Detroit Land Bank Authority v. 10043 Aurora Detroit Mi 48204 ( 2024 )

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DETROIT LAND BANK AUTHORITY, UNPUBLISHED
October 07, 2024
Plaintiff-Appellee, 1:44 PM
v No. 363250
Wayne Circuit Court
10043 AURORA DETROIT MI 48204 and 689 LC No. 22-006255-CH
GLADSTONE DETROIT MI 48202,
Defendants,
and
RICHARD MOWETT,
Appellant.
DETROIT LAND BANK AUTHORITY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 363253
Wayne Circuit Court
10043 AURORA DETROIT MI 48204 and 279 LC No. 22-006255-CH
HOLBROOK DETROIT MI 48202,
Defendants,
and
DAVID MOWETT,
Appellant.
Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and JANSEN and N. P. HOOD, JJ.
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PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals,1 appellants, appearing in propria persona, appeal by right
the trial court’s decision quieting title to property in favor of plaintiff. In Docket No. 363250,
Richard Mowett (Richard) appeals the trial court’s decision related to property located at 689
Gladstone in Detroit, and in Docket No. 363253, David Mowett (David) appeals the trial court’s
decision related to property located at 279 Holbrook in Detroit. We affirm in both docket numbers.
I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises from appellants’ failure to renovate properties they purchased from
plaintiff. David purchased 279 Holbrook on July 31, 2018, and Richard purchased 689 Gladstone
on December 14, 2018. Although Richard was a married man, he was the only purchaser of the
Gladstone property. As part of their purchase agreements, Richard and David promised to
renovate and rehabilitate their properties within six months of the sale. Also as part of the
agreements, Richard and David each executed a reconveyance deed, a quitclaim deed that
purported to convey the properties back to plaintiff. Under the purchase agreements, the
reconveyance deed would not become effective until plaintiff recorded it in the event of a breach
by the purchaser. Although the agreement provided that if the purchaser was a married man, his
wife must also execute the reconveyance deed, Richard’s wife did not sign his reconveyance deed.
Richard and David failed to renovate and rehabilitate the properties as promised. The
properties remained virtually untouched for more than three years. On April 27, 2021, plaintiff
sent an e-mail to David, stating that it was allowing him seven days to provide updates on the
renovation, or else reconveyance would occur. Just four minutes later, however, plaintiff sent
David another e-mail stating that plaintiff had already taken ownership of the property and that the
reconveyance deed had already been recorded. The same thing happened to Richard; he received
two e-mails four minutes apart on June 4, 2021, communicating the same conflicting information.2
After appellants received their respective emails, plaintiff and appellants discussed an extension
to the deadline for avoiding reconveyance, and plaintiff gave them a hard deadline of August 31,
2021 to submit materials indicating that they were in compliance with their purchase agreements,
but they again failed to do so.
On May 26, 2022, plaintiff filed a petition for expedited quiet title and foreclosure on
numerous properties, including 689 Gladstone and 279 Holbrook. Plaintiff alleged that it was the
owner of the properties. Plaintiff also alleged that under the Land Bank Fast Track Act (LBFTA),
1
See Detroit Land Bank Auth v 10043 Aurora Detroit MI 48204, unpublished order of the Court
of Appeals, entered January 30, 2024 (Docket Nos. 363250 and 363253).
2
The reconveyance deeds were not recorded on the date the emails were sent to either appellant;
rather, Richard’s reconveyance deed was recorded on June 16, 2021 and David’s reconveyance
deed was recorded on June 29, 2021.
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MCL124.751 et seq., all legal interests and liens against properties it owned may be extinguished,
and plaintiff sought to quiet title.
The hearing on the petition for all of the properties was originally scheduled for July 12,
2022. But the hearing with respect to the two properties involved in this appeal was adjourned to
August 30, 2022. Plaintiff filed a supplemental brief in the trial court with respect to those
properties. Plaintiff noted, among other things, that the chimney was deteriorating at the Holbrook
address and that neighbors were concerned that it would collapse and damage their property.
Plaintiff attached photographs of both 279 Holbrook and 689 Gladstone, showing the dilapidated
conditions.
