State of Minnesota v. Arron Scott King ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-0627
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Arron Scott King,
Appellant.
Filed February 2, 2015
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge
Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-13-703
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Andrew T. Jackola, Assistant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HOOTEN, Judge
On appeal from his conviction of aiding and abetting second-degree burglary,
appellant argues that (1) his conviction must be reversed because the state did not
adequately corroborate the testimony of appellant’s accomplice, and (2) the district court
abused its discretion by denying his request for a mistrial. We affirm.
FACTS
A residence in Blaine, Minnesota was broken into on the night of January 28,
2013, and several items were stolen. That night, a couple who lived in the same
townhouse complex were driving home and saw two individuals wearing hooded
sweatshirts walking out of their yard. One of the individuals appeared to be wearing a
“dark colored hooded sweatshirt,” while the other individual appeared to be wearing a
gray hooded sweatshirt. One of the witnesses saw one of the individuals run to a vehicle
and guessed that the witnesses had interrupted a robbery or act of vandalism, so he asked
the other witness to dial 911 while he tried to view the vehicle’s license plate. The two
individuals got in the vehicle and tried to drive away, but were prevented from doing so
by the witnesses, who had maneuvered their vehicle to block the suspects from leaving.
The witnesses were able to read the license plate number to the 911 operator before the
vehicle reversed course and drove away. The witnesses then advised the 911 operator
that the vehicle had turned onto northbound Highway 65.
Following the 911 call, the emergency dispatcher notified the Blaine Police
Department at 7:27 p.m. of a possible interrupted burglary in the townhouse complex.
Around 7:38 p.m., Lucas Christofferson, an Anoka County sheriff’s deputy, received a
radio call from police dispatch advising him that the suspect vehicle might be nearing his
location on Highway 65. Deputy Christofferson estimated that it would take 15 minutes
in normal traffic for the suspects to reach his location from the Blaine residence. Deputy
Christofferson decided to park his car at a crossover, “to see if the vehicle would pass
2
[by] where [he] was sitting.” He waited several minutes before spotting the suspect
vehicle. He proceeded to call for backup and pursue the vehicle.
The suspect vehicle immediately pulled over when Christofferson turned on his
lights. Police found appellant Arron Scott King and Willie Darnell Guise in the vehicle
and placed them under arrest. Guise had been driving and King was in the passenger
seat. At the time of arrest, Guise was wearing a dark hooded sweatshirt and King was not
wearing a sweatshirt, although a gray hooded sweatshirt was found in the backseat of the
vehicle. Several items in the suspect vehicle were later identified as belonging to the
victim of the Blaine burglary.
King was eventually charged with two counts of aiding and abetting second-
degree burglary, as the state alleged that King and Guise had also committed a burglary
in Fridley earlier the same night. A four-day jury trial was held at which the two
witnesses, the victims of the two burglaries, and several police officers testified to the
above facts. Per the terms of a plea agreement, Guise also testified against King at trial.
Guise stated that he and King had burglarized the Blaine residence on January 28, 2013,
and had also burglarized a second home in Fridley earlier that night. Guise testified that
he had driven King to both the Fridley and Blaine burglaries, and that King had broken
into both residences using a crowbar. King stole jewelry from the Fridley residence, and
both King and Guise stole jewelry, money, DVDs, and a laptop from the Blaine
residence. Guise testified that the two hurriedly left the Blaine residence after being
spotted by witnesses, and they threw some of the stolen items and the crowbar out of the
vehicle window before they were stopped and arrested.
3
The sole witness for the defense was a Minnesota Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension forensic analyst. She examined shoe prints found outside the Blaine
townhouse and opined that they were consistent with the shoes King was wearing that
night, but could not rule out the possibility that the shoe prints were made by a different
pair of shoes of a similar make and size.
The jury found King guilty of the Blaine burglary but acquitted him of the Fridley
burglary. At sentencing, the district court found that King qualified as a career offender
and sentenced him to 102 months in prison. This appeal followed.
DECISION
I.
King argues that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to corroborate
Guise’s testimony that King was the second burglar with whom Guise committed the
Blaine burglary. Accomplice testimony must be corroborated by other evidence showing
defendant’s guilt, and such evidence “is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission
of the offense or the circumstances thereof.” Minn. Stat. § 634.04 (2012). Instead, the
evidence “‘must link or connect the defendant to the crime’” and “‘point to the
defendant’s guilt in some substantial degree’” in order to adequately corroborate
accomplice testimony. Turnage v. State, 708 N.W.2d 535, 543 (Minn. 2006) (quoting
State v. Adams, 295 N.W.2d 527, 533 (Minn. 1980)). Corroboration can come from other
evidence showing “the defendant’s association with those involved in the crime in such a
way as to suggest joint participation, as well as from the defendant’s opportunity and
motive to commit the crime and his proximity to the place where the crime was
committed.” Adams, 295 N.W.2d at 533. The corroborating evidence can be either
4
direct or circumstantial. State v. Johnson, 616 N.W.2d 720, 727 (Minn. 2000). We
review the sufficiency of corroborating evidence in the light most favorable to the state
and resolve evidentiary conflicts in favor of the verdict. Turnage, 708 N.W.2d at 543.
