20231130_C366040_39_366040.Opn.Pdf ( 2023 )

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
November 30, 2023
In re WHEELER-CLOSE/WHEELER, Minors. Nos. 366040; 366041
Branch Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 22-006418-NA
Before: LETICA, P.J., and BORRELLO and RICK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals,1 respondent-mother and respondent-father appeal as of right
the trial court’s order terminating their parental rights to the minor children, HW and BW, under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). For the reasons set
forth in this opinion, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
This case began with a May 3, 2022 petition alleging that both mother and father were
continuing to use methamphetamine while the minor children were in their care. The petition
further alleged that mother was driving under the influence of methamphetamine while
transporting the children, that there was a history of domestic violence between mother and father
in the presence of the children, and that there was a history of homelessness.
With respect to mother, the trial court assumed jurisdiction over the minor children based
on mother’s plea of admission to the petition allegations that she had used methamphetamine while
the children were in her care and that she had tested positive for methamphetamine. The trial court
assumed jurisdiction regarding father based on his plea of admission to the petition allegations that
he was using methamphetamine while the children were in his care, which affected his ability to
care for the children.
1
In re Wheeler-Close/Wheeler, Minors, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered
May 17, 2023 (Docket Nos. 366040 and 366041).
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On September 1, 2022, following a hearing, the trial court entered the initial disposition
order with respect to both mother and father. The trial court ordered both parents to comply with
and benefit from the service plan and that each parent’s parenting time with the minor children
would be supervised. More specifically, mother and father were both ordered to complete and
pass random drug screens, engage with substance abuse services, complete psychological
evaluations and follow recommendations from these evaluations, participate in counseling, obtain
and maintain safe and stable housing, obtain and maintain verifiable employment, and complete
parenting classes.
As the case progressed, mother continued to test positive for methamphetamine numerous
times, and she missed many drug screens. Father also continued to test positive for
methamphetamine multiple times and missed many drug screens. The foster-care worker testified
that both parents indicated that they did not believe their substance abuse was an issue or that they
had neglected their children. However, father admitted in his testimony at the termination hearing
that he had a substance abuse issue that affected his ability to parent his children and that he had
not taken any steps to rectify that problem. Father admitted that he was still using
methamphetamine and that he had used it most recently on the day before the termination hearing.
Mother also admitted during her termination hearing that she had a substance abuse problem that
affected her ability to parent.
At the time of the hearing, mother was living in her car in the driveway of her sister’s home.
She had minimally participated in some substance abuse treatment for a period of time, but she
had not participated in substance abuse treatment for a few months before the termination hearing.
Father was living in a camper behind his employer’s factory. He had not participated in any
substance abuse treatment during the case.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of both mother and father under MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (3)(g), and (3)(j). Mother and father now appeal.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing
evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been
met.” In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 139; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). We review for clear error
the trial court’s finding that statutory grounds for termination exist. Id.After the trial court determines that at least one of the statutory grounds has been met, the
trial court must also find by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the children’s
best interests before it can terminate parental rights. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 86, 90; 836
NW2d 182 (2013). We review the trial court’s best-interest finding for clear error. In re Trejo,
462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the
reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due
regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App
at 80 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “If the court finds that there are grounds for
termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests,
the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification
of the child with the parent not be made.” MCL 712A.19b(5).
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III. STATUTORY GROUNDS
On appeal, mother first argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding that there were
statutory grounds to support terminating her parental rights.2
As previously noted, the trial court terminated mother’s parental rights to HW and BW
pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). The trial
court need only find that one statutory ground has been proven by clear and convincing evidence
to support terminating parental rights. In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011).
Termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) is appropriate when the
parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more
days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order,[3] and the
court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds . . . [t]he conditions that led to the
adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the
conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.
