Wajiha Shirin Shah, Relator v. IMI's MN, Inc., Department of Employment and Economic Development ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-1250
Wajiha Shirin Shah,
Relator,
vs.
IMI’s MN, Inc.,
Respondent,
Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.
Filed June 15, 2015
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge
Dissenting, Minge, Judge
Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 32381001-3
Thomas H. Boyd, Aalok K. Sharma, Winthrop & Weinstine, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for relator)
IMI’s MN, Inc., Minnetonka, Minnesota (respondent)
Lee B. Nelson, Munazza Humayun, Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Minge,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Relator challenges the unemployment-law judge’s (ULJ) decision that she is
ineligible for unemployment benefits, arguing that the ULJ erred in determining that she
quit employment without a good reason caused by the employer and contending that she
was constructively discharged. We affirm.
FACTS
Relator Wajiha Shirin Shah was employed as an optician by respondent IMI’s MN
Inc. at a Pearle Vision store from February 14, 2011 until October 7, 2013, the effective
date of her resignation pursuant to the terms of a settlement agreement with IMI’s. Shah,
who follows the Islamic faith, accepted employment with the condition that she would
not work on Fridays, because Friday is her day of religious observance. General manager
Blaine Hein-Harrison told Shah that this would not be a problem. For over two years,
Shah was not scheduled to work on Fridays.
In January 2013, Shah met with Maggie Ahrens, assistant general manager, to
report that her supervisor, Sheree Froelich, treated her unfairly and created a hostile
environment. Shah’s reports to Ahrens did not include any complaints about working on
Fridays or religious discrimination. In May, Shah found that she was scheduled to work
on Friday, May 24. She complained to Froelich, who responded by saying that “[t]hat’s
how the schedule goes.” Shah then wrote a May 16 letter to Hein-Harrison and Froelich,
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noting that she was scheduled to work on May 24 and that she had brought to Sheree’s
attention that she “was not available to work on Fridays due to Religion Mosque Prayer
day, which was understood and agreed upon by [IMI’s] at [her] interview time when
[she] was hired 2 ½ years ago. Therefore [she] accepted the position. Just a reminder to
give [IMI’s] enough time to adjust the schedule.” IMI’s did not require Shah to work on
May 24. But Shah continued to have disputes with Froelich over other issues, and she
asserted in a June 20 letter that unfair treatment and a hostile work environment
continued.
On June 13, 2013, after Shah learned that IMI’s had scheduled her to work on
Friday, June 28, Shah wrote to management with a reminder that she could not work on
Fridays for religious reasons. IMI’s did not require Shah to work on June 28 and
thereafter did not schedule her or require her to work on Fridays.
Shah had another scheduling dispute with IMI’s when IMI’s scheduled her to
work on Saturday, July 13 and Sunday, July 14, 2013. Shah sent a letter to management
on June 17, objecting to the July weekend scheduling on the ground that she normally
had the weekend off and had made other plans. On June 19, Shah had an argument with
Froelich concerning whether she had been about to leave work ten minutes before her
shift ended. On the same day, IMI’s issued a written notice of corrective action regarding
the weekend scheduling dispute, stating that it was her responsibility to find a
replacement if she was unable to work as scheduled and finding that she had been
insubordinate by refusing to listen or follow instructions. This notice of corrective action
contains nothing regarding Shah’s refusal to work on Fridays. Shah responded with the
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June 20 letter, disputing the facts contained in the notice, complaining again that Froelich
had subjected her to harassment and unfair treatment, and asserting that, since she had
complained about the unfair treatment and hostile environment in January, management
had begun scheduling her to work on Fridays. Shah alleged that, since she wrote “a letter
[presumably referring to the May 16 letter] on this matter of religious discrimination
things [had] escalated and even gotten worse,” with the regional manager expressing
disappointment in her “for standing [her] ground on this matter.”
On June 21, 2013, IMI’s management advised Shah by letter that: “Your
allegations of harassment by your supervisor, Sheree Froelich, are being taken very
seriously by our company. As we make clear to all of our employees, harassment of any
kind will not be tolerated within our company.” Management went on to state that IMI’s
was investigating the matter and had changed the staff schedule to limit her time with
supervisor Froelich, and IMI’s offered Shah the opportunity to work at a different store
located nearby. On the same day, June 21, Shah signed a complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
Shah responded to IMI’s June 21, 2013 letter with two letters, dated June 23. In
one letter, she declined the offer to transfer to another store because she felt that it was
less desirable and because no resolution had been reached about not scheduling her to
work on Fridays. She also complained that she had been scheduled to work the weekend
of June 29 and 30, when she previously was scheduled to be off, and that she felt that this
was done in retaliation for registering her complaints with management. In the second
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letter, she reported that she had been told on June 22 that at the new location she would
be required to work on Fridays.
