People of Michigan v. Raymond Shawn-Paul Reece ( 2023 )

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED
December 14, 2023
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 363302
Kent Circuit Court
RAYMOND SHAWN-PAUL REECE, LC No. 21-011322-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: FEENEY, P.J., and RICK and HOOD, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant-appellant, Raymond Shawn-Paul Reece, appeals as of right his jury trial
convictions of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(2)(b) (sexual
penetration involving person under 13 while defendant is 17 or older); and second-degree criminal
sexual conduct (CSC-II), MCL 750.520c(1)(a) (sexual contact involving person under 13). The
trial court sentenced defendant as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to concurrent
sentences of 400 months to 60 years’ imprisonment.
On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the
admission of several types of evidence at trial: (1) evidence concerning defendant’s prior sexual
relationship with a 15- or 16-year-old girl, (2) prior acts of domestic violence involving the
victim’s mother, and (3) an essay written by the victim for school. In addition, defendant asserts
that the trial court erred by not allowing the defense to admit medical records that did not support
the victim’s sexual-abuse claims. We conclude that these claims are without merit and affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises out of allegations that defendant sexually abused the victim, DW, in 2010
or 2011, when she was seven years old. Defendant was in a relationship with the DW’s mother
for approximately 16 years. DW disclosed the abuse to her mother in January 2021. Her mother
confronted defendant, who was in jail at the time. She did not contact law enforcement. In
September 2021, DW wrote an essay for school in which she stated that defendant sexually
assaulted her. Her teacher contacted law enforcement.
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Following trial, defendant was convicted of one count of CSC-I and one count of CSC-II.
This appeal followed.
I. ANALYSIS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review “a trial court’s evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion.” People v
Danto, 294 Mich App 596, 598-599; 822 NW2d 600 (2011). “A trial court abuses its discretion
when its decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes.” Id. at 599. “A decision on a
close evidentiary question ordinarily cannot be an abuse of discretion.” People v Thorpe, 504
Mich 230, 252; 934 NW2d 693 (2019). “Preliminary questions of law, such as whether a rule of
evidence or statute precludes the admission of particular evidence, are reviewed de novo, and it is
an abuse of discretion to admit evidence that is inadmissible as a matter of law.” People v Bynum,
496 Mich 610, 623; 852 NW2d 570 (2014).
B. PRIOR ACTS OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
Defendant first challenges the admission of testimony concerning a sexual relationship that
he had with CH when she was 15 or 16 years old. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by allowing this testimony.
The trial court concluded that CH’s testimony was admissible under MCL 768.27a.
MCL 768.27a provides an exception to the general prohibition against propensity evidence. For
instance, MRE 404(b) allows evidence of other crimes for nonpropensity purposes, such as to show
“motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident . . . .” On the other hand, in pertinent part,
MCL 768.27a(1) provides that “in a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of committing
a listed offense against a minor, evidence that the defendant committed another listed offense
against a minor is admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is
relevant.” Evidence is relevant if it tends “to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” MRE 401. In other words, “[b]ecause a defendant’s propensity to commit a crime
makes it more probable that he committed the charged offense, MCL 768.27a permits the
admission of evidence that MRE 404(b) precludes.” People v Watkins, 491 Mich 450, 470; 818
NW2d 296 (2012). However, “evidence admissible pursuant to MCL 768.27a may nonetheless
be excluded under MRE 403 if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Id. at 481 (quotation marks
and citation omitted).
In this case, CH testified that she had a “consensual” sexual relationship with defendant
when she was 15 or 16 years old. She further testified that there was one instance in which
defendant had sex with her on the couch after she told him no. Defendant having sex with a 15-
year-old child would be a “listed offense” under MCL 768.27a(2)(a) regardless of whether the
relationship was consensual. See MCL 28.722(v)(iv); MCL 750.520d(1)(a) (stating that a person
is guilty of third-degree criminal sexual conduct if the person engages in sexual penetration with
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a person who is at least 13 years old but under 16 years old). Moreover, the incident in which CH
described defendant sexually penetrating her on the couch against her will would be a listed offense
regardless of her age. See MCL 750.520d(1)(b) (stating that a person is guilty of third-degree
criminal sexual conduct if the person engages in sexual penetration with another person and force
or coercion is used to accomplish the sexual penetration). As a result, instances of sexual conduct
involving 15-year-old CH and the nonconsensual act would constitute listed offenses subject to
MCL 768.27a.1
Evidence concerning defendant’s sexual relationship with CH was relevant to defendant’s
propensity to have sexual relationships with young girls. There was no corroborating evidence in
this case. DW disclosed the sexual assaults approximately 10 years after the assaults occurred.
