20231214_C365244_47_365244.Opn.Pdf ( 2023 )

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
In re J. R. LITINSKI, Minor. December 14, 2023
No. 365244
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2021-000295-NA
Before: LETICA, P.J., and O’BRIEN and CAMERON, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the order terminating her parental rights to JL, pursuant to
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions leading to adjudication continue to exist), (c)(ii) (failure to
rectify other conditions), and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to parent’s home). We
affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In January 2021, respondent and JL’s father, KL,1 verbally argued, and KL left the home.
In light of a comment made by KL, respondent called the police. The police arrived and found
that the couple’s home was unsafe for JL. Specifically, there were nails and broken glass scattered
throughout the home, and a broken wooden door was laying on JL’s playpen. There was no
walkable pathway in the home, and there were empty pill and liquor bottles scattered throughout
it. There was a drug pipe located in the bathroom. The police had previously been called by the
couple for incidents of domestic violence. In addition to domestic violence, respondent was
involved with substance abuse and diagnosed with an untreated mental health disorder. Although
efforts were made to keep JL in respondent’s home, a petition was filed to remove JL, and he was
placed with paternal relatives.2 Respondent made admissions to substance abuse, an unsuitable
1
KL was also a party to a petition for removal of JL in light of the domestic violence and his own
substance abuse. However, KL’s successful completion of his treatment plan caused JL to be
returned to his care and custody.
2
Respondent’s angry and hostile interaction with the paternal relatives, in part, caused JL to be
moved to foster care.
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home, and domestic violence with KL. She agreed to a treatment plan that required her to attend
all court hearings and weekly parenting time visits, obtain a psychological evaluation and follow
its recommendations, attend and benefit from domestic violence counseling, participate in
individual counseling, participate and benefit from infant mental health services, obtain suitable
housing, obtain a legal source of income, obtain a substance abuse assessment and follow its
recommendations, and participate in weekly drug screens.
Nearly two years after JL was removed, respondent had failed to complete or benefit from
her treatment plan. Respondent participated in some of the services she was ordered to engage in,
but her involvement lessened as the case progressed. During the case, respondent went to Florida
to attend to two other minor children that were placed with their father. Respondent entered three
inpatient treatment facilities to address her substance abuse issues, but she left each of them shortly
after entering care. Respondent continually tested positive for controlled substances during the
proceedings. Respondent missed many visits with JL, and was terminated from Infant Mental
Health (IMH) because of nonattendance. Respondent did not acquire a legal source of income and
was living in her car. Respondent did not demonstrate any benefit from the services provided. In
her testimony, respondent acknowledged that she was not currently fit to parent JL, but requested
additional time to comply. The trial court found statutory grounds to terminate respondent’s
parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), and (j). The trial court adjourned the hearing
for preparation of a clinical study addressing JL’s best interests. Following the clinical study, the
trial court also determined that it was in JL’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights
because it was unlikely respondent could overcome her substance abuse issues within a reasonable
amount of time, respondent failed to show JL’s safety would not be at risk with her, and JL needed
permanence and stability.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, respondent seemingly submits that the trial court clearly erred when it found
statutory grounds to terminate her parental rights because respondent recognized her unfitness and
the need for more time to remedy her issues, thereby demonstrating “insight, growth, maturity,
and wisdom.” We disagree.
“We review for clear error a trial court’s finding of whether a statutory ground for
termination has been proven by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Richardson, 329 Mich App
232, 251; 961 NW2d 499 (2019) (citation omitted). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the
reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due
regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” Id.Parents have a “fundamental right to direct the care, custody, and control” of their children.
In re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 21; 934 NW2d 610 (2019). “To terminate parental rights, the trial
court must find that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has
been proved by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111(2011). A court may terminate a respondent’s parental rights if “182 or more days have elapsed
since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence,
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finds . . . [t]he conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable
likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s
age.” MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).