Only Richard filed objections to the petition. Regarding his specific legal objections,
Richard argued that (1) plaintiff had violated the LBFTA by not providing notice of the expedited
quiet title hearing, and because the scheduled August 30, 2022 hearing was illegally taking place
more than 90 days after the filing of the petition; (2) he had received conflicting information from
plaintiff on June 4, 2021 regarding the reconveyance of the property back to plaintiff; and (3) the
reconveyance deed was void because his wife did not sign it.
At the August 30, 2022 hearing, the trial court granted an adjournment until September 13,
2022, to allow appellants’ newly-retained counsel time to become familiar with the case. Between
the two hearing dates, appellants paid for some renovations to be done to the Holbrook home,
which they estimated cost approximately $15,000.
At the September 13, 2022 hearing, plaintiff argued that Richard and David had done
essentially nothing on the properties for four years. Further, even though the properties had been
reconveyed back to plaintiff, this quiet title action was necessary because “there is no other way
to get [appellants] to go away except for this Court to enter [a judgment of quiet title].” Plaintiff
noted that appellants had made many visits to the properties even after being notified that such
conduct is trespassing. Appellants’ counsel conceded that David had done “a considerable amount
of work[]” since the August 30, 2022 hearing without plaintiff’s permission. But appellants’
counsel also argued that plaintiff had provided contrary information regarding the reconveyance,
that the reconveyance deed was not properly notarized, and that Richard’s wife did not sign the
reconveyance deed.
The trial court granted quiet title in favor of plaintiff. The court found that the photographs
of the premises “show these properties to be nothing short of a disaster. There is nothing not only
to indicate that no improvements of any visible nature were made but, in fact, there is every reason
to think just as a layperson these properties have been utterly and completely neglected.” The
court also found it troubling that even after it has been made very clear that appellants were not to
trespass on the properties, they ignored that demand. The trial court acknowledged that it saw that
some contractors had pulled permits to perform work on the properties, but it stated:
[I]t’s all related to what’s going to be done in the future. This is four years that
people in the neighborhood have had to put up with properties that are, quite
frankly, disgraceful aesthetically and a physical danger as represented to this Court.
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Four years of promises. Four years of no action. Four years of city of
Detroit neighbors having to endure this type of circumstance is way more than
enough.
It’s the ruling of the Court that the Court will, in fact, quiet title to 689
Gladstone and 279 Holbrook with the Detroit Land Bank.
The court entered a judgment as described. These appeals followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s equitable actions to resolve title disputes to
property. Jonkers v Summit Twp, 278 Mich App 263, 265; 747 NW2d 901 (2008). We review for
clear error the trial court’s factual findings. Id. We review de novo questions of contract
interpretation. Holland v Trinity Health Care Corp, 287 Mich App 524, 526; 791 NW2d 724(2010). We also review de novo questions of law, such as whether a document is eligible for
recording and the proper interpretation of a statute. See City of Taylor v Detroit Edison Co, 475
Mich 109, 115; 715 NW2d 28 (2006); Stumbo v Roe, 332 Mich App 479, 484; 957 NW2d 830(2020). “Whether due process has been afforded is a constitutional issue that is reviewed de novo.”
Elba Twp v Gratiot Co Drain Comm’r, 493 Mich 265, 277; 831 NW2d 204 (2013).
III. DOCKET NO. 363250
A. BREACH OF CONTRACT
On appeal, Richard argues that the trial court’s quieting of title in favor of plaintiff should
be reversed because of the conflicting June 4, 2021 emails plaintiff sent to him. We disagree.
The emails at issue were sent in the early morning hours of June 4, 2021. The first email
had a time stamp of 3:48 a.m. and stated, in pertinent part:
You are currently out of compliance with the purchase agreement you
signed for the property at 689 Gladstone and have failed to provide regular updates
to the Detroit Land Bank Authority (DLBA).
If we do not hear from you within seven (7) days of the date this letter is
sent, we will assume that you are choosing not to comply with the terms of the
purchase agreement, and we will begin the reconveyance process back to the
DLBA. If the property is reconveyed to the Detroit Land Bank Authority you will
forfeit your deposit, the purchase price, the subject property, any improvements to
the property and you will be banned from any further participation in the Building
Detroit Auction.
