Tachelle Landin v. Department of Health and Human Services ( 2024 )

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TACHELLE LANDIN, FOR PUBLICATION
November 13, 2024
Plaintiff-Appellant, 10:58 AM
v No. 367356
Bay Circuit Court
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN LC No. 2022-003277-CD
SERVICES,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: PATEL, P.J., and YATES and SHAPIRO,* JJ.
SHAPIRO, J.
In Tyrrell v Univ of Mich, 335 Mich App 254; 966 NW2d 219 (2020), this Court held in a
published and precedentially binding opinion that when a state entity is sued in Circuit Court, as
opposed to the Court of Claims, the plaintiff need not file a claim or notice of intent within a year
after accrual as otherwise required by MCL 600.6431(1). Relying on that decision, plaintiff,
Tachelle Landin, filed suit in circuit court without complying with the requirements of the statute.
After plaintiff did so, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Christie v Wayne State University,
511 Mich 19; 993 NW2d 203 (2023), holding that the requirements of MCL 600.6431(1) apply to
all suits against the state, including those filed in circuit court. The Christie opinion did not state
whether or not it should be applied retroactively.
The circuit court read Christie as requiring full retroactivity and given plaintiff’s failure of
notice, dismissed the case. Plaintiff appeals as of right. While her appeal was pending, a panel of
the Court of Appeals held in Flamont v Dep’t of Corrections, ___ Mich App ___; ___) NW3d ___
(2024) (Docket # 367683), a case filed before the decision in Tyrrell was issued, that in that
circumstance Christie did not establish a new rule of law and should be applied retroactively. We
take no issue with Flamont’s application of Christie to cases not affected by the Tyrrell decision.
However, the question whether it should be applied retroactively to those cases in which the
plaintiff relied upon the then-binding precedent of Tyrrell did not arise in Flamont. Indeed,
Flamont makes no reference to cases filed in reliance on Tyrrell which is not surprising since the
_______________________
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
-1-
plaintiff could not and did not assert any such reliance given that the notice period applicable in
Flamont had run before Tyrrell was decided. Flamont, ____Mich App at ___; slip op at 1-2.
The question whether Christie should be applied retroactively to post-Tyrrell/pre-Christie1
cases is now before us. And we conclude that because Tyrrell, despite being wrongly decided,
was binding precedent at the relevant time in this case, the decision in Christie was a new rule of
law as to it and similarly-situated cases. We further conclude that plaintiff’s reliance interest was
such that the Christie decision should not be applied retroactively as to her. Accordingly, we
reverse the circuit court’s ruling summarily dismissing plaintiff’s lawsuit and remand for further
proceedings.
I. MCL 600.6431 AND A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Section 6431 of the Court of Claims Act (COCA), MCL 600.6401 et seq., provides, in
pertinent part, as follows:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a claim may not be
maintained against this state unless the claimant, within 1 year after the claim has
accrued, files in the office of the clerk of the court of claims either a written claim
or a written notice of intention to file a claim against this state or any of its
departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms, or agencies.
(2) A claim or notice under subsection (1) must contain all of the following:
(a) A statement of the time when and the place where the claim arose.
(b) A detailed statement of the nature of the claim and of the items of
damage alleged or claimed to have been sustained.
(c) A designation of any department, commission, board, institution, arm,
or agency of the state involved in connection with the claim.
(d) A signature and verification by the claimant before an officer authorized
to administer oaths. [MCL 600.6431.]
In Tyrrell, 335 Mich App at 257-258, an opinion issued by this Court on December 22,
2020, the panel addressed and construed MCL 600.6431, ruling:
At issue in this appeal is whether a plaintiff who files an action in circuit
court against a state defendant is required to comply with MCL 600.6431(1) of the
. . . COCA . . . . This in turn requires us to address whether compliance with MCL
600.6431(1) is a question of governmental immunity or a question of compliance
1
In other words, to circuit court cases that were in a procedural posture wherein Tyrrell’s
interpretation of MCL 600.6431 was binding precedent in Michigan during the one-year notice or
filing period following accrual of a claim.
-2-
with the rules for proceeding in the Court of Claims. For the reasons explained in
this opinion, we conclude that compliance with MCL 600.6431(1) both (1) does
not implicate governmental immunity absent the Legislature conditioning its
consent to be sued on compliance with the COCA, and (2) is only necessary for
claims proceeding in the Court of Claims. We therefore affirm. [Emphasis added.]