In the present case, respondent was given nearly two years to rectify the issues which led
to the adjudication before her parental rights were terminated. The conditions that led to the
adjudication were respondent’s drug abuse, unsafe and unfit home, domestic violence with KL,
and untreated mental health issues. Respondent failed to rectify any of the conditions that led to
the adjudication. She tested positive for many drugs throughout the duration of the case, including
methamphetamines, amphetamines, and cocaine, among others. Accordingly, the trial court
ordered respondent to participate in random drug screens and substance abuse therapy.
Respondent missed 85 of 118 drug screens and continued to test positive for drugs. Respondent
attended most of her substance abuse classes, but did not benefit therefrom, as evidenced by her
continued substance abuse. She began multiple substance abuse treatment programs but left them
prematurely and before completion. Respondent admitted she smoked “crystal meth” while JL
was present, and her other children were removed from her care because of her substance abuse
issues. Respondent did not take responsibility for her drug addiction, but rather, minimized the
severity of her problem. Because respondent failed to participate in the drug screens or otherwise
show she had resolved her substance abuse addiction, there was no indication that this issue had
been rectified or likely would be in the near future. See In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 339;
990 NW2d 685 (2022) (“[A] respondent-parent must both participate in services and demonstrate
that they sufficiently benefited from the services provided.”) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Additionally, respondent did not rectify her inappropriate housing situation. When JL was
removed, the police noted respondent’s house was unfit for JL because it had empty liquor and pill
bottles strewn about, nails and broken glass scattered throughout the home, a wooden door laying
on JL’s playpen, a methamphetamine pipe in the bathroom, and other safety hazards. At the time
of the termination hearing, respondent was homeless and living in her car. Respondent had been
living with her mother, but respondent’s mother refused to let respondent stay at her home because
respondent kept abusing substances.
Respondent also failed to rectify her domestic violence issues. There was evidence that
respondent and KL had a volatile relationship. Respondent disclosed that she slept with JL to
ensure his safety from KL. However, an act of domestic violence between the couple caused both
parties to be jailed for a couple of days. Although respondent did participate in domestic violence
classes, she failed to complete her domestic violence counseling and demonstrate a benefit.
Respondent continued contacting KL and bringing JL over to KL’s house during her visits with
JL, despite orders to the contrary. Respondent’s caseworker opined that respondent did not benefit
from her domestic violence counseling because she continued contacting KL, and was unable to
demonstrate a safe, healthy relationship with him.
Finally, respondent also failed to address her mental health issues. Respondent was
diagnosed with bipolar disorder, but she did not take her prescription medication. Respondent
engaged in some mental health services, but used other drugs to mask her mental health symptoms
in lieu of taking her prescribed medication. Respondent was not compliant with her mental health
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treatment plan. Respondent’s caseworker opined that respondent’s mental health issues would
create a severe risk of harm for JL if he was returned to her care. In light of the foregoing, we
conclude the trial court did not clearly err by finding that MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) was satisfied.
The conditions that led to the adjudication were never resolved, and respondent’s substantial
noncompliance left no reasonable likelihood that she could rectify the conditions within a
reasonable amount of time given JL’s young age. See In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 712; 846
NW2d 61 (2014) (holding that the respondent would likely not be able to rectify the reasons that
led to the adjudication because she failed to do so during the two-year period she was given).3
Respondent also contends the trial court clearly erred by finding it was in JL’s best interests
to terminate respondent’s parental rights because respondent had the maturity and wisdom to
recognize that she was not currently fit to care for JL, and merely needed additional time to work
toward reunification while KL cared for JL. We disagree.
This Court reviews a trial court’s determination regarding a child’s best interests for clear
error. White, 303 Mich App at 713. Clear error exists when the reviewing court has a firm and
definite conviction that a mistake was made. In re Benavides, 334 Mich App 162, 167; 964 NW2d
108 (2020).
“Once a statutory basis for termination has been shown by clear and convincing evidence,
the court must determine whether termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re Keillor, 325
Mich App 80, 93; 923 NW2d 617 (2018) (citation omitted). “Best interests are determined on the
basis of the preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). The trial court should consider
all of the evidence when determining whether it is in the child’s best interests to terminate parental
rights. White, 303 Mich App at 713. The factors to consider include “the child’s bond to the
parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and
the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” Id. (citation omitted). “The trial court
may also consider a parent’s history of domestic violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her
case service plan, the parent’s visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being while in
care, and the possibility of adoption.” Id. at 714. “A parent’s substance-abuse history is also
relevant to whether termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re Rippy, 330 Mich App 350,
361; 948 NW2d 131 (2019) (citation omitted).
