lavonne-pfeil-individually-and-as-trustee-for-heirs-of-henry-pfeil-v-st ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-0605
LaVonne Pfeil,
Individually and as Trustee for Heirs of Henry Pfeil, deceased,
Appellants,
vs.
St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran Church
of the Unaltered Augsburg Confession of Worthington,
Nobles County, Minnesota, et al.,
Respondents.
Filed January 12, 2015
Affirmed
Chutich, Judge
Nobles County District Court
File No. 53-CV-13-817
Zorislav R. Leyderman, The Law Office of Zorislav R. Leyderman, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellants)
Ken D. Schueler, Jennifer M. Peterson, Dunlap & Seeger, P.A., Rochester, Minnesota;
and
Timothy J. O’Connor, William L. Davidson, Lind, Jensen, Sullivan & Peterson, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents)
Considered and decided by Chutich, Presiding Judge; Stauber, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CHUTICH, Judge
Appellants LaVonne and Henry Pfeil challenge the district court’s dismissal of
their defamation claims against St. Matthew Evangelical Lutheran Church and its pastors.
The district court ruled that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine. Because any judicial inquiry into the truth of statements made
during a church disciplinary proceeding would create an excessive entanglement with the
church that would violate the First Amendment, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellants LaVonne and Henry Pfeil, an elderly couple who lived in Worthington,
were longstanding members of St. Matthew.1 In August 2011, the Pfeils were
excommunicated from St. Matthew. The following September, Pastor Thomas Braun and
Pastor Joe Behnke held a special voter’s meeting at St. Matthew to determine whether the
voting members of the church would affirm the Pfeils’ excommunication. The Pfeils and
approximately 89 other church members attended the meeting.
At the special voter’s meeting, Pastor Braun read from a prepared document and made
numerous statements about the Pfeils. These statements included:
 The Pfeils were “actively involved in slander, gossip, and speaking against
[Pastor Braun, Pastor Braun’s wife, St. Matthew, and Pastor Behnke].”
 The Pfeils had “intentionally attacked, questioned, and discredited the integrity”
of Pastor Braun, Pastor Behnke, and other St. Matthew leaders.
1
The respondents state that the church’s proper name is “St. Matthew” and not “St.
Matthews,” as is listed in the caption to the Pfeils’ action.
2
 Other people had seen the Pfeils display “anger and disrespect” towards Pastor
Braun.
 The Pfeils had publicly engaged in “sinful behavior” inside and outside St.
Matthew.
 The Pfeils had engaged in behavior unbecoming of Christians.
 The Pfeils had “refused to meet for the purpose of confession and forgiveness.”
 The Pfeils had “refused to show respect” towards servants of God and St.
Matthew leadership.
 The Pfeils had “led other people into sin.”
 The Pfeils had engaged in “slander and gossip” and refused to stop.
 The Pfeils had “refused to follow the words and teachings of God.”
During the same meeting, Pastor Braun also published and displayed a second
document containing statements about the Pfeils. The published statements included the
following:
 There had been “numerous reports” accusing the Pfeils of engaging in “slander”
against Pastor Braun and his wife prior to their arrival at St. Matthew.
 Pastor Braun and St. Matthew had received “monthly reports” accusing the
Pfeils of “slander” against Pastor Braun and “discredit[ing]” the ministry of
Pastor Braun and St. Matthew.
 On December 6, 2010, the Pfeils participated in a meeting during which “reports
of slander were [presented to the Pfeils].”
 Since January 26, 2011, Pastor Braun and St. Matthew had received “numerous
monthly reports,” from both members and nonmembers of St. Matthew, accusing
the Pfeils of “slander and gossip . . . against the leadership and ministry of [St.
Matthew].”
 In July 2011, the Pfeils “openly and intentionally attempted to discredit the
integrity of the pastors and church leaders [of St. Matthew].”
 Since August 2, 2011, Pastor Braun and St. Matthew had received additional
reports accusing the Pfeils of “slander and gossip.”
 Since August 2, 2011, the Pfeils engaged in “breaches of confidentiality.”
 The Pfeils had “publically and intentionally perpetuated false information and
caused . . . dissention for the work and ministry of St. Matthew.”