After an extensive analysis, the Tyrrell panel held that “a plaintiff properly bringing a claim in
circuit court against the state or a state defendant to which MCL 600.6431 applies is not required
to comply with MCL 600.6431 for his or her claim to proceed in that court.” Tyrrell, 335 Mich
App at 272.2
After Tyrrell was issued in December 2020, plaintiff filed a complaint in the circuit court
in May 2022 against defendant, the Department of Health and Human Services, (DHHS), alleging
that during her employment as a Children’s Protective Services specialist in the DHHS’s Bay
County office, plaintiff, an African-American female, was harassed and discriminated against on
the basis of her race in violation of the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2101 et
seq. Plaintiff never filed “in the office of the clerk of the court of claims either a written claim or
a written notice of intention to file a claim against” the DHHS. MCL 600.6431(1). Plaintiff was
first transferred to the Bay County office in July 2019, and the underlying acts giving rise to the
allegations in the complaint primarily transpired between June 2021 and November 2021, at which
time plaintiff was terminated from her employment. During that timeframe in 2021, Tyrrell
governed with respect to the construction of MCL 600.6431, and Tyrrell was still firmly in place
and binding when the complaint was filed in May 2022 and when a one-year period elapsed in
November 2022 as measured from November 2021—the latest date of accrual. After November
2022, it was no longer possible for plaintiff to comply with MCL 600.6431(1).
In July 2022, the DHHS filed an answer to the complaint, generally denying plaintiff’s
allegations, and it filed affirmative defenses, which included failure to state a claim, governmental
immunity, and lack of engagement in protected activity. Subsequently, on May 2, 2023, the
Michigan Supreme Court issued its opinion in Christie and held as follows:
We conclude that all parties with claims against the state, except those
exempted in MCL 600.6431 itself, must comply with the notice requirements of
MCL 600.6431(1). This includes claims against the state brought in the circuit
court. Because it concluded to the contrary, we overrule Tyrrell. It is undisputed in
this case that plaintiff did not comply with MCL 600.6431(1) within one year of
the accrual of her claims. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remand this case to the Wayne Circuit Court for entry of summary
disposition in favor of defendant. [Christie, 511 Mich at 64-65.]
2
In Tyrrell, the “[p]laintiff filed a complaint against defendants in circuit court alleging
discrimination and retaliation in violation of Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act
(PWDCRA), MCL 37.1101 et seq.” Tyrrell, 335 Mich App at 258. We note that the Supreme
Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal in Tyrrell because the application was filed too
late. Tyrrell v Univ of Mich, 507 Mich 990 (2021).
-3-
In Christie, the plaintiff had alleged that during 2017 she was subjected to acts and
communications by her employer that amounted to age discrimination, and she filed suit in circuit
court in April 2019 absent compliance with MCL 600.6431(1). Id. at 45-46. Even though the
Christie Court effectively applied its ruling retroactively to the parties before it, Tyrrell was not
released until approximately 20 months after the complaint was filed in Christie. In other words,
the plaintiff in Christie was not proceeding on the basis or with the benefit of Tyrrell; there was
no reliance on Tyrrell.
Returning to the case at bar, the DHHS moved for summary disposition shortly after
Christie was released, arguing that plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements detailed in
MCL 600.6431(1) and that summary dismissal was warranted by our Supreme Court’s recent
holding in Christie. Plaintiff responded that Christie should not apply retroactively because
Tyrrell had expressly permitted plaintiff to file suit in the circuit court without complying with the
one-year notice or filing requirement of MCL 600.6431(1).
In June 2023, the circuit court held a hearing on the DHHS’s motion for summary
disposition, and it took the matter under advisement. The circuit court subsequently issued an
opinion and order granting the DHHS’s motion for summary disposition, opining that our Supreme
Court implicitly indicated that Christie had retroactive application when the Court applied its
analysis and ruling to the facts of the case and to the facts in a contemporaneously-issued opinion
in Elia Cos, LLC v Univ of Mich Regents, 511 Mich 66; 993 NW2d 392 (2023).3 The circuit court
concluded that plaintiff’s claims were therefore barred due to her failure to abide by the
requirements of MCL 600.6431(1). This appeal ensued.
