In Re Guardianship of Jcm ( 2024 )

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
In re JCM, Minor. May 30, 2024
No. 368224
Berrien Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2013-000407-GM
Before: YATES, P.J., and CAVANAGH and BOONSTRA, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals by right the trial court’s order denying termination of petitioners’
guardianship of JM, a minor child. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2013, Children’s Protective Services (CPS) removed JM from respondent’s care and
placed her in the care of petitioners, JM’s grandparents. The removal was based on respondent’s
prostitution and abuse of illegal drugs. In September 2013, the trial court granted petitioners’
petition for guardianship of JM. Respondent had no contact with JM for the next two years and,
although she eventually became sober, she admitted to abusing methamphetamine during this time.
JM was diagnosed with several mental-health issues and emotional impairments. She was
suspended during preschool and kindergarten because of her inappropriate behaviors toward
teachers and students, which included biting and hitting. Consequently, she participated in special
education services as a supplement to her regular learning environment, and in speech and social
services. Respondent was not involved in the meetings regarding JM’s progress and needs.
Respondent testified at the hearing on her petition that petitioners did not communicate any
information to her regarding these meetings. She also said that petitioners refused to sign a release
of information so that she could communicate with JM’s teachers or the school social worker. And
she said that petitioners failed to inform the school and medical authorities of her existence, which
further prevented her from obtaining information on the child’s school or medical treatments.
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In March 2015, respondent moved to modify the guardianship and sought a reunification
plan that would include unsupervised parenting time. Respondent informed the trial court of her
sobriety and that she had obtained independent housing and government benefits, and was
currently caring for her one-year-old daughter. The trial court issued an order that modified the
guardianship and established a supervised parenting plan. The parenting plan visits occurred in
respondent’s home two Saturdays and one Friday every month, but they did not include any
overnight visits.
In June 2019, respondent moved to terminate the guardianship. The trial court ordered the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to prepare an investigative report, and it
ordered a psychological evaluation and parenting-time assessment of respondent and petitioners.
In 2021,1 respondent moved for additional parenting time. The parties agreed to employ a
counselor to provide reunification therapy for JM and respondent. The counselor recommended
one overnight parenting-time session per month initially, with a gradual increase in parenting time
over several months until JM was returned to respondent’s care full-time. The parties attempted
to resolve the parenting time issue through settlement conferences, but were unsuccessful.
In April 2023, the trial court denied respondent’s petition to terminate the guardianship.
Respondent moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s dispositional rulings. In re
Guardianship of Redd, 321 Mich App 398, 403; 909 NW2d 289 (2017). A trial court abuses its
discretion when it choses an outcome outside the range of principled outcomes. Id. A trial court
necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law. TM v MZ (On Remand), 326 Mich
App 227, 235-236; 926 NW2d 900 (2018). This Court reviews de novo questions of law. In re
Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 9; 761 NW2d 253 (2008).
III. ANALYSIS
Respondent argues that the trial court imposed an improper evidentiary standard on her.
Respondent also argues that the trial court erred in best-interest analysis. We disagree with the
former argument, and we remand for the trial court to provide further articulation regarding its
best-interest analysis.
Our courts have long respected the fundamental liberty interest that parents hold in the
care, custody, and management of their children. See Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 758-759;
102 S Ct 1388; 71 L Ed 2d 599 (1982). This Court has recognized that the state ordinarily has no
right to interfere with a parent-child relationship. In re AP, 283 Mich App 574, 591; 770 NW2d
403 (2009). However, when the parent proves unable to parent his or her child, the state may
1
It appears that the progress of these proceedings was significantly slowed by the COVID-19
pandemic.
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interfere with the parent and child’s “mutual due process liberty interests” by demonstrating
parental unfitness. In re Clausen, 442 Mich 648, 687, 687 n 46; 502 NW2d 649 (1993).
A. EVIDENTIARY STANDARD
Respondent argues that the trial court imposed a legally improper burden on respondent by
requiring her to establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the guardianship
was in JM’s best interests. We disagree with her characterization of the record.
