People of Michigan v. Aaron Darell Fancher ( 2023 )


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  •             If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
    revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
    STATE OF MICHIGAN
    COURT OF APPEALS
    PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
    October 26, 2023
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v                                                                    No. 362292
    Kalamazoo Circuit Court
    AARON DARELL FANCHER,                                                LC No. 2021-001770-FC
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: RICK, P.J., and SHAPIRO and YATES, JJ.
    PER CURIAM.
    Defendant appeals as of right his jury convictions for (1) two counts of assault with intent
    to rob while armed, MCL 750.89; and (2) one count of first-degree home invasion, MCL
    750.110a(2). The trial court sentenced defendant, as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL
    769.12, to serve concurrent sentences of 14 to 30 years and 9 to 20 years in prison, respectively.
    We affirm.
    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    This case arises out of a home invasion and robbery by multiple masked men. Two of the
    robbers held the victims inside the home at gunpoint, demanding money. After one victim stated
    there was money in the basement, a third person went to check. The robbers stole not only money,
    but some of the victims’ “Jordan shoes” that were stored in large totes in the basement.
    Neighbors of the victims testified as to activity they witnessed outside the home around the
    time of the robbery. One neighbor saw a stationary vehicle outside the victims’ home, and “saw a
    gentleman get out of the driver’s side door and flick a cigarette and then walk towards the house.”
    The cigarette landed “[s]omewhere in the vicinity of the back of the vehicle in that area; like right
    in front of our mailbox area.” Another neighbor saw a vehicle parked, but running, outside the
    victims’ home. This neighbor then saw a man exit the victims’ garage, run back inside, and exit
    again carrying a tote. The man then entered the parked vehicle, and the vehicle sped off.
    After police arrived at the scene, they interviewed the victims and witnesses. One officer
    learned of the cigarette, and found only one cigarette butt in the area identified by the witness.
    -1-
    DNA pulled from the cigarette butt was run through the Combined DNA Indexing System
    (CODIS), which associated defendant with the sample. Police investigated, identifying two
    telephone numbers associated with defendant, and obtained a search warrant for the cellular
    provider. The documents from the provider indicated one of the telephone numbers was only in
    Kalamazoo once, the date of the robbery, between August 2017 and November 2020. Indeed, at
    the time and date of the robbery, the cell phone used cell towers near the victims’ home. The
    detective assigned to the case called the telephone number in question, which defendant answered
    and identified himself. However, at a later interview, defendant contended, while he used the
    telephone number in the past, it was not until after the robbery took place, and he had since changed
    telephone numbers. The subscriber and payor of the telephone number was the mother of
    defendant’s children.
    The jury found defendant guilty of two counts of assault with intent to rob while armed
    and one count of first-degree home invasion. Additionally, the jury found defendant not guilty of
    four counts of carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony and one count of being a felon
    in possession of a firearm. After sentencing, defendant moved for a new trial or directed verdict
    of acquittal, arguing the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to
    identify defendant as a participant in the crime—an essential element—and the jury’s verdict was
    against the great weight of the evidence. The trial court denied defendant’s motion, concluding:
    The government concedes that without incriminating remarks or eyewitness
    testimony placing Defendant at the scene, the evidence in support of identity here
    is circumstantial. However, the court agrees with the government that the amount
    of circumstantial evidence was sufficient to satisfy a rational juror beyond a
    reasonable doubt that the Defendant participated in the crimes he was ultimately
    convicted of.
    ***
    In the instant case, the government provided the jury with the following
    pertinent evidence:
    1. The complainants were consistent with their account of how they were
    robbed; i.e., on [the date of the robbery], two masked men held them at gunpoint
    while at least one other person robbed them of money and shoes that were located
    in “totes.”
    2. [The complainants] testified that at least one intruder went to the
    basement where the money and the totes holding the shoes were located.
    3. Neighbors saw a vehicle with the engine running outside of the
    complainants’ home during the time it is claimed that they were being robbed and
    two witnesses testified that they saw an individual run from the home, hop inside
    the vehicle and the vehicle sped off.
