State of Minnesota v. Jennifer Lynn Humphrey ( 2014 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-0295
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Jennifer Lynn Humphrey,
Appellant.
Filed December 22, 2014
Affirmed
Stauber, Judge
McLeod County District Court
File No. 43-CR-13-976
Lori Swanson, Minnesota Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael K. Junge, McLeod County Attorney, Glencoe, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
State Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Chutich, Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
STAUBER, Judge
On appeal from her conviction for fourth-degree assault on a peace officer,
appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the officer was executing
a duty imposed by law. Appellant also asserts that the district court erred by permitting a
state’s witness to express an expert opinion that embraced a legal conclusion and by
failing to explain in its jury instructions the meaning of one of the elements of the
charged offense. We affirm.
FACTS
In June 2013, Hutchinson police officer Alicia Nortrom was sent to conduct a
welfare check on appellant Jennifer Lynn Humphrey, after Humphrey “threatened to end
her life by taking all the pills she had in her possession” in the course of a telephone
conversation. Nortrom spoke with Humphrey’s son, M.E., who told Nortrom that his
mother had a past history of attempting suicide by overdosing on prescription medication
and that lately she “just hasn’t been acting herself.”
Although Nortrom assured Humphrey that she was not in trouble and that Nortrom
was only investigating “concerning” statements, Humphrey became “agitated” and
“started yelling and screaming profanities.” After a second officer, Steve Sickman,
arrived, M.E. told the officers that “maybe she does need to be checked out by a medical
professional.” The officers decided to take her to the hospital for an emergency mental-
health hold. Humphrey physically resisted going with the officers. She was restrained,
handcuffed, placed in a squad car, taken to the Hutchinson hospital and admitted. At the
emergency room, Nortrom filled out an emergency-hold form that did not contain current
statutory language.
Humphrey continued to be agitated and combative in the emergency room, and the
officers decided to leave because their presence appeared to upset her. About one hour
after Nortrom left the emergency room, medical personnel contacted the Hutchinson
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Police Department to say that Humphrey had left against medical advice and asked the
police to find her and bring her back to the emergency room. Nortrom found Humphrey
a short distance away from the hospital. Nortrom ordered Humphrey to stop. Humphrey
kept walking away but then turned and walked up close to Nortrom. Nortrom tried to
push Humphrey away and turn her so that she could handcuff her, and as Nortrom pushed
on Humphrey’s left shoulder, Humphrey bit Nortrom’s right arm just inside the elbow.
Other officers arrived and were able to handcuff Humphrey and transport her to the
hospital. Because the bite had broken the skin, Nortrom was given a tetanus shot and
antibiotics.
Humphrey was charged with fourth-degree assault on a peace officer. At
Humphrey’s jury trial, Nortrom testified that a police officer may bring a person to the
hospital on an emergency hold if “we believe [the person] could be a danger to
themselves or others.” Nortrom testified that she was told that Humphrey was suicidal
and threatening to take pills, M.E. had told her that Humphrey “hasn’t been herself” and
had made a prior suicide attempt. Nortrom further testified that she believed Humphrey
was a danger to herself and that suicidal people “may not, . . . necessarily, [have] mental
health issues.”
Sickman’s testimony was consistent with Nortrom’s. When asked if he believed
that Humphrey was mentally ill or developmentally disabled, he replied that he did not
know, but that he believed “there was some psychiatric issues going on with her that day,
that she needed to see a professional.” Given a choice, he opined that she was mentally
ill based on her suicidal comments and the fact that “she is not thinking properly.”
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The officers’ supervisor, Sergeant Adam Ament, confirmed Nortrom’s recounting
of the events. When Sergeant Ament was asked when a person could be placed on an
emergency mental-health hold, he replied that the person must be a potential “harm to
themselves or others.” He explained that “[t]here’s a lot of mentally ill people out there
that aren’t signed in on holds because they’re properly medicated.” He also testified that
in his expert opinion, Nortrom was executing an official duty when she apprehended
Humphrey.
Humphrey testified that she had merely made a sarcastic comment about the pills
and that she had an anxiety attack. She thought that the doctor made it clear that she did
not belong in the hospital and decided to leave even though a nurse cautioned her not to
leave. Humphrey testified that Officer Nortrom “got physical” with no warning, and she
bit Nortrom on the hand because Nortrom was trying to break her jaw. She was held only
overnight at the hospital because her psychiatrist did not feel she needed hospitalization.
