In Re Attorney Fees of Michael a Faraone ( 2024 )

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re ATTORNEY FEES OF MICHAEL A.
FARAONE.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED
November 13, 2024
Plaintiff-Appellee, 10:05 AM
v No. 369180
Kent Circuit Court
JAMARIE NICHOLUS BELL, LC No. 21-003238-FC
Defendant,
and
MICHAEL A. FARAONE,
Appellant.
Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and MURRAY and CAMERON, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant appeals by right the trial court’s award of attorney fees. In 2022, a jury convicted
defendant of (1) first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a); (2) felony gang
membership, MCL 750.411u; and (3) carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony
(felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. Defendant appealed his convictions and sentences; this Court
affirmed defendant’s convictions but remanded for resentencing.1 Appellant is defendant’s court-
appointed appellate counsel. Appellant submitted an attorney fee request and itemized bill to the
trial court for his work on defendant’s appeal, and the trial court awarded some, but not all, of the
attorney fees requested. We vacate the award of attorney fees and remand for the trial court to
1
See People v Bell, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued February 1,
2024 (Docket No. 362347), p 1.
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either award appellant the full amount of the requested fees or articulate its basis for concluding
that the amount was not reasonable.
I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant submitted an itemized bill to the trial court for his work on defendant’s appeal,
requesting $4,340 in attorney fees and $261.12 in expenses.2 The trial court only approved $2,205
in attorney fees, as well as the $261.12 in expenses. The trial court did not provide any explanation
for the amount of the award apart from the comment “Reviewed by Judge Trusock and flat rate
cap was approved” found on the form approving the payment of fees. The trial court did not offer
any further explanation for its decision. Appellant moved the trial court for reconsideration, which
the trial court denied without making any additional findings. This appeal followed.
II. COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL FEES
Appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying his full fee request without making
any findings concerning their reasonableness. We agree.
“A trial court’s determination regarding the reasonableness of compensation for services
and expenses of court-appointed attorneys is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. A trial court
abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled
outcomes.” In re Foster Attorney Fees, 317 Mich App 372, 375; 894 NW2d 718 (2016) (quotation
marks and citations omitted).
Prior to its amendment in 2013, MCL 775.16 explicitly provided that a court-appointed
attorney who represented an indigent defendant was entitled to reasonable compensation; however,
the statute now simply provides that an indigent defendant has the right to an appointed counsel.
See MCL 775.16 before and after amendment by 2013 PA 94. Nevertheless, the Michigan
Supreme Court has referred to the reasonable-compensation requirement after MCL 775.16 was
amended. See In re Ujlaky, 498 Mich 890; 869 NW2d 624 (2015); Foster Attorney Fees, 371
Mich App at 376 n 1. The parties in this case do not dispute that appellant had represented an
indigent defendant and was entitled to reasonable attorney fees for his services.
In Ujlaky, 498 Mich at 890, our Supreme Court noted that “[t]he trial court applied the
county’s fee schedule, which capped compensation for plea cases at $660, but did not address at
all the reasonableness of the fee in relation to the actual services rendered, as itemized by the
appellant.” The Michigan Supreme Court explained that, “[a]lthough the expenditure of any
amount of time beyond that contemplated by the schedule for the typical case does not, ipso
facto, warrant extra fees, spending a significant but reasonable number of hours beyond the norm
may.” Id. Therefore, the Michigan Supreme Court remanded the case, instructing the trial court
to “either award the requested fees, or articulate on the record its basis for concluding that such
fees are not reasonable.” Id.
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Similarly, in In re Foster, 329 Mich App 371, 376; 941 NW2d 711 (2019), this Court
concluded “that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to either award [defense counsel] the
full amount of requested fees or articulate its basis for concluding that the amount was not
reasonable.” This Court reasoned as follows:
In this case, while the trial court expressed some concern about the number
of hours spent on the delayed application for leave to appeal, the trial court did not
conclude that this or any other amount of time that [defense counsel] spent on [the
defendant’s] case was unreasonable. However, the court clearly relied on
Kalamazoo County’s policy of capping compensation for appeals involving guilty
pleas at $500. At the hearing, [defense counsel] asked the trial court to consider
whether the hours spent in each category on his itemized billing statement were
reasonable. The trial court declined to do so on the record, but agreed instead to
examine [defense counsel’s] itemized hours and issue a written opinion. In its
written opinion, the trial court concluded that [defense counsel] was entitled to the
maximum amounts allotted by Kalamazoo County for representing [the defendant]
at her plea-withdrawal hearing and in her appeal, but it did not determine that any
of the additional time [defense counsel] spent on the case, for which he was
requesting additional fees, was unreasonable. [Id. at 375-376.]
As in Foster and Ujlaky, the trial court in this case was not permitted to merely reduce
appellant’s requested attorney fees based on a fee schedule or fee cap. Rather, it was required to
consider whether the hours billed by appellant were reasonable. Because the trial court did not
award the full amount of attorney fees requested, or in the alternative make findings concerning
the reasonableness of the fees in relation to the actual services rendered, it abused its discretion.
See Foster, 329 Mich App at 376. Accordingly, remand is necessary for the trial court to “either
award the requested fees, or articulate on the record its basis for concluding that such fees are not
reasonable.” Ujlaky, 498 Mich at 890. See also Foster, 329 Mich App at 376.
Vacated and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
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