State of Minnesota v. Don Antoine Jones ( 2014 )

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A12-1189
Court of Appeals Wright, J.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs. Filed: July 2, 2014
Office of Appellate Courts
Don Antoine Jones,
Appellant.
________________________
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and
Patrick J. Ciliberto, Scott County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistant County Attorney,
Shakopee, Minnesota, for respondent.
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.
________________________
SYLLABUS
1. Minnesota Statutes § 609.035, subd. 1 (2012), generally limits the number
of sentences a defendant may receive for multiple convictions arising out of a single
course of conduct.
2. Minnesota Statutes § 518B.01, subd. 16 (2012), does not create an
exception to Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1.
1
3. If separate sentences are not precluded by Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1,
the fact that the convictions involve a single course of conduct does not prevent a district
court from imposing permissive consecutive sentences in accordance with Minn. Sent.
Guidelines II.F.2.b (2010).
Reversed and remanded.
OPINION
WRIGHT, Justice.
In this case, we consider whether the statutory prohibition against multiple
punishments in Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1 (2012), bars the imposition of separate
sentences for multiple current felony convictions involving one victim and a single
course of conduct when the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines list the offenses as eligible
for permissive consecutive sentences.1 Appellant Don Antoine Jones was charged in
Scott County with stalking, a violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subds. 2(4), 4(b) (2012),
and violating an order for protection, a violation of Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 14(d)(1)
(2012). A jury returned two guilty verdicts, and Jones was convicted of both offenses.
The district court imposed a sentence for each offense and ordered the two sentences to
be served consecutively. The court of appeals affirmed the sentences, and we granted
Jones’s petition for review. Because we conclude that the district court and the court of
1
In the past, we have used the phrases “single course of conduct” and “single
behavioral incident” interchangeably. See, e.g., State v. Eaton, 292 N.W.2d 260, 267
(Minn. 1980) (citation omitted). Our use of the phrase “single course of conduct” in this
opinion has the same meaning as the phrase “single behavioral incident.”
2
appeals erred by conflating two distinct issues—whether separate sentences may be
imposed and how separate sentences should be served—we reverse and remand to the
district court with instructions to vacate the sentence imposed for violating an order for
protection.
I.
Jones and S.J. met in 2003, had two children together, and married in 2009. S.J.
decided to end their marriage in 2010. Thereafter, Jones caused S.J. to fear for her safety
and the safety of their children. On October 11, 2010, S.J. sought and was granted an ex
parte order for protection in accordance with Minn. Stat. § 518B.01 (2012). Two days
later, Jones was served with that order.
On October 16, 2010, S.J. received 33 text messages from Jones between the
hours of 10:00 p.m. and 12:30 a.m., while she was working at the Trail of Terror, a
seasonal Halloween attraction in Shakopee. The messages indicated that Jones was in the
vicinity and able to see S.J. For example, one message stated, “I see you; do you see
me?” Another read, “I see Bob [a co-worker of S.J.]; tell him to get back to work.” S.J.
feared for her safety and contacted law enforcement. A Scott County deputy responded
and searched the Trail of Terror unsuccessfully for Jones. At trial, the deputy testified
that S.J. was “visibly shaken” after receiving Jones’s messages.
Jones was charged in Scott County with stalking, Minn. Stat. § 609.749,
subds. 2(4), 4(b), and violating an order for protection, Minn. Stat. § 518B.01,
subd. 14(d)(1). Following a jury trial, Jones was convicted of both offenses. The State
sought consecutive sentences that would run consecutively to a 57-month sentence Jones
3
was already serving for felony stalking in Ramsey County. In doing so, the State relied
on the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, which permit consecutive sentences when a
district court imposes separate sentences for multiple current felony convictions that are
listed in section VI of the sentencing guidelines.2 The district court imposed sentences of
18 months imprisonment for stalking and one year and one day for violating the order for
protection. The district court further ordered those sentences to be served consecutively
following the 57-month sentence that Jones was already serving. The district court
specifically observed that each offense of conviction was on the list of offenses eligible
for permissive consecutive sentences. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines VI (2010).