To avoid reconveyance back to the DLBA, send a photo update using your
Update Reporting Link (URL) below with pictures, receipts, permits, bills, and
other proof showing you are making progress on the property. If you are unable to
use your URL, you may email us your photos . . . . [Emphasis omitted.]
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Then, just four minutes later at 3:52 a.m., plaintiff sent another email to Richard, stating:
The Detroit Land Bank Authority (DLBA) has taken ownership of 689
Gladstone, due to insufficient proof of renovation progress. We have sent several
warnings and the terms of the Purchase Agreement have not been met. The DLBA
has recorded the reconveyance deed that you signed at closing with the Wayne
County Register of Deeds and have taken legal ownership and possession of the
property. You have forfeited all costs related to the purchase and renovation of this
property.
PLEASE STOP ALL WORK ON THE PROPERTY!
Richard argues that these emails violated § 19(f) of the purchase agreement, which details
part of a purchaser’s obligations. Section 19(f) provides:
19. Purchaser’s Obligations, Requirements, and Restrictions.
* * *
f. If the DLBA determines that Purchaser has not complied with the terms of this
Agreement, the DLBA will notify Purchaser in writing indicating in what respects
Purchaser has failed to comply, and what measures and acts Purchaser must take or
perform in to cure such noncompliance. Purchaser shall thereafter complete the
work as required by this Agreement and any time period required under the written
notice of noncompliance.
Richard therefore argues that because plaintiff’s later email effectively rescinded its offer
to allow Richard seven days to contact plaintiff to explain why he has been noncompliant, it is in
violation of § 19(f). While it certainly is strange for plaintiff to have sent the back-to-back emails,
with one allowing for a seven-day window before reconveyance would occur and the other email
stating that reconveyance had already occurred, any confusion or discrepancy caused by the emails
does not require reversal of the trial court’s decision. Notably, § 20 of the purchase agreement
also provides the following:
20. DLBA’s Remedies upon Purchaser’s Breach of Agreement. If at any time
Purchaser fails to timely comply with any condition, covenant or obligation it has
under this agreement . . ., in addition to any other remedies provided in this
Agreement, may seek any and all of the following as its remedies:
* * *
b. In the event of a breach of this Agreement by Purchaser, and in addition to the
remedy provided in Subsection (a) above, the DLBA may in its sole discretion take
any one or more of the following actions:
(1) Post a warning notice on the Property.
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(2) Record the Reconveyance Deed at the Wayne County Register of Deeds
Office, reconveying ownership of the Property back to the DLBA.
(3) Take immediate possession of the Property.
(4) Enter and secure the Property.
(5) Remove all occupants and personal belongings from within the
Property.
(6) Take immediate ownership of all improvements and fixtures intended to
be permanently attached to the Property.
(7) Offer the Property for sale to other prospective purchasers, whether by
auction or otherwise, or hold the Property.
Accordingly, under the purchase agreement, upon a breach by a purchaser plaintiff could
immediately record the reconveyance deed to reclaim ownership. There is no requirement that
any notice be given or that plaintiff must allow a noncompliant party time to alleviate or explain
its breach. To the extent this conflicts with § 19’s proclamation that in the event of a breach,
plaintiff “will notify Purchaser in writing indicating in what respects Purchaser has failed to
comply, and what measures and acts Purchaser must take or perform in to cure such
noncompliance,” this provision is located under the section related solely to a purchaser’s
obligations, and should be viewed in that context. In other words, § 19(f) only imposes obligations
on a purchaser—not plaintiff—in the event that plaintiff exercises its discretion by allowing a
purchaser to cure any noncompliance. Consequently, plaintiff was not required to notify a
purchaser in writing of any breaches nor was it required to allow a purchaser to take remedial
efforts to cure the noncompliance. This interpretation is further reinforced by the plain language
of § 20, which provides that the remedies listed in that section are “in addition to any other
remedies provided in this Agreement.”