Termination of parental rights is proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) when “the totality
of the evidence amply supports that [the respondent] had not accomplished any meaningful change
in the conditions” that led to the adjudication, and there is not a reasonable likelihood that the
respondent would be able to rectify those conditions within a reasonable time considering the
child’s age. In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 272-273; 779 NW2d 286 (2009). “A parent’s
failure to participate in and benefit from a service plan is evidence that the parent will not be able
to provide a child proper care and custody.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 710; 846 NW2d 61(2014). Further, a parent’s repeated positive or missed drug screenings coupled with lack of
engagement with substance-abuse counseling services and continued substance abuse may
demonstrate that termination was appropriate pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) where substance
2
Father has not challenged the trial court’s statutory grounds finding with respect to him.
Nonetheless, we are satisfied from our review of the record that the trial court did not clearly err
by finding that MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) was proven by clear and convincing evidence regarding
father. The condition that led to his adjudication was methamphetamine abuse affecting his ability
to parent, and father admitted that he continued to use methamphetamine and had not taken any
steps throughout the case to rectify this problem. The record also indicates that father continued
to test positive for methamphetamine and miss drug screens throughout the case. The trial court
therefore did not clearly err in finding that father’s substance abuse affecting his ability to parent
continued to exist and that there was no reasonable likelihood that the condition would be rectified
within a reasonable time because father had not demonstrated any meaningful progress in
addressing this issue during the case. One statutory ground is sufficient to support terminating
parental rights. In re Ellis, 294 Mich App at 32.
3
The parties do not claim that this minimum statutory period had not elapsed, nor could they. The
initial dispositional order was entered on September 1, 2022 and the parent’s rights were
terminated on April 17, 2023.
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abuse was a condition that led to the adjudication. In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 344-345; 990
NW2d 685 (2022).
The condition that led to mother’s adjudication was her substance abuse involving
methamphetamine, including the abuse of methamphetamine while the children were in her care.
The record supports the trial court’s finding that mother did not make any meaningful progress in
rectifying this condition throughout the course of the case, which demonstrated that the condition
was also not reasonably likely to be rectified within a reasonable time given the children’s ages.4
Mother continued to test positive for methamphetamine, missed drug screens, and only minimally
participated in services aimed at treating substance abuse before completely ceasing participation
in substance abuse services. For months before the termination hearing, mother neglected to
reengage with substance abuse treatment. She admitted at the termination hearing that she had a
substance abuse problem that affected her ability to parent. Mother was living in her car. The trial
court did not clearly err by finding that termination was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).
Mother’s failure to participate in, and benefit from, her service plan showed that she was not able
to provide for her children’s care and custody in the future. See In re White, 303 Mich App at 710.
Because we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err as to Subsection (3)(c)(i), we
need not address Subsections (3)(g) and (3)(j). See In re Ellis, 294 Mich App at 32.
IV. BEST INTERESTS
Both respondents argue that the trial court erred when it determined that termination was
in the best interests of the children. Father also argues that the trial court failed to follow the
requirements of MCR 3.977(I) when it made its determination.
“Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that
termination is in the child’s best interests before it can terminate parental rights.” In re Olive/Metts
Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012); see also MCL 712A.19b(5). “[T]he focus
at the best-interest stage” is on the children, not the parent. In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 87. The
trial court may consider such factors as “the child’s bond to the parent[;] the parent’s parenting
ability[;] the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality[;] and the advantages of a foster
home over the parent’s home.” In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42 (citations omitted).
Other considerations include the length of time that the children were in foster care or placed with
relatives and the likelihood that “the child could be returned to her parent’s home within the
foreseeable future, if at all.” In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248-249; 824 NW2d 569 (2012).
Regarding mother, the trial court determined that termination was in the children’s best
interests because the children needed permanence and stability. Mother’s failure to participate in
services, including her failure to consistently and adequately participate in treatment for substance
abuse, indicated that mother could not provide permanence and stability. Further, mother’s excuse
that she merely forgot to sign up for services such as Narcotics Anonymous demonstrated the
mindset of someone unable to provide that stability and permanency. Addressing both parents,
the trial court also explained that HW and BW were placed with their grandfather, and it suspected
4
The children were 12 years old and 2 years old at the time of the termination hearing.