Jones appealed, challenging, among other things, the imposition of two
consecutive sentences for the Scott County offenses. The court of appeals affirmed.
State v. Jones, No. A12-1189, 2013 WL 2924263, at *5 (Minn. App. June 17, 2013). In
its opinion, the court of appeals acknowledged that Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1,
provides that if a person commits more than one offense during a single course of
conduct, the person may be punished for only one of the offenses, subject to certain
exceptions. Jones, 2013 WL 2924263, at *4. But the court of appeals concluded that it is
irrelevant whether the offenses committed by Jones involved a single course of conduct
because the offenses are on the sentencing guidelines list of offenses eligible for
permissive consecutive sentences. Id. at *5 (citing Minn. Sent. Guidelines VI, cmt.
II.F.203 (2010)).
2
We refer to the 2010 version of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines throughout
this opinion because that version was in effect at the time of Jones’s offenses.
4
We granted Jones’s petition for further review.
II.
We first consider whether the district court erred by imposing two sentences for
Jones’s conduct. Jones argues that, under Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1, the district
court was required to impose a sentence on only one of his convictions because the
convictions of stalking and violating an order for protection involved a single course of
conduct.
Section 609.035, subdivision 1, provides that, “if a person’s conduct constitutes
more than one offense under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only
one of the offenses,” subject to certain exceptions. Therefore, deciding whether the
district court’s imposition of two sentences was barred by section 609.035, subdivision 1,
requires us to determine first whether the conduct underlying the offenses involved a
single course of conduct. See State v. Johnson, 273 Minn. 394, 399, 141 N.W.2d 517,
521-22 (1966). If so, we then consider whether an exception to section 609.035,
subdivision 1, applies.
A.
Whether a defendant’s offenses occurred as part of a single course of conduct is a
mixed question of law and fact. State v. Kendell, 723 N.W.2d 597, 607 (Minn. 2006).
We review the district court’s findings of historical fact under the clearly erroneous
standard, but we review the district court’s application of the law to those facts de novo.
See State v. Sterling, 834 N.W.2d 162, 167-68 (Minn. 2013). Whether a defendant’s
multiple offenses occurred during a single course of conduct depends on the facts and
5
circumstances of the case. State v. Hawkins, 511 N.W.2d 9, 13 (Minn. 1994). Offenses
are part of a single course of conduct if the offenses occurred at substantially the same
time and place and were motivated by a single criminal objective. Johnson, 273 Minn. at
405, 141 N.W.2d at 525.
Based on the undisputed facts presented here, Jones’s offenses occurred at
substantially the same time and place and were motivated by a single criminal objective.
The 33 text messages that Jones sent to S.J. between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and
12:30 a.m. comprise the conduct underlying Jones’s offenses of both stalking and
violating an order for protection. S.J. received all of the messages while she was working
at the Trail of Terror. Although the precise time that each message was sent is not in the
record, a series of 33 messages over two and one-half hours amounts to a rate of
approximately one message every four minutes.
Jones’s conduct also reflects a singular intent to intimidate and harass S.J. In
deciding whether crimes were committed with a single criminal objective, we examine
the relationship of the crimes to each other. State v. Bauer, 792 N.W.2d 825, 829
(Minn. 2011). Broad statements of criminal purpose do not unify separate acts into a
single course of conduct. See, e.g., Bauer, 792 N.W.2d at 830 (sharing drugs with friends
for no profit was not a single criminal objective); State v. Gould, 562 N.W.2d 518, 521
(Minn. 1997) (making as much money as possible was not a single criminal objective);
State v. Gilbert, 262 N.W.2d 334, 338 (Minn. 1977) (“general hatred of women” was too
broad to constitute a single criminal objective). But acts “motivated by a continuous
intent to harass” a particular person over the course of a few hours evince a single
6
criminal purpose. State v. Mullen, 577 N.W.2d 505, 511 (Minn. 1998). Here, it was
Jones’s objective to harass S.J. when he sent her 33 text messages during a period of two
and one-half hours. This objective is sufficiently specific to constitute a single criminal
objective.
