Minnesota Voters Alliance v. State of Minnesota ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-1585
Minnesota Voters Alliance, et al.,
petitioners,
Appellants,
vs.
State of Minnesota, et al.,
Respondents
Filed May 26, 2015
Affirmed
Worke, Judge
Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-13-7718
Erick G. Kaardal, Mohrman, Kaardal & Erickson, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellants)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Alethea M. Huyser, Assistant Attorney General, Nathan
J. Hartshorn, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondents)
Considered and decided by Hudson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Smith,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellants challenge the district court’s denial of their request for attorney fees
under the Minnesota Equal Access to Justice Act (MEAJA), Minn. Stat. §§ 15.471-.474
(2014), after successfully obtaining a writ of quo warranto requiring respondents to
discontinue online voter registration, arguing that the district court erred by concluding
that respondents were substantially justified in creating an online-voter-registration
system. We affirm.
FACTS
In September 2013, respondent secretary of state introduced online voter
registration, allowing citizens of Minnesota to submit voter-registration applications
online.
On November 4, 2013, appellants Minnesota Voters Alliance, Minnesota
Majority, and Minnesota House of Representatives Steve Drazkowski, Ernie Leidiger,
Mary Franson, and Jim Newberger petitioned the district court for a writ of quo warranto
requiring respondents State of Minnesota and the secretary of state, in his official
capacity, or his successor1, to show by what grant of authority the secretary of state
created the online-voter-registration system. Appellants showed that taxpayer funds were
spent to develop and maintain the online-voter-registration system, which they claimed
was a misappropriation of public funds for an unauthorized action.
Respondents countered that the secretary of state has the authority and discretion
to permit Minnesota voters to submit their voter-registration applications by electronic
means. Respondents also challenged appellants’ standing to seek quo warranto relief.
1
Secretary of State Mark Ritchie introduced the online-voter-registration system. His
successor, Steve Simon, moved for substitution of his name for former Secretary
Ritchie’s as a respondent on appeal.
2
On April 28, 2014, the district court granted appellants’ petition for issuance of a
writ of quo warranto.2 The district court concluded that appellants had standing as
taxpayers because they challenged respondents’ unauthorized use of public funds. The
district court then considered whether any provision in Minnesota voter-registration law
prevented the extension of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA), Minn. Stat.
§§ 325L.01-.19 (2014), its purpose being to promote governmental transactions by
authorizing the use of electronic records and signatures, to authorize the creation of the
online-voter-registration system. The court found three requirements for a valid
Minnesota voter-registration application: (1) it must use a proper form, (2) the form must
be signed, and (3) the form must be delivered in the right way. See Minn. Stat.
§§ 201.061, subd. 1, .071, subds. 1, 3, 203B.16, .17 (2012). The parties did not dispute
that an acceptable form could be placed online, and the court concluded that the UETA
authorized electronic signatures on online voter registrations. The district court
concluded, however, that delivery was limited to “in person or by mail.” See Minn. Stat.
§ 201.061, subd. 1.
Respondents argued that under the UETA, the secretary of state and the voters
could agree to change the mail-delivery option to permit electronic delivery.
Respondents relied on a provision in the UETA that “a requirement under a law . . . to
send . . . a record by . . . mail may be varied by agreement to the extent permitted by the
other law.” Minn. Stat. § 325L.08(d)(2) (emphasis added). The district court found that
2
On April 29, 2014, the Minnesota Legislature passed a bill requiring the secretary of
state to maintain online voter registration. The governor signed the bill into law,
effective April 30, 2014. See Minn. Stat. § 201.061, subd. 1(2) (2014).
3
respondents failed to identify any law permitting the parties to deviate from the delivery
requirements. The district court concluded that neither the UETA nor Minnesota election
law authorized the secretary of state to accept electronically delivered applications
through an online-voter-registration system.
Appellants3 moved for attorney fees and costs, arguing that although attorney fees
are generally unavailable against the state, an exception exists under the MEAJA.