Therefore, although the June 4, 2021 e-mails provide conflicting information, there was no
breach of contract on plaintiff’s part, because plaintiff was not required to allow Richard any time
to explain or rectify his noncompliance. Section 20 plainly allows plaintiff to record the
reconveyance deed immediately upon a breach by a purchaser. Moreover, it is well established
that a party who breaches an agreement first cannot maintain an action for the other party’s
subsequent breach of that same contract. Able Demolition v City of Pontiac, 275 Mich App 577,
585; 739 NW2d 696 (2007). Richard was contractually bound to “renovate and rehabilitate” the
property within six months of closing on the property on December 14, 2018. The photographs
provided to the trial court showed that virtually nothing had happened with the properties in nearly
four years. Therefore, with Richard substantially breaching the agreement first, he cannot rely on
any subsequent breach by plaintiff. Id.Richard also cites the doctrine of promissory estoppel in support of his argument, but he
does not explain how that doctrine is pertinent. Under the concept of promissory estoppel, courts
will enforce a promise if the following are established:
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“(1) a promise, (2) that the promisor should reasonably have expected to induce
action of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee, and (3)
that in fact produced reliance or forbearance of that nature in circumstances such
that the promise must be enforced if injustice is to be avoided.” [Cove Creek Condo
Ass’n v Vistal Land & Home Dev, LLC, 330 Mich App 679, 713; 950 NW2d 502(2019) (citation omitted).]
Initially, we note that Richard has claimed that plaintiff breached an express contract, i.e., the
purchase agreement. A claim for promissory estoppel seeks to have a contract implied by law, but
a contract will be implied only if there is no express contract covering the same subject matter.
See Belle Isle Grill Corp v Detroit, 256 Mich App 463, 478; 666 NW2d 271 (2003). Therefore,
to the extent that Richard’s claim for promissory estoppel is based on the same subject matter as
the purchase agreement, it must fail. In any event, Richard has failed to show how any promise
from plaintiff induced action of a definite and substantial character on his part. Clearly, if he had
relied on the seven-day deadline found in the first email, he would have submitted the updates
within seven days, but Richard does not claim that he did. Moreover, the record shows that both
Richard and David were in contact with plaintiff after receiving their respective emails, and were
given an ultimate deadline of August 31, 2021 to submit the compliance materials, and they again
failed to do so. Richard has provided no evidence that he relied to his detriment upon any promises
made by plaintiff.
B. DUE PROCESS
Richard also argues that the June 4, 2021 e-mail he received saying that the reconveyance
deed had been recorded violated his right to due process of law, and suggests that he was denied
an opportunity to be heard before plaintiff reclaimed ownership. We disagree.
Richard’s argument on this issue is extremely undeveloped. He cursorily asserts that the
June 4 e-mail violates due process, without explaining why or how. He cites general law that due
process requires notice to be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action, see Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co,
339 US 306, 314; 70 S Ct 652; 94 L Ed 865 (1950), but he does not explain how the June 4, 2021
e-mail failed to apprise him of anything, let alone the pendency of any action. The failure to
adequately brief an issue results in it being abandoned. Seifeddine v Jaber, 327 Mich App 514,
521; 934 NW2d 64 (2019).
Richard also generally avers that plaintiff failed to follow “state and federal guidelines that
required additional compliance with real estate notices, foreclosures[,] evictions and notifications
in regards to vacating a property.” But Richard does not provide any details of what these
guidelines are or how they were not followed. “An appellant may not merely announce his position
and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims . . . .” Houghton ex
rel Johnson v Keller, 256 Mich App 336, 339; 662 NW2d 854 (2003).
C. INVALID RECONVEYANCE DEED
Richard also argues that the reconveyance deed recorded by plaintiff was invalid because
his wife did not sign it. We disagree.
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Richard correctly notes that under the purchase agreement, his wife was required to sign
the reconveyance deed. He also asserts that because of the lack of his wife’s signature, the deed
“was not eligible for recording and violated Michigan Deed recording statutes.” For these two
reasons, he argues, the reconveyance deed filed was not valid. Regarding his second argument, it
is not clear what statute Richard claims violated. He cites MCL55.307 for the proposition that “a
court may invalidate any notarial act that is not performed in compliance with the Michigan Notary
Public Act.”3 But this statute has nothing to do with whether the deed was eligible for recording
without his wife’s signature. Without citing which “Michigan Deed recording statute” supposedly
makes the deed unrecordable, Richard has abandoned this argument. See Johnson, 256 Mich App
at 339; Prince v MacDonald, 237 Mich App 186, 197; 602 NW2d 834 (1999).
