People of Michigan v. Willie Charles Woods ( 2024 )

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED
October 07, 2024
Plaintiff-Appellee, 2:39 PM
V No. 365996
Ingham Circuit Court
WILLIE CHARLES WOODS, LC No. 21-000265-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and MURRAY and LETICA, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his convictions of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL
750.316, and armed robbery, MCL 750.529, for which the trial court sentenced defendant to serve
concurrent prison terms of life without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction, and 30
to 75 years for the armed-robbery conviction. We affirm.
I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Unpreserved claims are reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Reversal is warranted only if the plain
error resulted in the conviction of an innocent person, or seriously affected the fairness, integrity,
or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s innocence. Id.This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a new trial for an abuse of
discretion. People v Muniz, 343 Mich App 437, 441; 997 NW2d 325 (2022). A court abuses its
discretion when it chooses an outcome that is not within the range of principled outcomes. People
v Orlewicz, 293 Mich App 96, 100; 809 NW2d 194 (2011), remanded on other grounds by 493
Mich 916 (2012).
The constitutional question whether an attorney provided ineffective assistance, depriving
a defendant of the right to counsel, is reviewed de novo. People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 242;
749 NW2d 272 (2008).
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II. JURY SELECTION
Defendant argues that the trial court improperly empaneled an “anonymous jury,” with the
potential jurors identified by number, not name, without providing an instruction that using such
a procedure was a matter of logistics rather than a reflection on defendant’s perceived guilt or
dangerousness.
“An ‘anonymous jury’ is one in which certain information is withheld from the parties,
presumably for the safety of the jurors or to prevent harassment by the public.” People v Williams,
241 Mich App 519, 522; 616 NW2d 710 (2000). An “ ‘anonymous jury’ is an extreme measure,
in which ‘certain biographical information about potential jurors’ is withheld, even from the
parties,” in contrast to when jurors are “merely referred to at trial by number rather than by name.”
Id. at 523, quoting United States v Branch, 91 F 3d 699, 723 (CA 5, 1996). The jury was not a
pure anonymous jury. Before jury selection, the trial court stated that “we will use numbers, not
names,” but only the names of the prospective jurors were withheld, and defendant does not argue
that general biographical information was in fact withheld. This procedure was similar to what
this Court approved of in Williams, in which there was “nothing in the record to support the
conclusion that any information was actually withheld from the parties,” because, “[a]t most, the
names of the jurors were replaced by numbers.” Williams, 241 Mich App at 523. This Court
concluded that the “defendant’s due process rights were not violated by using juror numbers
instead of names at trial.” Id. at 525.
The dangers of empaneling an “anonymous jury” are that a defendant could be denied “a
meaningful examination of the jury,” or that the presumption of innocence could be compromised.
Id. at 522-523. To show that a defendant’s rights were violated, the record must demonstrate such
compromise, or that “the parties have had information withheld from them, thus preventing
meaningful voir dire.” Id. at 523. Here, during voir dire the trial court questioned the potential
jurors, as did defendant and the prosecution. The prosecution’s questioning explored any possible
bias of potential jurors by asking about issues such as media exposure to the case, employment
background, education and experience, including current employer and occupation, and
perceptions about the burden of proof and punishment. Defendant probed various potential jurors
about employment issues as it related to their attitudes and feelings about premeditation, the burden
of proof, media exposure, and making decisions within a group. On appeal, defendant does not
identify any areas that the defense was not allowed to explore with potential jurors, and conceded
at the hearing on his motion for a new trial: “I don’t mean to suggest that the counsel did not have
sufficient information to conduct meaningful Voir Dire. Of course they did. They conducted
lengthy Voir Dire.” As in Williams, the voir dire covered a number of personal topics, and there
is no indication that the parties did not have access to the juror questionnaires. In fact, the record
provides no indication that any information about the jurors, other than their names, was kept
secret. Defendant has not shown how his ability to examine the potential jurors was compromised
in any way.
