People of Michigan v. Jonathan Michael Verhelle ( 2023 )

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED
November 16, 2023
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 363734
Tuscola Circuit Court
JONATHAN MICHAEL VERHELLE, LC No. 19-014782-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and CAVANAGH and GARRETT, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by leave granted1 his sentence of 40 to 60 months’ imprisonment for
domestic violence, after revocation of his probation. Defendant initially entered into a Cobbs2
agreement. In exchange for pleading no contest to his third-offense domestic violence charge,
MCL 750.81(4), defendant received a one-year cap on his jail sentence, and a 5-year term of
probation. In addition, the felonious assault charge, MCL 750.82, was dismissed. Defendant also
contests the order denying his motion to correct invalid sentence under MCR 6.429. We reverse
and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from a domestic altercation. In January 2019, police were dispatched to
the home of 63-year-old Larry Verhelle (Larry), defendant’s father. On the day of the altercation,
defendant’s girlfriend kicked him out because they were having financial issues. Defendant called
Larry asking if he could move in because he had “no place to go.” Despite a history of assaultive
behavior by both defendant and Larry, Larry agreed to let defendant stay with him. Shortly after
defendant arrived, he and Larry began arguing about defendant’s situation. During the argument,
Larry got up from the kitchen table and allegedly aggressively approached defendant, trying to
1
People v Verhelle, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 3, 2023 (Docket
No. 363734).
2
People v Cobbs, 443 Mich 276; 505 NW2d 208 (1993).
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grab him and remove him from the house. Defendant punched Larry in his left eye, struck him in
the head with a metal pan, and ran outside. Defendant and the prosecutor entered into the Cobbs
agreement, and the trial court accepted defendant’s plea, sentenced him to one year in jail, imposed
a 5-year probation period, and awarded 39 days of jail credit on the domestic violence charge.
After defendant was released from jail, the prosecutor filed several requests for warrants
alleging defendant committed numerous probation violations. In August 2020, the prosecutor
alleged defendant tested positive for marijuana and cocaine. Defendant agreed to plead guilty to
one count in exchange for dismissing the other, which the trial court accepted, sentencing
defendant to time served and continuing his probation. Between June 2021 and July 2021, the
prosecutor alleged defendant: (1) failed to report; (2) tested positive for alcohol; (3) operated a
motor vehicle with a suspended or revoked license; (4) operated a motor vehicle without a valid
plate; (5) operated an unregistered motor vehicle; (6) admitted to using marijuana; and (7) lied
about having COVID-19. In lieu of holding a probation violation hearing, the trial court ordered
defendant to complete the TRI-CAP treatment program. Between August 2021 and November
2021, the prosecutor alleged defendant: (1) failed to drop; (2) was found in possession of marijuana
wax and marijuana pipes; (3) was found in possession of two folding knives; (4) repeatedly failed
to report; (5) repeatedly failed to charge his curfew tether; (6) failed to submit to random drug
testing; and (7) failed to comply with the curfew tether. Further, defendant failed to complete his
court-ordered treatment at TRI-CAP. During the probation violation hearing, defendant agreed to
plead guilty to two counts in exchange for dismissing the remaining probation violation counts,
which the trial court accepted.
During the probation violation sentencing hearing, defendant and the prosecutor agreed the
sentence investigation report (SIR) accurately scored defendant’s sentencing guidelines at 14 to
29 months’ imprisonment. Defendant requested that the trial court sentence him at the low end of
the guidelines with credit for time served. The prosecutor requested that the trial court revoke
defendant’s probation and sentence him at the top end of the guidelines with credit for time served
because of defendant’s criminal history and extensive noncompliance with his probation. The trial
court revoked defendant’s probation and sentenced him above the sentencing guidelines to 40 to
60 months’ imprisonment with 449 days of jail credit.
Defendant moved to correct an invalid sentence under MCR 6.429, arguing OV 10 was
incorrectly assessed 10 points because there was no evidence defendant exploited any vulnerability
of Larry. Defendant claimed the only evidence of Larry’s vulnerability was the existence of a
domestic relationship, which was insufficient to show Larry was vulnerable. Additionally,
defendant claimed there was no evidence he exploited any vulnerability. Defendant also argued
that he was entitled to resentencing because his sentence was disproportionate and unreasonable.
Although defendant repeatedly violated the terms of his probation, the trial court failed to explain
why these violations justified a departure sentence or why the extent of the departure was justified.
The prosecutor responded, arguing OV 10 was properly assessed 10 points and there was
no procedural deficiency to warrant resentencing. The prosecutor also claimed, based on
defendant’s conduct and the record, defendant’s sentencing was not procedurally defective and his
sentence was not unreasonable. The prosecutor argued that the guidelines did not reflect the
seriousness of defendant’s criminal record or address defendant’s “failure to respond to
rehabilitative efforts.” Because defendant’s conduct justified the departure sentence and the trial
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court’s rationale adequately explained the reason for the extent of the departure, the prosecutor
contended defendant was not entitled to resentencing.
The trial court found the assessment of 10 points for OV 10 was proper because defendant
exploited his domestic relationship with Larry. The trial court also found the sentencing court did
not abuse its discretion in imposing a departure sentence because it “provided adequate reasons
for the extent of the departure sentence imposed,” and a departure sentence was warranted based
on defendant’s criminal history and numerous probation violations.3 This appeal followed.
While this appeal was pending, defendant moved for peremptory reversal under MCR
7.211(C)(4), claiming he was entitled to resentencing, which this Court denied. People v Verhelle,
unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 17, 2023 (Docket No. 363734).
II. OV 10
Defendant argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court incorrectly
assessed 10 points for OV 10. We agree.