II. ANALYSIS
The resolution of this appeal hinges on whether Christie must be applied retroactively such
that plaintiffs whose cases were governed by Tyrrell during the relevant notice period are subject
to dismissal for failing to comply with the one-year notice or filing requirement of MCL
600.6431(1).4 In Michigan, the well-established general rule is that a judicial decision is to be
3
Citing its decision in Christie, the Supreme Court in Elia Cos stated that, “[a]s an initial matter,
we reject plaintiff’s argument that it was not required to comply with the notice and verification
requirements of MCL 600.6431 because plaintiff initially filed suit in the circuit court rather than
in the Court of Claims.” Elia Cos, 511 Mich at 71. In Elia Cos, the plaintiff alleged multiple
causes of action arising from a lease with the defendant, and the actions at issue occurred in 2017
and 2018, with the complaint being filed in August 2018. Id. at 69. Accordingly, Tyrrell had no
bearing on the plaintiff’s actions in Elia Cos as it was not released until December 2020.
4
We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition. Christie, 511
Mich at 47. “Whether plaintiff was required to comply with MCL 600.6431 of the COCA is an
issue of statutory interpretation that this Court likewise reviews de novo.” Id. “Whether a judicial
decision should have retroactive application is a question of law and is reviewed de novo.”
Gabrielson v The Woods Condo Ass’n, Inc, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024)
(Docket Nos. 364809 and 364813); slip op at 7.
-4-
given complete retroactive effect. League of Women Voters of Mich v Secretary of State, 508 Mich
520, 564-565; 975 NW2d 840 (2022). But if an injustice might result from giving a decision full
retroactive effect, our Supreme Court has adopted a more flexible approach, giving a holding
limited retroactive or prospective effect. Id. at 565.5
As part of the retroactivity analysis, a threshold question is whether the judicial decision
clearly established a new principle of law. Id. A principle or rule of law is considered “new” for
purposes of the retroactive-versus-prospective inquiry when an established precedent–such as
Tyrrell– is overruled or when an issue of first impression is decided that was not foreshadowed by
any earlier appellate decision. Id. at 566. Although a judicial opinion may give effect to the
Legislature’s intent as reasonably inferred from the text of a governing statute, the opinion,
practically speaking, can still be characterized as being akin to the announcement of a new rule of
law when it corrects previous erroneous interpretations of the statute. See Pohutski v City of Allen
Park, 465 Mich 675, 696-697; 641 NW2d 219 (2002). The Pohutski Court, in expressing this
proposition, relied in part on Gusler v Fairview Tubular Prod, 412 Mich 270, 298; 315 NW2d 388(1981), wherein the Supreme Court observed:
Although our holding is based on what we perceive to have been the intent
of the legislature at the time of enactment of the provisions discussed, in practical
effect, given the contrary interpretations of the law by the Director of the Bureau
of Workers’ Compensation and the bureau’s subdivisions, the Workers’
Compensation Appeal Board and its hearing referees, and the Court of Appeals,
today’s holding is not unlike the announcement of a new rule of law. Its application
therefore should be treated accordingly.
Next, when a judicial holding establishes a “new principle of law,” we must continue the
analysis by next taking into consideration the following three factors: “(1) the purpose to be served
by the new rule, (2) the extent of the reliance on the old rule, and (3) the effect of retroactivity on
the administration of justice.” League of Women Voters, 508 Mich at 565-566 (quotation marks
and citations omitted).
With these principles in mind, we first conclude that the holding in Christie that a party
suing the state must comply with MCL 600.6431(1) even if the action is pursued in circuit court
5
“Rules determined in opinions that apply retroactively apply to all cases still open on direct
review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our
announcement of the rule[s].” McNeel v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Mich, 289 Mich App 76, 94;
795 NW2d 205 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original). “Rules
determined in opinions that apply prospectively only, on the other hand, not only do not apply to
cases still open on direct review, but do not even apply to the parties in the cases in which the rules
are declared.” Id.-5-
constituted a new rule or principle of law as to those cases filed when the holding in Tyrrell
constituted binding precedent. It is clear that Christie overruled precedent established in Tyrrell,
and although our Supreme Court in Christie, 511 Mich at 57, expressed that it was giving effect to
the intent of the Legislature as inferred from the text of MCL 600.6431(1), the correction of the
erroneous interpretation by the panel in Tyrrell effectively announced a new rule of law as to those
cases to which Tyrrell applied. See League of Women Voters, 508 Mich at 566; Pohutski, 465
Mich at 696-697. The precedent set by Tyrrell was clear and unambiguous, i.e., there is no need
to comply with MCL 600.6431(1) in a circuit court action against the state, and the ruling in
Christie was just as clear and unambiguous, i.e., compliance with MCL 600.6431(1) is required
regardless of the judicial forum. The distinction between these two holdings was not vague, hazy,
or indefinite; rather, Christie reflected a 180-degree change in the law, in relation to the governing
law defined in Tyrrell.6 Finding the threshold issue to be fully satisfied, we now proceed with our
examination of the three factors recited above from League of Women Voters.
