In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: M. H. and S. R., Parents. ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-1750
In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: M. H. and S. R., Parents
Filed March 16, 2015
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-14-147
Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Public Defender, Peter W. Gorman, Assistant Public
Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant M.H.)
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Cory A. Carlson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County Human Services
and Public Health Department)
Petra E. Dieperink, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent
S.R.)
Shirley A. Reider, Reider Law Office, St. Paul, Minnesota (for guardian ad litem Nicole
Rice)
Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and
Connolly, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the involuntary termination of her parental rights on the
grounds that (1) the district court abused its discretion by denying her a continuance and
(2) she was deprived of her procedural-due-process rights. We affirm.
FACTS
On June 20, 2013, appellant M.H. gave birth to X.R., and on June 24, X.R. tested
positive for opiates. M.H. admitted to using drugs during her pregnancy, and on June 28,
Hennepin County Human Services filed a child-in-need-of-protection-or-services
(CHIPS) petition for X.R. and placed X.R. in the care of M.H.’s stepmother.
On September 23, 2013, the district court adjudicated X.R. CHIPS and transferred
legal custody to Hennepin County. The court instituted case plans for M.H. and S.R.,
X.R.’s presumed father.1 Meanwhile, X.R. remained with M.H.’s stepmother. He now
suffers from a host of medical conditions, including an inguinal hernia, torticollis,
plagiocephaly, and neurofibromatosis.
On January 9, 2014, Hennepin County petitioned to terminate both M.H.’s and
S.R.’s parental rights over X.R. A subsequently filed amended petition sought
termination of M.H.’s parental rights under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(1), (2),
(4), (5), (8) (2012). In support of the petition, Hennepin County filed four court orders
transferring custody of four children from M.H. and three court orders terminating
1
S.R. is presumed to be X.R.’s father based on genetic testing.
2
M.H.’s parental rights to four other children.2 In each of those cases, the courts
proceeded by default, due to M.H.’s failure to appear.
On May 27, 2014, the district court continued a pretrial and trial proceeding and
scheduled a new pretrial and trial date for August 4, and a second trial date for
September 8. As a condition for the continuance, the court required M.H. and S.R. to
meet certain conditions, including submitting to random drug testing. Both M.H. and
S.R. failed to provide the required drug tests, and the county presumed that they failed.
On August 4, 2014, M.H. arrived at the courthouse for pretrial and trial but left
prior to the proceeding. According to M.H.’s attorney, she was agitated, due to a thyroid
condition and impending surgery. S.R., who also arrived at the courthouse, left with
M.H. The county attorney moved to proceed by default, arguing that M.H. and S.R.
failed to present any documentation regarding M.H.’s medical condition, that the case
was open for almost 14 months, and that permanency considerations were paramount.
M.H.’s attorney objected to the motion, arguing that M.H.’s thyroid condition “may very
well be the reason why [she] was not able to regulate herself” and that M.H. should not
be penalized for “laboring under a medical condition” during the already stressful
termination proceeding. M.H.’s attorney moved for a continuance to the second trial
date. S.R.’s attorney supported the motion for a continuance, concurring with the belief
that M.H. was dealing with a thyroid condition and stating that S.R. left only for the
purpose of ensuring M.H.’s safety. S.R.’s attorney also noted that S.R. wanted to pursue
a voluntary termination. The guardian ad litem’s attorney supported the motion to
2
M.H. has also placed a child for adoption through a private agency.
3
proceed by default, arguing that the case had been previously continued and that the court
should “start working towards . . . permanency.” The district court granted the motion to
proceed by default and implicitly denied a continuance. But the court stated:
In the event that [M.H.]’s failure to regulate herself in the
courtroom and perceived instability and the fact that she left
the courtroom before trial, in the event that is due to a
medical condition [M.H.] may provide evidence to this Court
of either her sobriety today by taking a UA or the fact that a
medical explanation by a doctor that her behavior today
including her leaving is due to an immediate thyroid
condition, I will allow that evidence to be submitted to this
Court after court and we can address it at a later date.
