20231214_C366223_40_366223.Opn.Pdf ( 2023 )


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  •             If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
    revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
    STATE OF MICHIGAN
    COURT OF APPEALS
    UNPUBLISHED
    In re STEPHENSON, Minors.                                            December 14, 2023
    No. 366223
    Calhoun Circuit Court
    Family Division
    LC No. 2004-002952-NA
    Before: REDFORD, P.J., and SHAPIRO and YATES, JJ.
    PER CURIAM.
    Respondent-mother appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights
    under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). We affirm.
    I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    Calhoun County Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) petitioned for the
    termination of respondent’s parental rights to three children during 2021 related to physical neglect
    and improper supervision of the children. Respondent admitted to methamphetamine use and
    addiction; however, she refused substance-abuse treatment and more often than not failed to
    submit to drug screens. The trial court ordered that the children be placed in temporary foster care
    and ordered respondent to participate in various services to enable reunification with the children.
    The children were removed from respondent’s care on February 1, 2022. The children were
    diagnosed with generalized tooth decay in multiple areas of the primary and permanent teeth and
    required significant dental treatment. Over the course of the proceedings, respondent had
    psychological evaluations scheduled that she failed to complete and she took minimal steps toward
    substance-abuse treatment and failed to complete the program and services made available to her.
    Respondent was provided parenting time but missed a substantial number of visits. DHHS filed a
    supplemental petition in January 2023 seeking termination of respondent’s parental rights. At the
    conclusion of the termination proceedings, the trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights.
    Respondent now appeals.
    II. ADJOURNMENT AND/OR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
    A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a respondent’s motion for an adjournment is
    reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re Jackson, 
    199 Mich App 22
    , 28; 
    501 NW2d 182
     (1993).
    -1-
    A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes.
    In re Jones, 
    286 Mich App 126
    , 130; 
    777 NW2d 728
     (2009).
    A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel generally presents a mixed question of fact and
    constitutional law, with questions of fact reviewed for clear error and questions of law reviewed
    de novo. In re Mota, 
    334 Mich App 300
    , 318; 
    964 NW2d 881
     (2020). Respondents in parental-
    rights proceedings are entitled to the effective assistance of counsel, and claims regarding
    ineffectiveness are reviewed under the same principles that apply in criminal proceedings. In re
    Martin, 
    316 Mich App 73
    , 85; 
    896 NW2d 452
     (2016). “Clear error exists when the reviewing
    court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” People v
    Anderson, 
    284 Mich App 11
    , 13; 
    772 NW2d 792
     (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
    We review de novo whether a particular act or omission fell below an objective standard of
    reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 19-20.
    Because respondent did not move in the trial court for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing on this
    matter, our review is limited to mistakes apparent on the existing record. In re AMB, 
    248 Mich App 144
    , 231-232; 
    640 NW2d 262
     (2001).
    A. ADJOURNMENT
    Respondent argues that the trial court erred by denying her request to adjourn the
    termination hearing to have the opportunity to consult and present an expert witness regarding
    respondent’s positive drug screen. A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a respondent’s motion
    for adjournment is largely controlled by MCR 3.923(G), which provides as follows:
    Adjournments of trials or hearings in child protective proceedings should
    be granted only
    (1) for good cause,
    (2) after taking into consideration the best interests of the child, and
    (3) for as short a period of time as necessary.
    This Court has determined “that in order for a trial court to find good cause for an adjournment, ‘a
    legally sufficient or substantial reason’ must first be shown.” In re Utrera, 
    281 Mich App 1
    , 11;
    
    761 NW2d 253
     (2008) (citation omitted). In a child-protective proceeding, a motion to adjourn
    must identify a good cause, and the court’s ruling should consider the child’s best interests.
    MCR 3.923(G)(1), (2). The court rules applicable to other types of proceedings specify that the
    unavailability of a witness or evidence may amount to good cause, but “only if the court finds that
    the evidence is material and that diligent efforts have been made to produce the witness or
    evidence.” MCR 2.503(C)(1), (2).
    Applying MCR 3.923(G) to the facts of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
    by denying respondent’s motion to adjourn the termination hearing. Respondent, through counsel,
    moved for an adjournment at the conclusion of day three of the termination proceedings.