Appellants argued that they were entitled to attorney fees because respondents’ action,
though plausible, was unreasonable. Respondents argued that there was no difference
between an act being “plausible” and “having a reasonable basis.” Respondents argued
that the secretary of state had a reasonable basis for his action because he understood that
under the UETA, the mail-delivery requirement could be varied by agreement to the
extent permitted by other law; because no law expressly prohibited the act, the secretary
of state believed that the requirement could be varied.
The district court denied appellants’ motion, concluding that appellants failed to
show that the state’s position was not substantially justified. The court stated that the
secretary of state “mistakenly concluded that . . . complex and interrelated laws gave him
express authority to establish an online voter registration tool . . . . The mere fact that the
secretary of state misinterpreted the law does not automatically render his analysis
unreasonable.” The district court concluded: “[Appellants’] attempt to split hairs with the
3
Only the Minnesota Voters Alliance and the Minnesota Majority sought recovery of
attorney fees and costs because only a “party” may recover attorney fees and costs, and
under the MEAJA, “party” is defined to exclude individuals. Minn. Stat. § 15.471, subd.
6; see McMains v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 409 N.W.2d 911, 914 (Minn. App. 1987).
4
terms ‘plausible’ and ‘reasonable’ is inconsistent with the definitions of the words. By
conceding that the [s]ecretary of [s]tate’s interpretation was ‘plausible,’ [appellants] must
also be viewed as admitting that the [s]ecretary of [s]tate’s positon was ‘reasonable.’”
This appeal followed.
DECISION
Standing
Initially, respondents challenge appellants’ standing. “Standing is the requirement
that a party has a sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy to seek relief from a court.”
State by Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 493 (Minn. 1996). “Standing
is acquired when a party has suffered some ‘injury-in-fact’ or when a party is the
beneficiary of some legislative enactment granting standing.” Citizens for a Balanced
City v. Plymouth Congregational Church, 672 N.W.2d 13, 18 (Minn. App. 2003)
(emphasis omitted). Standing is a jurisdictional issue reviewed de novo. In re Custody of
D.T.R., 796 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 2011).
Respondents argue that quo warranto petitions cannot be brought on the basis of
taxpayer standing because appellants cannot show any special interest different from that
of the general public. Generally, absent statutory authority, taxpayer standing does not
exist unless the taxpayer can show some individual injury that is special and different
from injury sustained by the general public. Conant v. Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi,
L.L.P., 603 N.W.2d 143, 146 (Minn. App. 1999), review denied (Minn. Mar. 14, 2000).
But taxpayers without a personal or direct injury may still have standing to maintain an
action that restrains the “unlawful disbursements of public moneys . . . [or] illegal action
5
on the part of public officials.” McKee v. Likins, 261 N.W.2d 566, 571 (Minn. 1977)
(quotation omitted).
Appellants challenged the online-voter-registration system, which was an ongoing
pursuit that appellants believed the secretary of state went beyond his power to create.
See State ex rel. Sviggum v. Hanson, 732 N.W.2d 312, 320 (Minn. App. 2007) (stating
that the quo warranto remedy may be applied to ongoing exercise of power).
Respondents conceded that taxpayer funds were used to create, maintain, and operate the
online-voter-registration system. Appellants thus had standing to petition for the writ.
Attorney fees
We review the district court’s denial of a request for attorney fees and costs under
the MEAJA for an abuse of discretion. Donovan Contracting of St. Cloud, Inc. v. Minn.
Dep’t of Transp., 469 N.W.2d 718, 720 (Minn. App. 1991), review denied (Minn. Aug. 2,
1991). A district court abuses its discretion when it exercises it “in an arbitrary or
capricious manner, or base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law.” State,
Campaign Fin. & Pub. Disclosure Bd. v. Minn. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, 671
N.W.2d 894, 899 (Minn. App. 2003).
The district court concluded that appellants were not entitled to attorney fees
because they failed to demonstrate that the state’s position was not substantially justified.
Under the MEAJA, a prevailing party may be awarded attorney fees if it shows that the
state’s position was not “substantially justified.” Minn. Stat. § 15.472(a).