During the default proceeding, the county attorney offered 36 exhibits into
evidence, en masse, without objection. The county attorney then examined the Hennepin
County social worker and the guardian ad litem, using numerous yes-or-no or otherwise
leading questions. Both witnesses gave opinion testimony regarding X.R.’s best
interests. No objections were made to either the form or substance of the questions asked
by the county attorney. M.H.’s attorney briefly examined the Hennepin County social
worker and the guardian ad litem, and the guardian ad litem’s attorney briefly examined
the guardian ad litem.
At the conclusion of the proceeding, the district court reiterated that M.H. and S.R.
had two weeks “to make any motion to reopen th[e] record.” M.H. submitted no
evidence of sobriety or her medical condition and made no motion to reopen the record
within the designated timeframe. In fact, M.H.’s attorney e-mailed the court indicating
that “[she] w[ould] not be submitting any medical justification for [M.H.]’s absence from
court.”
4
On September 9, 2014, the district court terminated M.H.’s and S.R.’s parental
rights over X.R. Specifically, the court terminated M.H.’s parental rights under Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (5), (8). On September 10, M.H. moved to reopen
the default or for a new trial under Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 45.04(f), (h), 46.02(e). She
argued that she believed she would prevail on the merits, there was insufficient evidence
to support termination, there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s
determination that termination was in X.R.’s best interests, and the court erred by
allowing opinion testimony on X.R.’s best interests. On September 19, the court denied
M.H.’s motion.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Denial of continuance
M.H. first argues that the district court erred by denying her a continuance. She
cites In re Welfare of Children of S.O., No. A04-0830, 2004 WL 2857672 (Minn. App.
Dec. 14, 2004), review denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2005), for the proposition that her alleged
medical condition justified a continuance.
The court may . . . continue . . . a trial to a later date upon
written findings or oral findings made on the record that a
continuance is necessary . . . for accumulation or presentation
of evidence or witnesses, to protect the rights of a party, or
for other good cause shown, so long as the permanency time
requirements set forth in these rules are not delayed.
Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 39.02, subd. 2. “Whether to grant a continuance is a ruling within
the trial court’s discretion, which will not be reversed absent a showing of a clear abuse
5
of that discretion.” In re Welfare of J.A.S., 488 N.W.2d 332, 335 (Minn. App. 1992)
(citing Dunshee v. Douglas, 255 N.W.2d 42, 45 (Minn. 1977)), review denied (Minn.
Oct. 20, 1992).
M.H.’s reliance on S.O. is misplaced for two reasons. First, although persuasive,
unpublished opinions of this court are not precedential. Vlahos v. R&I Const. of
Bloomington, Inc., 676 N.W.2d 672, 676 n.3 (Minn. 2004); see also Minn. Stat.
§ 480A.08, subd. 3(c) (2014) (“Unpublished opinions of the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals are not
precedential.”). Second, this case is factually distinguishable from S.O. In that case, the
“mother sought a continuance to acquire information about whether the lithium added to
her medications would stabilize her mood and allow her to complete her case plan.”
S.O., 2004 WL 2857672, at *2. This court reversed the district court’s denial of a
continuance because the mother was pursuing new evidence that she could not have
previously accumulated with diligence. Id. at *2-3. In this case, M.H.’s attorney
provided no justification for a continuance beyond the assertion that M.H. was absent due
to an alleged medical condition. M.H.’s attorney in no way suggested that a continuance
would allow for accumulation of evidence that could not have previously been obtained
with diligence.
M.H. also fails to address X.R.’s interest in permanency. Although the district
court did not discuss permanency as a reason for denying a continuance, the guardian ad
litem’s attorney and county attorney both argued that the court should proceed by default
because the case was previously continued and was open for almost 14 months and that
the court needed to move toward permanency. See J.A.S., 488 N.W.2d at 335 (noting that
6
“[t]he record shows the guardian ad litem believed it would be best for the children if the
detention hearing proceeded as scheduled . . . .”).