    According to trial counsel, the adjournment was necessary to refute testimony presented for the
    first time regarding the credibility of respondent’s exposure to methamphetamine during the
    cleaning of her residence. The record reveals, however, that respondent and trial counsel were
    -2-
    aware and had proper notice of the positive drug screen approximately 14 days before the
    termination hearing and that respondent contested that positive drug screen. Additional testimony
    was presented regarding respondent’s immediate reaction to the positive drug screen and her claim
    that it was a false positive. Evidence was presented that respondent informed her caseworker that
    it was a false-positive result before the termination proceedings and that respondent had provided
    at least two factual situations that she argued were the cause of the false-positive result.
    Respondent argues, on appeal, that evidence regarding skin exposure to methamphetamine was
    introduced for the first time at the termination hearing; however, contact exposure was the entirety
    of respondent’s argument both when she initially discovered the positive drug result and at the
    termination hearing. Further, respondent testified at the same termination hearing regarding her
    cleaning the basement of her residence, lack of protective equipment, and possible contact or
    ingestion of methamphetamine from failing to wash her hands and shower.
    On appeal, respondent argues that research regarding methamphetamine exposure “took a
    matter of a minute or so to find” and that “any competent professional could have testified on the
    issue.” The trial court did not err by expecting respondent to be prepared with evidence to refute
    the drug screen that she immediately opposed upon her discovery of the test results. Accordingly,
    the trial court properly determined that respondent and trial counsel were notified and contested
    the positive drug screen and could have timely presented evidence to refute the positive drug
    screen. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying respondent’s motion for
    an adjournment of the termination proceedings.
    B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
    In analyzing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at termination hearings, we apply
    by analogy the principles of ineffective assistance of counsel as they have developed in the
    criminal law context. In re Trowbridge, 
    155 Mich App 785
    , 786; 
    401 NW2d 65
     (1986). Both the
    Michigan and federal Constitutions guarantee the right to the assistance of counsel in criminal
    cases. Const 1963, art 1, § 20; US Const, Am VI. Given the nature of accusations and
    consequences in child-protective proceedings, this right has been extended to these civil
    proceedings. In re Martin, 316 Mich App at 85.
    If defense counsel provided deficient assistance and the deficient performance prejudiced
    the defendant’s trial, the defendant is entitled to a new trial. Strickland v Washington, 
    466 US 668
    ,
    687; 
    104 S Ct 2052
    ; 
    80 L Ed 2d 674
     (1984). To successfully establish a claim of ineffective
    assistance of counsel, a respondent in child-protective proceedings must show “that (1) counsel’s
    performance was deficient, falling below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that (2) the
    deficient performance prejudiced the respondent.” In re Martin, 316 Mich App at 85. “To
    demonstrate prejudice, a party must show the existence of a reasonable probability that, but for
    counsel’s error, the results of the proceeding would have been different, and a reasonable
    probability is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” In re Mota, 334
    Mich at 319.
    “When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court must be cognizant
    of, and guard against, the bias of applying 20/20 hindsight to counsel’s performance.” In re Casto,
    ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket No. 357656); slip op at 8. “In reviewing
    counsel’s performance, this Court ‘must determine whether the strategic choices were made after
    -3-
    less than complete investigation, and any choice is reasonable precisely to the extent that
    reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.’ ” Id., quoting People
    v Trakhtenberg, 
    493 Mich 38
    , 52; 
    826 NW2d 136
     (2012). There is a “strong presumption that
    counsel’s performance was born out of sound trial strategy.” Trakhtenberg, 
    493 Mich at 52
    .
    “[T]rial counsel cannot be faulted for failing to raise an objection or motion that would have been
    futile.” People v Fike, 
    228 Mich App 178
    , 182; 
    577 NW2d 903
     (1998).