Petitions to terminate a guardianship are governed by MCL 700.5208 (parental petition to
terminate guardianship) and MCL 700.5209 (limited guardianship and termination). In this case,
the trial court granted relief under MCL 700.5209(2)(c), which states,
If the minor resides with the guardian or limited guardian for not less than
1 year and if the court finds that the minor’s parent or parents have failed to provide
the minor with parental care, love, guidance, and attention appropriate to the child’s
age and individual needs resulting in a substantial disruption of the parent-child
relationship, [the court may] continue the guardianship if it is established by clear
and convincing evidence that the continuation would serve the best interests of the
minor.
In this case, the trial court made the following statement regarding the evidentiary standard at play
in these proceedings:
[T]he standard that needs to be met for termination of a guardianship, inclusive of
the best interests of the minor, rests upon a demonstration specifically of clear and
convincing evidence, the minor having resided with the guardian for, in this case,
clearly not less than a year, and the parents having failed to provide the minor with
specifically parental care, love, guidance, and attention that would appropriate to
the child’s age, and as argued by [counsel for petitioners], and the circumstances
supporting that, there is not, has not been , and quite candidly, could not have been
a demonstration of that met by the petitioner [sic, respondent] . . . .
Although the trial court stated the standard in MCL 700.5209(2)(c) out of order and in an
arguably confusing manner, there is no evidence that the trial court improperly applied a clear-
and-convincing-evidence standard to respondent. A trial judge is presumed to know and
understand the applicable law. See In re Archer, 277 Mich App 71, 84; 744 NW2d 1 (2007).
MCL 700.5209(2)(c) indicates that the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard applies to the
party attempting to preserve the guardianship in the context of the child’s best interests, after the
trial court finds that the child’s parent or parents “minor’s parent or parents have failed to provide
the minor with parental care, love, guidance, and attention appropriate to the child’s age and
individual needs resulting in a substantial disruption of the parent-child relationship.” The trial
court’s statement indicates an understanding of the requirements of MCL 700.5209(2)(c),
notwithstanding some arguably awkward phrasing, and nothing in the record suggests that the trial
court believed that it was respondent’s burden to provide clear and convincing evidence that
termination of the guardianship was in JM’s best interests. Utrera, 281 Mich App at 9.
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B. BEST-INTEREST ANALYSIS
Respondent also argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded that
termination of the guardianship was not in the child’s best interests. On the current record, we
conclude that remand for further articulation of the trial court’s findings with respect to the relevant
best-interest factors is required.
“The Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC), MCL 700.1101 et seq., governs the
laws concerning the affairs of protected individuals and legally incapacitated individuals.” In re
Guardianship of Gordon, 337 Mich App 316, 318; 975 NW2d 114 (2021). By contrast, the Child
Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq., governs child custody disputes. Berger v Berger, 277 Mich
App 700, 705; 747 NW2d 336 (2008). The best-interest factors of the Child Custody Act,
MCL 722.23, are also codified in the Estates and Protected Individuals Code. MCL 700.5101(a).
This Court has stated that because the Child Custody Act and the guardianship statutes share the
same purpose of promoting the best interests of children, “the two statutes may be interpreted
consistent with each other, or in pari materia.” Deschaine v St Germain, 256 Mich App 665, 671
n 9; 671 NW2d 79 (2003).
MCL 700.5101(a) defines “best interests of a minor” in the context of guardianship
proceedings as “the sum total of the following factors to be considered, evaluated, and determined
by the court”:
(i) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parties
involved and the child.
(ii) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child
love, affection, and guidance and to continue educating and raising the child in the
child’s religion or creed, if any.
(iii) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child
with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted
under the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs.
(iv) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory
environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(v) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial
home.
(vi) The moral fitness of the parties involved.
(vii) The mental and physical health of the parties involved.
(viii) The child’s home, school, and community record.
(ix) The child’s reasonable preference, if the court considers the child to be
of sufficient age to express a preference.
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(x) The party’s willingness and ability to facilitate and encourage a close
and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and his or her parent or
parents.
(xi) Domestic violence regardless of whether the violence is directed against
or witnessed by the child.
(xii) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular
dispute regarding termination of a guardianship, removal of a guardian, or parenting
time.
