State of Minnesota v. Deandre Dynell Burges ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-0168
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Deandre Dynell Burges,
Appellant
Filed March 2, 2015
Affirmed
Worke, Judge
Benton County District Court
File No. 05-CR-13-312
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Matthew G. Frank, Assistant Attorney General, St.
Paul, Minnesota; and
Philip Miller, Benton County Attorney, Foley, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
Connolly, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of unlawful possession of a firearm and
violation of a domestic-abuse no-contact order (DANCO), arguing that evidence of his
identity and gun should have been suppressed as the result of an unlawful search of his
wallet seized from his pocket while he was sleeping. We affirm.
DECISION
Appellant Deandre Dynell Burges argues that the unlawful seizure of his wallet
led to the discovery of his identity and arrest for violating a DANCO, which then led to
the discovery of the gun. He claims that the district court should have suppressed the
evidence.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit “unreasonable searches
and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “When reviewing
pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts
and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in . . . not suppressing
the evidence.” State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999). We review the district
court’s findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard, but legal determinations are
reviewed de novo. State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn. 2006); see State v.
Anderson, 733 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn. 2007) (“We review de novo a district court’s
ruling on constitutional questions involving searches and seizures.”); In re Welfare of
G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Minn. 1997) (stating the standard for reviewing district
court’s reasonable-suspicion determination for Terry stops and probable-cause
determination for warrantless searches is de novo).
“[C]onsistent with the Fourth Amendment, [an officer may] conduct a brief,
investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion [of] criminal
activity.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000) (citing Terry
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v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)). “Reasonable suspicion must be
based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 182
(Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted). A police officer’s reasonable suspicion is based on the
circumstances as a whole and includes his inferences and deductions that may not be
obvious to an untrained person. Harris, 590 N.W.2d at 99. While the reasonable-
suspicion standard is not high, State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008), it
cannot be based on a mere “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” State v.
Martinson, 581 N.W.2d 846, 850 (Minn. 1998) (quotation omitted). This court considers
the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the police had justification for a
Terry stop. State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000).
Here, en route to a reported domestic in progress, Officer Allen Braegelmann was
advised of a valid DANCO preventing Burges from contacting S.F. Approaching the
back of the residence, Officer Braegelmann could hear a male and female yelling from
inside. He knocked and announced himself as a police officer and the yelling stopped.
S.F. opened the door. The officer asked her where the male was. S.F. responded that he
had left, pointing out the door to a vehicle. S.F. then changed her mind and pointed to the
front door, claiming that she was uncertain. Officer Braegelmann asked another officer
to search the area for Burges; the search was unsuccessful.
S.F. admitted that she had been arguing with Burges. The officer requested to
speak with S.F.’s daughter who had called 911. S.F. went upstairs and returned with her
daughter who confirmed the argument. S.F. then consented to a search of the residence
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for Burges for S.F.’s safety. In one bedroom, officers found small children, in another
bedroom they found a sleeping male. S.F. identified the sleeping man as her cousin,
Xavier Lorenzo. Officer Braegelmann was skeptical about S.F.’s identification because
of her previous uncertainty regarding Burges’s point of departure from the residence and
because officers found no indication that anyone had left.
Officer Braegelmann told the male to wake up, but the male did not comply.
Officer Braegelmann unsuccessfully attempted to shake the male awake. The officer
lowered the blankets covering the male and observed a bulge in the male’s pocket, which
he believed to be a wallet. After unsuccessful attempts to wake the male, the officer
removed the wallet and found Burges’s ID inside. Burges was arrested for violating the
DANCO. Burges was assisted to a sitting position while he continued to appear sleeping.
Officers then noticed a blunt object in Burges’s pocket, which was a handgun.
While Burges concedes that the 911 call, the officer’s knowledge of the DANCO,
and S.F.’s admission that she was arguing with Burges gave the officers reasonable
suspicion to conduct a brief Terry investigation into whether Burges had violated the
DANCO, he argues that the search of his wallet exceeded the lawful scope of the
investigation. Burges asserts that at most the officers had a hunch that he was the
sleeping male, and without awareness of his description, there was no reason to doubt
S.F.’s identification of the man as her cousin.
We disagree. Officer Braegelmann had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
when he arrived at the residence, based on the 911 call, the officer’s knowledge of the
DANCO, the officer hearing the argument when he approached, and S.F.’s admission that
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she had been arguing with Burges. Officer Braegelmann then found a male sleeping
upstairs. Even though S.F. identified Burges as her cousin, the officer was skeptical of
her identification because of her earlier uncertainty and because officers did not find
anyone during their search outside of the residence. Officer Braegelmann testified that he
took the wallet out of Burges’s pocket because he was investigating the DANCO
violation and believed that Burges was inside the residence. Based on the totality of the
circumstances, the officer had probable cause to arrest when he found the male sleeping
upstairs who was uncooperative in identifying himself.
Police who have probable cause to arrest can conduct a search incident to arrest
even if the search occurs before the arrest. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11,
100 S. Ct. 2556, 2564 (1980); see State v. White, 489 N.W.2d 792, 795 (Minn. 1992)
(upholding search on basis of police officer’s objective probable cause to arrest suspect
for driving without a license). An officer is allowed to conduct a search incident to arrest
of “a person’s body and the area within his or her immediate control.” State v. Robb, 605
N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn. 2000). A search incident to arrest includes a search of pockets.
State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Minn. 1998).
The dispositive question under the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine is whether
police had probable cause to believe the suspect had committed a crime. G.M., 560
N.W.2d at 695. Probable cause exists when the “objective facts are such that under the
circumstances, a person of ordinary care and prudence would entertain an honest and
strong suspicion that a crime has been committed.” Id. A probable-cause determination
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evaluates an officer’s observations, information, and police experience. State v. Koppi,
798 N.W.2d 358, 362-63 (Minn. 2011).
We conclude that the warrantless seizure and search of Burges’s wallet were
reasonable because the police had probable cause to believe that the sleeping man was
Burges, and consequently, had objective probable cause to arrest Burges on the basis of
that belief. As for the gun, it was found after Burges was arrested for violating the
DANCO. The district court did not err by declining to suppress the evidence of Burges’s
identity and gun.
Affirmed.
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