Eugene Erick Fort v. State of Minnesota ( 2015 )

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A14-1692
Hennepin County Page, J.
Eugene Erick Fort, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs. Filed: Apil 1, 2015
Office of Appellate Courts
State of Minnesota,
Respondent.
________________________
Eugene Erick Fort, Bayport, MN, pro se.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Lee W. Barry, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.
________________________
SYLLABUS
The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion when it summarily denied
appellant’s second postconviction petition.
Affirmed.
Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.
1
OPINION
PAGE, Justice.
Appellant Eugene Erick Fort was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder,
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2014), and first-degree murder while
committing burglary, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3), in connection with the
1990 stabbing death of 11-year-old Marcus Potts. We affirmed Fort’s conviction for
premeditated first-degree murder, but vacated Fort’s conviction for first-degree murder
while committing burglary on the ground that a defendant may only be convicted of one
count of first-degree murder in connection with the murder of a single victim. See State
v. Fort (Fort I), 768 N.W.2d 335, 344 (Minn. 2009). We also affirmed the denial of
Fort’s first petition for postconviction relief. Fort v. State (Fort II), 829 N.W.2d 78, 80
(Minn. 2013). In this, his second postconviction appeal, Fort claims ineffective
assistance of trial and appellate counsel. He also claims that the State mishandled
evidence. Because Fort’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel fails as a
matter of law, and his remaining claims are time barred under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.
4(a)(2) (2014), the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in summarily denying
Fort’s petition. We therefore affirm.
I.
The relevant facts are as follows. Between midnight and 1 a.m. on December 15,
1990, Potts was stabbed 44 times and killed in the lower-duplex unit of his north
2
Minneapolis home.1 Potts’ mother discovered his body when she came home from work
at approximately 2 a.m. When police investigated, officers noticed a set of footprints in
the snow that led from a side door of the Potts’ house, and a police dog picked up a scent
from the prints and followed the prints to a neighboring house where Fort lived. Police
also found blood smeared on the wall by the back door of the Potts’ house. The
Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) tested the sample from the smear in
1991 and, while it was found to contain blood, it was too small for enzyme and DNA
testing. During a search of Fort’s house, police also detected eight drops of blood, but
that sample was also too small to be tested with the available DNA technology. In 2001,
after technology had sufficiently advanced, the BCA tested the drops of blood found at
Fort’s house and determined that the blood matched Potts’ DNA.
At trial, during the jury deliberations, a man called Fort’s trial counsel and said
that P.R., Fort’s cousin, had confessed to Potts’ murder. Based on that call, Fort
requested a new trial and the district court held an evidentiary hearing to consider P.R.’s
alleged confession. The district court ultimately denied Fort’s request for a new trial,
convicted Fort of both counts of first-degree murder, and sentenced him to life in prison
without the possibility of release.
On direct appeal, as discussed above, we affirmed Fort’s conviction of
premeditated first-degree murder, but vacated Fort’s conviction of first-degree murder
1
Because the underlying facts in this case are set forth in detail in Fort I, 768
N.W.2d at 338-41, and Fort II, 829 N.W.2d at 80-81, we limit our discussion of the facts
to those related to this appeal.
3
while committing a burglary. Fort I, 768 N.W.2d at 344. Fort filed a pro se
postconviction petition in 2009, requesting, among other things, DNA testing of the
blood smear found at the Potts’ house and disclosure of all other evidence the State
collected. Fort also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, asserting that his trial
attorney failed to have the smear tested, present alibi witnesses, and interview other
witnesses. In its response, the State explained that none of the limited blood sample
taken from the Potts’ house in 1990 remained to be tested, and indicated that the BCA
had attempted to test it in 2007, but because no sample remained, “there [was] no
possibility of any additional testing.” After subsequently retaining counsel, Fort filed a
motion to dismiss the pro se petition.
Fort renewed his petition for postconviction relief in 2011, requesting an
evidentiary hearing and a new trial to consider evidence he claimed was new and
exculpatory. Fort II, 829 N.W.2d at 80-81. Fort sought relief primarily based on the
issues of: (1) newly discovered eyewitness testimony regarding the whereabouts of P.R.
in the hours before the Potts murder, which Fort claimed buttressed his alternative-
perpetrator theory; and (2) a request for DNA testing of the blood smear found at the
crime scene. Again, the State explained that the sample from the blood smear was either
nonexistent or too small to retest. The postconviction court denied Fort’s petition for
postconviction relief and motion for DNA testing without holding an evidentiary hearing,
noting that, “as a practical and legal matter,” no DNA testing could be conducted on the
smear sample. We affirmed, concluding that the proffered testimony failed to satisfy the
four-prong test for newly discovered evidence from Rainer v. State, 566 N.W.2d 692, 695
4
(Minn. 1997), and that Fort failed to meet the threshold for new forensic testing because
he “made no assertion that new technology ha[d] been developed to render the sample
from the 12-inch smear capable of demonstrating Fort’s ‘actual innocence.’ ” Fort II,
829 N.W.2d at 82-84.
In April 2014, Fort brought the instant pro se petition for postconviction relief,
seeking an evidentiary hearing regarding (1) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel,
(2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and (3) the State’s “mishandling” of the blood-
smear sample that he claimed would have been exculpatory. The State argued that the
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel and loss-of-evidence claims are time barred under
Minn. Stat. § 590.01 (2014), and procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla.