    Respondent argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing
    to object during the termination hearing to the foster-care caseworker’s testimony regarding her
    conversation with an employee at the drug testing laboratory. The Michigan Rules of Evidence,
    other than rules respecting privileges, do not apply at the termination hearing, and the trial court
    is permitted to receive all relevant and material evidence. MCR 3.977(H)(2). The Michigan Rules
    of Evidence apply to an initial dispositional hearing when the petitioner has asked for termination
    at the initial disposition, and they apply to a dispositional hearing held on a supplemental petition
    asserting a ground for termination that is new or different from the offense that led the court to
    take jurisdiction. See MCR 3.977(E); MCR 3.977(F). For other dispositional hearings, the rules
    of evidence generally do not apply. MCR 3.973(E); MCR 3.977(H)(2); In re Sanders, 
    495 Mich 394
    , 406; 
    852 NW2d 524
     (2014). Instead, all relevant and material evidence is admissible and
    certain evidentiary privileges are abrogated. MCR 3.973(E)(1); MCR 3.973(E)(2). Therefore,
    hearsay is admissible. In re Hinson, 
    135 Mich App 472
    , 475; 
    354 NW2d 794
     (1984). Further, the
    trial court may consider all exhibits and testimony elicited during prior hearings, including exhibits
    not formally received into evidence at the earlier proceedings. In re King, 
    186 Mich App 458
    ,
    465; 
    465 NW2d 1
     (1990). If the court at any time believes that the evidence requires further
    development, the court may examine a witness, call a witness, or order the production of additional
    evidence. MCR 3.923(A); In re VanDalen, 
    293 Mich App 120
    , 137; 
    809 NW2d 412
     (2011). A
    ground is new or different when the grounds for termination are “unrelated to the basis on which
    the probate court initially established its jurisdiction over the children.” In re Snyder, 
    223 Mich App 85
    , 90; 
    566 NW2d 18
     (1997).
    In this case, petitioner filed a petition in February 2022 alleging, in relevant part, that
    respondent “neglected or refused to provide proper or necessary support, education, medical,
    surgical, or other care necessary for the children’s health or moral, or . . . subjected the children to
    a substantial risk of harm to his or her mental well-being” and that respondent’s “home or
    environment . . . is an unfit place for the children to live.” The petition also included specific
    factual allegations, stating, in part, that respondent “admits to continued use of methamphetamine”
    and that respondent “refused critical treatment.” Other allegations included respondent’s refusal
    to participate in drug screens, her most recent uses of methamphetamine, and her regular use and
    significant addiction to methamphetamine.
    In January 2023, petitioner filed a supplemental petition, seeking termination of
    respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (j). The supplemental petition
    again alleged, in part, that respondent “neglected or refused to provide proper or necessary support,
    education, medical, surgical, or other care necessary for the children’s health or moral,
    or . . . subjected the children to a substantial risk of harm to his or her mental well-being” and that
    respondent’s “home or environment . . . is an unfit place for the children to live.” The
    supplemental petition also included additional factual allegations of respondent’s drug use
    occurring after adjudication, including allegations that respondent had not addressed her
    -4-
    methamphetamine abuse, postponed or voluntarily chose not to participate in various treatment
    programs, and had subsequent positive drug screens for methamphetamine.
    At the termination hearing, the foster-care caseworker testified regarding respondent’s
    most recent positive drug screen for methamphetamine and her conversation with an employee of
    the drug testing laboratory regarding respondent’s contention that it was a false-positive drug
    screen. Trial counsel did not object during the direct examination of the witness but attempted to
    raise concerns regarding the employee’s credibility during his cross-examination with questions
    regarding the caseworker’s knowledge of the employee’s training and expertise. The trial court
    permitted petitioner to introduce hearsay by permitting the caseworker’s testimony regarding her
    conversation with the drug testing laboratory employee. Hearsay is “a statement, other than one
    made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
    of the matter asserted.” MRE 801(c). However, hearsay is admissible at the dispositional phase
    of the proceedings unless it relates to issues alleged in a supplemental petition not subject to the
    prior adjudication. In re DMK, 
    289 Mich App 246
    , 258; 
    796 NW2d 129
     (2010).
    In this case, respondent’s methamphetamine use was an ongoing issue since the initiation
    of the case and throughout all later proceedings. Because these statements were postadjudication
    with respect to the allegations of the initial petition, the rules of evidence did not apply.
    Accordingly, the testimony was admissible, and respondent’s counsel did not provide ineffective
    assistance by failing to object to the introduction of admissible testimony. “Counsel is not
    ineffective for failing to make a futile objection.” In re Archer, 
    277 Mich App 71
    , 84; 
    744 NW2d 1
     (2007).
    C. EXPERT WITNESS
    Next, respondent argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to
    present an expert in substance-abuse toxicology. Respondent maintains that testimony by an
    expert would have provided an effective challenge to the trustworthiness of the testimony
    presented regarding the most recent positive drug screen and corroborated respondent’s testimony
    that the drug screen presented a false-positive result.