At trial, Guise testified at length about King’s role in the Blaine burglary. Guise
detailed how, after the burglary, he and King left the Blaine residence and ran back to the
vehicle, and stated that they left quickly because they were concerned they had been seen
and were being followed by the witnesses. Guise testified that King was wearing a gray
sweatshirt during the Blaine burglary and that King removed the sweatshirt in the vehicle
afterward. Guise also confirmed that King was wearing shoes that night that matched
shoe prints found near the Blaine residence. Guise denied that the vehicle stopped at any
time between leaving the Blaine townhouse and being pulled over by the police.
In attempting to rebut Guise’s testimony and provide an alternative explanation for
King’s presence in the vehicle, King’s counsel asserted in closing arguments that Guise,
after fleeing the scene of the burglary, dropped off his true accomplice and picked up
King before being stopped by the police. But, there was no evidentiary support for this
alternative explanation for King’s presence in Guise’s vehicle. And contrary to King’s
arguments on appeal, Guise’s testimony that King participated in the burglary was
corroborated in several material respects. Eyewitnesses saw Guise’s vehicle leave the
site of the burglary and head north on Highway 65. Approximately 15 minutes later, the
police, who were expecting to see Guise’s vehicle on Highway 65, stopped the vehicle
and found King inside with stolen items from the Blaine burglary. King’s presence in
Guise’s vehicle so soon after the crime establishes his proximity to the crime scene and
involvement in the commission of the burglary. Moreover, additional circumstantial
5
evidence placed King at the scene of the crime. The second burglar was seen wearing a
gray sweatshirt by both witnesses, and such a sweatshirt was found near King in the
backseat of the vehicle. And while the shoe prints found at the scene do not conclusively
identify King as the accomplice in Blaine, they were consistent with the shoes King was
wearing when he was arrested and further bolster Guise’s testimony.
Apart from Guise’s testimony, the other evidence at trial connected King to the
Blaine burglary by indicating his presence at the crime scene and in the getaway vehicle.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state and resolving all conflicts in
favor of the conviction, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to properly
corroborate Guise’s testimony and for the jury to reject King’s version of events.
II.
King argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to grant a
mistrial based on two allegedly prejudicial statements made by Guise at trial. Before
trial, King moved to exclude any testimony or evidence regarding his prior incarceration,
and the district court granted King’s motion.
At trial, the following exchange occurred during redirect examination of Guise:
PROSECUTOR: On January 28th, describe your friendship
with Mr. King.
GUISE: I don’t know if I can really describe it. I mean, in the
beginning our relationship was real, real good. It was solid. I
felt like that was—he was a brother to me. But as the years
went on, we just kind of grew apart. He did some time in
prison and—
(Emphasis added). King’s counsel immediately objected. The district court sustained the
objection and instructed the jury to disregard Guise’s statement. Unprompted, Guise then
said, “I’m sorry. But he did some time[.]” (Emphasis added). When the jury left for a
6
lunch break soon thereafter, King’s counsel moved for a mistrial. He was concerned that
any warning given to Guise by the state about not mentioning King’s criminal history
was “ineffectual” and that the references to King serving time in prison were “going to
stick with the jury.”
The district court denied the motion for a mistrial. Following State v. McCurry,
770 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 2009), the district
court found that there was not a “reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial
would be different” absent Guise’s remarks because the state had already shown
“significant evidence of guilt.” King then agreed to a curative instruction, and the district
court used language directly from McCurry in instructing the jury to disregard Guise’s
statements about King’s prior incarceration.
We review the denial of a mistrial motion for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Jorgensen, 660 N.W.2d 127, 133 (Minn. 2003). “[A] mistrial should not be granted
unless there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would be different.”
State v. Spann, 574 N.W.2d 47, 53 (Minn. 1998). “References to a defendant’s prior
criminal history can be unfairly prejudicial,” but “a district court’s appropriate curative
instructions may be sufficient to overcome the harm caused by inadvertent references to
prior convictions.” McCurry, 770 N.W.2d at 558.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying King’s motion for a
mistrial. As found by the district court, McCurry is instructive here, as it contains a
similar fact pattern on which this court held that a district court did not abuse its
discretion by denying a mistrial. 770 N.W.2d at 558–59. As in McCurry, the state did
nothing to elicit the two remarks about prison time. See id. at 558. And, while King
7
argues that McCurry contained only a single inadvertent remark as opposed to the two
remarks in this case, the additional remark by Guise was unprompted and merely
repeated that King “did some time.” In McCurry, the witness indicated that the defendant
“went to prison for an attempted sexual assault charge.” Id. (quotations omitted). Two
fleeting references to serving time in prison are likely not as prejudicial as a statement
indicating that a defendant served time for a sex offense. Moreover, the district court
gave a curative instruction directly from McCurry, and such an instruction “is a
significant factor favoring the denial of a motion for a mistrial” in light of our
“presumption that jurors follow instructions.” Id. at 558–59 (quotation omitted).
The district court carefully considered the statements made by Guise and
concluded that there was no reasonable probability that they would alter the outcome of
the trial in light of the evidence already presented in support of King’s guilt. The record
does not show that the district court erred in making that conclusion. Under these
circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying King’s motion for
a mistrial and providing a curative instruction to the jury.
Affirmed.
8