With respect to the purpose to be served by the new rule, the Christie Court did not
specifically engage in an assessment of the purpose to be served by its ruling outside of simply
determining the intent of the Legislature and giving effect to that intent. The Supreme Court did
explain:
This Court has recognized that MCL 600.6431(1)’s notice requirements
ensure that the proper state entity learns about a potential claim, can prepare for
litigation, and can create reserves to cover potential liability. There is no logical
reason to conclude that the Legislature intended state defendants be notified when
a party intends to sue them in the Court of Claims but not when the party intends to
sue them elsewhere. [Christie, 511 Mich at 63-64 (citation omitted).]
With respect to the extent of the reliance on the old rule, given that Tyrrell was a published
opinion and represented binding precedent squarely regarding the necessary steps to take or not to
take when suing the state or state entities in circuit court, see MCR 7.215(C)(2) and (J)(1), the
extent of the reliance by plaintiff and other similarly-situated plaintiffs on the old rule was
extremely significant.
Finally, with respect to the effect of retroactivity on the administration of justice, we
conclude that this factor strongly favors plaintiff considering that retroactive application of
6
Since Christie clarified the intent of the Legislature that passed MCL 600.6431 many years ago,
it can be said to have determined that it was “always” the law that notice has to be provided in
circuit court cases. However, we do not require nor permit parties to disregard binding authority
even if it is incorrect–until and unless that authority is overruled. What constitutes the rule of law
applicable to a party is, by definition, what the most recent binding precedent says it is. Simply
put, parties must rely on the law as the binding precedent has defined it. What makes a rule “new”
for purposes of retroactivity analysis does not concern the soundness of the rule enunciated in a
decision on which the party relied; rather the test is whether the rule, even if misguided, was set
forth in binding precedent. While legal theorists may debate whether an overruled decision was
ever “the law” in some ultimate or platonic sense, the reality of litigation is that the applicable rule
of law is defined by the binding precedent in effect at the relevant time.
-6-
Christie’s construction of MCL 600.6431(1) would be patently unjust and inequitable. The
administration of justice would not be served and would in fact be circumvented wholesale by
punishing plaintiff with the wholesale loss of her cause of action—without consideration of its
merits—when she did nothing more than abide by the law as set forth during the pertinent
timeframe by this Court in its opinion in Tyrrell, a case directly and indisputably on point at the
time. This would also be the case in regard to plaintiffs in other suits against the state who were
in a similar posture and relied on Tyrrell to guide their actions. On the other hand, we see no
injustice to the state where plaintiff was terminated in November 2021 and the lawsuit was filed a
mere six months later in May 2022; therefore, the DHHS received notice of plaintiff’s claims in
under a year.
In sum, we conclude that upon weighing the three pertinent factors, they weigh against
applying Christie retroactively to cases in which plaintiffs reasonably relied on Tyrrell in making
the decision not to provide the notice in MCL 600.6431(1). That said, we feel it necessary to
address and examine some other arguments in favor of retroactive application.
Our Supreme Court has vacated some decisions by this Court and remanded the cases for
reconsideration in light of Christie. See Deitert v Univ of Mich Bd of Regents, 512 Mich 930, 930
(2023); Mich Immigrant Rights Ctr v Whitmer, 511 Mich 1017, 1017-1018 (2023). But we do not
read these orders as being contrary to our ruling. First, the Supreme Court did not vacate and
remand the cases for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants in light of Christie; rather, the
Supreme Court simply directed this Court to consider the impact of Christie on the resolution of
those appeals, without any statement or indication that Christie necessarily applied retroactively.
Furthermore, in Deitert, this Court had noted that “[w]eeks prior to oral argument in the instant
case, another panel of this Court issued a published opinion in Tyrrell.” Deitert v Univ of Mich
Bd of Regents, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued August 26, 2021
(Docket No. 349059), p 1. Therefore, as a matter of timing, under no circumstance could the
plaintiff in Deitert have relied on Tyrrell in choosing not to comply with MCL 600.6431(1). And
in Mich Immigrant Rights Ctr, the plaintiff brought the action in the Court of Claims, not the circuit
court, so it has no bearing on our reasoning and ruling. See Mich Immigrant Rights Ctr v Whitmer,
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 30, 2024 (Docket Nos.