3
At the same meeting, Pastor Braun and Pastor Behnke distributed a ballot for the
attendees to vote on whether to affirm the Pfeils’ excommunication. The statements
printed on the ballot included:
 The Pfeils had refused “to stop their slander and gossip.”
 The Pfeils had led “other people into sin by their behavior.”
 The Pfeils had refused “to follow the commands of God’s Word.”
 The Pfeils had “[p]ublically attempt[ed] to discredit the integrity of the pastors
and church leaders.”
 The Pfeils refused “to show respect to called and ordained servants of the
Word.”
 The Pfeils had refused “to meet with both pastors and the Board of Elders for the
purpose of confession and forgiveness.”
In March 2012, the Pfeils and approximately ten other people attended a synod
panel hearing.2 At St. Matthew, the synod panel is part of the dispute-resolution process
set forth in the bylaws of the church; the panel is responsible for reviewing decisions of
the church congregation regarding discipline. During this hearing, Pastor Behnke alleged
that the Pfeils had recently accused him of stealing money from St. Matthew.
The Pfeils sued respondents St. Matthew, Pastor Behnke, and Pastor Braun
(collectively, the Church), alleging that the Church’s statements injured their character
and reputation in their small community. The Pfeils’ complaint specifically alleges the
Church’s statements were defamatory, defamation per se, and that the Church was
negligent in making false and defamatory statements about the Pfeils. Henry Pfeil died
2
“Synod” refers to “an ecclesiastical council.” The American Heritage Dictionary 1766
(5th ed. 2011).
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before the complaint for this lawsuit was filed, and his wife, LaVonne Pfeil, continued
his defamation claims in his name as trustee of his estate.
In September 2013, the Church moved to dismiss under Minnesota Rule of Civil
Procedure 12.02(e), asserting that the Pfeils failed to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. In its motion, the Church argued that Henry Pfeil’s claim did not survive his
death, the Pfeils did not plead their defamation claims with the required level of
specificity, and the Pfeils did not allege any actionable defamatory statements.
In December 2013, the Church filed a second motion to dismiss under Minnesota
Rule of Civil Procedure 12.08(c) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In this motion,
the Church argued that all the alleged defamatory statements pertained to church
governance, membership, and/or discipline proceedings, and therefore the district court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.
In its well-reasoned order, the district court (1) granted the Church’s motion to
dismiss Henry Pfeil’s claims under rule 12.02(e), determining that his defamation claims
did not survive his death; (2) denied the Church’s motion to dismiss LaVonne Pfeil’s
claims under rule 12.02(e), determining that she pleaded sufficient facts to maintain her
claims; and (3) dismissed all of the Pfeils’ claims under rule 12.08(c), determining that
the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred the court from exercising subject-matter
jurisdiction over the dispute.
In its interpretation of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, the district court relied
on our decision in Schoenhals v. Mains, 504 N.W.2d 233, 235 (Minn. App. 1993). The
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district court reasoned that because all of the alleged defamatory statements “were made
in the context of internal church governance and involve the reasons and motives for
disciplining [the Pfeils],” the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under Schoenhals.
Both parties appealed. The Pfeils contend that the district court erroneously
dismissed their claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and erroneously dismissed
Henry Pfeil’s claims for failing to survive his death. The Church argues that the district
court erred by not dismissing LaVonne Pfeil’s claims for failure to state an actionable
claim.
DECISION
The Pfeils argue that the district court erred in dismissing their claims for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction because Schoenhals departs from prior Minnesota caselaw and
other relevant authorities. The Church responds, and we agree, that Schoenhals is
dispositive, and the district court properly applied the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine to
dismiss the Pfeils’ claims.
Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine
Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the court’s power to hear and to determine
cases. League of Women Voters Minn. v. Ritchie, 819 N.W.2d 636, 643 (Minn. 2012).
Whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists is a question of law that we review de novo. In
re Civil Commitment of Giem, 742 N.W.2d 422, 425-26 (Minn. 2007).
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The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment says that “Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion.” U.S. Const. amend. I. 3 The
Establishment Clause applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and it “forbids state action that: (1) lacks a secular purpose;
(2) has the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion; or (3) fosters excessive
entanglements with religion (Lemon test).” State v. Wenthe, 839 N.W.2d 83, 87 (Minn.
2013) (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, 91 S. Ct. 2105, 2111 (1971)).