Regarding his argument that the reconveyance deed was invalid under the purchase
agreement, it is true that purchase agreement required “Purchaser [to] execute the Reconveyance
Deed and deliver it to the DLBA . . . . If the Purchaser is a married man, the Purchaser’s wife must
also execute the Reconveyance Deed.” Notably, however, only Richard and plaintiff are parties
to the purchase agreement, with Richard being identified as the sole “Purchaser.” There is no
record evidence that Richard’s wife held any interest in the property; the Michigan Legislature
abolished the common-law concept of dower effective April 6, 2017. See 2016 PA 489;
MCL558.30; In re Estate of Burnett, 341 Mich App 613, 617-618; 992 NW2d 325 (2022). Richard
does not assert that his wife has an interest in the property, much less describe what that interest
may be. In any event, the reconveyance deed was a quitclaim deed purporting to convey Richard’s
interest in the property back to plaintiff. See Eastbrook Homes, Inc v Dep’t of Treas, 296 Mich
App 336, 348-349; 920 NW2d 242 (2012). Richard has not explained how, even if the purchase
agreement was technically breached by his wife not signing the reconveyance deed, such a breach
requires that the deed conveying his interest in the property be invalided. As described, Richard’s
failure to comply with the purchase agreement by properly renovating the property and updating
plaintiff on that progress gave plaintiff the right to immediately take ownership back by recording
the reconveyance deed.
D. REPAIRS AND RENOVATIONS
Richard also argues that the trial court erred by quieting title because appellants paid for
$15,000 worth of renovation and repairs to the Holbrook home between the time of the August 30,
2022 hearing and the September 13, 2022 hearing. We disagree.
We note that the photographs provided to the trial court do not depict work done at the
Gladstone home (purchased from plaintiff by Richard); instead, they reflect work done at the
Holbrook home (purchased from plaintiff by David). Richard offers no argument why work done
on the Holbrook home should have any bearing on why quiet title was not appropriate for the
Gladstone home. Any repairs and renovations done to the Holbrook home are irrelevant to whether
title to the Gladstone home was appropriately quieted. Additionally, even if some progress had
been undertaken on the Holbrook home between August 30, 2022, and September 13, 2022, it does
3
The proper name of the act is the Michigan Law on Notarial Acts.” MCL55.261. MCL55.307(2),
which is part of that act, allows a court to “invalidate any notarial act not performed in compliance
with this act.”
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not alter the fact that virtually no work had been done from December 14, 2018—the date Richard
purchased the Gladstone home—until September 2022. With Richard having done nothing of any
substance in nearly four years, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that Richard had not
satisfied his responsibility to restore the property under the purchase agreement. Consequently,
the trial court did not err by quieting title in favor of plaintiff.
Richard next argues that reversal is required because of certain irregularities in the
proceedings. We disagree.
Richard first contends that plaintiff violated MCL124.759 by failing to post notice of the
expedited quiet title action at the Gladstone property. He also claims that this failure constitutes a
due-process violation. MCL124.759(7) provides, in relevant part:
Not less than 30 days before the quiet title and foreclosure hearing under
subsection (11), the authority or its authorized representative or authorized agent
shall visit each parcel of property subject to expedited foreclosure and post
conspicuously on the property notice of the hearing.
And MCL124.759(11) pertinently states:
If a petition for expedited quiet title and foreclosure is filed under subsection
(3), before the hearing, the authority shall file with the clerk of the circuit court
proof of notice by certified mail under subsection (6), proof of notice by posting on
the property under subsection (7), and proof of notice by publication, if applicable.
There is no record evidence to support Richard’s contention that the posting on the
Gladstone property did not occur. On the contrary, the record contains the affidavit referenced in
MCL 124.759(11), averring that notice, which was “clearly visible from the street and readable as
posted,” was posted at the Gladstone address on June 9, 2022. Therefore, with no evidence to
support Richard’s position, we reject his argument.
