State of Minnesota v. Timothy Scott Anderson ( 2016 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1742
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Timothy Scott Anderson,
Appellant.
Filed September 19, 2016
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge
Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-14-3456
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Heather D. Pipenhagen, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)
Timothy Anderson, St. Cloud, Minnesota (pro se appellant)
Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s imposition of presumptive guidelines
sentences for three convictions of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, arguing that he
is particularly amenable to probation and should be granted downward dispositional
departures or a “restructuring” of his sentences. Because the district court did not abuse
its discretion in sentencing appellant, we affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Timothy Scott Anderson with five
counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. The state alleged that Anderson had
sexual contact with his three daughters when they were under the age of 16. Anderson
pleaded guilty to three counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. He then moved
for dispositional departures from the presumptive sentences under the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines, arguing that he “is particularly amenable to individualized sex
offender treatment in a probationary setting.” The district court denied Anderson’s motion
and imposed middle-of-the-box guidelines sentences. Anderson was committed to the
commissioner of corrections to serve concurrent sentences of 48 months, 91 months, and
130 months. This appeal follows.
DECISION
An appellate court “may review [a] sentence imposed or stayed to determine
whether the sentence is consistent with statutory requirements, unreasonable,
inappropriate, excessive, unjustifiably disparate, or not warranted by the findings of fact
issued by the district court.” Minn. Stat. § 244.11, subd. 2(b) (2014). Appellate courts
“afford the [district] court great discretion in the imposition of sentences and reverse
sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303,
307-08 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). An appellate court “will not ordinarily interfere
with a sentence falling within the presumptive sentence range, either dispositionally or
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durationally, even if there are grounds that would justify departure.” State v. Bertsch, 707
N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d
6, 7 (Minn. 1981) (expressing belief “that it would be a rare case which would warrant
reversal of the refusal to depart”).
“[T]he presumptive sentences are deemed appropriate for the felonies covered by
them. Therefore, departures from the presumptive sentences established in the Sentencing
Guidelines should be made only when substantial and compelling circumstances can be
identified and articulated.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1.A.5 (2014). “Substantial and
compelling circumstances are those circumstances that make the facts of a particular case
different from a typical case.” Taylor v. State, 670 N.W.2d 584, 587 (Minn. 2003)
(quotation omitted).
The supreme court “ha[s] held that ‘a defendant’s particular amenability to
individualized treatment in a probationary setting will justify departure in the form of a
stay of execution of a presumptively executed sentence.’” Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308
(quoting State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982)). The supreme court “ha[s]
recognized several . . . factors that can be relevant to determining if a defendant is
particularly amenable to probation, including ‘the defendant’s age, his prior record, his
remorse, his cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the support of friends and/or
family.’” Id. at 310 (quoting Trog, 323 N.W.2d at 31). Offense-related factors also may
be used to support a dispositional departure. State v. Chaklos, 528 N.W.2d 225, 228 (Minn.
1995); see also Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 313 (considering circumstances of offense of
conviction when reviewing dispositional departure).
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Analysis of the Trog factors indicates that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by denying dispositional departures. Anderson was 51 years old at the time of
sentencing. Cf. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 310 (indicating that youth of defendant may
demonstrate particular amenability to probation and disagreeing that defendant’s age of 37
demonstrated particular amenability). He had no prior juvenile or criminal record. He did
express shame and guilt about his criminal actions, but he also characterized his behavior
as merely a “boundary” issue. The psychosexual evaluator concluded that “Anderson
minimized the frequency, duration and severity of the sexual abuse of the minor aged
female family members.” Anderson initiated sex-offender treatment and counseling before
the plea hearing. But he also violated no-contact orders before sentencing by having
unapproved contact with two of the victims. He had the support of several friends and
family members, but his wife and daughters provided victim-impact statements referring
to him as deceptive and manipulative, and his wife filed for dissolution of the marriage.
Consideration of the offenses further demonstrates that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by denying dispositional departures. The district court noted that the
crimes “occurred over a period of 17 years” and that “three young women . . . have been
victimized.” The factual record amply supports this finding. The court also stated:
[A]s bad as the sexual abuse was, the fact that the sexual abuse
was committed by their father in their home is probably the
most difficult thing that I think these victims are going to have
to deal with because not only does it affect themselves and how
they view the world but it affects one of the most central things
in their life, their family.
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We also note that, even if the district court had determined that Anderson is
particularly amenable to probation, the court would not have been bound to grant
dispositional departures. See State v. Wall, 343 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Minn. 1984) (“The fact
that a mitigating factor was clearly present did not obligate the court to place defendant on
probation or impose a shorter term than the presumptive term.”); see also Bertsch, 707
N.W.2d at 668 (stating that appellate court “will not ordinarily interfere with a
[presumptive guidelines] sentence . . . even if there are grounds that would justify
departure” (quotation omitted)). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in sentencing Anderson.
Affirmed.
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