The postconviction court summarily denied Fort’s petition, concluding that Fort’s
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and loss of evidence were Knaffla-barred
because Fort raised them in his direct appeal and first postconviction petition, and that he
failed to demonstrate that appellate counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.
II.
We review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of
discretion. Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012). In doing so, we review
questions of law de novo, but our review of questions of fact is “limited to whether there
is sufficient evidence in the record to support the findings of the postconviction court.”
Sanchez-Diaz v. State, 758 N.W.2d 843, 846 (Minn. 2008) (citing Leake v. State, 737
N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn. 2007)).
5
A.
In this appeal, Fort argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for
withdrawing his first pro se postconviction petition and for not doing enough research on
his case. Fort’s claim fails as a matter of law. The United States and Minnesota
Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant a right to the effective assistance of counsel
in a criminal proceeding. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 6; see also
Ferguson v. State, 826 N.W.2d 808, 816 (Minn. 2013). The United States Supreme
Court has held, however, that the constitutional right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment, which applies to criminal defendants in state proceedings through the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not extend to state postconviction proceedings.
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). Thus, the Supreme Court has held that
a postconviction petitioner “cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of
counsel in [state postconviction] proceedings.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752
(1991); accord Schleicher v. State, 718 N.W.2d 440, 445-46 (Minn. 2006).
We have interpreted the right to counsel under the Minnesota Constitution more
broadly to guarantee a criminal defendant the right to counsel for a first postconviction
petition if the defendant did not pursue a direct appeal. Deegan v. State, 711 N.W.2d 89,
97-98 (Minn. 2006). We have also held, however, “that a defendant who has been
represented by counsel on direct appeal has no right under the Minnesota Constitution to
the assistance of counsel—effective or otherwise—in a subsequent postconviction
proceeding.” Ferguson, 826 N.W.2d at 816; see also Barnes v. State, 768 N.W.2d 359,
364 (Minn. 2009); Schleicher, 718 N.W.2d at 446. Because Fort received the assistance
6
of counsel during his direct appeal, neither the United States Constitution nor the
Minnesota Constitution entitled him to counsel during his first postconviction
proceeding. Consequently, Fort’s ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim fails
as a matter of law. See Ferguson, 826 N.W.2d at 816.
B.
We next consider Fort’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and
mishandling of evidence. A postconviction court need not grant a hearing on a claim if
the files and records of the proceeding conclusively establish that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief. Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2014). Accordingly, a postconviction
court may summarily deny a claim that is time barred. Riley, 819 N.W.2d at 170-71. All
petitions for postconviction relief must be filed within 2 years of the final disposition of
the petitioner’s direct appeal. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)(2).
We affirmed Fort’s conviction for first-degree premeditated murder on July 16,
2009, and denied his request for a rehearing on July 27, 2009. Fort did not seek review
from the United States Supreme Court, and thus, his conviction and sentence became
final for purposes of section 590.01 on October 25, 2009. See U.S. S. Ct. R. 13
(requiring petitions for certiorari to be filed in 90 days). Accordingly, Fort had until
October 25, 2011, to timely file a postconviction petition. Fort did not file the instant
petition until April 2014, more than 2 years after the statutory deadline. Therefore, his
request for postconviction relief is time barred under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a),
unless he can establish that he meets one of the five exceptions provided in subdivision
4(b).
7
Fort has not presented any argument—much less established—that an exception
applies to his petition that would excuse its untimeliness under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, nor
has our careful review of the record identified anything that would suggest any of the
exceptions to the time bar in section 590.01, subdivision 4(b), might apply. Therefore,
his claims are time barred.
III.
Because the record conclusively shows that the claims raised in Fort’s second
postconviction petition fail on the merits or are time barred, the postconviction court did
not err when it summarily denied Fort’s petition.2 We therefore affirm.
Affirmed.
2
Because Fort’s claims are time barred under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a), we
need not consider, as the postconviction court did, whether the claims are procedurally
barred by State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976) (holding
that once a direct appeal has been taken, “all matters raised therein, and all claims known
but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction
relief”).
8