There were no witnesses to the assaults, nor was there physical evidence related to the assaults.
Therefore, evidence that defendant had a previous sexual relationship with a minor, which included
nonconsensual sexual penetration, was relevant because it tended to make DW’s uncorroborated
testimony more likely.2
We do not believe that CH’s testimony was overly prejudicial. “[W]hen applying MRE
403 to evidence admissible under MCL 768.27a, courts must weigh the propensity inference in
favor of the evidence’s probative value rather than its prejudicial effect.” Watkins, 491 Mich
at 487. “That is, other-acts evidence admissible under MCL 768.27a may not be excluded under
MRE 403 as overly prejudicial merely because it allows a jury to draw a propensity inference.”
Id. The Michigan Supreme Court provided the following factors to consider whether other-acts
evidence admissible under MCL 768.27a should be excluded under MRE 403:
(1) the dissimilarity between the other acts and the charged crime, (2) the temporal
proximity of the other acts to the charged crime, (3) the infrequency of the other
acts, (4) the presence of intervening acts, (5) the lack of reliability of the evidence
supporting the occurrence of the other acts, and (6) the lack of need for evidence
beyond the complainant’s and the defendant’s testimony. [Id. at 487-488 (citation
omitted).]
“This list of considerations is meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive.” Id. at 488.
1
MCL 768.27a(1) provides, in pertinent part, that “evidence that the defendant committed another
listed offense against a minor is admissible . . . .” MCL 768.27a(2)(b) defines “minor” as “an
individual less than 18 years of age.” Although 16-year-old CH would have technically been a
“minor,” the consensual sexual relationship would not have constituted a “listed offense.” See
MCL 28.722.
2
Pursuant to MCL 750.520h, “[t]he testimony of a victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions
under” MCL 750.520b through MCL 750.520g, which relate to charges of criminal sexual
conduct.
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In this case, the trial court did not expressly address each of the Watkins factors in its ruling
that CH’s testimony was admissible.3 Rather, the trial court focused on the similarities between
the other acts and the instant charges. According to the trial court, a grown man having intercourse
with a seven-year-old child was an incredibility violent act, while CH reported that defendant
sexually penetrated her vagina after she told him no several times. She did not tell anyone about
the incident because she was afraid. As a result, the court opined that both acts concerned violence
against a child involving threatening behavior.
Although the other acts and the charged conduct in this case involved nonconsensual sexual
acts with young girls, there were several differences between the two situations. CH was 15 or
16 years old at the time of her interactions with defendant. She testified that—aside from the one
instance—her sexual relationship with defendant was consensual. However, she also testified that
she felt obligated to have sex with defendant and that she felt that something bad would happen if
she did not. Yet, she denied that he ever threatened her. CH was a friend who played cards and
hung out with defendant and DW’s mother. CH stated that the sexual relationship lasted for over
a year. She said that DW was three or four years old at the time. She ended the relationship
because she felt guilty and stopped having contact with either DW’s mother or defendant. She did
not disclose the relationship because she did not think that anyone would believe her.
On the other hand, DW alleged that defendant sexually assaulted her when she was seven
years old, which would have been three or four years after defendant’s relationship with CH.
Defendant acted as a stepfather to DW, although it does not appear that he and DW’s mother ever
married. The assaults occurred when DW’s mother was at work. The assaults stopped when
defendant was incarcerated when DW was eight or nine years old. He later moved back in with
the family, but there were no more assaults. DW’s mother’s work hours had changed. DW did
not disclose the abuse because defendant threatened to hurt her family members.
Ultimately, even though there were dissimilarities between the other-acts involving CH
and the charged offenses, we do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion by deciding
that the probative value of the other-acts evidence was not substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial effect. Unfair prejudice may exist when “there is a tendency that the evidence will be
given undue or preemptive weight by the jury” or when “it would be inequitable to allow use of
the evidence.” People v Cowhy, 330 Mich App 452, 468; 948 NW2d 632 (2019) (quotation marks
and citation omitted). Although CH’s testimony was damaging to defendant’s case, it ultimately
bears on DW’s credibility. Accordingly, defendant has not established that this evidence should
have been excluded under MRE 403.4
3
“The list of considerations in Watkins provides a tool to facilitate, not a standard to supplant, this
proper MRE 403 analysis, and it remains the court’s responsibility to carry out such an analysis in
determining whether to exclude MCL 768.27a evidence under that rule.” People v Uribe, 499
Mich 921, 922 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Although Uribe is a Michigan
Supreme Court order, such orders constitute binding precedent if the decision includes an
understandable rationale. People v Giovannini, 271 Mich App 409, 414; 722 NW2d 237 (2006).