Humphrey admitted that she had suffered from mental illness since 2007, including
anxiety attacks. The jury convicted Humphrey of fourth-degree assault. This appeal
followed.
DECISION
We review a claim of insufficient evidence by conducting “a painstaking analysis
of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable
to the conviction, is sufficient to allow the jurors to reach a verdict of guilty.” State v.
Porte, 832 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted). This court “will not
disturb the verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence
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and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that
the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Humphrey was convicted of felony fourth-degree assault; this offense occurs when
a person “assaults a peace officer . . . when that officer is effecting a lawful arrest or
executing any other duty imposed by law . . . [and] the assault inflicts demonstrable
bodily harm [on the peace officer]. Minn. Stat. § 609.2231, subd. 1 (2012). Humphrey
argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that the assault occurred while Nortrom
was executing a duty imposed by law.
Under Minnesota’s emergency-hold law, a peace officer
may take a person into custody and transport the person to a
licensed physician or treatment facility if the officer has
reason to believe, either through direct observation of the
person’s behavior, or upon reliable information of the
person’s recent behavior and knowledge of the person’s past
behavior or psychiatric treatment, that the person is mentally
ill or developmentally disabled and in danger of injuring self
or others if not immediately detained.
Minn. Stat. § 253B.05, subd. 2(a) (2012). Therefore, in order for a peace officer to take a
person into custody on an emergency hold, the officer must believe that the person is both
a danger to herself and mentally ill or developmentally disabled. Humphrey argues that
because Nortrom did not testify that she believed Humphrey to be mentally ill, Nortrom
was not executing a duty imposed by law and, therefore, the emergency hold was not
lawful. Accordingly, Humphrey asserts that Nortrom’s apprehension of her after she left
the hospital was not a duty imposed by law.
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A “person who is mentally ill” is defined as “any person who has an organic
disorder of the brain or a substantial psychiatric disorder of thought, mood, perception,
orientation, or memory which grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize
reality, or to reason or understand.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 13 (2012). This can be
demonstrated by “grossly disturbed behavior or faulty perceptions” that include “a recent
attempt or threat to physically harm self or others.” Id., subd. 3. Although Nortrom, a
lay person not learned in psychology or psychiatry, did not describe Humphrey as
“mentally ill,” she described agitated or irrational behavior, an apparent threat to commit
suicide, and information from M.E. that his mother had previously attempted suicide.
The statute does not require that Nortrom be certain that Humphrey is mentally ill or that
she will commit suicide; rather, Nortrom was required to have “reason to believe,” based
either on observation or reliable information about current or past behavior, that
Humphrey was mentally ill and a danger to herself. The testimony here is sufficient to
support Nortrom’s initial decision to take Humphrey into custody and to request that the
hospital hold her for observation. If this initial act was proper, Nortrom was executing a
duty imposed by law when she took Humphrey into custody a second time at the request
of the hospital that was holding Humphrey. It was during this second seizure that
Humphrey bit Nortrom.
Despite Nortrom’s failure to mirror the language of the statute, the evidence is
sufficient, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, to sustain Humphrey’s
conviction.
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II.
Humphrey argues that the district court abused its discretion by permitting
Sergeant Ament to express an expert opinion that Nortrom was executing a duty imposed
by law when she took Humphrey into custody. Humphrey did not object at trial to this
testimony, and, therefore, this court’s review is under the plain-error standard. See State
v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998) (holding that in the case of unobjected-to
error, a defendant must demonstrate that the court’s ruling was plain error that affects his
substantial rights and that the error must be addressed to ensure the fairness and integrity
of the proceedings). Humphrey has the burden of showing that there was plain error that
affected her substantial rights. State v. Sontoya, 788 N.W.2d 868, 872 (Minn. 2010).
We review the district court’s admission of expert testimony for an abuse of
discretion. Id. The district court must decide “whether the expert is qualified to express
[an] opinion, and whether the opinion is helpful because it will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Id. (quotation omitted).
