In Re wikstrom/strand Minors ( 2023 )

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
In re WIKSTROM/STRAND, Minors. October 12, 2023
Nos. 364714; 364855
Marquette Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 13-009676-NA
Before: LETICA, P.J., and HOOD and MALDONADO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 364714, respondent-father appeals by right the trial court’s order
terminating his parental rights to his three children1 under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (failure to
rectify the conditions that led to adjudication). In Docket No. 364855, respondent-mother appeals
by right the same order terminating her parental rights to the same children under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The court took jurisdiction over the children in July 2021, after respondents pleaded no
contest to allegations of domestic violence, substance abuse by respondent-father, and a threat by
respondent-mother to kill herself and the children.2 Early in the case, respondents received
woefully inadequate services, including the caseworker’s ignoring respondents’ concern about
abuse in the initial foster home. However, respondents’ caseworker was replaced by a dedicated
and competent caseworker, and they were referred for and received appropriate services.
1
The January 4, 2023 order terminated respondents’ parental rights to MW (d/o/b 11/7/16), SS
(d/o/b 12/6/19), and OS (d/o/b 2/8/21).
2
Respondent-mother also has an older child, who was placed in a guardianship with her maternal
grandmother after she entered foster care due to neglect.
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In their new foster home, the children made great strides, receiving regular physical and
occupational therapy that markedly improved their growth and development. The foster parent
ensured that the children attended school and their many medical appointments.
During the pendency of the case, respondent-father made commendable progress by
addressing his methamphetamine use and maintaining his strong bond with the children. Even so,
the caseworker expressed concern that respondent-father struggled to parent three special-needs
children on his own during his separate parenting time. Respondent-father also did not
satisfactorily address his alcohol dependence. Moreover, he admitted to being a victim of domestic
abuse by respondent-mother, but refused to leave the relationship despite the negative physical
and emotional effects it had on the children. He testified at the termination hearing that he would
leave respondent-mother and parent the children alone if necessary; however, he had taken no
steps in this direction, despite being advised by the caseworker to do so during the pendency of
the case.
Respondent-mother somewhat engaged in mental health services, but made no progress.
She continued to have outbursts during parenting visits that negatively affected the children.
Police were called after she pushed a caseworker out of her home. Her outburst at a hospital
threatened to disrupt a surgery planned for one of the children. She also had outbursts in the
courtroom. Her parenting educator and her therapist both opined that she had not benefited from
their services. Shortly before the termination, respondent-mother’s cigarette burned respondent-
father, and the police were called to respond to the resulting incident, during which respondent-
father’s hand struck respondent-mother’s hip and he punched a wall. Respondent-father initially
told the police that respondent-mother had intentionally tried to burn him, but later stated that he
was not sure whether she had acted intentionally.
The trial court ultimately determined that respondents were not making any progress. It
found that respondents had not “seemed to internalize what they were taught by the ordered
services.” Although respondent-father had rectified his methamphetamine issues and became
better able to control his alcohol intake, the home was unsanitary, respondent-mother had not
demonstrated emotional stability, and respondents continued to engage in domestic violence.
Respondent-father acknowledged that he was in an abusive relationship, but refused to find a
separate home for himself and the children. Respondents continued to struggle with parenting the
children. The court found that clear and convincing evidence to support termination of
respondents’ parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). After considering the children’s bonds
with the parents, respondents’ parenting abilities, the children’s great strides in foster care, and the
foster parent’s willingness to adopt the children, the trial court also found that termination was in
the children’s best interests and ordered respondents’ parental rights terminated. Respondents’
appeals were consolidated to “advance the efficient administration of the appellate process.”3
3
In re Wikstrom/Strand Minors, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 14,
2023 (Docket Nos. 364714; 364855).
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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
This Court reviews for clear error the trial court’s decision that petitioner has proved a
ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence. In re Curry, 505 Mich 989, 991; 938
NW2d 735 (2020). This standard is “the most demanding standard applied in civil cases[.]” Id.(quotation marks and citation omitted, alteration in original). Clear and convincing evidence is
clear, direct, and weighty evidence that allows the finder of fact to reach a conclusion without
hesitancy. In re Martin, 450 Mich 204, 227; 538 NW2d 399 (1995). Evidence may be clear and
convincing when contradicted, but sometimes uncontradicted evidence is not clear and convincing.