4
We will address the jury instructions concerning the other-acts evidence in the next section.
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C. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Next, defendant asserts that the trial court erred by allowing testimony concerning domestic
violence that he allegedly perpetrated against DW’s mother. We disagree that the court erred.
The trial court allowed testimony concerning domestic violence as other-acts evidence not
offered to prove character under MRE 404(b). According to MRE 404(b)(1),
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other
crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the
conduct at issue in the case.
In People v Vandervliet, 444 Mich 52, 74; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), the Michigan Supreme Court
articulated the following requirements for other-acts evidence to be admitted pursuant to
MRE 404(b): (1) the evidence must be offered for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence is relevant;
(3) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair
prejudice; and (4) the trial court shall, upon request, instruct the jury that the similar acts evidence
is to be considered only for the proper purpose for which it was admitted. “Relevance is a
relationship between the evidence and a material fact at issue that must be demonstrated by
reasonable inferences that make a material fact at issue more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.” People v Crawford, 458 Mich 367, 387; 582 NW2d 785 (1998).
“Materiality is the requirement that the other-acts evidence be related to any fact that is of
consequence to the action.” People v Denson, 500 Mich 385, 401; 902 NW2d 306 (2017)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
The evidence related to domestic violence was not presented to prove that, because
defendant was physically violent toward DW’s mother, he must have sexually assaulted seven-
year-old DW. Instead, testimony concerning domestic violence provided background information
for the family dynamic and time line. DW explained that life in the home was hectic because of
fighting between defendant and her mother, which included physical abuse. She further stated that
she did not disclose the abuse because defendant threatened that he would hurt her mother, her
biological father, or her siblings. DW believed his threats because she witnessed defendant
physically abuse her mother. DW testified that the abuse stopped after defendant was incarcerated,
presumably as a result of a domestic-violence incident involving DW’s mother. Defendant and
DW’s mother later reconciled after he was released and he moved back in with the family. The
abuse did not continue. The testimony also indicated that DW later moved in with her father
because of domestic-violence issues. Moreover, evidence at trial showed that DW’s mother
confronted defendant after DW disclosed the abuse in January 2021. He was in jail at the time.
DW’s mother stated that she felt powerless because defendant was released from jail the following
day.
As a result, evidence related to domestic violence perpetrated by defendant was relevant to
show when and why the abuse ceased, DW’s fear of defendant, and the timing of defendant’s
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absence and presence in the home. On appeal, defendant argues that DW’s reasons for delaying
her disclosure were not relevant because the defense did not argue that she should not be believed
for that reason. However, Michigan courts allow expert testimony concerning “typical symptoms
of child sexual abuse for the sole purpose of explaining a victim’s specific behavior that might be
incorrectly construed by the jury as inconsistent with that of an abuse victim or to rebut an attack
on the victim’s credibility.” People v Peterson, 450 Mich 349, 373; 537 NW2d 857 (1995).
Therefore, DW’s testimony about why she was afraid to tell anyone about the abuse was
permissible absent a specific attack by the defense.
Further, the evidence related to domestic violence was not overly prejudicial. Aside from
DW stating that defendant attempted to stab her mother in one incident and DW’s mother making
a vague reference to “felonious assault,” the witnesses did not specifically describe any of the
instances of domestic violence. Rather, the testimony showed generally that domestic violence
occurred in the household and that violence affected members of the household in ways relevant
to the instant case. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing testimony
concerning domestic violence. See Vandervliet, 444 Mich at 74.
Finally, the trial court provided the jury with the following jury instructions:
The prosecution has introduced evidence of claimed acts of sexual
misconduct by the defendant with a minor for which he is not on trial.
Before you may consider such alleged acts as alleged against the defendant,
you must first find the defendant actually committed those acts. If you find the
defendant did commit those acts, you may consider them in deciding if the
defendant committed the offenses for which he is now on trial. You must not
convict the defendant here solely because you think he’s guilty of other bad
conduct. The evidence must convince you—must convince you beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the alleged crime, or you must find
him not guilty.