The third prong of the Lemon test, excessive entanglement, prohibits a court from
inquiring into or reviewing “the internal decisionmaking or governance of a religious
institution.” Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d 426,
435 (Minn. 2002). “No entanglement problem exists, however, when civil courts use
neutral principles of law—rules or standards that have been developed and are applied
without particular regard to religious institutions or doctrines—to resolve disputes even
though those disputes involve religious institutions or actors.” Wenthe, 839 N.W.2d at
90.
Under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction
if the disputed topic is “strictly and purely ecclesiastical in its character, [a] matter over
which the civil courts exercise no jurisdiction, [a] matter which concerns theological
controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the
3
Similarly, the Minnesota Constitution gives every citizen the right to worship
“according to the dictates of his own conscience” and requires that the state not control,
interfere, or give preference by law to “any religious establishment or mode of worship.”
Minn. Const. art. I, § 16.
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members of the church to the standard of morals required of them.” Serbian E. Orthodox
Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713-14, 96 S. Ct. 2372, 2382 (1976) (emphasis
omitted) (quotation omitted).
In Schoenhals, we interpreted the ecclesiastical abstention in a strikingly similar
factual situation. 504 N.W.2d at 233. The Schoenhals received a letter from their pastor
terminating their membership from the church. Id. at 234. The pastor read the letter to
the entire congregation and discussed it separately with the Schoenhalses’ son, who was
also a member of the church. Id. at 235. The letter set forth the following reasons for
terminating the Schoenhalses’ membership with the church:
1. A lack of financial stewardship with consistency and
faithful tithing and offering over a given period of time.
2. A desire on your part to consistently create division,
animosity and strife in the fellowship.
3. Direct fabrication of lies with the intent to hurt the
reputation and the establishment of Faith Tabernacle of
Truth Church and congregation.
4. Backbiting, railing accusations, division, lying, are some
of the most serious sins found in the Bible. Where, by all
appearances and related conversations, you have fallen
into all of the categories.
Id. at 234.
The Schoenhals sued the church and its pastor alleging defamation, among other
claims. Id. at 235. The district court granted summary judgment to the church and
dismissed the Schoenhalses’ defamation claim under the ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine. Id. at 235. We affirmed the dismissal and held that an examination as to the
truth of the pastor’s statements would “require an impermissible inquiry into Church
8
doctrine and discipline” in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Id. at 236.
We also specifically acknowledged that one of the pastor’s statements—the
accusation that the Schoenhals had fabricated lies intended to hurt the reputation and
establishment of the church—appeared unrelated to church doctrine on its face. Id. But
we nevertheless reasoned that the statement “relate[d] to the Church’s reasons and
motives for terminating the Schoenhals[es]’ membership” and therefore any examination
into “those reasons and motives would also require an impermissible inquiry into Church
disciplinary matters.” Id. In addition, we noted that the letter was disseminated only to
other congregation members, which strengthened our conclusion that the pastor’s
statements were related and limited to internal church disciplinary proceedings. Id.
The statements here, like the statements in Schoenhals, are all related to the
Church’s motives and reasons for excommunicating the Pfeils. Any examination as to
the truth of these statements would be an impermissible inquiry into church doctrine
under the First Amendment. Id. at 236. Adjudicating the truth of statements concerning
sin and Christian doctrine cannot be done without impermissibly intruding on issues that
are “strictly and purely ecclesiastical in [their] character.” Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713,
96 S. Ct. at 2382 (quotation omitted).
At oral argument, the Pfeils’ counsel conceded that we could not examine the truth
of the statements concerning “sin” and Christian doctrine without violating the
Establishment Clause. Nevertheless, the Pfeils contend that four categories of
statements—the breach of confidentiality, lying or perpetuating false information,
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accusing Pastor Behnke of stealing money, and the reported complaints of other
congregation members concerning the Pfeils’ behavior—can be adjudicated true or false
based on secular, legal principles.
But this argument overlooks why the statements were made and the context in
which they were made. In Schoenhals, we declined to inquire into any statements that
related to a church’s reasons and motive for terminating membership, even if the alleged
defamatory statements appear unrelated to church doctrine on their face. 504 N.W.2d at
236. Likewise here, any examination into whether the statements were truthful would be
an “impermissible inquiry into Church doctrine and discipline,” id., because the
statements were directly related to the Church’s reasons for excommunicating the Pfeils.
