State of Minnesota v. Antionee Jarmaine Mixon ( 2014 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-0126
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Antionee Jarmaine Mixon,
Appellant.
Filed December 15, 2014
Affirmed
Ross, Judge
Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-12-9530
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, James B. Early, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and
Janelle Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Chutich, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Ross,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ROSS, Judge
Antionee Mixon exposed his genitals to a 15-year-old girl who was babysitting his
friend’s children, then he held her down while vaginally penetrating her. Now Mixon
challenges his conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, arguing that the trial
evidence was insufficient to prove that the victim suffered “personal injury.” He also
challenges his sentence, arguing that the district court was obligated to sentence him at
the low end of the guidelines range. Because the victim’s injuries meet the statutory
definition of “personal injury” and because the district court did not abuse its discretion
by imposing the presumptive sentence, we affirm.
FACTS
In April 2012, 15-year-old E.F. was staying overnight at A.G.’s home to help care
for A.G.’s children. A.G. left to get food but Antionee Mixon, A.G.’s friend, stayed
behind in the home. Mixon and E.F. were alone after the children went upstairs to sleep.
Mixon then went into the bathroom, and he exited with his penis exposed. He
approached E.F. and tried to pull her shorts off. E.F. pushed back and tried to run. She
screamed. Her scream woke the children, but Mixon covered her mouth with his hand.
Then he overpowered her, held her arms down, and inserted his penis into her vagina
multiple times. Mixon ejaculated on E.F.’s leg and told her, next time she would not be
so “lucky.”
E.F. ran into the bathroom and sat in the tub. She felt vaginal pain and saw blood.
She left the bathroom and went upstairs. The next morning she went home and told her
mother what happened. Her mother took her to the hospital. At the hospital E.F. told St.
Cloud police officer Don Salazar that she was raped the previous night. Officer Salazar
noticed arm bruising that he found consistent with E.F.’s description of being held down.
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Nurse Amanda Kleinvachter examined E.F. and also saw the bruises on E.F.’s arms.
Physician’s assistant Renee Funk also observed that E.G.’s vaginal area was red.
The state charged Mixon with first-degree and third-degree criminal sexual
conduct under Minnesota Statutes section 609.342, subdivision 1(e)(i) and section
609.344, subdivision 1(b) (2012). Mixon waived his right to a jury trial, and the district
court found him guilty on both counts after a bench trial. The district court sentenced
Mixon to 360 months in prison on the first-degree conviction. Mixon appeals both the
conviction and sentence.
DECISION
Neither Mixon’s challenge to his conviction nor his challenge to his sentence has
any merit.
Mixon first argues that the state did not present sufficient evidence to support the
conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Mixon bears a “heavy burden” to
convince us to overturn the fact-finder’s guilty verdict. See State v. Vick, 632 N.W.2d
676, 690 (Minn. 2001). We review claims of insufficient evidence in the light most
favorable to the conviction and will affirm the conviction if the evidence supports the
verdict. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). Mixon’s arguments do not
come close to overcoming this standard of review.
To sustain the first-degree conviction, we would generally look for record
evidence supporting all three elements: that Mixon sexually penetrated E.F., that he used
force or coercion to accomplish the penetration, and that he caused E.F. personal injury.
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See Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(e)(i). But Mixon challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence only on the third element, personal injury. We address only that element.
Viewing the record favorably to the conviction, we have no difficulty holding that
sufficient evidence supports the finding that Mixon injured E.F. Personal injury includes
“bodily harm as defined in section 609.02, subdivision 7.” Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 8
(2012). Bodily harm means “physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of
physical condition.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7 (2012). The trial testimony readily
proved the element. E.F. testified that she suffered pain when Mixon forcefully held her
down by her arms, and multiple witnesses corroborated the resulting bruising. E.F.
testified to vaginal pain and vaginal bleeding, and the medical witnesses saw vaginal
redness the next morning. Testimony establishing that a victim felt pain and had bruises
is sufficient to prove “personal injury.” State v. Mattson, 376 N.W.2d 413, 415 (Minn.
1985); see also State v. Reynolds, 386 N.W.2d 828, 830 (Minn. App. 1986) (holding that
photographic evidence of a bruise established proof of a “personal injury”). Mixon
ignores this caselaw and contends that E.F.’s injuries fall short of the “typical” injuries in
first-degree criminal sexual conduct cases. The contention is groundless.
Mixon also maintains that the state did not prove that he caused the bruises. But
we defer to the fact-finder’s weighing of the evidence and its assessment of witness
credibility. State v. Foreman, 680 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn. 2004). In doing so, we
necessarily presume that the fact-finder believed the prosecution witnesses and
disbelieved any contrary evidence. State v. Atkins, 543 N.W.2d 642, 646 (Minn. 1996).
E.F. told police and medical personnel that Mixon forcefully held her by the arms and the
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district court found that the bruising supported the claim, meaning that it found that the
bruising was caused by Mixon’s force. We will not second-guess that fact-finding. And
even if we did, Mixon’s argument overlooks the other evidence of personal injury beyond
the bruising.
Mixon relatedly argues that the state improperly relied on the same single piece of
evidence to establish two elements of first-degree criminal sexual conduct: personal
injury and force or coercion. Because third-degree criminal sexual conduct requires only
force or coercion but not personal injury, Mixon argues that personal injury must be
proved by facts distinct from force. The argument is both factually erroneous and legally
inconsequential. The state presented evidence of force or coercion apart from personal
injury when E.F. testified that Mixon covered her mouth to prevent her from screaming
for help; E.F. never testified that she suffered injury to her face. And the state presented
more than one piece of evidence showing personal injury, so different evidence indeed
shows injury (vaginal pain) and force or coercion (bruising). But the argument’s factual
deficiency is only half the problem, because the state may prove personal injury and other
elements for first-degree criminal sexual conduct using the same facts. See State v. Jarvis,
649 N.W.2d 186, 193 (Minn. App. 2002) (seeing “no support in the law” for claim that
state cannot use same series of acts to prove more than one element of a crime). Factually
and legally, Mixon’s argument fails.
Because E.F.’s injuries constitute “personal injury” and Mixon’s collateral
arguments are unpersuasive, we hold that sufficient evidence supports the conviction.
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Mixon argues next that the district court abused its discretion by sentencing him to
the presumptive term of 360 months in prison. Appellate courts generally do not review
the district court’s decision to impose a sentence within the presumptive guidelines range.
State v. Williams, 337 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn. 1983); see also Minn. Sent. Guidelines
2.D.1 (2013) (“The sentence ranges provided in the [Sentencing Guideline] Grids are
presumed to be appropriate.”). And Mixon points to no “compelling circumstances”
necessary to demonstrate that he is entitled to a lighter sentence. See State v. Delk, 781
N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).
Mixon maintains that his crime was “less egregious” than a typical first-degree
criminal sexual conduct offense. We are not persuaded by the generalized argument;
Mixon offers no legal support for his claim that less egregious facts compel reversing a
presumptive sentence. We are aware of none. He also argues that he has a history of
untreated, self-diagnosed mental illness that makes his case atypical and requires a lesser
sentence. The district court carefully considered Mixon’s claims of mental illness and
concluded that they did not justify deviating from the presumptive sentence. Mixon fails
to cite any authority suggesting that a medically uncorroborated, self-diagnosed mental
illness requires any consideration at sentencing, let alone establishes a ground to compel
a shorter sentence. We will not disturb the sentence.
Affirmed.
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