Id. “Clear error exists when some evidence supports a finding, but a review of the entire record
leaves the reviewing court with the definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a
mistake.” Curry, 505 Mich at 991 (quotation marks and citation omitted). A reviewing court
accords deference to the trial court’s factual findings, given its opportunity to judge the credibility
of the testifying witnesses. In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). This Court
also reviews for clear error whether the petitioner made reasonable efforts to reunify the family.
In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 338; 990 NW2d 685 (2022). Finally, this Court reviews for
clear error the trial court’s finding that terminating a parent’s parental rights is in the children’s
best interests. Id. at 346.
III. STATUTORY GROUNDS
Parents have a significant constitutional liberty interest in the care and custody of their
children. Stanley v Illinois, 405 US 645, 651; 92 S Ct 1208; 31 L Ed 2d 551 (1972); In re Miller,
433 Mich at 346. To terminate a parent’s parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and
convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground for termination exists. In re
Jackisch/Stamm-Jackisch, 340 Mich App 326, 333; 985 NW2d 912 (2022).
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) provides that the trial court may terminate a parent’s rights if 182 days
have elapsed since the entry of the initial dispositional order4 and that “[t]he conditions that led to
the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be
rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.”
A. RESPONDENT-FATHER
Respondent-father raises a variety of arguments concerning how petitioner failed to help
him address the issues leading to adjudication and how he rectified various parenting barriers. We
are not definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court made a mistake when it found that
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) supported terminating respondent-father’s parental rights because, despite
making progress in some areas, significant barriers still existed to safely return the children to his
care.
First, respondent-father argues that petitioner should have done more to help him address
respondents’ domestic-violence issues, such as ordering respondent-mother out of the home.
4
Neither parent disputes that this timeframe was satisfied.
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Respondent-father also argues that he was willing to leave respondent-mother in order to take care
of his children.
A parent’s parental rights may not be terminated solely because the parent is a victim of
domestic violence. Jackisch/Stamm-Jackisch, 340 Mich App at 334. However, being a victim of
domestic violence does not necessarily preclude termination of a parent’s parental rights. Id.
Termination may be based on a determination that the parent’s “own behaviors were directly
harming the children or exposing them to harm.” In re Plump, 294 Mich App 270, 273; 817 NW2d
119 (2011). Persisting in a relationship with an abusive partner may support termination. See id.Further, when a victim is also a perpetrator, domestic violence may remain a concern that supports
termination. Jackisch/Stamm-Jackisch, 340 Mich App at 334. The trial court may consider
whether the parent’s conduct had the potential to psychologically harm the child. In re Hudson,
294 Mich App 261, 268; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). Children should not have to wait for long periods
in foster care for “the mere possibility of a radical change in [the parent’s] life.” In re Williams,
286 Mich App 253, 273; 779 NW2d 286 (2009).
In this case, domestic violence was one of the initial circumstances that supported the
court’s taking jurisdiction. The court based much of its decision on the domestic violence between
respondents and found that it had no hope that this situation would improve. During the pendency
of the case, respondents worked with a relationship counselor. Respondent-father acknowledged
that he was having difficulty practicing calming techniques or walking away from respondent-
mother. Respondent-mother would instigate arguments and respondent-father would respond by
yelling back, swearing, and calling her names in the presence of the children. The caseworker
urged respondent-father to go to a domestic-violence shelter or seek alternative housing, but
respondent-father almost immediately signed a two-year lease with respondent-mother and stated
that he did not want to leave her. Respondents engaged in domestic violence shortly before the
termination hearing, and even at the termination hearing, respondent-father again stated that he did
not want to leave respondent-mother. Although respondent-father represented that he would do
so for the sake of the children, he took no steps during the case to do so, and the caseworker opined
that it was unlikely that he would.
It is very clear from the record that respondents’ relationship is physically and verbally
violent. Respondent-father had been given the opportunity to demonstrate that he would in fact
put his children first by leaving his relationship with respondent-mother. Instead, he professed to
love her and stayed in the relationship.
