Capital One Bank, N. A. v. Don T. Mashak ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-0678
Capital One Bank, N. A.,
Respondent,
vs.
Don T. Mashak,
Appellant.
Filed December 7, 2015
Affirmed
Stauber, Judge
Wright County District Court
File No. 86-CV-13-3955
Amy M. Goltz, Gurstel Chargo, P.A., Golden Valley, Minnesota (for respondent)
Don T. Mashak, Albertville, Minnesota (pro se appellant)
Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Kirk, Judge; and
Smith, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
STAUBER, Judge
In this breach-of-contract and collections action, appellant challenges the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to respondent bank and asserts that the district court
erred by refusing to grant his request for disability accommodation and his motion to
enforce discovery. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2004, appellant Don T. Mashak signed a credit-card application and was issued
a credit card by respondent Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. Mashak used the credit card
for five years and made his last payment on the account in 2009, owing $24,524.78 to
Capital One when the account was “charged off.” In January 2013, Capital One initiated
a collection action against Mashak, alleging breach of contract, account stated, and unjust
enrichment.
In his answer, Mashak accused the court system of various forms of corruption,
denied owing any money, contended that Capital One was guilty of several consumer-
lending violations, and stated that the American banking system and Federal Reserve
have devalued the United States currency to such a degree that no debt can be fully
repaid, subverted “Natural Law,” and created worthless money resulting in involuntary
servitude. Mashak also raised counterclaims of fraud and violations of the Constitution
and “Natural Law.” Mashak sought punitive damages in the amount of $5 million, to be
paid in gold or silver.
Capital One moved for summary judgment on August 1, 2013. Mashak removed
the case to federal court on August 30, 2013. Mashak filed several motions and requests
for discovery in state court during the time the case was in federal court. These included
motions (1) to remove the assigned judge; (2) for an Americans with Disability Act
(ADA) accommodation; (3) for discovery; and (4) to amend his answer, counterclaims,
and affirmative defenses. Mashak’s ADA accommodations request was based on post-
traumatic-stress disorder (PTSD) occasioned by “legal abuse syndrome.”
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The federal court remanded the matter to state court in January 2014. Mashak
moved to compel discovery in October 2014. Capital One produced 150 documents and
responded to 100 requests for admissions, but sought a protective order after Mashak
attempted to subpoena Capital One’s president to question him about fractional reserve
licensing fees, profitability, and creating money out of thin air. Mashak also sought to
create a class action to oppose all Minnesota fractional reserve banking institutions.
On November 20, 2014, the district court denied Mashak’s request for an ADA
accommodation, ruling that Mashak had failed to show that he was entitled to
accommodation. On December 19, 2014, the district court issued an order denying
Mashak’s discovery and class-action motions after Mashak failed to appear at the motion
hearing, quashed the subpoenas as not reasonably likely to lead to admissible evidence,
and granted a protective order to Capital One prohibiting Mashak from seeking more
discovery. Mashak appealed the order to this court, which dismissed the appeal as taken
from a nonappealable order.
Capital One moved for summary judgment on January 30, 2015. Mashak
responded with his own motion for summary judgment, alleging that he was entitled to
summary judgment because the Federal Reserve had devalued the U.S. currency through
the “Money Multiplier” effect, which meant the currency was without value and he owed
no money. Further, he argued that the credit-card contract was not legally binding or
enforceable.
After a hearing in March 2015, the district court denied Capital One’s motion for
summary judgment based on unjust enrichment, but granted summary judgment in favor
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of Capital One on its breach-of-contract and account-stated claims. The district court
denied Mashak’s motions, ordered him to pay $24,524.78, and reserved the question of
costs and disbursements. This appeal followed.
DECISION
I.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo to determine
whether there are genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its
application of the law. Larson v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 855 N.W.2d 293, 299 (Minn.
2014). An appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and may not decide issues of fact. Id. There is no genuine issue of
material fact when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the nonmoving party.” DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 69 (Minn. 1997)
(quotation omitted). If the nonmoving party has the burden of proof on an essential
element of a claim, “the nonmoving party must make a showing sufficient to establish
that essential element.” Id.at 71.
The undisputed evidence demonstrates that (1) Mashak applied for a credit card
issued by Capital One; (2) he used the credit card for a period of five years, from 2004 to
2009; (3) he incurred charges of at least $24,524.78; (4) he made no payments after 2009,
leaving an outstanding balance of $24,524.78; and (5) under the terms of the credit-card
application and agreement, he agreed to pay charges incurred while using the card upon
certain terms that include interest payments.
