State of Minnesota v. Adaiah Deontraie Townsend , 2015 Minn. App. LEXIS 87 ( 2015 )

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-0050
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Adaiah Deontraie Townsend,
Appellant.
Filed December 7, 2015
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge*
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-13-31433
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael Richardson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Carlo E. Faccini, Sensus Legal Center, Anoka, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Smith, Presiding Judge; Stauber, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.
SYLLABUS
A factual basis for a valid guilty plea to the crime of aiding an offender after the
fact can be established without regard to whether the principal offender is convicted of
the underlying offense.
*
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
OPINION
KLAPHAKE, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea to the offense of aiding an offender after the fact, Minn. Stat. § 609.495,
subd. 3 (2012), when a jury subsequently found the principal offender not guilty of the
underlying offense. We affirm.
FACTS
In May or June 2013, appellant Adaiah Donotraie Townsend purchased a handgun
from Damin Shufford. On June 26, 2013, Shufford asked Townsend if he could have the
gun back because he intended to rob someone. Townsend loaned him the unloaded gun.
Later that day, Shufford called Townsend and asked him to go to the parking lot of an
apartment complex. Shufford gave Townsend the gun and told him that the “situation
went sour, and he had to slump the guy.” Shufford led Townsend and two others, Steven
Graham and Davonte Trawick, to another parking lot, and showed them a dead man in a
car. Graham removed a wallet from the car and distributed money among the group of
four. Shufford asked for the gun, but Townsend did not give it to him.
In August 2013, the gun was found in Townsend’s possession after police stopped
a car in which he was a passenger. The gun was identified as the murder weapon and
Townsend was arrested and charged with aiding and abetting first- and second-degree
murder, and aiding and abetting attempted first-degree aggravated robbery. An
indictment for aiding and abetting first-degree murder was subsequently returned. After
plea negotiations, Townsend agreed to plead guilty to an amended offense of aiding an
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offender after the fact, and to testify against Shufford. Before he was sentenced,
Townsend testified at Shufford’s trial. Shufford was found not guilty by the jury.
Townsend moved at his sentencing hearing to withdraw his guilty plea, under both
the fair-and-just and manifest-injustice standards. The district court denied his motion
and sentenced Townsend to 74 months in prison. This appeal followed.
ISSUES
1. Did the district court err by refusing to permit Townsend to withdraw his
guilty plea to correct a manifest injustice?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by refusing to permit Townsend to
withdraw his plea before sentencing under the fair-and-just standard?
ANALYSIS
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. State v.
Farnsworth, 738 N.W.2d 364, 371 (Minn. 2007). “At any time the court must allow a
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea upon a timely motion and proof to the satisfaction of
the court that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P.
15.05, subd. 1.
Before sentencing, a district court may permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty
plea “if it is fair and just to do so.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. Under the fair-and-
just standard, the district court may exercise its discretion and permit withdrawal of a
guilty plea, after giving “due consideration to the reasons advanced by the defendant.”
Farnsworth, 738 N.W.2d at 371 (quoting Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2). Townsend
asserts that both standards apply to his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
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I.
Townsend argues that the district court erred by refusing to permit him to
withdraw his guilty plea in order to correct a manifest injustice. A manifest injustice
occurs when a guilty plea is not valid. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010).
To be valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. Id. Townsend
concedes that his plea was voluntary and intelligent. “The accuracy requirement protects
a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than that for which he could
be convicted if he insisted on his right to trial.” Id. “There must be sufficient facts on the
record to support a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which
he desires to plead guilty.” Lussier v. State, 821 N.W.2d 581, 588 (Minn. 2012)
(quotation omitted). Townsend has the burden of demonstrating that his plea was not
accurate. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. We review the validity of a plea as a question of
law subject to de novo review. Id.
Townsend contends that the factual basis for his plea was inaccurate because the
state could not prove the elements of the offense to which he pleaded guilty: that
Shufford committed the offense of first-degree murder and that Townsend knew that he
did. Townsend argues that the facts that he testified to at Shufford’s trial were the same
as those used as a factual basis for his plea, and a jury concluded that these facts did not
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Shufford was guilty. Therefore, Townsend asserts,
these facts do not provide an adequate factual basis for his guilty plea.
The statute under which Townsend was convicted provides that “[w]hoever
intentionally aids another person whom the actor knows or has reason to know has
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committed a criminal act, by destroying or concealing evidence of that crime, . . . [or]
receiving the proceeds of that crime . . . is an accomplice after the fact.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.495, subd. 3. The elements of this offense are: (1) Shufford committed the crime
of first-degree murder; (2) Townsend knew or had reason to know that Shufford
committed first-degree murder; (3) Townsend concealed evidence of the crime or
received proceeds of the crime; and (4) Townsend acted with intent to aid Shufford. See
10A Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 24.13 (2006). This offense is distinguished from
those in which a person aids and abets the commission of a crime or conspires with
another to commit a crime; a person who aids an offender after the fact “‘interfere[es]
with the processes of justice and is best dealt with in those terms.’” State v. Skipintheday,
717 N.W.2d 423, 427 (Minn. 2006) (quoting 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal
Law § 13.6(a), at 404 (2d ed. 2003)).
Townsend argues that his factual admissions are inadequate because he could not
know that a crime was committed if Shufford was found not guilty of first-degree
murder. He relies on In re Welfare of A.C.N., 583 N.W.2d 303, 305-06 (Minn. App.
1998), in which this court stated “that the element of knowledge of the underlying
offense must be proven as other elements.” But A.C.N. was decided before an
amendment to the statute, which added the words “has reason to know” to the statute.
