Nyqueela P. James, Relator v. Minnesota Department of Transportation, Department of Employment and Economic Development ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-0051
Nyqueela P. James,
Relator,
vs.
Minnesota Department of Transportation,
Respondent,
Department of Employment
and Economic Development,
Respondent.
Filed September 8, 2015
Affirmed
Hudson, Judge
Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 32980858-3
Peter B. Knapp, Jennifer A. Carlson (certified student attorney), William Mitchell Law
Clinic, St. Paul, Minnesota (for relator)
Minnesota Department of Transportation, St. Paul, Minnesota (respondent employer)
Lee B. Nelson, Department of Employment and Economic Development, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent department)
Considered and decided by Hudson, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HUDSON, Judge
In this certiorari appeal, relator challenges the decision of an unemployment-law
judge (ULJ) that she was ineligible for unemployment benefits because she was not
available for or actively seeking suitable employment. We affirm.
FACTS
Relator Nyqueela P. James worked for respondent Minnesota Department of
Transportation (MnDOT) as an account clerk performing data entry from March 2012
until October 2014, when she quit her employment. James worked 40-hour weeks on a
fixed schedule from 7:00 a.m. until 3:30 p.m.
James lost her daycare arrangement for her 20-month-old child in fall 2014, when
her previous daycare center became unavailable to her, and other persons who had been
caring for her child became unable to do so on a full-time basis. James informed her
supervisor that she was having problems obtaining daycare and asked if she could adjust
her work schedule to come in later, work part-time, or telecommute. The supervisor
denied her request. Because James was not offered accommodation for her childcare
issue and was unable to obtain affordable daycare, she gave notice that she was quitting
employment. She later discovered that a neighbor would be available to care for her
child but could only take the child after 9:00 or 10:00 a.m. each day.
James established an unemployment-benefits account with respondent Minnesota
Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED) but was determined
ineligible for benefits. At an appeal hearing before a ULJ, she testified that she was
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looking for work in an afternoon shift, from 3:00 to 11:00 p.m. She stated that she had
spent several hours per day looking for work, had applied for about seven to ten jobs, and
had received some job offers through a temporary agency, but was unable to accept them
because they required availability in earlier morning hours when she lacks childcare.
The ULJ issued a decision finding that, because James quit due to the loss of her
childcare, requested accommodation from her employer, and was denied accommodation,
she would be eligible for unemployment benefits if all other requirements were met. See
Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1(8) (2014) (stating exception to ineligibility for benefits
due to voluntary quit when an applicant loses childcare and meets certain requirements).
But the ULJ determined that James was not entitled to benefits because she did not meet
the additional eligibility requirement that she be available for, and actively seeking,
suitable employment. See 2015 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 1, art. 6, § 8, at 1690
(amending Minn. Stat. § 268.085, subd. 1(4)-(5) (2014)).
On reconsideration, the ULJ affirmed the decision. The ULJ found that James was
not available for suitable employment because she was available to start work only after
9:00 or 10:00 a.m., and suitable employment for her included earlier start times. The
ULJ also found that James was not actively seeking suitable employment because she had
been looking exclusively for second-shift work, and suitable employment included earlier
shifts. The ULJ noted that, if James believed that she was currently available for and
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seeking suitable employment, she should contact DEED and provide evidence to support
her claim.1 This certiorari appeal follows.
DECISION
When reviewing a ULJ’s decision, this court may affirm, remand the case for
further proceedings, or reverse and modify the decision if the substantial rights of the
relator have been prejudiced because the decision is unsupported by substantial evidence
in view of the record as a whole or affected by an error of law. 2015 Minn. Laws 1st
Spec. Sess. ch. 1, art. 6, § 12, at 1693 (amending Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d)
(2014)). We review the ULJ’s factual findings in the light most favorable to the decision
and will not disturb those findings if the evidence substantially sustains them. Grunow v.
Walser Auto. Grp. LLC, 779 N.W.2d 577, 580 (Minn. App. 2010). But we review de
novo the legal conclusion that an applicant is ineligible to receive unemployment
benefits. Id. at 579.
To be eligible for unemployment benefits, an applicant must be “available for”
and “actively seeking” “suitable employment.” 2015 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 1,
art. 6, § 8, at 1690 (amending Minn. Stat. § 268.085, subd. 1(4)-(5) (2014)). A person is
considered available for suitable employment if that person is “ready, willing, and able to
accept suitable employment.” Minn. Stat. § 268.085, subd. 15(a) (2014). The issues of
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At oral argument, respondent’s attorney indicated that James was currently receiving
unemployment benefits. Because this information is not part of the record before us, we
do not consider it. See Appelhof v. Comm’r of Jobs & Training, 450 N.W.2d 589, 591
(Minn. App. 1990) (stating that on certiorari review of an unemployment-benefits
hearing, “evidence which was not received below may not be reviewed as part of the
record on appeal”).