Further, this violence directly harmed the children. After respondent-mother’s outbursts,
one of the children would begin to hurt himself by banging his head on the floor or on the inside
of a vehicle and crying. The middle child had issues sleeping and had “tearful” nights. The
youngest child would get wide-eyed and grow very stiff, and after one altercation, she would
scream if anyone raised their voice or made a loud noise. Although being a victim of domestic
violence would not support termination on its own, in this case, respondent-father was actively
involved in the conflict, and there was evidence that respondents’ domestic relationship physically
and emotionally harmed the children. The trial court did not err by considering the parties’
domestic violence as a factor supporting termination of respondent-father’s parental rights.
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Second, respondent-father argues that, although he admitted to difficulties parenting his
children, his parenting classes were delayed. Respondent-father also contends that he was not
given the opportunity to parent the children in respondents’ home in order to demonstrate his
ability to care for them as a single father.5
DHHS “has an affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify a family before
seeking termination of parental rights.” In re Hicks, 500 Mich 79, 85; 893 NW2d 637 (2017).
Those efforts include the duty to create a service plan that addresses the issues that led the trial
court to exercise jurisdiction over the children in an attempt to reunify the family. Id. at 85-86.
Thus, the reasonableness of DHHS’s efforts affects the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
statutory grounds underlying the trial court’s termination decision. In re Fried, 266 Mich App
535, 541; 702 NW2d 192 (2005).
In this case, the trial court found that parenting continued to be an issue. During joint
parenting time, respondents argued instead of engaging with the children. The court found that,
when given separate parenting time, respondent-father worked harder to be engaged with the
children, but he was overwhelmed. It is undisputed that the initial caseworker did not provide
respondent-father with anything approaching sufficient services. The children were removed from
the home in July 2021, and respondent-father raised concerns about being given the wrong dates
for their medical appointments, abuse in a foster home, and that the parenting time location did
not account for one child’s disabilities. The trial court expressly assured respondents that it did
not hold those issues against respondents but rather held them against DHHS.
Respondent-father had his family education intake in February 2022, and the petition to
terminate respondents’ parental rights was filed in August 2022. Respondent-father’s caseworker
consistently stated that respondent-father had done well during parenting time, including when the
children were outside the home. The children were happy to see him, he interacted with them
positively, and he brought necessary items to the visits. However, the caseworker also testified
that respondent-father struggled with the children because they had special needs, he became
frustrated when they went in different directions, he became tired of them quickly, and he did not
try to occupy them or engage in problem-solving to keep them from running off. The caseworker
testified that she did not see an improvement in respondent-father’s parenting between the time
that he began family education and the time of the termination hearing. Respondent-father himself
agreed that his parenting skills could be better, and he would not mind repeating the parenting
classes (without respondent-mother) to gain additional insight.
It is commendable that respondent-father recognized that he had parenting deficiencies and
that he would benefit from further parenting classes. Although respondent-father received belated
parenting services, when the termination petition was filed, he had had six months of additional
services, including a twelve-week program, addressing parenting skills. Even so, he had been
5
But the record shows that respondents’ lack of in-home parenting time was neither caused by nor
contributed to by petitioner’s lack of effort. Rather, respondent-mother’s pushing a caseworker
out the door, respondents’ allowing a person with a criminal record to live with them, and the
contributions by respondents—particularly respondent-mother—to an out-of-control bedbug
infestation in the home made it necessary that parenting opportunities occur in a different location.
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unable to improve to the point where he could take care of all three children at the same time.
Further, in light of the previously discussed issues regarding domestic violence, we are not
definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court made a mistake when it found that respondent-
father would not be able to improve his parenting abilities within a reasonable time.
Third, respondent-father argues that his issues were affected by unaddressed transportation
problems. The record does not support this argument. Although transportation was identified as
an issue early in the case, in February 2022, the caseworker discussed having provided respondents
with bus tickets, volunteer transporters, and gas cards. Although the bus route stopped at
6:00 p.m., the caseworker indicated that gas cards could be given to cover the costs of
transportation after that. The foster parent also had offered to help with transportation, and the
foster parent scheduled the children’s medical appointments “in a chunk” on the same weekday
morning for them to be predictable. There is no indication that respondent-father would have fared
better had he been provided with some additional, unidentified transportation service. See In re
Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 264; 976 NW2d 44 (2021) (“When challenging the services offered,
a respondent must establish that he or she would have fared better if other services had been
offered.”).
