James Fletcher Cameron v. Commissioner of Public Safety ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-1304
James Fletcher Cameron, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.
Filed June 8, 2015
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge
Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CV-13-6011
Greg A. Engel, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Jeffrey S. Bilcik, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Hudson, Judge; and
Bjorkman, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the revocation of his driver’s license, arguing that the
evidence of his alcohol concentration should have been suppressed because the stop of
his vehicle was not justified by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and there was no
probable cause to arrest him for driving while impaired. We affirm.
FACTS
At 1:30 a.m. on June 23, 2013, Cold Spring Police Sergeant Chris Boucher was on
patrol in St. Augusta as an annual town festival was drawing to an end. Sergeant
Boucher saw a vehicle driven by appellant James Cameron exit a parking lot in front of
him and initiated his squad-car video camera. Immediately after turning into the road, the
vehicle drifted to the centerline and then back toward the fog-line. Sergeant Boucher
followed the vehicle for almost a mile and observed it weave within its lane several more
times. Sergeant Boucher also saw the vehicle drift to the right and then come close to a
concrete median as it turned left onto an entrance ramp to Interstate 94. Sergeant
Boucher stopped the vehicle before it entered the highway.
Cameron was slow to acknowledge Sergeant Boucher’s presence, but when he did
roll down his window, Sergeant Boucher immediately detected an “overwhelming” odor
of alcohol. Sergeant Boucher noticed that Cameron’s speech was slurred, his eyes were
bloodshot and watery, and his pupils were dilated. Cameron admitted that he had been
drinking since 10:00 p.m. Cameron refused to perform field sobriety tests. Sergeant
Boucher did not separately ask him to take a preliminary breath test. Sergeant Boucher
arrested Cameron, and a subsequent breath test revealed an alcohol concentration of .19.
Cameron was charged with driving while impaired (DWI), and respondent Minnesota
Commissioner of Public Safety revoked his driving privileges.
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Cameron petitioned for judicial review, arguing that drifting within his lane did
not provide reasonable suspicion for the stop and that there was no probable cause to
arrest him for DWI based on the totality of the circumstances. At the implied-consent
hearing, Sergeant Boucher testified about his observations and that, based on his
experience, Cameron’s driving conduct was consistent with impairment.
In sustaining the license revocation, the district court found that Cameron’s
vehicle “almost turn[ed] into the opposite lane of traffic when it exited the parking lot”
and “[his] vehicle was not traveling in a straight line but moving from side to side within
his lane of traffic for almost a mile . . . coming into contact or near contact with the
centerline on several occasions.” And the district court concluded that the “totality of the
circumstances, combined with Sergeant Boucher’s experience and judgment” established
probable cause to arrest Cameron for DWI.
In the criminal DWI proceeding, a different district court judge made contrary
findings and suppressed the alcohol-concentration evidence. Cameron moved to vacate
the revocation order. The district court denied the motion, concluding that it was not
bound by a ruling in a separate criminal proceeding and that Cameron otherwise failed to
present any new evidence showing the license revocation was in error. Cameron appeals
the revocation of his license.1
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Cameron does not challenge the denial of his motion to vacate.
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DECISION
I. The stop of Cameron’s vehicle was supported by reasonable suspicion that
Cameron was driving while impaired.
Law enforcement must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
activity to conduct a brief investigatory stop of a vehicle. State v. Richardson, 622
N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001). An officer’s observation of a traffic violation, no matter
how insignificant, generally “forms the requisite particularized and objective basis for
conducting a traffic stop.” State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minn. 2004). And
Minnesota appellate courts have consistently held that swerving or weaving within the
lane of travel is a sufficient basis to stop a vehicle. See, e.g., State v. Kvam, 336 N.W.2d
525, 528 (Minn. 1983) (stating that officer who observes a driver weaving within his lane
in an erratic manner is justified in stopping the driver to investigate); State v. Dalos, 635
N.W.2d 94, 96 (Minn. App. 2001) (holding that continuous weaving within the lane for
one-half mile provides reasonable suspicion of criminal activity). But a single, isolated
swerve, State v. Brechler, 412 N.W.2d 367, 369 (Minn. App. 1987), or “subtle” weaving
alone is insufficient. Warrick v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 374 N.W.2d 585, 585-86 (Minn.