The State seeks to establish that, because the messages were sent over a period of
two and one-half hours and because the Trail of Terror spans a large area, the offenses
did not occur at the same time and place. But the cases cited by the State include
circumstances that are distinguishable from those presented here. For example, in State
v. Shevchuk, we concluded that the crimes of assault, robbery, and unauthorized use of a
motor vehicle, which were committed over a period of about two and one-half hours,
were not part of a single course of conduct under section 609.035. 282 Minn. 182,
184-86, 163 N.W.2d 772, 774-76 (1968). But in Shevchuk, we considered more than the
length of time during which the offenses were committed. Id. at 187-88, 163 N.W.2d at
776. We also considered that the victim’s car was driven to several locations, that the
crimes occurred at “clearly separate times,” and that there was no “single criminal
objective” among the offenses. Id. at 186-88, 163 N.W.2d at 775-76. Unlike the
defendant in Shevchuk, Jones did not subject S.J. to multiple distinct crimes during the
two-and-a-half-hour period. Rather, he sent a series of text messages to S.J. at a rate
averaging one message every four minutes. See Mullen, 577 N.W.2d at 511 (stating that
harassing telephone calls and breaking a window within a few hours shared unity of time
and place). Similarly, the facts regarding the locations of the offenses in State v.
Bookwalter, 541 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. 1995), are distinguishable from those presented
7
here. In Bookwalter, the defendant sexually assaulted his victim in one location before
driving her “approximately a mile and a half to two miles” to a different location where
he attempted to murder her. Id. at 292. By contrast, Jones committed both offenses at
S.J.’s workplace. That her workplace—the Trail of Terror—spans a large area does not
support a determination that Jones committed the offenses in different locations.
Because the State did not prove that the series of text messages is divisible either
by time and place or by criminal objective, we conclude that the conduct underlying
Jones’s convictions for stalking and violating an order for protection involved a single
course of conduct for purposes of section 609.035, subdivision 1.
B.
The imposition of two separate sentences for convictions involving a single course
of conduct is prohibited by section 609.035, subdivision 1, unless an exception applies.
Such exceptions are found in several statutes and in our case law. Section 609.035,
subdivision 1, includes exceptions for several offenses. Other statutory exceptions are
not listed in section 609.035.3 But each of these other statutory exceptions specifically
3
For example, section 609.035 includes exceptions for kidnapping, solicitation of
juveniles, and fleeing a peace officer, Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subds. 1, 5, but other
exceptions exist for methamphetamine-related crimes involving children and vulnerable
adults, Minn. Stat. § 152.137, subd. 4 (2012); aggravated witness tampering, Minn. Stat.
§ 609.498, subd. 4 (2012); and the failure to render aid to one’s shooting victim, Minn.
Stat. § 609.662, subd. 2(c) (2012).
8
refers to section 609.035.4 A judicially created exception to section 609.035, subdivision
1, exists for offenses involving multiple victims. State v. Ferguson, 808 N.W.2d 586,
589-90 (Minn. 2012).
The State argues that the Domestic Abuse Act, Minn. Stat. § 518B.01 (2012),
provides an additional exception to section 609.035, subdivision 1. Under the Domestic
Abuse Act, a victim of domestic abuse may file a petition for an order for protection in
the district court that has jurisdiction. Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subds. 3-4. Moreover, “[a]
person who violates an order for protection . . . is subject to [certain criminal] penalties.”
Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 14(a). The State asserts that section 518B.01, subdivision
16, permits a district court to impose separate sentences for a violation of an order for
protection and any other criminal act committed as part of a single course of conduct.