See 2001 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 8, art. 8, §§ 24-25, at 2082-83 (amending
section 609.495, subdivisions 1(a) and 3). This amendment “reduced the state’s burden
of proof by allowing the prosecutor to show that the accused has reason to know that a
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crime has been committed.” State v. Hager, 727 N.W.2d 668, 675 (Minn. App. 2007)
(quotation omitted).
The crucial point here is the first element: whether Shufford committed first-
degree murder if he was later found not guilty. The statutory language is “the actor
knows or has reason to know [that someone] has committed a criminal act.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.495, subd. 3. “The objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and
effectuate the Legislature’s intent.” State v. Rick, 835 N.W.2d 478, 482 (Minn. 2013).
If the Legislature’s intent is clear from the statute’s plain and
unambiguous language, then [an appellate court] interpret[s]
the statute according to its plain meaning without resorting to
canons of statutory construction. But, if a statute is
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, then
the statute is ambiguous and [the court] may consider the
canons of statutory construction to ascertain its meaning.
Id. (citations omitted).
The plain language of the statute does not require conviction of a criminal act;
rather, a person must commit a criminal act. Townsend admitted the following at the plea
hearing: (1) he lent Shufford his gun because Shufford intended to rob someone;
(2) Shufford told him that the robbery had gone “sour” and that he had to “slump” the
victim; (3) Townsend went with Shufford to the site of the murder and Shufford showed
him the dead victim in a car, saying that the victim is “not waking up” because Shufford
“slumped him”; and (4) Townsend knew the gun had been used to kill the victim. These
admitted facts “support a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to
which he desires to plead guilty.” Lussier, 821 N.W.2d at 588. Townsend admitted to
facts that described the commission of first-degree murder by Shufford and demonstrated
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that Townsend had reason to know that Shufford had committed the crime. Therefore,
Townsend’s plea was accurate.
Townsend did not plead guilty to aiding and abetting the underlying crime, but
such cases provide the reasoning for upholding a related conviction when the principal
actor has been acquitted. The Minnesota Supreme Court stated that acquittal of a
principal offender does not affect the conviction of a defendant charged with aiding and
abetting the principal. State v. Cegon, 309 N.W.2d 313, 314 (Minn. 1981); see also State
v. Iverson, 396 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Minn. App. 1986) (applying Cegon), review denied
(Minn. Jan. 18, 1987). The supreme court relied on the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Standefer v. United States, in which the Court discussed the reasons why
nonmutual collateral estoppel does not apply in criminal cases, citing differences between
civil and criminal rules of evidence; the fact that the state cannot challenge an acquittal,
despite clear evidence of guilt; and the rules of suppression that can be invoked by one
defendant, but not by other parties to the crime. 447 U.S. 10, 22-24, 100 S. Ct. 1999
2007-08 (1980). The Court noted that “[t]his case does no more than manifest the
simple, if discomforting, reality that different juries may reach different results under any
criminal statute. That is one of the consequences we accept under our jury system.
While symmetry of results may be intellectually satisfying, it is not required.” Id. at 25,
100 S. Ct. at 2008-09 (quotation omitted).
While it may seem unfair for Townsend to suffer a penalty greater than Shufford,
it is also within the power of a jury to find Townsend not credible or to exercise lenity
toward a defendant. The jury is the ultimate judge of credibility and it may have rejected
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Townsend’s testimony. See State v. Reese, 692 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 2005) [holding
in Cegon was that evidence was sufficient to convict defendant as principal]
(acknowledging that assessment of witness credibility is a jury function). Or the jury
could have exercised jury lenity, “the extraordinary power of the jury to issue a not-guilty
verdict even if the law as applied to the proven facts establishes that the defendant is
guilty.” State v. Hooks, 752 N.W.2d 79, 86 (Minn. App. 2008). But the fact of the jury’s
rejection of Townsend’s trial testimony or its act of lenity in Shufford’s case does not
demand lenity as to Townsend in his separate criminal action with the same underlying
facts. Because Townsend’s guilty plea was accurate, and, therefore, valid, the district
court did not err by denying Townsend’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea based on
manifest injustice.
II.
Under the fair-and-just standard, a court considers the reasons a defendant offers
to support withdrawal of a guilty plea and the prejudice to the state should withdrawal be
permitted. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97. The defendant has “the burden of advancing
reasons to support withdrawal”; the state has the burden of showing the prejudice that
would be caused by withdrawal. Id. This is a less demanding standard than the manifest-
injustice standard, but it does not permit withdrawal of “a guilty plea for simply any
reason.” State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted). We
review the district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97.
Townsend’s sole reason for asking to withdraw his plea is that he “faces
punishment for an after-the-fact role in a murder that a jury determined could not be
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proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” As set forth above, the offense of aiding an offender
after the fact requires the defendant to know or have reason to know that another person
had committed a criminal act as defined by section 609.495, subdivision 3. The statute
does not require that the other person be convicted of the crime. This argument raises no
more persuasive reason for relief under the fair-and-just standard. Townsend had the
opportunity to present his case to a jury but chose to waive his trial rights to take
advantage of a favorable plea negotiation. The district court did not abuse its discretion
by concluding that Townsend’s realization that he made a bad bargain did not provide
him with a fair and just reason to withdraw his guilty plea. See Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545
U.S. 175, 186, 125 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2005) (“[A] plea’s validity may not be collaterally
attacked merely because the defendant made what turned out, in retrospect, to be a poor
deal.”).
DECISION
Because Townsend admitted to a sufficient factual basis to aiding an offender after
the fact, his guilty plea was accurate despite the fact that the principal offender was
acquitted of the underlying offense.
Affirmed.
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