E. VIOLATION OF THE LBFTA
Richard also argues that the hearing related to the Gladstone property occurred on August
30, 2022, which is outside the statutorily required 90-day window required by the LBFTA. We
disagree. MCL124.759(3) and (4) state:
(3) An authority may file a single petition with the clerk of the circuit court
in which property subject to expedited foreclosure under this section is located
listing all property subject to expedited foreclosure by the authority and for which
the authority seeks to quiet title. If available to the authority, the list of properties
shall include a legal description of, a tax parcel identification number for, and the
street address of each parcel of property. The petition shall seek a judgment in favor
of the authority against each property listed and shall include a date, within 90
days, on which the authority requests a hearing on the petition. The petition shall
request that a judgment be entered vesting absolute title in the authority, without
right of redemption for each parcel of property listed, as provided in this section.
Prior to the entry of judgment under this section, the authority may request the court
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to remove property erroneously included in the petition, or any tax delinquent
properties redeemed prior to the hearing.
(4) The clerk of the circuit court in which a petition is filed under subsection
(3) shall immediately set the date, time, and place for a hearing on the petition for
foreclosure. The date shall be set by the clerk and shall not be more than 10 days
after the date requested by the authority in the petition. In no event may the clerk
schedule the hearing later than 90 days after the filing of a petition by the authority
under subsection (3). [Emphasis added.]
In this case, the petition was filed on May 26, 2022. And in that petition, plaintiff requested
a hearing date on all 27 properties to be held on July 12, 2022, which is within 90 days. Indeed, a
notice of hearing was filed providing notice that the hearing was to occur on July 12, 2022. The
accompanying proof of service indicates that Richard was mailed this notice on June 30. In other
words, the initial scheduling of the hearing was compliant with the LBFTA. The hearing for the
Gladstone and Holbrook properties was then adjourned to August 30, 2022, and that notice was
mailed to both Richard and David. Richard filed his objections in advance of the August 30
hearing, and his attorney appeared at that hearing. At that hearing, Richard’s attorney requested a
brief adjournment because he had only recently been retained, and the trial court granted the
adjournment to September 13, 2022.
We perceive no violations of the LBFTA. While the act establishes requirements for
setting the initial hearing date, significantly, there are no prohibitions or limitations against
adjournments. If the Legislature had intended to not allow any adjournments beyond the 90-day
window, it could have stated so, but the language of the act clearly only contemplates the
scheduling of the initial hearing. Subsection (3) requires the petitioner to request an initial hearing
date within 90 days. And Subsection (4) requires the court clerk to immediately set a date for that
initial hearing within 90 days of the petition being filed. As explained earlier, with the initial
hearing being set for July 12, 2022, these requirements were satisfied. It is highly doubtful that
the Legislature intended to not allow any subsequent adjournments beyond that 90-day window
without clearly specifying that limitation. Courts are not to read language into an unambiguous
statute. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v Clare, 323 Mich App 678, 689; 919 NW2d 420(2018).
F. ABANDONED OR UNPRESERVED ARGUMENTS
In his brief on appeal, Richard argues that the trial court failed to address his objections to
the petition, but he does not specify which objections he believes had merit. It is not enough to
simply assert that the court failed to generally address arguments. “An appellant may not merely
announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his
claims . . . .” Johnson, 256 Mich App at 339.
Additionally, to the extent that Richard argues that the trial court encouraged appellants to
work on the properties between August 30 and September 13 2022, that argument is waived
because it was not raised in the trial court. See Tolas Oil & Gas Exploration Co v Bach Servs &
Mfg, LLC, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2023); slip op at 4-5 (holding that unpreserved
issues in civil cases are waived); Glasker-Davis v Auvenshine, 333 Mich App 222, 227; 964 NW2d
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809 (2020) (stating that an issue must be raised or decided in the lower court to preserve it for
appellate review).
Richard also asserts that plaintiff violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
several ways. However, Richard never made this argument in the trial court, which means it is not
preserved for appellate review and is also waived. See Glasker-Davis, 333 Mich App at 227; Tolas
Oil, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 4-5.
IV. DOCKET NO. 363253
A. CONFLICTING EMAILS
In Docket No. 363253, David argues that the conflicting e-mails he received on April 27,
2021, require that this Court reverse the trial court’s decision to quiet title in favor of plaintiff. We
disagree. As explained, no written notice was required for plaintiff to reconvey the property back
to itself after David failed to fulfill his obligations under the purchase agreement; therefore, to the
extent David argues that plaintiff breached the purchase agreement, we disagree for the same
reasons stated in Section III(A) of this opinion.