361451 and 362515), p 1.
Although the Supreme Court in Christie and Elia Cos did not state that the holdings were
retroactive, it could be implied given that its construction of MCL 600.6431(1) was applied
directly to the cases before the Court. See Proctor v Saginaw Co Bd of Comm’rs, 340 Mich App
1, 26; 985 NW2d 193 (2022) (indicating that it would not be fair or logical for the Supreme Court’s
holding to be applied just to the parties before it but not retroactively applied to parties in other
cases). But, importantly, the Proctor panel added the caveat that the principle or proposition
applies “to cases in which the parties are similarly situated.” Id. at 26-27 (emphasis added). As
indicated earlier, plaintiff in the instant case was not similarly situated to the plaintiffs in Christie
and Elia Cos because Tyrrell had yet to be issued when the plaintiffs in the Supreme Courts cases
failed to abide by MCL 600.6431(1). Here, plaintiff took a rational and legally sound course of
action in not filing the notice under MCL 600.6431(1) because Tyrrell clearly dictated that doing
so was wholly unnecessary when commencing suit against the state in a circuit court.
-7-
In Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197; 731 NW2d 41 (2007), our Supreme
Court addressed the 120-day notice provision in MCL 691.1404(1) that is applicable to the
defective-highway exception to governmental immunity. The trial court denied the road
commission’s motion for summary disposition despite the plaintiff’s late notice because binding
Supreme Court precedent provided, on constitutional grounds, that a failure to comply with the
notice requirement could only serve as a basis for dismissal on immunity grounds if the
governmental agency was prejudiced by the lack of compliance with MCL 691.1404(1), even
though the statute contained no language regarding prejudice. Id. at 201, 210. The Rowland Court
overruled the precedent, concluding “that the plain language of this statute should be enforced as
written: notice of the injuries sustained and of the highway defect must be served on the
governmental agency within 120 days of the injury.” Id. at 200. The Court then proceeded to
engage in a fairly lengthy analysis regarding whether its decision should have retroactive effect,
using the principles and factors that we employed in the instant case. Id. at 220-223. The Rowland
Court, in ruling that its decision applied retroactively, did state at the very end of its discussion as
follows:
[W]e are mindful of the fact that the public fisc is at risk in these cases. The
decision to expand the class of those entitled to seek recovery against the
government should be in the hands of the Legislature. This Court does not have the
authority to waive the government’s immunity from suit, and tax dollars should
only be at risk when a plaintiff satisfies all the prerequisites, including a notice
provision, set by the Legislature for one of the exceptions to governmental
immunity. [Id. at 222-223.]
Nevertheless, the Court still found it necessary to analyze the retroactive-versus-
prospective factors. The Rowland Court emphasized that the precedent being overruled deviated
from the plain language of the statute, which had no “prejudice” requirement. Id. at 222.
Comparatively, we do not believe that MCL 600.6431(1) is as clear regarding whether it applies
to circuit court actions. Regardless, the Court in Rowland also stated that “in the instant case, there
exist no exigent circumstances that would warrant the ‘extreme measure’ of prospective
application” because “no one was adversely positioned, we believe, in reliance on” the existing
precedent. Id. at 221 (emphasis added). It is important to understand that the precedent overruled
in Rowland did not provide that notice or timely notice was not required; rather, the overruled
precedent simply indicated that an action could proceed even if MCL 691.1404(1) was not
satisfied, but only if the governmental agency suffered no prejudice. It would defy logic for a
plaintiff not to comply with MCL 691.1404(1) on the mere hope that prejudice would ultimately
not be found. Here, however, the then-controlling precedent, Tyrrell, ruled that a plaintiff did not
have to file notice under MCL 600.6431(1) when commencing an action in the circuit court. It
would be entirely reasonable and logical not to file the notice in MCL 600.6431(1) when caselaw
clearly indicated that doing so was wholly unnecessary. That was the situation in which plaintiff
in this case found herself.
III. CONCLUSION
We hold that Christie does not apply retroactively to circuit court cases that were in a
procedural posture wherein Tyrrell’s interpretation of MCL 600.6431 was the law in Michigan
-8-
during the one-year notice or filing period following accrual of a claim. Such was the situation
with respect to plaintiff’s case against the DHHS.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. No costs shall
be awarded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
/s/ Sima G. Patel
-9-