But section 518B.01, subdivision 16, does not include the language, “notwithstanding
section 609.035,” that is present in other statutory exceptions. Rather, section 518B.01,
subdivision 16, provides that “[a]ny proceeding under this section shall be in addition to
other civil or criminal remedies.” The State argues that the plain language of section
518B.01, subdivision 16, “clarifies that a conviction and sentence for violating the
4
See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 152.137, subd. 4 (“Notwithstanding sections 609.035 and
609.04, a prosecution for or conviction under this section is not a bar to conviction of or
punishment for any other crime committed by the defendant as part of the same
conduct.”); Minn. Stat. § 609.498, subd. 4 (“Notwithstanding section 609.035 or 609.04,
a prosecution for or conviction of the crime of aggravated first-degree witness tampering
is not a bar to conviction of or punishment for any other crime.”); Minn. Stat. § 609.662,
subd. 2(c) (“Notwithstanding section 609.035 or 609.04, a prosecution for or conviction
under this subdivision is not a bar to conviction of or punishment for any other crime
committed by the defendant as part of the same conduct.”).
9
Domestic Abuse Act is ‘in addition to other . . . criminal remedies.’ ” Implicit in this
argument is an assumption that the language of section 518B.01, subdivision 16—“[a]ny
proceeding under this section”—includes a criminal prosecution for violating an order for
protection.
Whether section 518B.01, subdivision 16, creates an additional exception to the
prohibition in section 609.035 against imposing multiple punishments for a single course
of conduct presents an issue of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation is a
question of law, which we review de novo. Ruiz v. 1st Fid. Loan Servicing, LLC, 829
N.W.2d 53, 56 (Minn. 2013). The goal of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the
intent of the Legislature. Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Minn. 2010);
accord Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2012). We construe the statute as a whole and give effect to
all of its provisions. State v. Watkins, 840 N.W.2d 21, 29 (Minn. 2013). The first step in
statutory interpretation is to determine whether the statute is ambiguous on its face.
Larson v. State, 790 N.W.2d 700, 703 (Minn. 2010). “A statute is ambiguous only when
the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” State v.
Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn. 2012). When the Legislature’s intent is discernible
from plain and unambiguous language, statutory construction is neither necessary nor
permitted; and courts apply the statute’s plain meaning. Am. Tower, L.P. v. City of
Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn. 2001). We construe words and phrases according to
their plain and ordinary meanings. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 307; State v. Peck, 773 N.W.2d
768, 772 (Minn. 2009).
Our analysis begins with the language of section 518B.01, subdivision 16, which
10
provides, “[a]ny proceeding under this section shall be in addition to other civil or
criminal remedies.” (Emphasis added.) According to its ordinary meaning, a
“proceeding” is a “procedural means for seeking redress from a tribunal or agency.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 1398 (10th ed. 2014); see also State v. Hohenwald, 815 N.W.2d
823, 830 (Minn. 2012) (“The word ‘proceedings’ generally refers to ‘the course of
procedure in a judicial action or in a suit in litigation’ . . . .” (quoting Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 1807 (2002))). By
contrast, the ordinary meaning of “remedy” is a “means of enforcing a right or preventing
or redressing a wrong.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1485 (10th ed. 2014).
Applying the plain meaning of “proceeding,” we conclude that the phrase “[a]ny
proceeding under this section” does not refer to a criminal prosecution for an alleged
violation of Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 14. Section 518B.01, subdivision 14, creates a
criminal offense. That is a substantive means of redressing a violation of an order for
protection, not a procedural means of seeking redress of that offense from a tribunal or
agency. The procedural means for seeking redress for a criminal offense, including a
violation of an order for protection, is set forth in the Minnesota Rules of Criminal
Procedure and several statutes, including Minn. Stat. § 484.87 (2012) (prescribing the
pleading, practice, and procedure in criminal proceedings); Minn. Stat. §§ 628.01-.26
(2012) (prescribing the procedural requirements for a criminal indictment); Minn. Stat.
§§ 630.12-.37 (2012) (prescribing pretrial procedures in a criminal case); and Minn.
