State of Minnesota v. Jason Wade Hostutler ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-0626
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Jason Wade Hostutler,
Appellant.
Filed February 2, 2015
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge
Rice County District Court
File No. 66-CR-13-1839
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Paul Beaumaster, Rice County Attorney, Terence Swihart, Assistant County Attorney,
Faribault, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn J. Lockwood, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Connolly, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty
plea based on the victim’s recantation. We affirm.
FACTS
On July 19, 2013, M.G. arrived at the Northfield Hospital alleging that her ex-
boyfriend, appellant Jason Wade Hostutler, had been choking and beating her for the past
few days. Officer Mark Kohn spoke with M.G. at the hospital and noticed redness
around her neck and left shoulder and a handprint-shaped bruise on her right bicep. M.G.
also had bruising and a cut near her right elbow, which she attributed to Hostutler striking
her with a broom handle.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Hostutler with domestic assault by
strangulation and misdemeanor domestic assault. In late August, Hostutler pleaded guilty
to domestic assault by strangulation. In exchange, the state dismissed the misdemeanor
charge and agreed to recommend a stayed sentence. In early October, M.G. recanted her
statements against Hostutler in an affidavit. M.G. explained that she fabricated her
allegations because Hostutler had once falsely accused her of assaulting him with a knife
and she “wanted him to go away.”
Prior to sentencing, Hostutler moved to withdraw his guilty plea based on M.G.’s
affidavit. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Hostutler provided a
sufficient factual basis for his guilty plea at his plea hearing and that nothing indicated his
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plea was “not fair and not just.” The district court subsequently imposed the agreed-upon
sentence. Hostutler appeals.
DECISION
The decision to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing is
left to the discretion of the district court, and will only be reversed “in the rare case in
which the appellate court can fairly conclude that the [district] court abused its
discretion.” Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. 1989). A defendant is permitted
to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing “if it is fair and just to do so.” Minn. R.
Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2.1 When ruling on a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea,
the district court must consider the reasons advanced by the defendant, as well as whether
granting the motion would prejudice the prosecution. Id. Underlying the “fair and just”
standard is “the notion that giving a defendant an absolute right to withdraw a plea before
sentence would undermine the integrity of the plea-taking process.” Kim, 434 N.W.2d at
266.
Hostutler argues that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because
M.G. recanted the allegations underlying the assault offense. Recantation by a
complaining witness does not compel a district court to allow a defendant to withdraw his
guilty plea. State v. Tuttle, 504 N.W.2d 252, 256-57 (Minn. App. 1993). Rather, the
court must be “reasonably certain that the recantation is genuine” before granting such a
motion. State v. Risken, 331 N.W.2d 489, 490 (Minn. 1983). “Courts tend to view
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Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1, allows a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea at any
time to “correct a manifest injustice.” On appeal, Hostutler does not contend that
withdrawal is warranted under the manifest-injustice standard.
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recanted testimony with suspicion because of the possibility that it was obtained through
coercion.” State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 585 n.7 (Minn. 1982).
The district court acknowledged that resolution of Hostutler’s motion required it to
weigh two conflicting sworn statements: Hostutler’s testimony at his plea hearing and
M.G.’s recantation in an affidavit. While the district court did not make an explicit
credibility determination regarding M.G.’s recantation, by framing the issue as a choice
between two conflicting versions of events, the denial of Hostutler’s motion implies that
the district court did not find M.G.’s recantation to be genuine. We defer to a district
court’s credibility findings. Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 473 (Minn. App.
2000).
Moreover, the record supports the district court’s implicit credibility determination
and establishes a factual basis for Hostutler’s guilty plea. First, M.G.’s injuries, including
bruising, redness around her neck and left shoulder, and cuts are consistent with her
original allegations. Second, M.G.’s statements to Officer Kohn at the hospital
immediately following the incident are consistent with her injuries. Finally, Hostutler’s
testimony at the plea hearing is consistent with M.G.’s statement that he choked her.
Hostutler stated “we were arguing, and we got in a little wrestling match at the top of the
stairs, and we went rolling down the stairs, and when we got to the bottom of the stairs, I
was on top of her with my arm on her neck.” He also admitted that he then wrapped his
left arm around M.G.’s neck, squeezing to the point that she struggled to breathe.
Hostutler nonetheless argues that plea withdrawal is warranted because M.G.’s
affidavit is inherently reliable because it constitutes a statement against interest and M.G.
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had a strong motive to fabricate. We are not persuaded. M.G.’s affidavit does admit to
lying to law enforcement about the assault, but the risk of prosecution was likely
minimal. The recognized possibility that a complaining witness might falsely recant
statements due to coercion also undercuts the argument that the statement is inherently
reliable. See Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d at 585 n.7.
And the acrimonious relationship between Hostutler and M.G. arguably provides
both with the motivation to fabricate. M.G.’s affidavit asserts that she accused Hostutler
because he had previously lied about her attacking him, and she “wanted him to go
away.” Hostutler’s past allegation could provide a motive for M.G. to lie. But as the
state points out, Hostutler similarly recanted his allegation against M.G., and he could
have used this to persuade her to do the same when the roles of accuser and accused were
reversed. Such competing theories demonstrate that Hostutler’s previous recantation
could plausibly lend support to either party’s argument.
In sum, evidence in the record, combined with Hostutler’s own testimony,
provided sufficient grounds for the district court to find that M.G.’s recantation was not
genuine and that there is a sufficient factual basis for his plea. Accordingly, we conclude
the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Hostutler’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
Affirmed.
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