In the context of child custody disputes, this Court has stated that trial courts must consider
each factor and explicitly state its findings and conclusions. Rittershaus v Rittershaus, 273 Mich
App 462, 475; 730 NW2d 262 (2007). “When a trial court does not make such findings on the
best-interest factors, the proper remedy is reversal and a remand for a new child-custody hearing.”
Rivette v Rose-Molina, 278 Mich App 327, 330; 750 NW2d 603 (2008). But, in making findings
regarding the best-interest factors, a trial court need not comment on every matter in evidence or
declare whether it accepted or rejected every proposition argued. See Baker v Baker, 411 Mich
567, 583; 309 NW2d 532 (1981). “However, the record must be sufficient for this Court to
determine whether the evidence clearly preponderates against the trial court’s findings.” See
MacIntyre v MacIntyre (On Remand), 267 Mich App 449, 452; 705 NW2d 144 (2005). Courts
are also not required to give equal weight to all the factors. Sinicropi v Mazurek, 273 Mich App
149, 184; 729 NW2d 256 (2006). They may consider the relative weight of the factors as
appropriate to the circumstances. Id.In this case, the record shows that the trial court made findings that could have indicated
consideration of several of the best-interest factors. For example, the trial court found that
respondent had failed to provide “parental care, love, guidance, and attention” appropriate to JM’s
age and particular circumstances, including her health issues. Specifically, the trial court noted
the fact that respondent had not had much experience dealing with JM’s special needs and
supporting her as a special needs child. The trial court stated that respondent had not been
responsible for the JM’s psychological or school emotional health. Overall, the trial court
concluded that there was no “baseline” to determine whether respondent had the capacity to care
for herself, given her own mental struggles, and the child, given the child’s mental struggles. The
trial court also stated that the parenting time so far enjoyed by respondent with JM was not actual
parenting time “in the full sense of the word.” The trial court also noted that JM was “really
blossoming” in her current custodial environment with her grandparents. The trial court
additionally noted respondent’s mental health issues and stated that it had met with JM. However,
the trial court never explicitly addressed the statutory best-interest factors or stated which factors
it had considered, its conclusion regarding each of those factors, or how the underlying facts
supported those conclusions.
We therefore conclude, based on the current record, that the trial court did not adequately
articulate its best-interest findings on the record. Although the trial court discussed several facts
from the case generally, it failed to link those facts to particular best-interest factors, and therefore
failed to articulate a best-interest determination that was the sum total of the relevant best-interest
factors that it had considered and evaluated. MCL 700.5101(a); see also Rivette, 278 Mich App
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at 330. The purpose of an explicit analysis of the best-interest factors is to provide this Court with
a sufficient record to determine whether the evidence clearly preponderates against the trial court’s
findings. MacIntyre, 267 Mich App at 452. We conclude that the current record is inadequate for
us to do so.
Accordingly, we remand to allow the trial court to place on the record its findings regarding
the relevant best-interest factors. The trial court should consider up-to-date information when
doing so. See Pierron v Pierron, 282 Mich App 222, 262; 765 NW2d 345 (2009).
Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Christopher P. Yates
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
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Court of Appeals, State of Michigan
ORDER
Christopher P. Yates
In re JCM, Minor Presiding Judge
Docket No. 368224 Mark J. Cavanagh
LC No. 2013-000407-GM Mark T. Boonstra
Judges
Pursuant to the opinion issued concurrently with this order, this case is REMANDED for
further proceedings consistent with the opinion of this Court. We retain jurisdiction.
Proceedings on remand in this matter shall commence within 28 days of the Clerk’s
certification of this order, and they shall be given priority on remand until they are concluded. As stated
in the accompanying opinion, the probate court shall articulate its findings on the best-interest factors on
the record, taking into account up-to-date information. The proceedings on remand are limited to this
issue.
The parties shall promptly file with this Court a copy of all papers filed on remand. Within
seven days after entry, appellant shall file with this Court copies of all orders entered on remand.
The transcript of all proceedings on remand shall be prepared and filed within 21 days after
completion of the proceedings.
_______________________________
Presiding Judge
May 30, 2024