People of Michigan v. Justen Michael Watkins ( 2023 )

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED
November 16, 2023
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v No. 366299
Tuscola Circuit Court
JUSTEN MICHAEL WATKINS, LC No. 21-015604-FH
Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and CAVANAGH and GARRETT, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff, the People of the State of Michigan, appeals as on leave granted1 the trial court’s
order “striking” defendant’s sentence and ordering resentencing. Defendant cross-appeals the
same order, arguing that the trial court should have allowed him to withdraw his plea. Defendant
entered pleas of guilty to conspiracy to teach the use of a firearm for the purpose of a civil disorder,
MCL 750.528a(2), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm),
MCL 750.227b, in exchange for dismissal of other charges in this case and in other cases. The
trial court sentenced defendant to 32 months’ to four years’ imprisonment for teaching the use of
a firearm, and it sentenced defendant to a consecutive term of two years for felony-firearm.
Defendant moved to correct an invalid sentence, arguing that there were ambiguities in his plea
and that he expected a minimum sentence of between zero and nine months. The trial court
determined that there was a possible ambiguity in the plea, ordered defendant’s sentence
“stricken,” and ordered resentencing. We agree with plaintiff’s assertion that the trial court erred
by finding a possible ambiguity in the plea and ordering resentencing; therefore, we reverse.
I. UNDERLYING FACTS
Defendant’s charges and convictions in this matter arise out of his participation, along with
three other people, in entering a former Michigan Department of Corrections facility without
permission and taking some items from that facility. Defendant admitted that he took at least one
1
People v Watkins, ___ Mich ___ (2023) (Docket No. 165774).
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gun into the facility, and all four participants intended to use the facility to engage in firearms
training in anticipation of their later participation in “some level of civil disorder.” By the time of
defendant’s plea hearing, he was also facing charges in two other cases, one in Washtenaw County
and the other in Huron County. Defendant entered into a plea agreement in this case as part of “a
global plea resolution” of all three cases.
At defendant’s plea hearing, the trial court and defense counsel agreed that the trial court
had made a Cobbs2 evaluation and indicated that it expected to impose a minimum sentence of 32
months for teaching the use of a firearm. Defense counsel also indicated that defendant’s
sentencing guidelines minimum range was zero to nine months, and although the trial court had
expressed that it was likely to impose a sentence of 32 months, he wished to address the length of
that sentence “in an in person sentencing.” Defendant further stated that “[o]bviously the
sentencing is entirely within the—the discretion of the Court” and that he did not “believe it’s an
agreement to the 32 months” but rather “an agreement to the guidelines, and then to allow the
Court to sentence appropriately.” The prosecutor represented that “[i]t was not a sentence
agreement,” and she “was just listing out the Cobbs.” Consistent with those representations, the
parties also signed a written plea agreement form which stated that there had been a Cobbs
evaluation of 32 months and that defendant’s “estimated sentencing guideline range” was zero to
nine months for the teaching use of a firearm charge.
During defendant’s plea, the trial court advised him that his teaching firearms charge
carried a maximum penalty of four years’ imprisonment and a $10,000 fine, and defendant stated
that he understood. The trial court further advised defendant:
THE COURT. Now, the—the initial scoring of the guidelines it sounds like
is 0 to 9 on Count 3 [teaching firearms]. The Court is not bound by that guideline
range, but rather, that is—that is a consideration for the Court to take at the time of
sentencing. But that doesn’t necessarily mean that’s what the sentence is going to
be. Do you understand that?
DEFENDANT. Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT. Okay. Do you have any questions about this plea agreement
at all?