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that respondents would be able to contact them further. Considering this, the trial court explained
that it would have considered keeping the children in foster-care longer if it had seen any progress
from respondents, but they failed to show any of the necessary progress to justify giving them
more time.
On appeal, respondent-mother argues that she had a bond with her children. Further, she
claims, if she was given a reasonable amount of time, she would be able to provide for their proper
care and custody. Mother’s bond with her children is just one factor that the trial court may
consider. See In re White, 303 Mich App at 713-714 (providing the multiple best-interest factors).
In this case, the trial court acknowledged that respondent-mother loved her children and that
respondent-mother performed well during parenting time. However, respondent-mother’s bond
with HW and BW alone does not demonstrate that, if given more time, respondent-mother could
provide her children with permanence and stability or overcome her substance abuse issues.
Respondent-mother made no progress throughout these proceedings and, in fact, ended this
case in a worse position compared to when the proceedings were initiated. Mother was unable to
consistently maintain housing or employment. These proceedings were initiated largely because
respondent-mother used methamphetamine when caring for her children. She did not sufficiently
demonstrate that she understood that using methamphetamine when she cared for her children
placed them in danger. Likewise, she never followed through with completing services to address
her substance-abuse issues. She was living in her car in the driveway of her sister’s home. All of
this showed that she could not provide a safe and stable home for her children and that she would
not be able to do so within a reasonable time. The trial court considered all of these factors together
when it determined that HW and BW needed permanence and stability and that respondent-mother
could not provide that for them. The trial court’s best-interest determination on the record does
not leave a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed . . . .” In re Moss, 301
Mich App at 80 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, the trial court did not clearly
err when it determined that termination of mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best
interests.
Regarding father, the trial court also determined that termination was in the children’s best
interests. The trial court emphasized that the children needed permanence and stability. Father
did not show that he could provide permanence and stability because he did not participate in the
services that were required. He admitted that he had a substance abuse problem, but he did not
seek treatment. The trial court acknowledged that the children were placed with a relative, so
father likely would have future contact with his children. However, father’s lack of progress
prevented the trial court from determining that a foster placement or guardianship would be a better
option for HW and BW.
Father seemingly argues that the trial court failed to follow the requirements of
MCR 3.977(I) because it did not address the children’s bond with father, father’s parenting ability,
the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home, the possibility of adoption, or the
children’s well-being in care.
In a proceeding seeking termination of parental rights, the trial court must state on the
record or in writing its findings of fact and conclusions of law. MCR 3.977(I). “Brief, definite,
and pertinent findings and conclusions on contested matters are sufficient.” MCR 3.977(I)(1).
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However, the court is not required to examine at length each and every factor that could be
relevant to HW’s and BW’s best interests. Instead, the trial court was obligated to determine if
termination of father’s parental rights was in HW’s and BW’s best interests on the whole record.
In re White, 303 Mich App at 713. Further, the trial court directly considered several of the factors
that father argues that the trial court did not consider. The trial court considered placement of HW
and BW in a foster home and a guardianship, but it determined that these placements were not
appropriate because of respondents’ complete lack of progress in services. The trial court satisfied
the requirements of MCR 3.977(I).
Moreover, even accepting as true father’s argument that his bond with his children and
housing situation weighed against terminating his parental rights, we are not left with a definite
and firm conviction that the trial court erred by determining that termination was in the children’s
best interest considering father’s total failure to address his substance abuse issue. In re Moss, 301
Mich App at 80. The stability needed by children includes having caretakers that are not abusing
methamphetamine while they are supposed to be caring for the children, rendering them
functionally unavailable to carry out their responsibilities to the children. Father’s apparent bond
with his children is only one of many factors that the trial court may consider in the best-interest
analysis. See In re White, 303 Mich App at 713-714 (providing the multiple best-interest factors).
Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err when it determined that termination of father’s
parental rights was in the children’s best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Anica Letica
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
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