    removal of the minor children. We disagree.
    “We review the trial court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction for clear error in light of the
    court’s findings of fact[.]” In re BZ, 
    264 Mich App 286
    , 295; 
    690 NW2d 505
     (2004) (citation
    omitted). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm
    conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special
    opportunity to observe the witnesses.” 
    Id. at 296-297
    .
    Jurisdiction must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. 
    Id. at 295
     (citations
    omitted). If a child is in protective custody, the trial court may exercise jurisdiction if it finds that
    all of the following criteria exist:
    (a) Custody of the child with the parent presents a substantial risk of harm
    to the child’s life, physical health, or mental well-being.
    (b) No provision of service or other arrangement except removal of the child
    is reasonably available to adequately safeguard the child from risk as described in
    subdivision (a).
    (c) Continuing the child’s residence in the home is contrary to the child’s
    welfare.
    (d) Consistent with the circumstances, reasonable efforts were made to
    prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child.
    (e) Conditions of child custody away from the parent are adequate to
    safeguard the child’s health and welfare.      [MCL 712A.13a(9); see also
    MCR 3.965(C)(2).]
    After hearing evidence at the preliminary hearing, the trial court focused on the children’s
    circumstances as a whole in conjunction with mother’s willingness to receive and participate in
    services, and gave a lengthy rationale for assuming jurisdiction. Regarding the first statutory
    factor, the court noted that ample evidence supported a finding that custody with mother presented
    “a substantial risk of harm” to the children. See MCL 712A.13a(9)(a). We agree. Of particular
    concern is the fact that mother was on the verge of homelessness when the preliminary hearing
    occurred. Also of note is mother’s history of substance abuse. All three of the children in this
    case tested positive for methadone and/or amphetamines at birth, and during the investigation of
    this case, a glass pipe used for smoking methamphetamine was found in a car that mother was
    using to drive the minor children and another resident’s child. According to Mourey, mother
    allegedly asked the other resident’s child to dispose of the pipe before the police arrived. Mother
    denied ever possessing the pipe and refused to submit to a drug test. However, when mother
    surrendered the children to petitioner’s temporary custody in March 2023, she tested positive for
    amphetamines and marijuana.
    -4-
    The court also heard testimony from Mourey regarding her parenting concerns. Mourey
    testified that mother was not very observant of the children. Staff at the domestic-violence shelter
    noted that mother would leave the children unattended for “long periods of time.” The children’s
    medical records were also submitted as evidence, and indicated that none of the children had been
    to the doctor since August 2022. This was particularly concerning, given that the youngest child
    was only nine months old at the time of the preliminary hearing. In light of mother’s impending
    homelessness, substance abuse issues, and parenting issues, we agree that the trial court did not
    clearly err by determining that the first statutory factor was met.
    Regarding the second statutory factor, which states that jurisdiction is proper if “[n]o
    provision of service or other arrangement except removal of the child is reasonably available to
    adequately safeguard the child from risk,” MCL 712A.13a(9)(b), the trial court reasoned that
    petitioner attempted to provide services to mother before advancing to removal, but mother did
    not attend a meeting regarding services and failed to maintain contact with petitioner. Overall, the
    record indicates that mother failed to show a willingness to participate in services designed to help
    rectify the issues caused by mother’s impending homelessness and prevent the children’s removal.
    Thus, the trial court did not clearly err by determining that this statutory factor was met.
    Regarding the third statutory factor, under which “[c]ontinuing the child’s residence in the
    home is contrary to the child’s welfare,” MCL 712a.13(a)(9)(c), the trial court heard evidence of
    mother’s imminent homelessness and reasoned that the lack of stable housing was sufficient to
    support taking jurisdiction over the children. The court specifically noted that “at least as of now,
    the agency doesn’t even know what home residence would be for the children, so there’s no option
    for continuing the children’s residence in the mother’s home as the agency knows about, at this
    point in time.” As was the case with the first statutory factor, we agree that mother’s unstable
    housing situation and impending homelessness supported the trial court’s decision to exercise
    jurisdiction over the children. Thus, the trial court did not clearly err by determining that this
    statutory factor was met.
    The trial court also heard ample evidence regarding the fourth statutory factor, which
    provides that exercising jurisdiction is appropriate where, “[c]onsistent with the circumstances,
    reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child.”
    MCL 712A.193a(9)(d). The record indicates that mother failed to attend three scheduled meetings
    since the investigation opened in February 2023, including a meeting with Mourey, a meeting with
    Families First, and a family team meeting. Parenting services were canceled because mother did
    not attend a second scheduled meeting. On this record, mother was offered services designed to
    prevent the need for the children to be removed, and she did not take advantage of them. Therefore,
    the trial court did not clearly err by determining that this statutory factor was met.
    Finally, as for the fifth statutory factor, which provides that jurisdiction is proper where
    “[c]onditions of child custody away from the parent are adequate to safeguard the child’s health
    and welfare,” MCL 712A.13b(9)(e), the trial court stated that, “given the fact that that foster home
    is licensed, the Court can presume that those conditions are adequate to safeguard the health and
    welfare of the children.” There does not appear to be any clear error in the trial court’s
    determination that this statutory factor was met. Accordingly, we conclude that mother’s claim
    that the trial court erred by assuming jurisdiction over the children must fail.
    -5-
    III. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s order assuming jurisdiction over the minor
    children is affirmed.
    /s/ Michelle M. Rick
    /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
    /s/ Christopher P. Yates
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 365984

Filed Date: 10/26/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/27/2023