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whether an applicant is available for, and actively seeking, suitable employment are
factual determinations. Goodman v. Minn. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 312 Minn. 551, 553,
255 N.W.2d 222, 233 (1977) (availability); McNeilly v. Dep’t of Emp’t & Econ. Dev.,
778 N.W.2d 707, 711-12 (Minn. App. 2010) (actively seeking).
James argues that the ULJ erred by not making express findings as to what
constitutes “suitable employment” for her and clearly erred by finding that she was not
available for suitable employment. Suitable employment is defined as “employment in
the applicant’s labor market area that is reasonably related to the applicant’s
qualifications”; it includes employment on a second, third, rotating, or split shift if that
arrangement of hours is customary in the occupation in the labor market area. Minn. Stat.
§ 268.035, subd. 23a(a), (f) (2014). James maintains that the ULJ assumed that suitable
employment for her would include only jobs similar to her data-entry job at MnDOT and
only addressed the issue of suitable employment by finding that she was not available to
work before 9:00 or 10:00 a.m.
But the ULJ’s failure to make express findings on what would constitute suitable
employment for James does not affect the determination that she was ineligible for
benefits because she indicated that she was only looking for jobs that would require a late
start or an evening shift. “An applicant may restrict availability to suitable employment,
but there must be no other restrictions, either self-imposed or created by circumstances,
temporary or permanent, that prevent accepting suitable employment.” Minn. Stat.
§ 268.085, subd. 15(a).
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An applicant who has restrictions on the hours of the
day or days of the week that the applicant can or will work,
that are not normal for the applicant’s usual occupation or
other suitable employment, is not “available for suitable
employment.” An applicant must be available for daytime
employment, if suitable employment is performed during the
daytime, even though the applicant previously worked the
night shift.
Id., subd. 15(d) (2014). The record shows that James had self-imposed restrictions on her
working hours, based on the hours she had available childcare. Even if other jobs in
addition to data entry were considered suitable employment, in order to be considered
available for those jobs, she would be required to be able to work without restricted hours
on a day shift. See id. James argues that the record shows that she was seeking
employment on a day shift because she turned down job offers based on their 8:00 a.m.
start time. But her application for those jobs does not mean that she was available for
suitable employment when she would not accept them, based on her childcare
availability. Substantial evidence supports the ULJ’s finding that James was not
available for suitable employment.
James also challenges the ULJ’s finding that she was not actively seeking suitable
employment. She points out that whether an applicant is actively seeking suitable
employment depends on the circumstances of each case, McNeilly, 778 N.W.2d at 711-
12, and she maintains that the ULJ ignored evidence of her efforts to apply for jobs,
finding only that she searched exclusively for second-shift work. But although James
may have diligently sought employment within the framework of her childcare
availability, the statute requires that an applicant’s active search must be for suitable
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employment. See 2015 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 1, art. 6, § 8, at 1690 (amending
Minn. Stat. § 268.085, subd. 1(5) (2014)). And in James’s case, suitable employment
was not limited to second-shift jobs but also included earlier shifts. The ULJ did not
clearly err by finding that James had not been actively seeking suitable employment.
James finally argues that because the Minnesota legislature created an exception to
the “voluntary quit” provision to allow persons who have lost childcare to become
eligible for unemployment insurance, see Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1(8), this court
should also read the “available for suitable employment” provision to take account of a
person’s inability to maintain a work schedule due to loss of childcare. See 2015 Minn.
Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 1, art. 6, § 8, at 1690 (amending Minn. Stat. § 268.085, subd.
1(4) (2014)). We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Carlson v. Dep’t of
Emp’t & Econ. Dev., 747 N.W.2d 367, 371 (Minn. App. 2008).
If the legislature’s intent is discernable from a statute’s plain and unambiguous
language, this court applies its plain meaning. Id. In examining a statute, we may read
the language of related statutes together. Id. at 372. If a statute is ambiguous, this court
must ascertain legislative intent, considering the law’s purpose, legislative history, and
existing legislative or administrative interpretations. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2014);
Carlson, 747 N.W.2d at 372.
James argues that her proposed interpretation would further the unemployment-
compensation law’s policy of assisting those who are unemployed through no fault of
their own. See Minn. Stat. § 268.03, subd. 1 (2014) (stating that policy); see also Minn.
Stat. § 268.031, subd. 2 (2014) (stating that the unemployment-law chapter is remedial in
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nature). But although quitting employment due to loss of childcare does not initially
render an applicant ineligible for benefits, the relevant statute plainly provides that the
loss-of-childcare “exception raises an issue of the applicant’s being available for suitable
employment under section 268.085, subdivision 1, that the commissioner must
determine.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1(8). Thus, the commissioner must render a
separate decision on whether an applicant who has quit because of a loss of childcare is
available for suitable employment. Id.; see also McNeilly, 778 N.W.2d at 711 (holding
that, although a seasonal employee was not deemed ineligible for benefits based on an
off-season layoff due to lack of work, he “was nevertheless required to comply with the
requirements outlined in section 268.085, subdivision 1, in order to remain eligible” for
benefits).
There is no equitable or common-law entitlement to unemployment benefits.
Minn. Stat. § 268.069, subd. 3 (2014). Even though James was not deemed ineligible for
benefits when she quit due to her inability to obtain childcare, in order to remain eligible
for those benefits, she was still required to be available for suitable employment. The
ULJ did not err by finding that she was not available for suitable employment and thus
determining that she was ineligible for unemployment benefits.
Affirmed.
Dated: ___________________ _______________________________
Judge Natalie E. Hudson
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