“‘Substantially justified’ means that the state’s position had a reasonable basis in law and
fact, based on the totality of the circumstances before and during the litigation or
6
contested case proceeding.” Minn. Stat. § 15.471, subd. 8. We must determine whether
the district court erroneously viewed the meaning of “substantially justified” in denying
appellants’ request for attorney fees. See State, Campaign Fin. & Pub. Disclosure Bd.,
671 N.W.2d at 899 (stating that a district court abuses its discretion when it bases its
ruling on an erroneous view of the law).
Citing to caselaw, the district court stated that “substantially justified” means
“justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” See Pierce v. Underwood,
487 U.S. 552, 565, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2550 (1988). Because appellants conceded that the
secretary of state’s position was “plausible but not reasonable,” the district court
compared dictionary definitions of the words “plausible” and “reasonable,” and
concluded that appellants’ “attempt to split hairs with the terms ‘plausible’ and
‘reasonable’ [was] inconsistent with the definitions of the words[,]” and that “[b]y
conceding that the [s]ecretary of [s]tate’s interpretation was ‘plausible,’ [appellants] . . .
also . . . admitt[ed] that the [s]ecretary of [s]tate’s position was ‘reasonable.’” Appellants
challenge the district court’s finding that plausibility is reasonable, asserting that there is
a difference between what is plausible and what is reasonable.
Dictionary definition
Appellants first object to the district court’s reliance on dictionary definitions.
The district court looked to the Oxford Dictionary and stated that a “plausible” argument
is “reasonable or probable.” Relying on the same source, the court concluded that
“reasonable” and “plausible” are synonyms. Appellants cite to the Merriam-Webster
Dictionary, which also defines “plausible” as “reasonable.” The American Heritage
7
College Dictionary defines plausible as “[s]eemingly or apparently valid, likely, or
acceptable; credible.” The Am. Heritage College Dictionary 1048 (3d ed. 2000). But
appellants point out that “plausible” can alternatively mean “to deceive.” See id.
(providing alterative definition for “plausible” as “[g]iving a deceptive impression of
truth”).
Appellants claim that the district court should not have relied on dictionary
definitions because of the alternative meaning and because, while dictionaries are useful,
they lack context. But the district court did have context in which to apply the
definitions. The district court was within the confines of section 15.471, subdivision 8:
“‘Substantially justified’ means that the state’s position had a reasonable basis in law and
fact.” Minn. Stat. § 15.471, subd. 8 (emphasis added). Because appellants conceded that
the secretary of state’s interpretation of the law was “plausible,” the district court
compared the words “plausible” and “reasonable” and determined that they were
synonymous. The district court did not erroneously view the law by analyzing dictionary
definitions and applying them to the statute.
Comparison by analogy
Appellants also attempt to show that not all plausible arguments are reasonable by
way of analogy to other areas of law—matters explaining differential diagnosis,
insurance-policy interpretations, and tribal-gaming statutes. But the district court never
stated that all plausible arguments are reasonable. Although appellants claim that the
district court’s interpretation failed to view the words in the appropriate context, raising
analogous situations takes the issue out of context.
8
For example, in appellants’ analogy to a differential diagnosis, they quote to a
case, stating: “In performing a differential diagnosis, a physician begins by ‘ruling in’ all
scientifically plausible causes of the [patient’s] injury. The physician then ‘rules out’ the
least plausible causes of injury until the most likely cause remains.” McDonough v.
Allina Health Sys., 685 N.W.2d 688, 695 n.3 (Minn. App. 2004) (quotation omitted).
Appellants take from that quotation: “Hence, it is recognized that not all plausible acts,
causes, or actions, are the same here, ‘most likely.’ Similarly, not all plausible arguments
are reasonable in the context of the MEAJA’s statutory definition of ‘reasonable basis.’”
But being “most likely” and being “reasonable” are not identical concepts. Additionally,
in the context of a differential diagnosis, ruling out the “least plausible causes of injury”
does not mean that initially ruling them in was unreasonable. Finally, the statute does not
require that the state action be the “most likely” course; it must be “substantially
justified,” having “a reasonable basis in law and fact.” Minn. Stat. § 15.471, subd. 8.
Appellants’ challenge to the district court’s conclusion by way of analogy is
unpersuasive.