2
People v Cobbs, 443 Mich 276, 283; 505 NW2d 208 (1993). Pursuant to Cobbs, “trial judges
may participate in the plea negotiation process by indicating the length of sentence that the judge,
on the basis of a preliminary evaluation of the case, believes is appropriate for the charged
offense.” People v Chappell, 223 Mich App 337, 341; 566 NW2d 42 (1997). A “genuine Cobbs
agreement” occurs when “a defendant enters a guilty plea in exchange for a specific sentence
disposition by the trial court.” People v King, ___ Mich ___, ___ n 2; ___ NW2d ___ (2023)
(Docket No. 162327); slip op at 3 n 2. The trial court is not obligated to impose the sentence
anticipated by its preliminary evaluation, but the defendant may withdraw the plea “if the judge
later determines that the sentence must exceed the preliminary evaluation.” Cobbs, 443 Mich at
283.
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DEFENDANT. No, your Honor.
Defendant entered pleas of guilty to the teaching firearms charge and the felony-firearm charge.
At sentencing, the parties presented arguments concerning several sentencing guidelines variables.
The trial court ultimately calculated defendant’s guidelines minimum range as two to 17 months.
Defense counsel argued for a sentence within the guidelines, but the trial court imposed a minimum
sentence of 32 months.
Defendant thereafter filed a motion to correct his sentence. Defendant generally argued,
as he does on appeal, that there had either been a sentencing agreement to a minimum sentence of
zero to nine months, or the plea agreement was made on the basis of an ambiguity. The trial court
found “that ambiguity may exist as to whether Defendant entered into a valid sentencing
agreement,” so, “[t]o ensure that a correct record of the matter exists, and that no ambiguity exists
regarding the sentence agreement, Defendant’s sentence is stricken, and the Court remands
Defendant for resentencing.”
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“The trial court’s discretionary decisions—including its exercise of sentencing
discretion—are reviewed for an abuse of discretion,” which occurs if the trial court “selects an
outcome that falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” People v Odom, 327
Mich App 297, 303; 933 NW2d 719 (2019). A trial court’s decision on a motion for resentencing
is discretionary and reviewed for an abuse of that discretion. See People v Puckett, 178 Mich App
224, 227; 443 NW2d 470 (1989). This Court also reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s
decision on a motion to withdraw a plea. People v Martinez, 307 Mich App 641, 646; 861 NW2d
905 (2014). The trial court’s underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Odom, 327
Mich App at 303. “Clear error exists if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm
conviction that the trial court made a mistake.” Id. at 304 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
This Court generally affirms a trial court’s ruling if the result was correct, irrespective of the trial
court’s reasoning. People v Meeker (On Remand), 340 Mich App 559, 569; 986 NW2d 622 (2022).
Underlying questions of law, including the interpretation and application of a court rule,
are reviewed de novo. Martinez, 307 Mich App at 646-647. “Interpreting the meaning of a court
order involves questions of law that we review de novo on appeal.” Citizens for Higgins Lake
Legal Levels v Roscommon Co Bd of Comm’rs, 341 Mich App 161, 177; 988 NW2d 841 (2022).
“This Court reviews de novo as a question of law the proper interpretation of a contract, including
a trial court’s determination whether contract language is ambiguous.” Hein v Hein, 337 Mich
App 109, 115; 972 NW2d 337 (2021). De novo review means this Court evaluates “the legal issue
independently and without deference to the court below.” Krieger v Dep’t of Environment, Great
Lakes, and Energy, ___ Mich App ___, ___ n 16; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket Nos. 359895 et
al.); slip op at 24. Although the question of “[w]hether a contract is ambiguous is a question of
law,” the matter of “determining the meaning of ambiguous contract language becomes a question
of fact.” Zwiker v Lake Superior State Univ, 340 Mich App 448, 474; 986 NW2d 427 (2022). The
trial court’s interpretation of an ambiguous contract is therefore reviewed for clear error as a factual
issue. People v Swirles (After Remand), 218 Mich App 133, 136; 553 NW2d 357 (1996).