    4. One witness also testified that he heard one of the men exclaim that he
    forgot a “tote” and saw a man run back into the home and return with an object that
    compared to a tote.
    -2-
    5. [A neighbor] testified that while looking out of her living room window
    at the apparent getaway vehicle, she noticed that the person who got out of the
    driver’s side door flick a cigarette near a mailbox. She later pointed this out to an
    investigating law enforcement officer.
    6. Shortly after the incident, police retrieved a single cigarette butt found in
    the area that [the neighbor] described and sent it to a crime laboratory for analysis.
    7. Michigan State Police was able to extract DNA from the cigarette butt
    and through the Combined DNA Indexing System, the profile matched that of the
    Defendant.
    8. Police obtained and reviewed cellphone [sic] records associated with
    either the Defendant or the mother of his children.
    9. Cellular records and tower mapping revealed that the cell phone that
    Defendant had earlier remarked was one that he used, travelled from Holland to
    Kalamazoo on the incident date and was in the general vicinity of the crime scene
    at the time of the robbery.
    10. Similar cellular records supported the position that Defendant’s phone
    was not in Kalamazoo at any other time beyond [the date of the crime] but remained
    in the Holland area where evidence suggested the Defendant lived.
    Defendant now appeals.
    II. ANALYSIS
    Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a new trial
    based on insufficiency of the evidence, and his convictions are against the great weight of the
    evidence. We disagree.1
    1
    “This Court reviews de novo challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence.” People v Solloway,
    
    316 Mich App 174
    , 180; 
    891 NW2d 255
     (2016). This Court examines the evidence in the light
    most favorable to the prosecution in determining whether the prosecution presented sufficient
    evidence which could allow a rational trier of fact to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
    doubt. People v Smith-Anthony, 
    494 Mich 669
    , 676; 
    837 NW2d 415
     (2013).
    “The credibility of witnesses and the weight accorded to evidence are questions for the
    jury, and any conflict in the evidence must be resolved in the prosecutor’s favor.” People v
    Harrison, 
    283 Mich App 374
    , 378; 
    768 NW2d 98
     (2009). This Court “will not resolve credibility
    issues anew on appeal.” People v Milstead, 
    250 Mich App 391
    , 404; 
    648 NW2d 648
     (2002).
    “This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a
    motion for a new trial. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court renders a decision falling
    -3-
    Defendant was convicted of two counts of assault with intent to rob while armed, MCL
    750.89, and one count of first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2). Defendant does not
    dispute there was a home invasion or robbery. Instead, defendant argues an essential element in
    all criminal prosecutions—identity—was not proven with sufficient evidence. See People v
    Fairey, 
    325 Mich App 645
    , 649; 
    928 NW2d 705
     (2018) (“Identity is an essential element of every
    crime.”). The two primary pieces of evidence the prosecution provided in support of defendant’s
    charges were defendant’s DNA on a cigarette butt located near the victims’ home on the night of
    the robbery, and a cell phone number, which, when called, was answered by defendant. That cell
    phone number had used the cell towers closest to the victims’ home at the time of the home
    invasion.
    As the trial court reasoned, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to place defendant
    at the scene of the crime, specifically as the unknown man who exited the vehicle’s driver side
    door, flicked a cigarette, and then walked toward the victims’ home. The testifying witness
    stopped watching defendant at this point, and did not see whether defendant actually entered the
    home. However, this testimony still allows for an inference that he did, or, at the very least,
    contradicts defendant’s suggestion that he merely stood outside by the vehicle with no knowledge
    of what was occurring inside the victims’ home. Regardless, even if defendant did not hold the
    victims at gunpoint or enter the home, the evidence establishes defendant participated in the
    robbery, even if only as an aider-abettor.2 The jury, when presented with this evidence, was able
    to make the reasonable inference that the vehicle defendant exited was the same vehicle later
    observed speeding away from the victims’ home after one of the passengers ran back into the home
    to retrieve a tote. Defendant, who may be reasonably inferred to have been the driver of the
    vehicle, plainly assisted the commission of the crime by speeding away. Viewed in a light most
    favorable to the prosecution, this was sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to determine
    defendant “performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the commission of the crime,”
    People v Jackson, 
    292 Mich App 583
    , 589; 
    808 NW2d 541
     (2011), and “intended the commission
    outside the range of principled decisions.” People v Powell, 
    303 Mich App 271
    , 276-277; 
    842 NW2d 538
     (2013) (citation omitted).