Fourth, respondent-father argues that the court erred by terminating his parental rights
when he successfully addressed his substance-abuse issues. The trial court expressly found that
respondent-father had rectified his methamphetamine issue and had not tested positive for
17 months. The extent of the trial court’s findings regarding abuse of substances was a statement
that “[respondent-father] also was better able to control his alcohol intake but had not given it up
totally.” It is not clear that the trial court found that respondent-father’s alcohol use supported
terminating his parental rights, but even if it did, its finding was not clearly erroneous.
Respondent-father had reduced his drinking from “all day, every day” to two or three drinks a
week. However, when asked whether his drinking was under control, he responded, “To a point,
yes.” He also had testified that there were times he exceeded the amount that he and his substance-
abuse counselor had agreed on.
Regardless, the primary focus of the trial court’s decision was respondents’ unrectified
domestic violence and inadequate parenting. On balance, we are not definitely and firmly
convinced that the trial court made a mistake when it found that MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) supported
terminating respondent-father’s parental rights.
B. RESPONDENT-MOTHER
Respondent-mother argues that she participated in the services offered to her, despite
petitioner’s delays, her physical difficulties, and petitioner’s negative view of respondent-mother.
Respondent-mother also argues that domestic violence and the cleanliness of the home improved
significantly. We are not not definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court made a mistake
when it found that MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) supported terminating respondent-mother’s parental
rights because she made almost no progress toward rectifying the barriers that prevented a safe
return of the children to her care.
First, respondent-mother argues that she participated in all the services that were offered
to her. A parent must both participate in and benefit from services; simply participating in services
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is not sufficient. In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). Even if conditions
improved before the termination hearing, the court may consider the totality of the evidence when
deciding whether “a parent accomplished meaningful change in the conditions that led to
adjudication.” Jackisch/Stamm-Jackisch, 340 Mich App at 334.
In this case, the trial court found that respondent-mother had not seemed to internalize what
she was taught by the service providers. The court determined that respondent-mother continued
to demonstrate emotional volatility. And respondent-mother’s caseworker testified that she was
not fully compliant with her mental health provider’s recommendations. Specifically, she had not
been seeing an individual therapist and her couples therapist opined that she had not benefited
from her services. Respondent-mother’s continued struggles were evidenced by her outbursts at
caseworkers, respondent-father, the trial court, and the children. One such outburst caused one of
the special-needs children to hurt himself while the two remaining children exhibited emotional
responses. Although there was evidence that respondent-mother engaged in some services,
particularly toward the end of the case, there is limited to no evidence that she benefited, even as
her outbursts demonstrably affected the children’s well-being.
Second, respondent-mother also argues that her caseworker took a negative view of her,
which was why she engaged with her in a belligerent manner. The record does not support this
argument. Rather, the record is replete with instances of respondent-mother engaging with a
variety of people in a belligerent manner. Although the caseworker and respondents offered vastly
differing views of her engagement during a birthday party at the end of the case, we do not agree
that this established that the caseworker took a negative view of respondent-mother. Further,
respondent-mother demonstrated her belligerence in many other ways. She pushed a different
caseworker out of her home, was verbally abusive to respondent-father, was described as
“explosive” by her parenting educator, and became aggressive during one of the children’s
surgeries. Respondent-mother left the courtroom during hearings when addressed by the court on
more than one occasion. The record does not support that respondent-mother’s belligerence was
caused by a hostile caseworker.
Third, respondent-mother argues that she missed parenting time only because of illnesses
and restrictions, and like respondent-father, respondent-mother argues that transportation
presented a barrier to her participation in reunification services. Again, the record does not support
these arguments. Respondent-mother’s caseworker provided the same extensive variety of
transportation assistance to respondent-mother as she did to respondent-father. After respondent-
mother asserted that she was having busing issues because the bus needed to be scheduled two
months in advance, the children’s appointments were altered to a weekly block of time. And,
although respondent-mother had stated that she could not have visits outside of her home because
of her medical health needs, she withdrew her medical releases after verification was requested.