    “An attorney’s decision whether to retain witnesses, including expert witnesses, is a matter
    of trial strategy.” People v Payne, 
    285 Mich App 181
    , 190; 
    774 NW2d 714
     (2009). It is presumed
    that counsel’s trial strategy is effective; therefore, a party challenging counsel’s trial strategy must
    present evidence to rebut the presumption of effectiveness. 
    Id.
     On appeal, respondent simply
    argues that trial counsel should have retained an expert to refute the positive drug screen that the
    trial court considered, in part, in its determination to terminate respondent’s parental rights.
    Respondent failed to address that trial counsel requested an adjournment to retain an expert
    after the testimony regarding the drug screen was presented at the termination hearing and after
    respondent had provided testimony to rebut the positive drug screen. Further, trial counsel
    attempted to refute the positive drug screen by presenting evidence that the drug screen could have
    been a false-positive result through testimony from the foster-care caseworker regarding the low
    level of the results and regarding the caseworker’s knowledge of the lab employee’s training and
    expertise on touch exposure versus ingestion. Additionally, trial counsel elicited testimony
    regarding respondent’s negative drug screens before and after the positive drug screen and
    -5-
    respondent’s previous high levels when she admitted to using methamphetamine versus the low
    levels of the recent test in which she denied using methamphetamine. Trial counsel also elicited
    testimony from respondent regarding her cleaning process and her detailed experience with the
    various drug paraphernalia to which she had exposure during her cleaning process.
    Respondent failed to present evidence regarding how an expert witness would have
    effectively refuted the positive drug screen and argues only that an expert may have challenged
    the trustworthiness of the caseworker’s testimony and corroborated respondent’s testimony.
    Respondent provided no evidence or affidavits to establish what expert could have been called or
    what testimony would have been presented. Instead, respondent only included a reference to a
    publication that indicated that contamination and exposure of methamphetamine in residential
    homes was an issue of concern to public health and that there are uncertainties pertaining to
    exposure and health effects. At most, respondent offered speculation that such an expert may have
    supported her position. Lacking additional details, we cannot evaluate whether trial counsel’s
    decision not to call an expert was sound strategy or whether any prejudice resulted from the
    decision.
    Even assuming that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to retain an expert
    witness, respondent has failed to show prejudice resulting from that deficiency. The evidence in
    the case supported the termination of respondent’s parental rights because respondent’s substance
    abuse was just one of the multiple reasons that the trial court determined that statutory grounds
    existed for termination of respondent’s parental rights and that termination served the children’s
    best interests. The trial court discussed respondent’s inability to care for her children and
    respondent’s ongoing issues regarding stability, employment, and unsuitable housing. The trial
    court discussed respondent’s lack of participation in services, the length of time that respondent
    would need to provide suitable housing for the children, respondent’s adult daughter with addiction
    issues living with her, respondent’s mental-health issues, respondent’s sporadic employment, and
    the children’s anxiety about returning to respondent’s care.
    Additionally, the trial court specifically addressed respondent’s positive drug screen in its
    findings. The trial court also stood in the position to make credibility determinations. We give
    deference to the trial court’s special opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re
    Miller, 
    433 Mich 331
    , 337; 
    445 NW2d 161
     (1989). The trial court did not specifically state that
    respondent’s argument for a false-positive result did not have merit; instead, the trial court
    addressed how, on the basis of respondent’s experience with methamphetamine, the trial court did
    not believe that respondent would clean her residence and have intentional contact with drug
    paraphernalia without proper cleaning supplies, including gloves, and without washing her hands
    or showering after hours of cleaning.
    Ultimately, the trial court determined that respondent’s argument lacked merit because
    respondent would or should have known not to put herself in that situation. The trial court referred
    to respondent’s past attempts to conceal her methamphetamine use and respondent’s failure to
    provide proof that respondent claimed to have from her counseling agency regarding a
    conversation with her counselor regarding her new prescription medications. The trial court did
    not specifically indicate that respondent’s argument that contact with methamphetamine while
    cleaning did not have merit; instead, the trial court determined that respondent’s version of events
    was not credible and constituted a “last ditch effort” to conceal her recent drug use.
    -6-
    Accordingly, respondent failed to establish that she was prejudiced and that the outcome
    of the proceedings would have been different had trial counsel retained an expert witness at the
    termination proceedings. Therefore, respondent failed to establish the claim that her trial counsel
    provided ineffective assistance.