App. 1985). When examining the validity of a stop, courts consider the totality of the
circumstances and recognize that law-enforcement officers are permitted to make
inferences that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person. Kvam, 336
N.W.2d at 528.
We review a district court’s determination that there was reasonable suspicion to
justify a stop de novo. State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000). But we review
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the district court’s findings of fact for clear error, giving weight to the inferences drawn
from those facts. State v. Lee, 585 N.W.2d 378, 383 (Minn. 1998). Findings of fact are
clearly erroneous when they are “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not
reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” Schulz v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 760
N.W.2d 331, 333 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Apr. 21,
2009).
Cameron first challenges the district court’s findings that his vehicle almost turned
into the wrong lane when it exited the parking lot and came into “contact or near contact”
with the centerline several times while drifting within its lane. Cameron argues that the
squad-car video does not support these findings and calls Sergeant Boucher’s testimony
into question. We begin our analysis by observing that the existence of a video recording
does not change our role as an appellate court. The fact-finder—here, the district court—
weighs the evidence, judges the credibility of witnesses, and draws reasonable inferences
from the facts. We determine whether the evidence supports the factual findings. On
balance, we conclude that it does in this case.
Turning to the challenged findings, we agree with Cameron that the squad-car
video does not support the district court’s finding that Cameron almost turned into the
wrong lane of traffic when he exited the parking lot. But the video and Sergeant
Boucher’s testimony both support the district court’s findings that Cameron’s vehicle
came into “near contact” with the centerline several times and weaved within its lane
prior to the stop.
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Sergeant Boucher testified that he followed Cameron’s vehicle for a mile and saw
it weaving within its lane on several occasions. He stated that when Cameron’s vehicle
turned in front of him out of the parking lot it “drifted towards the center line” and then
“almost immediately, drifted to the fog line.” He also described how the vehicle “drifted
to the right” as it entered the left turn lane and then “got extremely close . . . to the
concrete barrier” just before executing the left turn onto the freeway entrance ramp.
More generally, Sergeant Boucher testified that it seemed as though “whoever was
driving [the] vehicle was fighting the vehicle” and “[i]t would drift one direction, only to
come back towards the other direction.”
The squad-car video likewise shows Cameron’s vehicle drifting within his lane at
least four times. Some instances are more pronounced than others, such as when
Cameron first turns out of the parking lot, and later when his vehicle drifts close to the
concrete median before turning onto the I-94 entrance ramp. The quality of the recording
makes it difficult to ascertain whether Cameron’s vehicle actually touched the centerline.
But it appears to have at least come close to doing so several times. We have repeatedly
recognized that an experienced officer is more attuned to suspicious driving conduct and
deference should be afforded to this training and expertise. See Richardson, 622 N.W.2d
at 825 (acknowledging that trained law-enforcement officers are permitted to make
inferences and deductions that would be beyond competence of untrained person). It is
undeniable that Sergeant Boucher was in the best position to observe and draw inferences
from Cameron’s driving conduct. On this record, we conclude that there was sufficient
evidence to support the district court’s findings that Cameron’s vehicle weaved within its
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lane several times over the course of a mile, at times coming close to touching the
centerline.
Cameron next asserts that the totality of the circumstances does not justify the stop
of his vehicle. We disagree. As noted above, weaving within one’s lane of traffic can
provide reasonable suspicion for a stop. Dalos, 635 N.W.2d at 96. And while there may
be possible innocent explanations for this driving conduct, this does not mean it cannot
serve as a basis to suspect criminal activity. State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Minn.
1996) (holding that an actual traffic violation is not necessary to justify a stop); State v.
Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824, 826 (Minn. 1989) (“[I]nnocent activity might justify the
suspicion of criminal activity.”). Sergeant Boucher explained that Cameron’s driving
conduct seemed “unusual” and was consistent with impaired driving he has observed in
the past. Indeed, Sergeant Boucher’s ability to articulate why the specific driving
behavior he saw led him to suspect impaired driving demonstrates that the stop was based
on more than “mere whim.” Cf. State v. Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 308, 309 (Minn. 1977)
(quotation omitted).
Other circumstances also support the validity of the stop. The stop occurred
around 1:30 a.m.—a time at which it is reasonable to suspect that unusual driving
conduct results from impairment. See, e.g., State v. Engholm, 290 N.W.2d 780, 784
(Minn. 1980) (stating stop was valid based on vehicle traveling at exceptionally slow
speed and weaving within its lane shortly after local bars had closed). Moreover,
Sergeant Boucher initiated the stop in the area where a town festival was ending.
Cameron’s presence in the area of this well-attended festival supports the reasonable
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inference that any unusual driving behavior was due to impairment from alcohol
consumption at the event.
In sum, we acknowledge that this is a close case. But reasonable suspicion is a
minimal standard. State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008). The video
evidence depicts Cameron’s vehicle drifting within its lane multiple times. Sergeant
Boucher’s observations and testimony that in his experience such conduct is consistent
with impaired driving, support a reasonable suspicion of illegal driving conduct.
Accordingly, we discern no error in the district court’s determination that there was
reasonable suspicion to stop Cameron.
II. There was probable cause to arrest Cameron for DWI.
The determination of probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact. State v.
Kier, 678 N.W.2d 672, 678 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. June 15, 2004).
We review a district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusion
de novo. State v. Horner, 617 N.W.2d 789, 795 (Minn. 2000). “The test of probable
cause to arrest is whether the objective facts are such that under the circumstances a
person of ordinary care and prudence [would] entertain an honest and strong suspicion
that a crime has been committed.” State v. Wynne, 552 N.W.2d 218, 221 (Minn. 1996)
(alteration in original) (quotation omitted). Recognized indicia of impairment include an
odor of alcohol, bloodshot and watery eyes, slurred speech, and an uncooperative
attitude. Kier, 678 N.W.2d at 678.
Cameron argues that there was not probable cause to arrest him for DWI, pointing
to two inconsistencies between Sergeant Boucher’s testimony and the squad-car video.
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First, Sergeant Boucher testified that he had to knock on the car window to get
Cameron’s attention, but the video shows that Sergeant Boucher never knocked on the
window. Second, Cameron contends the squad-car video discredits Sergeant Boucher’s
testimony that Cameron was unsteady on his feet once he exited his vehicle. We are not
persuaded.
The existence of these limited inconsistencies does not alter the fact that the
evidence of Cameron’s impairment is overwhelming. Sergeant Boucher testified that
Cameron displayed many indicia of intoxication, including his slow response to the
officer’s approach and initial refusal to roll down his window or turn off his stereo; his
difficulty rolling down the window and producing his insurance card; the overwhelming
odor of alcohol from Cameron and the vehicle; and his slurred speech, bloodshot and
watery eyes, and dilated pupils. And Cameron admitted that he had been drinking since
10:00 p.m. Many of these indicia of intoxication could not be captured by the squad-car
video. In relying on Sergeant Boucher’s testimony regarding these details, the district
court implicitly found this testimony credible. We defer to such credibility
determinations. State v. Klamar, 823 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn. App. 2012).
Alternatively, Cameron asserts that he was improperly arrested for failing to
perform field sobriety tests, including a preliminary breath test. We disagree. First,
Cameron’s outward manifestations of intoxication provided a sufficient objective basis to
arrest him. See Holtz v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 340 N.W.2d 363, 365 (Minn. App. 1983)
(stating an officer needs only one objective indication of intoxication to constitute
probable cause to believe a person is under the influence). Second, nothing in the record
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indicates that Cameron was arrested for refusing a field sobriety or preliminary breath
test. Rather, Sergeant Boucher testified that he arrested Cameron because he believed he
was impaired. Based on our careful review of the record, we conclude that there was
probable cause to arrest Cameron for DWI.
Affirmed.
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