Moreover, once the releases were reinstated, the caseworker discovered that respondent-mother
did not have conflicting medical appointments. When respondent-mother was provided with an
unlimited bus ticket, the caseworker found that respondent-mother gave the ticket to a friend to
get groceries. The record does not reflect that a lack of transportation or respondent-mother’s own
health issues caused respondent-mother to miss the children’s appointments. Further, to the extent
that respondent-mother argues that illnesses and quarantine restrictions caused her to miss
parenting time, these issues all occurred at the very end of the case. We are not definitely and
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firmly convinced that the trial court made a mistake when it found that petitioner engaged in
reasonable efforts toward reunifying respondent-mother with the children.
Fourth, respondent-mother argues that the state of the home improved significantly
throughout the case. But the trial court found that the home “remained in an unhealthy state with
garbage overflowing and a strong odor of cat urine just days before the termination trial.” There
continued to be a bedbug issue in the house and respondents allowed other adults to live in the
home without those individuals paying rent or helping to clean it. The caseworker identified the
cleanliness of the home as a safety issue early in the case, stating that the home was untidy with
cat feces and old food on the floors. A caseworker stepped on a pin that penetrated her skin. These
conditions were inappropriate for crawling children. The home also had a persistent bedbug
infestation that respondent-mother fought with the caseworker about having remediated. The
caseworker testified that, after the home was treated for bedbugs, respondent-mother moved
furniture back into the home despite being advised not to do so, and the inspector subsequently
reported new bedbug activity. Considering the children’s young ages, issues such as pins on the
floor and dirty floors had the direct ability to affect their health, not to mention the ongoing and
unaddressed bedbug infestation.
Respondent-mother only briefly addresses respondents’ domestic violence, referring to the
regrettable incident before the termination hearing as a single instance that did not establish that
the condition persisted. However, as discussed regarding respondent-father, respondents’
domestic relationship did not improve and affected the children. Considering the entire record, we
are not definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court made a mistake when it found that
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) supported terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights.
IV. BEST INTERESTS
Respondent-father argues that the trial court erred by finding that terminating his rights
was in the children’s best interests because he and the children were deeply bonded and he had not
been able to demonstrate his ability to parent the children in a home-like setting. Respondent-
father also argues that the children’s need for permanency could be satisfied by returning the
children to him, and that the foster home did not have advantages over his home. The trial court
did not clearly err when it found otherwise because, despite respondent-father’s love for the
children, other factors weighed in favor of termination being in the children’s best interests.
To determine whether termination of a parent’s parental rights is in a child’s best interests,
the court should consider a wide variety of factors that may include “the child’s bond to the parent,
the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the
advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” In re Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 321; 964
NW2d 881 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The trial court may also consider “a
parent’s history of domestic violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan,
the parent’s visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the
possibility of adoption.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Though the trial court may
not consider the advantages of a foster home when determining whether it has statutory grounds
to terminate a parent’s parental rights, once it concludes that the statutory grounds are met, the
trial court may consider the advantages of a foster home placement to determine the child’s best
interests. In re Foster, 285 Mich App 630, 635; 776 NW2d 415 (2009).
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In this case, the trial court issued a very detailed opinion regarding the children’s best
interests. It found that respondent-father and the children had a bond and did well together, but it
based its decision on his lack of parenting ability, the domestic violence between respondents and
respondent-father’s understanding of the effect it had on the children but his unwillingness to
separate from respondent-mother, and the children’s great strides in growth and development while
in foster care. The court also considered in detail the children’s flourishing in foster care and found
that the children needed stability, permanency, and finality that respondents could not provide.
Instead, respondents provided a chaotic environment that lacked a nurturing structure. Finally, the
foster parent intended to adopt the children.
Respondent-father argues that the foster home lacked financial advantages. We note that
the record does not address advantages or disadvantages. Regardless, the foster home had other
advantages, and even if a financial disadvantage existed, this would be but one factor weighing
against termination. Considering the entire record, we are not definitely and firmly convinced that
the trial court made a mistake when it found that it was in the children’s best interests for
respondent-father’s parental rights to be terminated.
Affirmed.
/s/ Anica Letica
/s/ Noah P. Hood
/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado
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