    III. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
    We review “for clear error both the court’s decision that a ground for termination has been
    proven by clear and convincing evidence and . . . the court’s decision regarding the child’s best
    interest.” In re Trejo, 
    462 Mich 341
    , 356-357; 
    612 NW2d 407
     (2000). “A finding of fact is clearly
    erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
    committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.”
    In re Moss, 
    301 Mich App 76
    , 80; 
    836 NW2d 182
     (2013).
    A. STATUTORY GROUNDS
    The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (the
    conditions that led to adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that they
    will be rectified within a reasonable time) and (j) (a reasonable likelihood exists that the children
    will be harmed if returned to the home of the parent). Respondent argues that the trial court erred
    because clear and convincing evidence did not support termination. We disagree.
    Under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), the court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child
    if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the conditions that led to the adjudication
    continued to exist and that there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified
    within a reasonable time considering the child’s age. The trial court entered an initial dispositional
    order in March 2022. The termination hearing concluded in May 2023. More than 182 days
    elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c).
    According to the petition and respondent’s dispositional hearing, the conditions that led to
    adjudication were respondent’s ongoing addiction to methamphetamine, positive drug screens for
    methamphetamine, respondent’s refusal of treatment, and respondent’s unemployment and
    inability to support and care for the children. At the termination hearing, the trial court specified
    that the conditions that led to respondent’s adjudication were respondent’s inability to care for her
    children, her methamphetamine addiction, her refusal of treatment, and the need for stability and
    employment.
    Regarding respondent’s methamphetamine addiction and refusal of treatment, evidence
    established that respondent had struggled with substance-abuse issues for years and that
    respondent’s struggles impacted respondent’s adult daughter and possibly contributed to her
    addiction issues. Evidence established that respondent had not participated in services including:
    missed psychological evaluation appointments, which ultimately delayed additional services;
    parenting education program referrals, parenting education, which respondent was discharged
    from because of missed visitations; two missed interview intakes for the Women’s Life Recovery
    Program (WLRP), voluntarily choosing to stop Summit Pointe counseling treatment after two
    appointments; and failing to complete required attendance of Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics
    Anonymous meetings. The trial court specifically addressed that, if respondent would have
    -7-
    utilized the WLRP, she would have had suitable housing and her children returned to her during
    the program; however, respondent decided on her own that the program would not be good for her.
    Evidence also established that several early drug screens were positive for methamphetamine and
    a more recent drug screen obtained during a break of the termination proceedings reported a
    positive result for methamphetamine use.
    Regarding employment, evidence established that respondent had been employed for a
    week in January 2023 but she quit because she felt that the job was not a good fit for her. Evidence
    showed that respondent participated in “curbing,” which involved respondent collecting materials
    that individuals put by the road and then selling or trading the items as a source of income.
    Respondent’s probation officer indicated that respondent had not obtained steady employment and
    that respondent had failed to make any payments on her probation fines. Respondent testified that
    she planned to develop a cleaning business when her schedule slowed down, hoping that it would
    be a steady source of income eventually. Evidence was presented at the last termination hearing
    that respondent had obtained a first-shift job; however, respondent never provided verification of
    her employment. Evidence indicated that respondent had not had to pay rent and lived rent-free
    at a home for which she had a pending agreement to purchase for $25,000.
    Clear and convincing evidence established that respondent’s employment and ability to
    financially support her children and support respondent’s own basic needs remained unstable.
    Respondent held employment only short in duration, had significant gaps of unemployment, and
    she remained extremely inconsistent in maintaining employment. Moreover, respondent’s
    caseworker never received verification that respondent was employed by the last termination
    proceeding.
    The record in this case supports the trial court’s determination that clear and convincing
    evidence established respondent’s unresolved and ongoing issues with substance abuse, refusal to
    participate in treatment, and ongoing inability to financially support her children as of the time of
    the termination hearing. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding that a statutory ground
    existed under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) for termination of respondent’s parental rights to the
    children.1
    B. BEST INTERESTS
    “[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proven
    by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 90. “[T]he focus at the best-
    interest stage” is on the children, not the parent. Id. at 87. The trial court should weigh all the
    evidence available to it in determining the child’s best interests. In re Trejo, 462 Mich at 356-357.