We also reject defendant’s argument that the trial court did not instruct the jurors that the
use of numbers to identify them was a matter of logistics, rather than a reflection of defendant’s
perceived guilt or dangerousness. This Court held in Williams that “[t]here is no suggestion that
jurors understood the use of numbers rather than names to be anything out of the ordinary,” and
therefore that “there was no suggestion that defendant’s trial was being handled in a special way,
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with the resulting implication that he was generally dangerous or guilty as charged.” Id. at 524.
Likewise, there is no indication in this record that the jury was given any basis for looking upon
defendant as presenting any special danger because the jurors were referred to by number. There
was no discussion about why numbers were being used, and therefore no basis upon which the
jury might presume that this approach was other than standard procedure. Defendant has not
shown that identifying jurors by numbers, rather than names, interfered with his presumption of
innocence. Indeed, the trial court thrice instructed the jury, including twice during jury selection,
that defendant was presumed innocent. “[J]urors are presumed to follow their instructions.”
People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998). Under these circumstances there
was no plain error. People v Hanks, 276 Mich App 91, 93-95; 740 NW2d 530 (2007).
III. PROSECUTORIAL ERROR
Defendant argues that the prosecutor’s cross-examination of defendant constituted
“persistent misconduct” because it was used “to drive [defendant] to a state of agitation.”
The prosecutor has a duty to ensure that a defendant receives a fair trial. People v Farrar,
36 Mich App 294, 299; 193 NW2d 363 (1971). The responsibility of a prosecutor is “to seek
justice and not merely convict.” People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 63; 732 NW2d 546 (2007).
“[T]he test of prosecutorial misconduct[1] is whether a defendant was denied a fair and impartial
trial.” Id. A fair trial “can be jeopardized when the prosecutor interjects issues broader than the
defendant’s guilt or innocence.” Id. at 63-64.
“ ‘Witnesses are entitled to respectful consideration, and it is the duty of courts to see that
they are protected from the insinuations and attacks of counsel . . . .’ ” People v Whalen, 390 Mich
672, 684; 213 NW2d 116 (1973), quoting People v Cahoon, 88 Mich 456, 461; 50 NW 384 (1891).
A prosecutor must refrain from denigrating a defendant with intemperate and prejudicial remarks.
People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282-283; 531 NW2d 659 (1995).
Here, defendant asserts that the prosecuting attorney was aware that defendant had
questionable mental health, and attempted to inflame defendant with his questioning. Defendant
points out that he had informed the trial court that he had not been prescribed psychotropic
medications while incarcerated, which he had taken in the past. Further, defendant attended trial
with a “stun cuff” attached to his lower leg under his pants, which could be used to administer an
electric pulse to immobilize defendant, because he had engaged in violent behavior while
incarcerated.
Absent in defendant’s argument for this issue, however, is any specification of allegedly
inappropriate questions, or any objectionable line of questioning. Defendant mentions only that
certain questioning angered him to where he requested a break. The questioning that preceded
1
The phrase “prosecutorial misconduct” is a term of art used to describe any error committed by
the prosecution, even though claims of inadvertent error by the prosecution are “better and more
fairly presented as claims of ‘prosecutorial error,’ with only the most extreme cases rising to the
level of ‘prosecutorial misconduct.’ ” People v Cooper, 309 Mich App 74, 87-88; 867 NW2d 452(2015).
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defendant’s request for a break because “I’m about to go crazy in here” consisted of the prosecuting
attorney asking defendant whether he used his relationship with Erwin Bell to enter Bell’s
apartment to ask for money, which defendant denied by stating that he did not involve his aunt,
who was an acquaintance of Bell’s, in the matter. The prosecuting attorney then attempted to elicit
from defendant confirmation that he entered the apartment, that he had a BB gun in his backpack,
that Bell made a comment about sexuality that angered defendant, and that Bell approached
defendant with a knife, when defendant responded that the prosecuting attorney was “leaving
things out,” and interrupted the next question to interject that he told Bell he was going to leave
before Bell approached with a knife.
