O People of Michigan v. Casey Stephen Turner ( 2024 )

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED
February 1, 2024
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 349691
Emmet Circuit Court
CASEY STEPHEN TURNER, LC No. 19-004875-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
ON REMAND
Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and M.J. KELLY and BOONSTRA, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of aggravated stalking, MCL 750.411i, and
using a computer to commit a crime, MCL 752.796(1) and MCL 752.797(3)(d). The trial court
sentenced defendant, as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 46 months to 15 years
in prison for each conviction, with the sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, we affirmed
defendant’s convictions and the within-guidelines sentence. In lieu of granting leave to appeal,
the Michigan Supreme Court vacated our decision to the extent it was inconsistent People v Posey,
___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 162373), and remanded to us for
reconsideration in light of that decision.1 Having done so, we again affirm defendant’s sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
We2 previously summarized the underlying facts of this case:
Defendant rented an apartment and he and his girlfriend, the victim, were
living there together when he was convicted of certain felonies and was sentenced
1
People v Turner, ___ Mich ___; 997 NW2d 198 (2023) (Docket No. 162772).
2
Judges M.J. KELLY and BOONSTRA have been substituted for Judges SAWYER and BECKERING in
light of the latters’ respective departures from this Court’s bench.
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to jail. Shortly before he was to be released from jail, his girlfriend told him that
she was breaking up with him. She arranged for him to be moved out of the
apartment. Defendant sought to convince her to reconcile. This led to him calling
her and sending her numerous text messages, some of which included links to
Netflix, YouTube, and other internet connections, which he was prohibited from
accessing while on probation; defendant also accessed her Facebook account. She
repeatedly asked defendant to stop contacting her but defendant claimed that while
she did so, she also continued to contact him. She explained that her contacts
involved outstanding issues such as having him pick up his remaining possessions
and letting him know he had mail. On one occasion, after coming to the apartment
to pick up a letter, defendant contacted the victim, accused her of cheating on him,
and claimed to have found her sex toys. This caused her to believe that defendant
had entered the apartment, which concerned her because defendant had surrendered
his key and she had subsequently had the locks changed. However, he claimed that
he had a key. The victim contacted the police. She also confirmed that her sex toys
had been taken from a dresser drawer and removed from the apartment. [People v
Turner (Turner I), unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued
January 28, 2021 (349691), pp 1-2.]
Defendant was acquitted of second-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(3), and larceny
in a building, MCL 750.360. As we explained in our prior opinion, the jury acquitted defendant
of these charges, “presumably on the basis that defendant could not invade an apartment of which
he was the lessee and that there was insufficient evidence that he entered the apartment or stole
the items.” Id. at 5. The aggravated stalking conviction was based on defendant violating a
condition of his probation. See MCL 750.411i(2)(b). In the prior appeal, we rejected defendant’s
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction:3
The testimony at trial established that defendant’s order of probation
provided that he was not to “violate any criminal law of any unit of government,”
or “engage in any assaultive, abusive, threatening or intimidating behavior,” or
“own or possess any computer or device capable of connecting to the internet . . .
unless he obtained permission from his probation agent.” Defendant violated a
condition of probation by his repeated unconsented contacts with the victim, which
constituted “abusive, threatening, or intimidating behavior.” Also, he owned a
“computer or device capable of connecting to the internet” because he owned and
used a cell phone with which he apparently connected to the internet. Additionally,
defendant’s refusal to stop his repeated contacts, his apparent entry into the
apartment after the locks were changed, and his contacts during which he accused
her of cheating on him and called her a whore, were additional evidence that
defendant had engaged in “abusive, threatening or intimidating behavior.” [Turner
I, unpub op at 8.]
3
We also rejected defendant’s argument that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. See
Turner I, unpub op at 2-6.
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We noted that “[w]hile the jury may have decided not to convict defendant of second-degree home
invasion[,] . . . that did not mean that the victim was not threatened or intimidated by his apparent
entry after she had the locks changed.” Id. at 8 n 5.
Defendant also argued that his sentence was unreasonable. We first determined that
defendant was barred from raising this claim, because this Court “has routinely affirmed sentences
that are within the recommended minimum sentencing guidelines range” pursuant to 769.34(10),
even following Lockridge.4 Turner I, unpub op at 9. Setting that aside, we determined that
defendant’s challenge to his sentence lacked merit, reasoning that sentences in the guidelines range
were presumptively proportionate to the seriousness of the crime, and defendant had not shown
unusual circumstances to rebut this presumption.5 See id.