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Mashak has raised a number of affirmative defenses or counterclaims. He asserts
in this appeal that (1) Capital One is an illegal cartel; (2) the district court improperly
applied a so-called “Rule of Man,” which he also refers to as “Case Law,” rather than
“Constitution-based Law, the Rule of Law”; and (3) the Federal Reserve and “Fractional
Reserve Banks” have devalued the currency through the “Money Multiplier Effect” that
renders the United States currency valueless.
Mashak did not raise the question of whether Capital One was an illegal cartel
before the district court and therefore may not raise this issue on appeal. See Thiele v.
Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). Mashak’s allegation that Capital One, the
Federal Reserve, and the United States banking system are involved in a conspiracy is
beyond the scope of the action, and the district court does not have subject-matter
jurisdiction over the question of whether Capital One and the Federal Reserve engaged in
illegal manipulation of the United States currency. See, e.g., Jinadu v. CenTrust Mortg.
Corp., 517 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. App. 1994) (discussing state court’s lack of jurisdiction
over claims brought under a federal regulatory statute), review denied (Minn. July 27,
1994).
Mashak does not explain the distinction between “Rule of Man” or “Case Law”
and “Constitution-based law,” but generally, the American legal system uses statutes,
precedential or case law, and constitutional law. See Olmanson v. LeSueur Cty, 693
N.W.2d 876, 879 (Minn. 2005) (discussing statutory construction to avoid constitutional
problems); Dahlin v. Kroening, 784 N.W.2d 406, 409 (Minn. App. 2010) (discussing
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interplay of common law and statutory law), aff’d 796 N.W.2d 503 (Minn. 2011). On
this record, the district court did not misapply the law.
Finally, Mashak’s claim that the Federal Reserve, in conjunction with “Fractional
Share Banks,” devalued the U.S. currency through use of the “Money Multiplier Effect”
is not supported by credible record evidence, is beyond the scope of this collection action,
and is an issue over which the district court does not have jurisdiction.
Mashak also argues that the record evidence fails to show acceptance,
consideration, and a meeting of the minds, matters essential to contract formation. See
Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 263 Minn. 520, 531-32, 117 N.W.2d 213, 220-21 (1962)
(stating that valid contract requires consideration, acceptance, and a manifestation of
mutual assent). But the undisputed facts here show that Mashak applied for and was
issued a credit card, a manifestation of mutual assent; he used the card according to its
terms for five years, which demonstrates acceptance; and he incurred charges and
received credit, which provides consideration for the contract. The district court did not
err by granting summary judgment to Capital One on its breach-of-contract claim.
II.
Mashak next argues that the district court “cannot rightfully overtly nor covertly
limit [his] right to Discovery in vigorously asserting his defenses.” Mashak cites no law
to support his claim that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to
compel discovery. “An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported
by any argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will not be considered
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on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” State v. Modern
Recycling, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 770, 772 (Minn. App. 1997) (quotation omitted).
In any case, a district court has broad discretion in its discovery orders. In re
Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 735 N.W.2d 706, 711 (Minn. 2007). The district court denied
Mashak’s motions to compel discovery when he deliberately failed to attend the motion
hearing, and quashed subpoenas that Mashak sought in order to disclose problems in the
banking system, concluding that it was unlikely to lead to discovery of evidence
admissible in this action. Minn. R. Civ. P. 26.02(b) provides that “[d]iscovery must be
limited to matters that would enable a party to prove or disprove a claim or defense . . .
and must comport with the factors of proportionality[.]” On this record, the district court
did not abuse its discretion by quashing subpoenas that were unlikely to prove a defense
to a collections action.
III.
Mashak argues that the district court erred by failing to make an ADA
accommodation for him by permitting him appear by telephone rather than in person.
The district court denied his motion but permitted him to ask for periodic breaks during
court proceedings.
The ADA prohibits a public entity from excluding a person with a disability from
participating in or receiving services from the public entity or otherwise being subject to
discrimination by the public entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2013). A “disability” is defined
as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities” of a person, the “record of such an impairment,” or “being regarded as having
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such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2013). A “major life activity” includes
“caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking,
standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking,
communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2013). “Whether the plaintiff has
an impairment within the meaning of the ADA is a question of law for the court to
decide.” Doebele v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1129 (10th Circ. 2003).
According to the district court’s order denying Mashak an ADA accommodation,
Mashak claims to suffer from “PTSD – legal abuse syndrome,” but he did not provide
“any record of his impairment by such a condition, nor has he shown that he is regarded
as having such impairment.” A person asserting an ADA claim has the burden of
showing a “recognized impairment” and “must show that the impairment substantially
limits one or more [major life activities].” Id. The only evidence Mashak offered was
“an internet URL that links to a youtube.com video explaining ‘legal abuse syndrome.’”
The district court did not err by concluding that Mashak “failed to show that he is entitled
to accommodation under the ADA.”
Affirmed.
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