    1
    Termination of parental rights needs only to be supported by a single statutory ground. In re
    HRC, 
    286 Mich App 444
    , 461; 
    781 NW2d 105
     (2009). Therefore, we need not address the trial
    court’s additional findings under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). Regardless, having reviewed the record,
    we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by finding that clear and convincing evidence
    established that a reasonable likelihood existed, based on respondent’s lack of parenting skills,
    failure to abide by the case service plan, and her struggles with stability and sobriety, that the
    children would be harmed if they were returned to respondent’s home.
    -8-
    The trial court may consider factors including “the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting
    ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home
    over the parent’s home.” In re Olive/Metts, 
    297 Mich App 35
    , 41-42; 
    823 NW2d 144
     (2012)
    (citations omitted). This Court has also considered the length of time the child was placed in foster
    care or with relatives and whether it was likely “that the child could be returned to her parents’
    home within the foreseeable future, if at all.” In re Frey, 
    297 Mich App 242
    , 248-249; 
    824 NW2d 569
     (2012). To determine whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests, this
    Court may consider a parent’s history of domestic violence, the parent’s compliance with his or
    her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being while
    in care, and the possibility of adoption. In re White, 
    303 Mich App 701
    , 715; 
    846 NW2d 61
     (2014).
    Addressing the best-interest factors, the trial court found that the children shared a close
    relationship and strong bond with respondent. The trial court, however, noted that the children
    exhibited significant anxiety because of severe nightmares about being returned to respondent’s
    care. The trial court considered the evidence presented by the children’s counselors regarding the
    children’s self-harm and emotional struggles throughout the case proceedings and that respondent
    had not yet established a proper and consistent home for the children. The trial court also noted
    the petitions and state intervention and how respondent failed to address her issues, including
    substance abuse, that gave rise to early state intervention. The trial court also indicated that the
    children were thriving and doing very well in their preadoptive placement.
    Evidence established that respondent shared a close bond with the children and that she
    loved them. Respondent struggled to attend all parenting visits early in the case; however, her
    attendance improved and she did not miss a visitation from November 2022 to the termination of
    her parental rights. Respondent actively participated in the visits by playing activities with the
    children and bringing snacks for the children. The record reflects that the children were slow to
    leave, did not want to end their visitations with respondent, and that visitations went very well.
    However, the trial court was also presented with evidence that respondent missed
    24 visitations and only began to comply with the visitation schedule once the goal changed from
    reunification to adoption. Evidence established that the children had significant anxiety about
    being returned to respondent’s care and suffered nightmares that they were at respondent’s home
    and had to protect her from intruders. Additionally, the children felt the need to assist respondent
    financially and offered to sell their artwork for money to put toward obtaining a home. Evidence
    also established that the children had black and rotted teeth and needed extensive dental treatment
    including 6 to 10 tooth extractions each to remedy the problems. During the proceedings,
    respondent failed to consistently attend their dental treatment appointments. Because of
    respondent’s inconsistent involvement, the state sought and obtained an emergency order from the
    trial court to gain authority to consent to the children’s treatment. Later, respondent failed to attend
    all the follow-up treatment appointments despite being informed of the appointment dates and
    being offered a gas card to help her attend.
    Evidence demonstrated that the children had a close bond with their foster parents and
    referred to them as “mom” and “dad.” Their foster placement expressed willingness to adopt all
    three children and the children made remarks indicating that they wanted to live with their foster
    placement forever.
    -9-
    Respondent exhibited a lack of accountability regarding the impact that her way of living
    had on her children. She testified: “I feel like the foster care system has caused more stress and
    trauma to my kids than my addiction did,” and “I had eight—or 16 investigations when everyone
    of them knew I was on methamphetamines and still closed out every single investigation because
    I provided for my kids.” Evidence, however, established that the children were adversely impacted
    by respondent’s ongoing struggles.
    The record establishes that the children needed stability, permanency, and consistency, and
    respondent could not provide that. Respondent failed to successfully address her substance-abuse
    issues, failed to obtain suitable housing, failed to obtain and maintain consistent employment, and
    failed to gain the ability to support the children. Further, respondent failed to take responsibility
    for her methamphetamine addiction by failing to follow through with treatment programs.
    A preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court’s determination that the
    termination of respondent’s parental rights served the children’s best interests. See In re
    Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42; see also In re Frey, 297 Mich App at 248-249. Accordingly,
    the trial court did not err in terminating respondent’s parental rights to the children.
    Affirmed.
    /s/ James Robert Redford
    /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
    /s/ Christopher P. Yates
    -10-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20231214

Filed Date: 12/14/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/15/2023