“Opinion testimony is not objectionable merely because it embraces an ultimate issue to
be decided by the jury.” Id. “If the jury is in as good a position to reach a decision as the
expert, expert testimony would be of little assistance to the jury and should not be
admitted.” State v. Obeta, 796 N.W.2d 282, 289 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).
Ament testified that he was in charge of the field-training program for the
Hutchinson Police Department. In response to the question, “[W]ere [Nortrom and
Sickman] acting in the discharge of their official duties as [peace officers] with the City
of Hutchinson during that period of time?” he replied, “Yes, they were.” In response to
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the question, “Is there anything in [the use of force reports] that shows that the officers
were doing anything other than acting within the scope of their professional duties?” he
replied, “Absolutely not.” Finally, in response to the question, “And do you have an
opinion as to whether or not the officers were acting within their official duties
throughout this incident?” he replied affirmatively. Humphrey argues that Ament
“invaded the province of the jury by expressing an expert opinion that embraced a legal
conclusion that the assaulted officer was acting within her official duties at the time she
was assaulted.”
Given the vague responses of Ament, the minimal foundation for his opinion, and
his omission of part of the standard under section 253B.05, subdivision 2(a), the district
court abused its discretion by admitting an opinion that did little to assist the jury in
reaching its verdict. But even if the district court plainly erred in permitting the
testimony, Humphrey was not deprived of substantial rights. A person is deprived of
substantial rights if there is a reasonable likelihood that the error had a significant effect
on the jury’s verdict. Sontoya, 788 N.W.2d at 873. This court considers the strength of
the state’s case, the “pervasiveness of the error,” and the defendant’s opportunity to
respond to the testimony. Id. Here, the evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict
without Ament’s testimony; his testimony is limited, vague, and not particularly helpful,
and Ament was cross-examined about his failure to describe and to teach his officers the
correct standard for taking a person into custody for an emergency mental-health hold.
Because Humphrey has failed to demonstrate that admission of this testimony affected
her substantial rights, she has not sustained her burden of showing plain error.
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III.
Humphrey argues that the district court plainly erred by failing to instruct the jury
as to the meaning of the phrase “executing a duty imposed by law.” Because Humphrey
did not object to the jury instructions, our review is again under the plain-error standard.
See State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 805 (Minn. 2012) (directing courts to use plain-
error standard when reviewing unobjected-to jury instructions).
A district court has “broad discretion and considerable latitude in choosing the
language of jury instructions,” but the instructions must “fairly and adequately explain
the law of the case.” Id. (quotation omitted). This court reviews the district court’s
choice of jury instructions for an abuse of discretion. Id. Because she did not object to
the instructions, Humphrey has a heavy burden under the plain-error standard of proving
that the instructions were prejudicial. Id. at 809.
Instructions must be viewed in their entirety to determine whether they fairly and
adequately explain the law; an instruction is erroneous if it materially misstates the law.
State v. Ihle, 640 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn. 2002). Generally, “it is well settled that the
court’s instructions must define the crime charged and the court should explain the
elements of the offense rather than simply read statutes.” Id.The district court did not explain the meaning of “executing a duty imposed by
law” but simply read the emergency-hold statute. During deliberations, the jury asked for
a copy of the fourth-degree assault statute; the district court, with the agreement of the
attorneys referred the jury to the instructions where the elements of the crime were set
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forth. No other explanation of “executing a duty” was offered to the jury. The district
court’s failure here to explain the elements of the charged offense was plain error.
But Humphrey has failed to show that her substantial rights were affected. The
testimony presented to the jury largely centered on whether Nortrom’s actions fit within
the parameters of Minn. Stat. § 253B.05, subd. 2; the evidence was sufficient to show that
Nortom reasonably believed that Humphrey was mentally ill and a danger to herself; and
the jury instructions read in their entirety fairly explained that Nortrom had to be
executing a duty imposed by law. See Ihle, 640 N.W.2d at 917 (concluding that despite
failure to explain elements, “[i]n light of the evidence presented and all of the jury
instructions given,” the defendant had not shown that it was reasonably likely that the
error had a significant effect on the verdict). We conclude that Humphrey has failed to
show that the district court’s error in instructing the jury had a significant effect on the
verdict.
Affirmed.
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