A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“Under the sentencing guidelines, the circuit court’s factual determinations are reviewed
for clear error and must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” People v Hardy, 494
Mich 430, 438; 835 NW2d 340 (2013) superseded in part by statute as stated in People v
Rodriguez, 327 Mich App 573, 579 n 3; 935 NW2d 51 (2019). The trial court may consider all
record evidence in calculating the sentencing guidelines, including the contents of the PSIR.
People v Johnson, 298 Mich App 128, 131; 826 NW2d 170 (2012). “Clear error exists when the
reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made.” People v
Brooks, 304 Mich App 318, 319-320; 848 NW2d 161 (2014) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “Whether the facts, as found, are adequate to satisfy the scoring conditions prescribed
by statute, i.e., the application of the facts to the law, is a question of statutory interpretation, which
an appellate court reviews de novo.” Hardy, 494 Mich at 438.
B. ANALYSIS
“Offense variable 10 is exploitation of a vulnerable victim.” MCL 777.40(1). OV 10 is
properly assessed 10 points when “[t]he offender exploited a victim’s physical disability, mental
disability, youth or agedness, or a domestic relationship, or the offender abused his or her authority
status.” MCL 777.40(1)(b). The term “ ‘vulnerability’ means the readily apparent susceptibility
of a victim to injury, physical restraint, persuasion, or temptation.” MCL 777.40(3)(c). The term
3
Relevant to the OV score, defendant also claimed that OVs 1, 2, 12 and 19 were improperly
scored. The trial court held that OVs 1 and 2 were properly scored but OV 12 was improperly
scored; the prosecution also conceded that OV 19 was improperly scored. OVs 12 and 19 were
assessed 0 points, so defendant’s overall OV score was reduced from 71 points to 56 points.
Because this reduction did not alter defendant’s minimum guidelines range, resentencing was not
required.
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“ ‘[e]xploit’ means to manipulate a victim for selfish or unethical purposes.” MCL 777.40(3)(b).
A “domestic relationship” means “a familial or cohabitating relationship.” People v Jamison, 292
Mich App 440, 447; 807 NW2d 427 (2011). “Accordingly, to merit a score of 10 points for OV
10, a defendant must have manipulated a [] victim for a selfish or unethical purpose and the
victim’s vulnerability must have been readily apparent.” People v Needham, 299 Mich App 251,
255; 829 NW2d 329 (2013). Only conduct that relates to the offense being scored may be
considered in assessing points. People v Sargent, 481 Mich 346, 350; 750 NW2d 161 (2008).
The parties agree there is a domestic relationship between defendant and Larry because
they are father and son. However, defendant claims the mere existence of a domestic relationship
was insufficient to show Larry was vulnerable and there was no evidence defendant exploited any
vulnerability of Larry. In addition to the domestic relationship, the record shows defendant was
22 years old at the time of the offense, while Larry was 63 years old. This 40-year age gap arguably
supports a finding of vulnerability because of agedness. See MCL 777.40(1)(b).
The record shows that the morning of the altercation, defendant called Larry asking if he
could stay with him after being kicked out by his girlfriend. After arriving at Larry’s house, the
two engaged in a heated discussion regarding defendant being kicked out. Larry allegedly and
aggressively approached defendant in an attempt to grab him and physically remove him from the
home, which resulted in defendant hitting Larry. Larry’s active participation in the altercation and
attempts to physically remove defendant from his home undermines a finding he was a “vulnerable
victim.” Additionally, the record does not support a finding that defendant manipulated Larry’s
age or their domestic relationship for a selfish or unethical purpose; defendant simply asked Larry
if he could come home because he had nowhere else to go. There is no evidence to suggest
defendant asked to come home to assault Larry, or that defendant threatened Larry into letting him
come home; Larry was free to decline, but willingly chose to allow defendant into his home. What
the evidence does show is that in response to the heated argument and Larry’s attempts to
physically remove defendant, defendant struck Larry twice in the head with his fist and a metal
pan without regard to the domestic relationship or Larry’s age. Defendant reacted in the heat of
the moment without regard to whether Larry was vulnerable. “[I]f no vulnerable victim was in
fact placed in jeopardy or exploited by an offender’s actions, OV 10 does not apply.” People v
Russell (On Remand), 281 Mich App 610, 615; 760 NW2d 841 (2008). The trial court erred in
finding defendant exploited a vulnerability on behalf of Larry and assessing 10 points for OV 10.
Significantly, we note that the trial court reassessed points for OVs 12 and 19, reducing
defendant’s overall OV score from 71 points to 56 points. Because a score of zero points for OV
10 would further decrease defendant’s overall OV score from 56 to 46, this results in a decrease
in his minimum sentencing guidelines range, and defendant is entitled to be resentenced. See
People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 89-90; 711 NW2d 44 (2006) (“It would be in derogation of the
law, and fundamentally unfair, to deny a defendant . . . the opportunity to be resentenced on the
basis of accurate information.”).4
4
Because defendant is entitled to resentencing, it is unnecessary to address his argument that the
trial court abused its discretion by imposing a departure sentence. At resentencing, if the trial court
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Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett
again chooses to impose a departure sentence, it must comply with the principle of proportionality,
which “requires sentences imposed by the trial court to be proportionate to the seriousness of the
circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.” People v Walden, 319 Mich App 344,
351-352; 901 NW2d 142 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The trial court must also
“justify the sentence imposed in order to facilitate appellate review, which includes an explanation
of why the sentence imposed is more proportionate to the offense and the offender than a different
sentence would have been.” People v Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich App 490, 525; 909 NW2d 458 (2017)
(quotation marks and citations omitted). We express no opinion on whether a departure sentence
would be reasonable.
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