State of Minnesota v. Thomas Dwayne Brown ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-0286
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Thomas Dwayne Brown,
Appellant.
Filed November 23, 2015
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge
Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HACR124110
Lori Swanson, Minnesota Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
James Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Jessica A. Bierwerth, Assistant Dakota
County Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
State Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant Thomas Dwayne Brown challenges the imposition of the statutory
maximum sentence pursuant to the career-offender statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.1095,
subd. 4 (2012), and the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his count III conviction of
violating a domestic-abuse no-contact order. We affirm.
FACTS
On November 29, 2012, appellant Thomas Dwayne Brown was involved in a
domestic-disturbance incident with his then-girlfriend, E.G. During an argument
between appellant and E.G., appellant threatened to put out his cigarette on E.G.’s face.
Appellant was charged with: two counts of domestic assault (intent to cause fear and
infliction of bodily harm), in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4 (2012);
violation of a domestic-abuse no-contact order (DANCO), in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 629.75, subd. 2(d)(1) (2012); and providing false information to the police, in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 609.506, subd. 1 (2012).
The state filed notice of intent to seek an aggravated durational departure from the
sentencing guidelines pursuant to the career-offender statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.1095,
subd. 4. The jury found appellant guilty of all four counts. Appellant waived his right to
a Blakely trial by jury and submitted the issue of whether he qualified as a career offender
to the court. The district court determined that appellant qualified as a career offender.
Appellant was sentenced to 60 months on count I (felony domestic assault, intent
to cause fear); a concurrent term of a year and a day on count II (felony domestic assault,
infliction of bodily harm); a concurrent term of a year and a day on count III (felony
violation of DANCO); and a concurrent term of 90 days on count IV (misdemeanor
giving false information to police). On appeal, this court reversed appellant’s count II
felony domestic-assault conviction and remanded the matter to the district court for
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resentencing. State v. Brown, No. A13-1083, 2014 WL 2684750 (Minn. App. June 16,
2014), review dismissed (Minn. Aug. 4, 2014).
On remand, appellant requested that the presumptive sentence under the guidelines
of 33 months be imposed on count I, the most serious offense arising from the incident.
The district court denied appellant’s request and imposed the maximum statutory
sentence of 60 months imprisonment. This appeal followed.
DECISION
I. The district court did not err in imposing a 60-month sentence under Minn.
Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 4, the career-offender statute.
Appellant argues that the district court improperly sentenced him to the statutory
maximum of 60 months imprisonment for assault for threatening to burn E.G. with a
cigarette. Appellant’s presumptive sentence for this crime was 33 months in prison.1
Following a Blakely hearing, the district court determined that appellant qualified as a
career offender under Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 4. Appellant does not dispute his
career-offender status. Rather, appellant asserts that his sentence unfairly exaggerates the
criminality of his conduct.
We review a sentencing enhancement based on the career-offender statute for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Munger, 597 N.W.2d 570, 574 (Minn. App. 1999), review
denied (Minn. Aug. 25, 1999). A “judge may impose an aggravated durational departure
from the presumptive sentence up to the statutory maximum sentence if the factfinder
1
The offense-severity level for domestic assault is four. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 5.A
(2012). Appellant had a criminal-history score of nine, including a custody-status point
for which a three-month enhancement applied. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B (2012).
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determines that the offender has five or more prior felony convictions and that the present
offense is a felony that was committed as part of a pattern of criminal conduct.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 4. The statute does not limit the court’s discretion and does
not require any additional findings before sentencing an offender to the statutory
maximum. Vickla v. State, 793 N.W.2d 265, 269 (Minn. 2011). Moreover, the
sentencing guidelines provide that an offender’s status as a “career offender” under
Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 4, alone constitutes a sufficient reason to depart from the
presumptive sentence. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3.b.(9) (2012). However, a court
departing under the career-offender statute must still provide “written reasons specifying
that the requirements of the statute have been met.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines cmt. 2.D.304
(2012).