Stat. §§ 631.02-.21 (2012) (prescribing trial procedures in a criminal case). Section
518B.01 does not provide the procedural means to criminally prosecute a violation of an
11
order for protection. Rather, section 518B.01, subdivision 4, provides a procedural
means to seek an order for protection. By its terms, section 518B.01, subdivision 4,
creates “an action known as a petition for an order for protection” and then sets forth the
procedure that a private party may use to obtain an order for protection from a district
court that has jurisdiction. Accordingly, the phrase “[a]ny proceeding under this section”
as used in section 518B.01, subdivision 16, does not refer to a criminal prosecution for
violating an order for protection. Rather, that phrase refers to an action to obtain an order
for protection from a court that has jurisdiction. Because the phrase “[a]ny proceeding
under this section” does not refer to a criminal prosecution for violating an order for
protection, we reject the State’s contention that a criminal conviction and sentence for
violation of an order for protection are “in addition to other . . . criminal remedies” within
the meaning of section 518B.01, subdivision 16.
In sum, the plain language of section 518B.01, subdivision 16, provides that an
action seeking an order for protection shall be in addition to other civil or criminal
remedies. It does not provide that a criminal prosecution for violating an order for
protection shall be in addition to other civil or criminal remedies. For these reasons,
section 518B.01, subdivision 16, does not create an additional exception to the
prohibition against imposing multiple punishments for a single course of conduct found
in section 609.035, subdivision 1. Because such an exception does not apply to Jones,
section 609.035, subdivision 1, bars the imposition of two separate sentences in his case.
III.
We next consider whether the imposition of two separate sentences for Jones’s
12
conduct was within the district court’s discretion under the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines. Because we conclude that section 609.035, subdivision 1, precludes the
imposition of multiple sentences for Jones’s conduct, we reject the State’s argument that
the imposition of separate consecutive sentences was within the discretion of the district
court under the sentencing guidelines.
Section II.F.2.b of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines provides that “[m]ultiple
current felony convictions for crimes on the list of offenses eligible for permissive
consecutive sentences found in Section VI may be sentenced consecutively to each
other.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.F.2.b (2010). The parties do not dispute that both
offenses of which Jones was convicted—violating an order for protection under Minn.
Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 14(d), and stalking under Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 4—appear
on the list of offenses eligible for permissive consecutive sentences. Minn. Sent.
Guidelines VI (2010). Moreover, comment II.F.203 of the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines provides that consecutive sentencing is permissive under section II.F.2.b
“even when the offenses involve a single victim involving a single course of conduct.”
Minn. Sent. Guidelines cmt. II.F.203.
The State argues, and the court of appeals agreed, that the imposition of
consecutive sentences by the district court was proper because consecutive sentences for
stalking and violating an order for protection are expressly permitted under section
II.F.2.b of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. Citing comment II.F.203, the court of
appeals concluded that it is irrelevant whether the offenses committed by Jones involved
a single course of conduct for purposes of Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1, because the
13
offenses were on the sentencing guidelines list of offenses eligible for permissive
consecutive sentences. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the court of appeals
erred in its interpretation of section II.F.2.b and comment II.F.203 of the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines.
The interpretation of the sentencing guidelines presents a question of law, which
we review de novo. State v. Williams, 771 N.W.2d 514, 520 (Minn. 2009). We apply the
rules of statutory construction to our interpretation of the sentencing guidelines. State v.
Campbell, 814 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2012). When there is an apparent conflict between
two provisions, we first attempt to construe the provisions to give effect to both. Minn.
Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1 (2012). We follow the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines unless
the applicable provision is contrary to statute. If it is impossible to harmonize the
sentencing guidelines with an applicable statute, the statutory provision will control.
Comments to the sentencing guidelines, however, are advisory and are not binding on the
courts. Asfaha v. State, 665 N.W.2d 523, 526 (Minn. 2003).
When a defendant is convicted of multiple offenses, two issues that are germane to
sentencing arise: (1) the number of sentences to be imposed, and (2) if multiple
sentences are imposed, whether the sentences will be served concurrently or
consecutively.5 Minnesota Statutes section 609.035, subdivision 1, governs the number
of sentences a district court may impose for multiple convictions arising from a single
5
“A consecutive sentence is one which does not begin to run until the expiration of
the term of the prior sentence.” State v. Petersen, 305 Minn. 478, 480-81, 235 N.W.2d
801, 803 (1975). By contrast, concurrent sentences “are served simultaneously.” Id. at
481, 235 N.W.2d at 803.