Furthermore, these statements all occurred during the context of internal church
disciplinary proceedings—the special voter’s meeting in September and the synod panel
hearing in March—that are specifically designed to determine membership status at St.
Matthew.
The Pfeils next argue that we should “modify” Schoenhals because it
(1) improperly departs from Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. App. 1991), review
denied (Minn. Aug. 29, 1991); (2) creates an absolute immunity for religious leaders
unrecognized in state and federal law; and (3) enhances religion in violation of the First
Amendment. None of these assertions are persuasive.
In Black, the appellant was a female pastor who claimed that her supervisor, a
male pastor, repeatedly made unwelcome sexual advances toward her. Id. at 717-18.
Less than three months after reporting the sexual harassment to the Minnesota
10
Department of Human Rights, the appellant was fired for her “inability to conduct the
pastoral office efficiently in [the] congregation in view of local conditions.” Id. at 718.
She sued the church and pastor for sexual harassment and defamation, among other
claims. Id.
We dismissed the appellant’s defamation claim because we determined that any
inquiry into the church’s stated reason for her discharge—her inability to conduct her
ministry efficiently—would be an impermissible inquiry into “an essentially
ecclesiastical concern.” Id. at 720. We permitted the appellant to pursue her sexual
harassment claim because it was unrelated to her pastoral qualifications or issues of
church doctrine and the remedy that she claimed would not require extensive court
oversight. Id. at 721.
The Pfeils claim that Schoenhals strays from our holding in Black because the
defamation claim in Schoenhals could have been resolved on neutral legal principles like
the sexual harassment claim in Black. We disagree. Schoenhals aligns with Black
because both decisions characterize the discharge of a person—whether an employee or
church member—as a matter that concerns church governance and discipline over which
civil courts have no subject-matter jurisdiction. Schoenhals, 504 N.W.2d at 236; Black,
471 N.W.2d at 720.
The Pfeils also contend that Schoenhals creates an absolute immunity for religious
leaders that is not recognized in state and federal law and it enhances religion in violation
of the First Amendment. Contrary to the Pfeils’ assertions, Schoenhals does not create an
absolute immunity for religious leaders; it merely recognizes that courts cannot interfere
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with a church’s disciplinary proceeding of its own members. As the United States
Supreme Court has stated, issues of church discipline are “strictly and purely
ecclesiastical . . . over which the civil courts exercise no jurisdiction.” Milivojevich, 426
U.S. at 713-14, 96 S. Ct. at 2382 (quotation omitted). And if church leaders are accorded
any special protection, it is only when the principles of the First Amendment require it.
See id.; see also Schoenhals, 504 N.W.2d at 236.
Finally, the Pfeils argue that we should adopt the reasoning of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Connor v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 975 A.2d 1084 (Pa. 2009).
This court, however, is not bound by the decisions of other state courts. In re Welfare of
Child of E.A.C., 812 N.W.2d 165, 174 (Minn. App. 2012), review denied (Minn. Mar. 27,
2012). And when binding Minnesota precedent is directly on point, we cannot disregard
our own authority for that of other states. Accordingly, we decline to follow
Pennsylvania caselaw here.
In concluding that the Pfeils’ claims must be dismissed, we do not minimize the
concerns that brought them to court. We recognize that LaVonne Pfeil, a lifelong
resident of Worthington and longstanding member of the St. Matthew congregation,
believes that the Church’s statements besmirched her reputation and that of her deceased
husband, Henry Pfeil, a grievous injury to the family name. But the separation of church
and state, a principle enshrined in the Minnesota and United States Constitutions,
prevents a district court from determining the merits of the Pfeils’ dispute with their
former church. Our decision here does not excuse any defamatory behavior that may
have occurred in a sacred setting; it merely honors the separation of church and state by
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avoiding secular intrusion into the heart of religious concerns: who may be a member of
the church; what standards of behavior are required of them; and how and when members
may be disciplined.
In sum, because the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bars the court from inquiring
into excommunication proceedings under these circumstances, the Pfeils’ claims were
properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Given our conclusion above,
we need not address the Pfeils’ remaining arguments and the Church’s cross-appeal.
Affirmed.
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