The prosecuting attorney continued to suggest that defendant had stated that Bell swung
the knife at him and that he struck Bell with the BB gun, and asked, “One of the things you forgot
is when did you get the BB gun out of the backpack?” The prosecuting attorney continued, after
stating that Bell was much older and smaller than defendant, to recount defendant’s testimony that
he struck Bell with the BB gun, causing him to drop the knife, and suggested to defendant that he
decided to kill Bell when Bell angered him with a sexual comment. Defendant responded that he
did not intend to kill Bell, but rather intended to protect himself, explained that he had witnessed
older inmates in prison stab younger ones, asked the prosecuting attorney if he had been to prison,
and commented about his own difficulties understanding other persons.
Questioning then moved on to confirming that defendant had inflicted the cutting wounds
on Bell, who was attempting to evade the attack, and suggesting twice to defendant that he decided
to stab Bell, eliciting defendant’s response that he did not formulate a plan, but was “[p]rotecting
myself, man. I don’t know what you talking about.” The prosecuting attorney then suggested to
defendant that he observed that Bell was dying, but did not attempt to get help, and defendant
responded that there was no point, upon which the prosecuting attorney commented that he could
have helped Bell, and defendant stated: “I could have just stabbed him all up and slit his throat,
chopped him up in his heart. If I really wanted to get the job done, why would I stop?”
The prosecuting attorney questioned defendant as to whether he became “tired” that Bell
was not yet dead when he was lying on the floor, such that defendant “stabbed him right through
the heart and killed him; right, sir?” Defendant interjected, “That’s your assumption,” adding “I
seen the whole thing. I was there. Was you there?” Defendant then explained that he was not
aware that he had stabbed Bell’s chest because Bell was wearing a sweatshirt, then said, “You
racist, man, racist.”
Defendant was asked to watch a portion of his interview with the police, after which he
confirmed that he gathered some money from Bell’s apartment after the killing. The prosecuting
attorney then moved on to discuss defendant’s conduct of rolling the body in a blanket and hiding
it in a closet, which defendant confirmed, before, apparently exasperated, requesting a break.
Defendant argues that this questioning was analogous to what the United States Supreme
Court disapproved of in Berger v United States, 295 US 78, 84; 55 S Ct 629; 79 L Ed 1314 (1935):
That the United States prosecuting attorney overstepped the bounds of that
propriety and fairness which should characterize the conduct of such an officer in
the prosecution of a criminal offense is clearly shown by the record. He was guilty
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of misstating the facts in his cross-examination of witnesses; of putting into the
mouths of such witnesses things which they had not said; of suggesting by his
questions that statements had been made to him personally out of court, in respect
of which no proof was offered; of pretending to understand that a witness had said
something which he had not said and persistently cross-examining the witness upon
that basis; of assuming prejudicial facts not in evidence; of bullying and arguing
with witnesses; and, in general, of conducting himself in a thoroughly indecorous
and improper manner.
However, the questions here concerned matters regarding which defendant had testified,
and reasonable attendant inferences. The prosecuting attorney was direct in his questioning, and
insistent on obtaining answers regarding intent, even if detecting that defendant was responding in
an increasingly adversarial manner. The prosecution’s probing questions based on defendant’s
testimony were not rendered improper by defendant’s increasingly unresponsive and aggressive
responses. The prosecutor did not misstate facts, but probed possible inferences from the evidence,
and did not engage in the “bullying and arguing” at issue in Berger. Accordingly, the record does
not support defendant’s claim of prosecutorial error in relation to this questioning.
Because defendant has not identified any basis for a successful objection to the any of the
prosecutor’s questions, he has failed to establish that his counsel was ineffective for not raising
any objection. People v Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192, 201; 793 NW2d 120 (2010).
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Anica Letica
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