14
course of conduct. By contrast, section II.F of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
focuses squarely on the second issue—how multiple separate sentences are to be served.
Section II.F creates several presumptions regarding consecutive and concurrent
sentences. Section II.F provides that “[g]enerally, when an offender is convicted of
multiple current offenses . . . concurrent sentencing is presumptive.” Minn. Sent.
Guidelines II.F (2010). Section II.F.2 provides several exceptions to the general
presumption in favor of concurrent sentencing. Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.F.2. Among
these exceptions is the provision at issue here, Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.F.2.b, which
permits the district court to impose consecutive sentences without departure for offenses
listed in section VI.
Because Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1, addresses the number of sentences that
may be imposed for multiple current felony convictions and Minn. Sent. Guidelines
II.F.2.b addresses whether multiple sentences will be served concurrently or
consecutively, the two provisions operate in tandem and do not conflict. The correct
analysis at sentencing, therefore, requires the district court first to determine whether
multiple sentences are permitted under section 609.035, subdivision 1. If multiple
sentences are permitted—because the convictions did not arise from a single course of
conduct or the case implicates an exception to section 609.035, subdivision 1—then
Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.F governs the district court’s decision regarding whether the
sentences will be served concurrently or consecutively. If, however, the convictions
involve a single course of conduct and no exception to section 609.035, subdivision 1,
applies, then the district court must impose a single sentence for the more serious
15
offense.6
This interpretation is consistent with Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines comment
II.F.203. Comment II.F.203 states that “[c]onsecutive sentencing is permissive [under
section II.F.b] even when the offenses involve a single victim involving a single course of
conduct.” We construe this nonbinding language as anticipating and rejecting the
argument that, even when multiple sentences are permitted under an exception to Minn.
Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1, and consecutive sentences are permitted under Minn. Sent.
Guidelines II.F.2, consecutive sentences should not be imposed when the offenses
involve a single course of conduct.7
In sum, the court of appeals erred when it concluded that, because the offenses
were on the sentencing guidelines list of offenses eligible for permissive consecutive
sentences, it is irrelevant whether multiple sentences were authorized under Minn. Stat.
6
Section 609.035, subdivision 1, contemplates that a defendant should be sentenced
only for the most serious offense arising from a single course of conduct because
“imposing up to the maximum punishment for the most serious offense will include
punishment for all offenses.” State v. Kebaso, 713 N.W.2d 317, 322 (Minn. 2006)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
7
Such an argument might arise, for example, when a defendant commits criminal
sexual conduct with force and another crime against a single victim during a single
course of conduct. Although the exception in Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 6 (2012),
would allow separate sentences for each offense, the defendant might argue that the
sentences should be imposed concurrently based on an assertion that consecutive
sentences would result in an unduly severe punishment for offenses committed during a
single course of conduct. Comment II.F.203 rejects that logic and indicates that
consecutive sentences would be permitted under such circumstances. Moreover, Minn.
Stat. § 609.035, subd. 6, states that “[i]f an offender is punished for more than one crime
as authorized by this subdivision and the court imposes consecutive sentences for the
crimes, the consecutive sentences are not a departure from the Sentencing Guidelines.”
16
§ 609.035, subd. 1. Because section 609.035, subdivision 1, bars the imposition of two
sentences in this case, we reverse the sentence imposed for violating an order for
protection and remand to the district court with instructions to vacate that sentence.
IV.
Jones argues for the first time in his brief to this court that the district court erred
by convicting him of multiple offenses arising from the same conduct. We generally will
not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Ferguson v. State, 645
N.W.2d 437, 448 (Minn. 2002). Jones had the opportunity to challenge the entry of
multiple convictions at both the district court and the court of appeals. But he did not do
so. Accordingly, we decline to address this issue on appeal.
Reversed and remanded.
17