B. INVALID RECONVEYANCE DEED
David argues that the reconveyance deed was not properly notarized because the notary
was not present when he signed the deed. We hold that David is not entitled to any relief.
David’s argument implies that because the deed was not property notarized, the trial court
should not have quieted title in favor of plaintiff. He does not explain why it would follow that if
the deed was not properly notarized, this Court should reverse the trial court’s ultimate ruling to
quiet title in favor of plaintiff. In any event, the record is devoid of evidence to support David’s
assertion that the notary was not present when he signed the deed. David supplied no affidavits or
other evidence in the trial court to support his position. In his brief on appeal, David states that he
“can testify that he only recalls [a different individual] being at the closing.” A promise to provide
evidence later is not evidence. See Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 121; 597 NW2d 817 (1999)
(noting that “[a] mere promise” to produce evidence in a summary-disposition setting is not
evidence).
David also states that the notary did not use a stamp on the deed. But he does not explain
how using a stamp was required or, conversely, how the failure to use a stamp means the deed is
void. Indeed, such a position is contrary to MCL55.287(2), which simply permits a notary to use
a stamp—it is not required.4
4
MCL55.287(2) provides:
On each record that a notary public performs a notarial act and immediately
near the notary public’s signature, as is practical, the notary public shall print, type,
stamp, or otherwise imprint mechanically or electronically sufficiently clear and
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We find no defect with the notarization of the reconveyance deed requiring invalidation of
that deed, or otherwise requiring reversal of the trial court.
C. ABANDONED AND UNPRESERVED ARGUMENTS
David argues that the conflicting e-mails he received violated his right to due process, but
does not support this argument with factual or legal authority. This argument is therefore
abandoned. “An appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to
discover and rationalize the basis for his claims . . . .” Johnson, 256 Mich App at 339.
David’s appellate brief also contains the following statement of the question presented:
Did the circuit court’s advise [sic] at oral argument at the first hearing on August
30th, 2022 hearing that immediate action needed to be taken in regards to the
property. (Appendix G, Trial Court First Hearing 8/30/22 pg. 8 lines 9 to 25 & pg.
9 lines 1 to 8). Also see additional photos submitted to DLBA and trial court in
Appendix D[.]
This statement is nonsensical; it does not form a complete or meaningful sentence. To the
extent that David attempts to argue that the trial court made a statement at the August 30, 2022
hearing prior to adjournment that requires reversal of its quiet title decision, that argument is
unsupported by facts or law and is abandoned. See Froling v Carpenter, 203 Mich App 368, 373;
512 NW2d 6 (1993). Moreover, because the issue is not raised before the trial court, it is waived.
See Tolas Oil, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 4-5.
David also argues that plaintiff’s agents made misrepresentations during the proceedings
below. Because David never raised these arguments in the trial court, they are waived. See id.Alternately, the issue also is abandoned because David does not adequately brief why he is entitled
to relief for this issue. David identifies three instances of alleged misconduct: (1) plaintiff failed
to provide a copy of its supplemental brief and accompanying photographs to David; (2) at the
September 13, 2022 hearing, plaintiff’s attorney referred to the property as a “pile of rubbish” 5;
and (3) plaintiff’s attorney allegedly told David that if he agreed to drop his interest in the Holbrook
property, then plaintiff would allow appellants to work on the Gladstone property. David provides
no law, theory, or rationale why any of these acts would be a ground to reverse the trial court. “An
appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and
rationalize the basis for his claims . . . .” Johnson, 256 Mich App at 339.
V. CONCLUSION
legible to be read by the secretary and in a manner capable of photographic
reproduction all of the following . . . .
5
At the hearing, plaintiff’s counsel stated, “[T]he neighbors have had to deal with these two piles
of rubbish for four years.” Appellants’ counsel even conceded at that same hearing that the
properties were “of course, in poor condition” and “obviously” “need . . . quite a bit of work.”
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Affirmed in both docket numbers. As the prevailing party, plaintiff may tax costs.
MCR7.219(A).
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Noah P. Hood
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