    2
    The jury was instructed on aiding and abetting, MCL 767.39: “Every person concerned in the
    commission of an offense, whether he directly commits the act constituting the offense or procures,
    counsels, aids, or abets in its commission may hereafter be prosecuted, indicted, tried and on
    conviction shall be punished as if he had directly committed such offense.”
    To support a finding that a defendant aided and abetted a crime, the
    prosecution must show that (1) the crime charged was committed by the defendant
    or some other person, (2) the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that
    assisted the commission of the crime, and (3) the defendant intended the
    commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its
    commission at the time he gave aid and encouragement. [People v Jackson, 
    292 Mich App 583
    , 589; 
    808 NW2d 541
     (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted).]
    “Aiding and abetting describes all forms of assistance rendered to the perpetrator, including any
    words or deeds that may support, encourage, or incite the commission of a crime.” 
    Id.
    -4-
    of the crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time he gave aid
    and encouragement.” 
    Id.
    For the same reasons, we conclude the verdict was not against the great weight of the
    evidence.
    In contrast to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a motion for a
    new trial based on a belief that the verdict was against the great weight of the
    evidence does not implicate issues of constitutional magnitude and, for that reason,
    the decision to grant a new trial is committed to the discretion of the trial court.
    [People v Roper, 
    286 Mich App 77
    , 83-84; 
    777 NW2d 483
     (2009).]
    “Thus, a new trial based upon the weight of the evidence should be granted only where the
    evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict and a serious miscarriage of justice would
    otherwise result.” People v Lemmon, 
    465 Mich 625
    , 642; 
    576 NW2d 129
     (1998) (quotation marks
    and citation omitted).
    “To determine whether a verdict is against the great weight of the evidence, or has worked
    an injustice, a judge necessarily reviews the whole body of proofs.” People v Herbert, 
    444 Mich 466
    , 475; 
    511 NW2d 654
     (1993), overruled in part on other grounds Lemmon, 
    465 Mich 625
    .
    “[A]bsent exceptional circumstances, issues of witness credibility are for the jury, and the trial
    court may not substitute its view of the credibility ‘for the constitutionally guaranteed jury
    determination thereof.’ ” Lemmon, 465 Mich at 642 (citation omitted). Exceptions include
    testimony that contradicts indisputable physical facts or laws, testimony that is patently incredible
    or defies physical realities, testimony that is material and is so inherently implausible that it could
    not be believed by a reasonable juror, or testimony that was seriously impeached. Id. at 643-644.
    “Generally, a verdict may be vacated only when the evidence does not reasonably support
    it and it was more likely the result of causes outside the record, such as passion, prejudice,
    sympathy, or some other extraneous influence.” People v Lacalamita, 
    286 Mich App 467
    , 469;
    
    780 NW2d 311
     (2009). “The hurdle that a judge must clear in order to overrule a jury and grant a
    new trial is unquestionably among the highest in our law.” People v Unger, 
    278 Mich App 210
    ,
    232; 
    749 NW2d 272
     (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Defendant again argues there
    is little to no evidence indicating he participated in the home invasion or robbery, either as a
    principal or aider-abettor, and there was no direct evidence of face or voice identification, license
    plate numbers, fingerprints, boot prints, or guns. However, there was sufficient circumstantial
    evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant participated in, or aided and abetted,
    the home invasion and robbery, and defendant did not present any evidence weighing more heavily
    in his favor than against him. Because the evidence does not preponderate so heavily against the
    jury’s verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand, see Lemmon,
    465 Mich at 642, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant a new trial.
    Affirmed.
    /s/ Michelle M. Rick
    /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
    /s/ Christopher P. Yates
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 362292

Filed Date: 10/26/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/27/2023