The prosecution has introduced evidence of claimed acts of domestic
violence by the defendant against [DW’s mother]. He is not on trial for domestic
violence. Before you may consider such allegations as evidence against the
defendant, you must first find that the defendant actually committed those acts.
If you find that the defendant did commit acts of domestic violence against
[DW’s mother], you may only consider them for the limited purpose as to what
bearing the evidence may have in explaining why [DW] may not have disclosed the
alleged sexual assaults at the time or shortly after they happened.
You must in the convict [sic—not?5] the defendant here because you think
he committed acts of domestic violence or because you conclude that he is a bad
person. The evidence must convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that the
5
The written jury instructions in the lower court record used "not" rather than "in the".
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defendant committed the alleged crime for which he is now on trial or you must
find him not guilty.
“Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions, and instructions are presumed to cure most
errors.” People v Chapo, 282 Mich App 360, 370; 770 NW2d 68 (2009); see also Weeks v
Angelone, 528 US 225, 234; 120 S Ct 727; 145 L Ed 2d 727 (2000). As a result, defendant has
not shown that admission of testimony concerning sexual misconduct involving CH or domestic
violence constituted error requiring reversal.
D. ESSAY
Defendant also asserts that DW’s school essay—which was the catalyst to the criminal
investigation—was inadmissible hearsay. We disagree that the trial court erred by admitting the
essay.
Hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than the one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”
MRE 801(c). “Evidence that is properly authenticated may nonetheless be inadmissible hearsay
if it contains out-of-court statements, written or oral, that are offered for the truth of the matter
asserted and do not fall under any exception to the hearsay rule.” People v Smith, 336 Mich App
79, 110; 969 NW2d 548 (2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
In this case, the trial court ruled that the essay was not hearsay because it was not offered
to prove that defendant sexually assaulted DW. Rather, the essay was admitted to explain why she
waited so long to disclose. Evidence concerning the essay was relevant to explain how law
enforcement became involved in the case. However, the actual contents of the essay had limited
relevance because it was about DW’s mother and her disclosure to her mother. In any event, even
if the essay amounted to inadmissible hearsay, it was cumulative to testimony provided by DW
and her mother. Before reading the essay, DW testified about the sexual assaults and that she
disclosed to her mother in the winter or spring of 2021, which was before she wrote the essay.
DW’s mother later testified that DW disclosed the abuse to her in January 2021. The defense did
not object to this testimony or argue on appeal that it was improper. Therefore, the essay was
cumulative to other evidence that was properly admitted. See id. at 116. Accordingly, even if the
contents of the essay were improperly admitted, the erroneous admission was ultimately harmless.
See id.
E. MEDICAL RECORDS
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by not allowing the admission of medical
records that did not support the DW’s allegations. We disagree that the court erred.
The issue concerning medical records was briefly addressed with the other evidentiary
issues before trial. The trial court agreed to review certain records to decide which records might
be relevant. Other than to reiterate that the court was taking the matter under advisement, the issue
was not ever mentioned on the record again.
Defendant does not provide any further information concerning the medical records.
Defendant does not identify which medical records should have been admitted or explain how the
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admission of those records would have resulted in a different outcome in this case. As a result,
this claim is abandoned.
It is not enough for an appellant in his brief simply to announce a position or assert
an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for
his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for
authority either to sustain or reject his position . . . . [People v Kevorkian, 248 Mich
App 373, 389; 639 NW2d 291 (2001).]
“Failure to brief a question on appeal is tantamount to abandoning it.” Id. Accordingly, we decline
to address this abandoned claim.
F. CUMULATIVE ERROR
Finally, defendant argues that a combination of the evidentiary errors in this case seriously
prejudiced him and denied him a fair trial.
“The cumulative effect of several errors can constitute sufficient prejudice to warrant
reversal even when any one of the errors alone would not merit reversal, but the cumulative effect
of the errors must undermine the confidence in the reliability of the verdict before a new trial is
granted.” People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 106; 732 NW2d 546 (2007).
Defendant has not established that the admission of any of the challenged evidence was in
error. “Absent the establishment of errors, there can be no cumulative effect of errors meriting
reversal.” Id. Accordingly, defendant has not established that he was denied his right to a fair
trial.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
/s/ Noah P. Hood
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