The district court’s written reasons meet the statutory requirements. Appellant has
committed well over five prior felony-level offenses.2 In addition, at least one of
appellant’s present offenses is a felony. The district court found, and appellant does not
dispute, that the current felony offense was committed as part of a pattern of criminal
conduct. Furthermore, the psychological-evaluation report noted appellant’s failure to
appreciate the consequences of his actions as well as the likelihood that he will reoffend.
And the presentence-investigation report recommended that appellant be sentenced as a
career offender under Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 4, and that the maximum sentence be
imposed.
2
Appellant has an extensive criminal record, which, at the time of appellant’s trial,
spanned over 25 years.
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Appellant cites State v. Norris, 428 N.W.2d 61 (Minn. 1988), and State v.
Goulette, 442 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1989), for the proposition that this court must vacate
appellant’s 60-month sentence because it “unfairly exaggerates the criminality of
appellant’s conduct.” However, appellant’s reliance on Norris and Goulette is
misguided, as neither Norris nor Goulette implicated the career-offender statute. And
beyond Norris and Goulette, appellant fails to identify any case in which criminal
conduct similar to his own, or more serious than his own, was punished more leniently.
Both Norris and Goulette discussed the appropriateness of imposing multiple
sentences for a single behavioral incident involving multiple victims. In such cases, the
applicable standard provides that a district court may impose multiple sentences for
convictions arising out of a single behavioral incident if (1) the offenses involve multiple
victims and (2) multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the
offender’s conduct. State v. Marquardt, 294 N.W.2d 849, 850-51 (Minn. 1980).
Appellant’s crime involved only one victim, so the aforementioned standard concerning
whether the sentence exaggerates the criminality of the offender’s conduct is
inapplicable.
Appellant was properly sentenced under Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 4, the
career-offender statute. The district court found, on the record, that appellant satisfied the
career-offender statutory criteria. Accordingly, the district court was permitted to impose
an aggravated durational departure up to the statutory maximum sentence. Therefore, the
district court acted within its authority when it sentenced appellant to 60 months
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imprisonment for violating Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4. No additional finding of
severe aggravating factors was necessary. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3.b.(9).
II. The district court did not err in finding that sufficient evidence supports
appellant’s count III conviction for violating a DANCO.
Appellant also submitted a supplemental brief in which he asserts two arguments.
First, appellant asserts an argument identical to that raised by his counsel, invoking
Norris and Goulette to support the proposition that his 60-month sentence is
disproportionate to the crime charged. For the reasons previously discussed, Norris and
Goulette are inapposite, and that argument is not supported by law. Second, appellant
purports to provide an explanation for a mix-up regarding the no-contact order in place at
the time of the November 29, 2012 offense. Appellant asserts that the no-contact order in
place at the time of the offense was in fact for the victim’s mother, not E.G. herself.
As an initial matter, this argument is not properly before this court because it was
not presented to the district court. Appellant raised this issue at his resentencing hearing
on October 29, 2014. Appellant was granted a continuance until November 18, 2014, to
further investigate the facts which gave rise to the no-contact order. The district court
advised appellant that he should file a petition for post-conviction relief to have this
matter addressed. Moreover, this appeal was stayed so that appellant could investigate
whether to pursue post-conviction relief regarding same. Appellant decided not to pursue
post-conviction relief. Therefore, because the issue was not appropriately presented to
the trial court, it was not preserved for consideration by this court. Roby v. State, 547
N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996).
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Even if we were to consider the issue raised by appellant, his claim lacks merit.
We construe appellant’s argument as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
underlying his count III conviction. In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, this
court must carefully examine the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed
in the light most favorable to the conviction, is sufficient to allow the jury to reach the
verdict that it did. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). The reviewing
court will not disturb the verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of
innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably
conclude the defendant was guilty of the charged offense. Bernhardt v. State, 684
N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004).
There is nothing in the record to support appellant’s assertion that the no-contact
order in place at the time of his offense should have covered E.G.’s mother, not E.G. To
the contrary, the record reflects that the no-contact order was indeed issued for E.G.
Furthermore, at appellant’s trial, E.G. testified that Anoka County had a no-contact order
in place between E.G. and appellant, that appellant was not supposed to be in contact
with her, and that both she and appellant were aware of the no-contact order.
Affirmed.
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