Finally, M.H. has failed to demonstrate prejudice from the district court’s denial of
a continuance. See id. The court provided M.H. two weeks to submit a drug test
demonstrating sobriety or some type of medical evidence demonstrating that her absence
was due to her medical condition. The court explicitly stated that if M.H. submitted such
evidence, it would address it. M.H. failed to submit any evidence in the designated time.
We conclude that the district court therefore did not abuse its discretion by
denying the continuance.
Procedural due process
M.H. next argues that the district court violated her procedural-due-process rights
by (1) allowing leading questions, resulting in “the unending succession of ‘yes’ and ‘no’
answers from the agency witness and from the Guardian” and (2) allowing “opinion
testimony from both the agency social worker and the Guardian-ad-Litem.” She argues
that “[t]here is simply nothing in [Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P.] 18 and nothing in any decided
case which permits the juvenile court to grant a default termination of parental rights
upon the sort of ‘pretend’ trial that was had here.”
“Due process requires reasonable notice, a timely opportunity for a hearing, the
right to counsel, the opportunity to present evidence, the right to an impartial decision-
maker, and the right to a reasonable decision based solely on the record.” In re Welfare
of Children of D.F., 752 N.W.2d 88, 97 (Minn. App. 2008). “The applicable due-process
standard in a [termination] proceeding resides in the guarantee of fundamental fairness.”
7
Id. (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394-95 (1982)).
“Although the amount of process due in a particular case varies with the unique
circumstances of that case, prejudice as a result of the alleged violation is an essential
component of the due process analysis.” In re Welfare of Child of B.J.-M., 744 N.W.2d
669, 673 (Minn. 2008) (citations omitted).
“Whether a parent’s due-process rights have been violated in a termination
proceeding is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo.” In re Welfare of
Children of B.J.B., 747 N.W.2d 605, 608 (Minn. App. 2008). “It is well settled that
where the trial court has jurisdiction of the offense and of the defendant a judgment will
be held void for want of due process only where the circumstances surrounding the trial
are such to make it a sham and a pretense rather than a real judicial proceeding.” In re
Welfare of Children of Coats, 633 N.W.2d 505, 512 (Minn. 2001) (quotation omitted).
In this case, the district court received evidence by way of exhibits and testimony.
M.H.’s attorney was present throughout the proceeding, and the record contains no
suggestion that she was restricted from fully participating therein. In fact, the court
expressly afforded M.H.’s attorney the opportunity to argue against proceeding by
default, move for a continuance, cross-examine witnesses, present evidence in opposition
to the termination, and present a closing argument. M.H.’s attorney could have raised
objections at any time during the proceeding, as evidenced by her objection to proceeding
in default. And M.H. makes no claim that her attorney provided deficient or ineffective
assistance. See In re Welfare of L.B., 404 N.W.2d 341, 345 (Minn. App. 1987)
(analyzing appellant’s claim that he was denied fair trial because, among other things,
8
“his court-appointed counsel was ineffective”). Notably, M.H. cites no legal authority to
support her contention that the alleged evidentiary errors, if truly errors, rendered the
proceeding procedurally inadequate. She makes no claim that she did not receive
“reasonable notice, a timely opportunity for a hearing, the right to counsel, the
opportunity to present evidence, the right to an impartial decision-maker, [or] the right to
a reasonable decision based solely on the record.” See D.F., 752 N.W.2d at 97.
Finally, M.H. has failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the alleged violation
of her procedural-due-process rights. See id. (determining that appellant failed to
demonstrate prejudice from alleged due-process violation). Indeed, she makes no
argument that the district court’s factual findings are incorrect or that the outcome of the
case would be different without the alleged violation.
For all of the above reasons, we conclude that this case was not “a sham [or] a
pretense rather than a real judicial proceeding.” Coats, 633 N.W.2d at 512. It was
“fundamental[ly] fair[].” See D.F., 752 N.W.2d at 97.
Affirmed.
9