Statutory definition
Appellants also argue that the district court should have looked no further than the
MEAJA, which defines “substantially justified” as having “a reasonable basis in law and
fact,” not a “plausible basis.” Id.
The statutory definition has been interpreted and explained in caselaw. In
Donovan, the state and the Minnesota Department of Transportation challenged the
award of attorney fees to contractors under the MEAJA. 469 N.W.2d at 719. The
9
contractors had successfully challenged enforcement of an addendum that purported to
interpret the existing wage statute until the state engaged in formal rule-making. Id. In
determining whether the state’s action was substantially justified, the court examined the
reasons given by the state for promulgating the addendum without first engaging in
formal rule-making procedures. Id. at 721. The court concluded that the “position of the
state in the underlying action . . . would not be viewed by the reasonable person as having
a reasonable basis in fact or law” and was, therefore, not substantially justified. Id. at
723.
In determining whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding that
appellants failed to show that the secretary of state’s action was not “substantially
justified,” we must review the underlying litigation position and determine if the
secretary of state’s creation of the online-voter-registration system could satisfy a
“reasonable person” as having a reasonable basis in fact or law. See id. (evaluating the
state’s position under the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the act was
justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person); see also Pierce, 487 U.S. at
569, 108 S. Ct. at 2552 (reviewing the “actual merits” of the government’s position).
Underlying decision
Appellants assert that the district court’s conclusion that the secretary of state’s
action was substantially justified contradicts the district court’s conclusion in the
underlying decision that the secretary of state lacked authority to create an online-voter-
registration system. Respondents assert that the secretary’s positon was not merely
10
substantially justified, but correct.4 Respondents argued that under the UETA the
secretary of state was permitted to modify registration delivery methods. See Minn. Stat.
§ 201.061, subd. 1. The UETA allows parties to a transaction to agree to conduct their
transactions by electronic means. Minn. Stat. § 325L.05. But even if parties agree to
conduct their transaction by electronic means, if there is a law requiring a record be sent
or transmitted by a specific method, the record must be sent or transmitted by the method
specified in the other law. Minn. Stat. § 325L.08 (a), (b). “[A] requirement under a
law . . . to send . . . a record by . . . mail may be varied [however] by agreement to the
extent permitted by the other law.” Id. (d)(2) (emphasis added).
The district court concluded that no law permitted the delivery-by-mail
requirement to be modified. Respondents claim that the UETA is broad and that the
district court’s interpretation that the mail-delivery requirement cannot be altered without
a law that explicitly permits the alteration essentially results in the section having no
effect on any law created before the implementation of the UETA. Respondents assert
that if the legislature amended all laws with a mail-delivery requirement to permit
electronic transmission the UETA would be superfluous. Thus, relevant to our analysis is
4
Respondents suggest, citing to rule 103.04, that we review the correctness of the
underlying order. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04 (stating that on appeal from a
judgment, this court may review any order involving the merits or affecting the
judgment). But whether the district court should have granted the petition for the writ
quo warranto is moot; legislation amended the statute and the secretary of state is now
legally required to maintain an online-voter-registration system. See Kahn v. Griffin, 701
N.W.2d 815, 821 (Minn. 2005) (stating that an issue is moot if a court is unable to grant
effectual relief); State v. Rud, 359 N.W.2d 573, 576 (Minn. 1984) (stating that an issue is
moot if an event occurs that resolves the issue or renders it impossible to grant effective
relief).
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a determination of whether the secretary of state’s interpretation of the UETA to allow
alteration of the mail-delivery requirement was reasonable, making the creation of the
online-voter-registration system substantially justified.
Respondents assert that an alternative interpretation of “to the extent permitted by
the other law” means that a mail-delivery requirement may be altered unless the other law
explicitly states that it cannot be altered by the UETA. For example, a law could read:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the document shall be sent by U.S. mail.
The limitation would be created in the other law. This interpretation is not unreasonable;
therefore, the secretary of state’s creation of the online-voter-registration system based on
this interpretation was substantially justified, i.e., satisfying the reasonable person. See
Donovan, 469 N.W.2d at 723. Because respondents’ underlying position was
substantially justified, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellants’
request for attorney fees and costs.
Affirmed.
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