The trial court found termination was in JL’s best interests, despite his relative placement
with KL.4 This finding was not clearly erroneous because respondent failed to make appreciable
progress toward rectifying the issues which led to the trial court’s assumption of jurisdiction over
JL, and there was a reasonable likelihood JL would be harmed if returned to respondent.
Respondent’s failure to comply with her case service plan demonstrated that it would be in JL’s
3
Only one statutory ground must be established by clear and convincing evidence to warrant the
termination of a respondent’s parental rights. Ellis, 294 Mich App at 32. Nonetheless, the
evidence also supported termination of respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii)
and (j).
4
See MCL 712A.13a(1)(j) (explaining a “relative” includes any adult related to the child within
the “fifth degree”—which includes biological parents).
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best interests to terminate the respondent’s parental rights. See White, 303 Mich App at 713
(holding a respondent’s degree of compliance with her treatment plan should be considered in a
best-interests analysis). Respondent did not submit to drug screens and continued to abuse
controlled substances. Respondent was tested for drugs before her visitation with JL, and her
acknowledgment that she was under the influence or her apparent inebriation prevented some visits
from occurring. See Rippy, 330 Mich App at 361 (holding a respondent’s history of substance
abuse is pertinent to the child’s best interests to terminate the respondent’s parental rights).
Additionally, respondent was ordered to participate in parenting classes and attend IMH
meetings; however, respondent failed to attend most of her visits with JL and was terminated from
IMH because of her nonattendance. There was no indication that respondent benefited from the
visits and IMH meetings she did attend. See White, 303 Mich App at 713 (holding the parent’s
parenting ability is a factor the trial court should consider when making a best-interests finding);
see also Atchley, 341 Mich App at 339 (“[A] respondent-parent must both participate in services
and demonstrate that they sufficiently benefited from the services provided.”) (quotation marks
and citation omitted). Rather, respondent demonstrated she was not committed to parenting JL
when she attempted to move to Florida and leave JL. Additionally, respondent’s caseworker noted
that any bond with JL lessened over time because of the decreased visitation and respondent’s time
spent during the visits complaining to JL about the child protective proceedings.
Respondent failed to address her mental health and domestic violence issues. Respondent’s
outburst and inability to control her emotions caused the paternal relatives to stop caring for JL.
And respondent was unable to impart her participation in domestic violence classes into a
functioning parenting relationship with KL. Overall, respondent’s mental health and domestic
violence issues supported the trial court’s finding that it was in JL’s best interests to terminate
respondent’s parental rights.
A child’s placement with a relative weighs against termination of parental rights. In re
Mason, 486 Mich 142, 164; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). The trial court acknowledged JL’s placement
with KL, but found termination was still in JL’s best interests, primarily because of respondent’s
ongoing substance abuse issues and JL’s need for permanence and stability. Respondent
demonstrated she was not committed to reunifying with JL through her lack of compliance with
her treatment plan. Respondent demonstrated her disinterest in reunifying with JL by only visiting
JL on 33 of 118 occasions respondent could have visited with him. Additionally, she fell asleep
or appeared intoxicated at visits she attended.
Finally, a child’s bond with the parent is an important best-interests factor. See White, 303
Mich App at 713. Though JL initially had a bond with respondent, the caseworker opined
respondent and JL did not have a bond by the time of the termination hearing. Respondent’s
caseworker opined it would be in JL’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights
because respondent failed to control her substance abuse or mental health issues, and she did not
show much interest in visiting or supporting JL over the five months preceding the termination
hearing. Respondent admitted she was “no good” for JL, and was not in a position to care for him.
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Respondent’s caseworker determined that respondent’s continued involvement with JL could
negatively impact KL’s reunification with the child and KL’s progress. In light of the foregoing,
we conclude the trial court did not clearly err by finding it was in JL’s best interests to terminate
respondent’s parental rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ Anica Letica
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
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