In Posey, ___ Mich ___, the Supreme Court issued a plurality decision, with a majority of
the Court agreeing that the first sentence of MCL 769.34(10) requiring affirmation of within-
guidelines sentences is unconstitutional. This Court recently summarized the Supreme Court’s
decision in Posey:
Supreme Court Justices BOLDEN, BERNSTEIN, CAVANAGH, and WELCH agreed that
the opening sentence of MCL 769.34(10) is unconstitutional, although Justice
WELCH offered a different constitutional analysis. Posey, ___ Mich at ___
(BOLDEN, J.); slip op at 29-30, (CAVANAGH, J.); slip op at 1, and (WELCH, J.); slip
op at 2. Furthermore, the latter three Justices agreed with Justice BOLDEN’s
pronouncements in her lead opinion that “within-guidelines sentences are to be
reviewed for reasonableness,” that reasonableness review requires a determination
whether a sentence was proportionate, that there is a nonbinding presumption of
proportionality, meaning that a within-guidelines sentence is not binding on the
Court of Appeals, that “the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that their
within-guidelines sentence is unreasonable or disproportionate,” and that “a within-
guidelines sentence may indeed be disproportionate or unreasonable.” Id. at ___
(BOLDEN, J.); slip op at 36, (CAVANAGH, J.); slip op at 1, and (WELCH, J.); slip op
at 2. [People v Posey (On Remand), ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023)
(Docket No. 345491); slip op at 2.]
Defendant’s application to the Supreme Court was held in abeyance pending the Court’s
decision in Posey.6 The case now returns to us for review of defendant’s sentence in accordance
with the Supreme Court’s plurality holdings.
4
People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358; 870 NW2d 502 (2015).
5
We also rejected defendant’s claim that he was sentenced on the basis of inaccurate information.
See Turner I, unpub op at 9-10.
6
People v Turner, ___ Mich ___; 964 NW2d 365 (2023) (Docket No. 162772).
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II. ANALYSIS
We conclude defendant fails to rebut the presumption that his within-guidelines sentence
was proportionate.7
As noted, within-guidelines sentences are now reviewed for proportionality, with a
rebuttable presumption that the sentences are proportional. See Posey, ___ Mich at ___ (BOLDEN,
J.); slip op at 37-38 (“When a trial court sentences a defendant within the guidelines’
recommended range, it creates a presumption that the sentence is proportionate. However, unlike
a mandate that an appellate court affirm a within-guidelines sentence, the presumption of
proportionality may be overcome.”). Further, “challenges to within-guidelines sentences are
reviewed for reasonableness according to the test outlined in [People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453,
471; 902 NW2d 327 (2017)].” Posey, ___ Mich at ___ (BOLDEN, J.); slip op at 4-5. “[T]he
relevant question for appellate courts reviewing a sentence for reasonableness” is “whether the
trial court abused its discretion by violating the principle of proportionality . . . .” Steanhouse, 500
Mich at 471. The principle of proportionality “requires sentences imposed by the trial court to be
proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.”
People v Walden, 319 Mich App 344, 351-352; 901 NW2d 142 (2017) (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Defendant argues that the circumstances of the offense did not warrant a sentence at the
top of the sentencing guidelines range, because the repeated text messages he sent to the victim
were “the outpouring of emotions following a difficult breakup,” and he did not threaten violence
toward the victim. Defendant greatly minimizes his conduct and the effect of his repeated
unwanted text messages on the victim. As we stated in our prior opinion, “[t]he victim testified
that she was so disturbed by defendant’s continuous contacts that she lost weight, had trouble
eating, and broke out in hives,” and “[d]efendant admitted that he continued to contact the victim
despite her requests that he stop.” Turner I, unpub op at 4. Further, defendant overlooks the
significant mental distress caused by his apparent entry into the apartment after the victim changed
the locks. In her victim-impact statement, the victim explained that she still does not feel safe
staying at the apartment. Defendant’s entry into the apartment was followed by text messages
accusing the victim of lying to him and cheating on him, similar to previous messages in which he
called the victim a whore. The trial court found that the victim suffered “serious and profound
harm” because of defendant’s actions. Thus, contrary to defendant’s argument, the circumstances
of the offense involved much more than an “outpouring of emotions.” The fact that defendant did
not threaten the victim with harm is not an unusual circumstance that would overcome the
presumption of proportionality and render his within-guidelines sentence an abuse of discretion.
7
“This Court reviews the proportionality of a trial court’s sentence for an abuse of discretion.”
People v Lydic, 335 Mich App 486, 500; 967 NW2d 847 (2021). “An abuse of discretion occurs
when the court chooses an outcome that falls outside the range of reasonable and principled
outcomes.” People v Bass, 317 Mich App 241, 256; 893 NW2d 140 (2016) (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
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Regarding defendant’s criminal history, defendant had two prior domestic violence cases
against his ex-wife.8 We previously affirmed the trial court’s statement at sentencing that
defendant had “issues of domestic violence.” See Turner I, op at 10. Accordingly, we do not view
defendant’s conduct in this case as an isolated incident stemming from a difficult breakup.
In sum, considering the circumstances of the offense and the offender, defendant has not
overcome the presumption that his within-guidelines sentence was proportional.
Affirmed.
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
8
The first case was ultimately dismissed under the spouse abuse act, MCL 769.4a, and the second
case resulted in defendant pleading to assault and battery.
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