Bio Wood Processing, LLC, Relator v. Rice County Board of Commissioners ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-0990
Bio Wood Processing, LLC,
Relator,
vs.
Rice County Board of Commissioners,
Respondent.
Filed April 13, 2015
Reversed and remanded
Johnson, Judge
Rice County Board of Commissioners
Dustan J. Cross, Matthew C. Berger, Gislason & Hunter LLP, New Ulm, Minnesota (for
relator)
Paul D. Reuvers, Nathan C. Midolo, Iverson Reuvers Condon, Bloomington, Minnesota
(for respondent)
Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Larkin, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Bio Wood Processing, LLC, applied for an amended conditional-use permit that
would be less restrictive than an existing conditional-use permit. The Rice County
Planning Commission recommended that the Rice County Board of Commissioners deny
the application. The board followed the recommendation by denying the application.
We conclude that the county did not comply with a county ordinance that requires the
planning commission to make formal findings of fact on the record. Therefore, we
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
Bio Wood recycles wood products into animal bedding and mulch. Bio Wood
conducts its operations at one facility in Rice County, near the city of Faribault, in a
location that the county has determined to be within the urban-reserve zoning district. In
that zoning district, the county designates the operations of agriculturally oriented
businesses such as Bio Wood as conditional uses, which require a conditional-use permit
(CUP). Rice County Zoning Ordinance (RCZO) §§ 503.05, 508.05 (2012).
In September 2011, Bio Wood applied for and was granted a CUP. The CUP
allowed the company to grind wood material between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday
through Friday, and between 8:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. on Saturdays. The CUP contained
no other restrictions on Bio Wood’s hours of operation.
In the summer of 2013, Bio Wood applied for an amended CUP. Bio Wood
sought to amend the existing CUP in various ways, including an expansion of its wood-
2
grinding hours. The county planning commission voted to recommend approval of the
application with an expansion of wood-grinding hours to allow a half hour of machinery
warm-up time beginning at 7:30 a.m. The county board approved the amended CUP but
restricted all of Bio Wood’s operations to the hours of 7:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m., Monday
through Friday, and 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on Saturdays.
In April 2014, Bio Wood applied for a second amended CUP. Bio Wood sought
to amend the existing CUP by proposing a new set of conditions that did not include any
restrictions on its hours of operation. The planning commission considered Bio Wood’s
application at a public hearing on May 1, 2014. After receiving comments from Bio
Wood representatives and residents living near Bio Wood’s facility, the planning
commission discussed the application. A member of the planning commission moved to
recommend that the application be denied. By a voice vote, the planning commission
unanimously approved the motion to recommend denial of the application.
At some time between May 1, 2014, and May 13, 2014, a written report of the
planning commission was prepared and submitted to the board in preparation for the
board’s May 13, 2014 meeting. The report is a one-page document, entitled “Findings of
Fact,” with seven enumerated paragraphs of factual findings.
On May 13, 2014, the board considered Bio Wood’s application at a public
hearing. A board member moved to adopt the planning commission’s recommendation
to deny Bio Wood’s application for a second amended CUP. By a voice vote, the board
unanimously approved the motion to adopt the recommendation to deny the application.
On the same date, the chair of the board signed a written resolution that reflected the
3
board’s denial of the application and incorporated the seven findings of fact that had been
submitted to the board. A county staff person certified the resolution as correct on June
10, 2014, and the resolution was filed with the county recorder the following day.
Bio Wood appeals by way of a writ of certiorari.
DECISION
Bio Wood argues that the county erred by denying its application for an amended
CUP. Bio Wood’s challenge is multi-faceted. It argues that (1) the planning commission
failed to make findings of fact on the record, (2) the board failed to engage in reasoned
decision-making, (3) the board’s findings are not supported by the factual record, and (4)
the board treated similarly situated applicants differently.
A county’s land-use decisions are quasi-judicial in nature and, thus, may be
reviewed on a writ of certiorari. Big Lake Ass’n v. Saint Louis Cnty. Planning Comm’n,
761 N.W.2d 487, 490 (Minn. 2009); Interstate Power Co., Inc. v. Nobles Cnty. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 617 N.W.2d 566, 574 (Minn. 2000). On a writ of certiorari, our review is
limited to an inspection of the record of the inferior tribunal
in which the court “is necessarily confined to questions
affecting the jurisdiction of the board, the regularity of its
proceedings, and, as to merits of the controversy, whether the
order or determination in a particular case was arbitrary,
oppressive, unreasonable, fraudulent, under an erroneous
theory of law, or without any evidence to support it.”
Dietz v. Dodge County, 487 N.W.2d 237, 239 (Minn. 1992) (quoting State ex rel. Ging v.