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III. PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Plea agreements “are essentially contracts and can be subject to the same rules and
principles governing contracts.” People v Smith, 502 Mich 624, 632; 918 NW2d 718 (2018). In
addition, because plea agreements “are concerned with the criminal law, they are governed by the
‘interests of justice’ rather than by commercial principles.” People v Rydzewski, 331 Mich App
126, 138; 951 NW2d 356 (2020) (citation omitted). Although the terms of a plea agreement “must
serve the interests of justice,” those terms are determined pursuant to ordinary contract principles
of seeking to determine the intent of the parties from the language of their contract and then
enforcing unambiguous language. Id. at 318 (quotation marks and citation omitted). General
contract principles are also applied to the construction of plea agreements that have ambiguous
terms. Id. A patent ambiguity is apparent on the face of a contract, whereas a latent ambiguity
arises when the contract is carried out. Id. at 139. “A contractual term can be ambiguous either
when it is equally susceptible to more than a single meaning or if two provisions of the same
contract irreconcilably conflict with each other.” Id. at 138-139 (quotation marks, brackets, and
citation omitted). “When the contract’s terms are ambiguous, a court may look to extrinsic
evidence to determine the parties’ intent.” Id. at 138. A plea agreement must be knowing and
intelligent, which means the defendant must have an accurate understanding of the benefits of the
bargain and the likely consequences of the plea. People v Guyton, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW2d
___ (2023) (Docket No. 163700); slip op at 8-12.
IV. ANALYSIS
Both the appeal and the cross-appeal ultimately turn on the parties’ disagreement whether
it is possible to determine from reading the plea transcript and the record what they actually agreed
to at the plea hearing. Defendant argues that any agreement was ambiguous, and plaintiff argues
that there was no possible ambiguity. We agree with plaintiff.
There was no confusion that the trial court had conducted a Cobbs evaluation and
pronounced a likely minimum sentence of 32 months, because that evaluation was recited in the
written plea agreement and stated on the record. There was also no confusion that there was no
agreement to impose a sentence of 32 months. The prosecutor expressly stated that there was no
sentence agreement, and defendant acknowledged that the court was “likely to give him 32
months” but expressed the desire to address the trial court in person at sentencing regarding the
ultimate sentence. At sentencing, defendant received a full opportunity to address the trial court
and argue in support of a lesser sentence, and the trial court ultimately did not exceed its Cobbs
evaluation of 32 months.
The prosecutor’s statement that there was no sentencing agreement is unambiguously
supported by the record. Unlike a sentence recommendation, a sentence agreement requires the
assent of the trial court. People v Killebrew, 416 Mich 189, 206-210; 330 NW2d 834 (1982). The
trial court plainly told defendant that although his “initial” guidelines range was zero to nine
months, the trial court was expressly not guaranteeing a minimum sentence within that range.
Defendant signified his understanding. Although defense counsel stated that there was an
agreement “to the guidelines, and then to allow the Court to sentence appropriately,” defense
counsel did not represent that there was an agreement to sentence within those guidelines or to
recommend a sentence within those guidelines. Therefore, defendant could not possibly have
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entered his plea on the expectation that he would receive a minimum sentence between zero and
nine months.
Defendant argued in his motion to correct that he was not informed “that the guidelines
were merely an estimate and that the guidelines could score higher.” However, the written plea
agreement form expressly states that the guidelines range was an estimate, and, consistent with
that form, the trial court expressly warned defendant that his guidelines range was “initial.” Even
if there was any ambiguity regarding defendant’s understanding of his guidelines range, any such
confusion would have been irrelevant. As stated, the trial court clearly warned defendant that his
minimum sentence might not fall within the range of zero to nine months, to which defense counsel
did not object. Therefore, there was unambiguously no agreement, understanding, or reasonable
expectation that defendant would receive a minimum sentence of between zero and nine months.
Defendant’s plea could not have been made on the basis of a misunderstanding of the ramifications
of that plea. See Guyton, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 8-12.
Reversed.
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett
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