Board of Educ. of Duluth, 213 Minn. 550, 571, 7 N.W.2d 544, 556 (1942), overruled on
other grounds, Foesch v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 646, 300 Minn. 478, 223 N.W.2d
371 (1974)).
4
We begin by analyzing Bio Wood’s first argument, which effectively challenges
the “regularity” of the county’s “proceedings.” See id. Bio Wood’s argument is based on
the following county ordinance:
A public hearing on the application shall be held by
the Planning Commission after the application has been
certified as complete. The Planning Commission shall make
its report to the County Board recommending approval with
conditions, or disapproval of the proposed conditional use
permit.
....
The report from the Planning Commission to the
County Board shall take the form of formal findings on the
record.
RCZO §§ 503.05(H)(3), (8) (emphasis added).
Bio Wood contends that the county did not comply with this ordinance because
the planning commission failed to make “formal findings on the record.” In response, the
county points to the planning commission’s written report, which contains findings of
fact. But, as the county concedes, those findings were prepared by county staff after the
planning commission’s May 1, 2014 hearing and were neither announced nor approved
by the planning commission during one of its meetings. The county nonetheless contends
that “the ordinance does not require a planning commission member actually write the
findings themselves or that the findings be read aloud on the record verbatim.”
The parties’ respective arguments are based on different interpretations of the
phrase “formal findings on the record,” as it appears in section 503.05(H)(8) of the
county’s ordinances. We interpret an ordinance in the same manner as a statute. In re
5
Haslund, 781 N.W.2d 349, 354 (Minn. 2010). In doing so, our “primary objective” is “to
ascertain and give effect to the intention” of those who enacted the ordinance. See
Greene v. Commissioner of Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs., 755 N.W.2d 713, 721 (Minn.
2008). “The principal method of determining” that intent is “to rely on the plain
meaning” of an ordinance, which may be discerned by reference to the ordinary meaning
of words used in the ordinance as well as rules of grammar and syntax and the structure
of the statute. See State v. Thompson, 754 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Minn. 2008); Occhino v.
Grover, 640 N.W.2d 357, 359-60 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. May 28,
2002). On certiorari review, we apply a de novo standard of review to matters of the
interpretation of a statute or an ordinance. Braatz v. Parsons Elec. Co., 850 N.W.2d 706,
710 (Minn. 2014).
The phrase “on the record” is not defined within the Rice County Ordinances. In
the judicial context, the phrase typically is used to refer to something that occurs or is
spoken in open court and later is reflected in a transcript of the proceedings. See
Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage 757 (3d ed. 2009) (sense C); see, e.g., State v.
Newcombe, 412 N.W.2d 427, 429 (Minn. App. 1987) (referring to statements made “on
the record”), review denied (Minn. Nov. 13, 1987). In the present context, the plain
language of section 503.05(H)(8) of the county’s ordinances should be interpreted to
require the planning commission to make formal findings in the course of a public
meeting, either by stating them orally or by approving a previously prepared document
that includes written findings. In fact, the planning commission employed a notary
public at the May 1, 2014 meeting, and he later prepared a partial transcript, which
6
includes a certification “that the foregoing is a true and correct transcription of said
portion of” the planning commission’s meeting. But nowhere in that transcript is there
any mention of the findings of fact that later appeared in the planning commission’s
written report, nor is there any mention of a document on which those findings are
printed. The county did not satisfy the plain language of section 503.05(H)(8) of the
county’s ordinances because county staff prepared written findings after a planning
commission meeting and submitted the written findings to the county board, without the
planning commission ever formally adopting the findings “on the record,” either at the
prior meeting or a subsequent meeting. Thus, we agree with Bio Wood that the county
did not comply with section 503.05(H)(8) when it considered Bio Wood’s application for
a second amended CUP.
Having concluded that the county failed to follow the procedures in section
503.05(H)(8) of its ordinances, we next must determine the appropriate remedy. A
county’s failure to make valid findings may be grounds for reversal and remand for
further proceedings by which valid findings may be made. For example, in White Bear
Rod & Gun Club v. City of Hugo, 388 N.W.2d 739 (Minn. 1986), the supreme court
reversed the city’s decision to deny a special-use permit because the city failed to make
appropriate findings supporting its decision. Id. at 742-43. The supreme court remanded
the matter to the city council for preparation of “appropriate findings for its decision.”
Id. at 742. A similar remedy is warranted in this case.
Thus, we reverse the county board’s decision to deny Bio Wood’s application for a
second amended CUP, and we remand the matter to the county for further proceedings in
7
compliance with the county’s ordinances. In light of Bio Wood’s success on its first
argument, we need not consider its remaining arguments.
Reversed and remanded.
8