Shah continued working through July 14, 2013, and she acknowledged that she
was not scheduled to work on Fridays during this period. Shah and IMI’s participated in
mediation with the EEOC on July 15, but IMI’s owner became upset and left before the
matter was resolved. Shah, who had an appointment with her doctor the same day,
reported suffering from physical symptoms due to anxiety; her doctor recommended an
immediate medical leave of absence, which IMI’s granted. Her doctor released her to
return to work as of August 26, but Shah and IMI’s had reentered mediation by that date
and their lawyers decided that Shah should remain on leave until the EEOC claim was
resolved. After further mediation, Shah and IMI’s entered into an EEOC stipulated
confidential settlement, in which Shah agreed to resign from her employment effective
October 7 and to release IMI’s from any and all claims, and IMI’s paid Shah
consideration in the amount of $25,500.
Shah applied for unemployment benefits in February 2014. Respondent Minnesota
Department of Employee and Economic Development (DEED) initially determined Shah
eligible to receive benefits, and IMI’s appealed the determination. At an evidentiary
hearing before a ULJ, an IMI’s manager testified that IMI’s had sold three of its five
optical stores in December 2012 and that one of its employees was on maternity leave,
which required that the remaining staff have greater scheduling flexibility. The manager
added that, although Shah had been scheduled to work on Fridays in May and June 2013,
IMI’s responded to her complaints and accommodated her so that she never actually
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worked on a Friday. Shah testified that, until she filed the charge with the EEOC, her
employer was adamant that she had to work on Fridays, but once she filed the EEOC
complaint, she was taken off Fridays. She noted that she tried to help the employer by
working extra shifts during the week, and she pointed out that IMI’s accommodated a
part-time employee who was unable to work Wednesdays.
Shah also testified that she had been “forced to resign” because IMI’s was not
accommodating her need to take Fridays off for religious reasons, although she
acknowledged that she had been taken off the schedule for Fridays after she filed the
EEOC charge. The settlement agreement has a paragraph entitled “Voluntary and
Knowing Action,” which provided that Shah
expressly acknowledges and recites that (i) she has entered
into this Agreement knowingly and voluntarily, without any
duress or coercion; (ii) she has read and understands this
Agreement in its entirety; (iii) she has consulted with an
attorney with respect to this Agreement before signing it; and
(iv) she has not been forced to sign this Agreement by any
employee or agent of IMI’s.
Shah testified that, had she returned to work rather than settle her claim, she was not sure
and could not predict whether she would have been scheduled to work on Fridays again.
Hein-Harrison testified that although the changes in staffing made it increasingly
difficult, and they had requested that Shah work on some Fridays, they were willing to
accommodate her religious beliefs.
The ULJ decided that Shah is ineligible for unemployment benefits because she
quit her employment without a good reason caused by the employer and did not quit
6
because of religious discrimination. The ULJ affirmed the decision on reconsideration.
This certiorari appeal follows.1
DECISION
We review a ULJ’s decision to determine, among other things, whether the
decision was affected by an error of law. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2014). This
court’s review of a question of law is de novo. Stagg v. Vintage Place Inc., 796 N.W.2d
312, 315 (Minn. 2011). “Whether an employee had good cause to quit is a question of
law, which we review de novo.” Rowan v. Dream It, Inc., 812 N.W.2d 879, 883 (Minn.
App. 2012) (quotation omitted). Legal conclusions must be based on findings that have
“the requisite evidentiary support.” Nichols v. Reliant Eng’g & Mfg., Inc., 720 N.W.2d
590, 594 (Minn. App. 2006).
I.
Shah first argues that the ULJ erred in deciding that she did not have a good
reason to quit her employment. Generally, an employee who quits employment is
ineligible for unemployment benefits. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1 (2014). But an
employee who quits employment because of a good reason caused by the employer
remains eligible for benefits. Id., subd. 1(1). The relevant statutory definition provides:
1
After Shah filed her brief, DEED initially conceded that the ULJ failed to develop the
record adequately as to several critical facts, including whether IMI’s was willing to
accommodate Shah’s request to have Fridays off or whether the ULJ found Shah’s
religious beliefs to be sincere, and asked this court to remand for an additional
evidentiary hearing. In its brief, which it filed with the permission of this court so that it
could participate in oral argument, DEED did not repeat these concessions or the request
for a remand.
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A good reason caused by the employer for quitting is a
reason: (1) that is directly related to the employment and for
which the employer is responsible; (2) that is adverse to the
worker; and (3) that would compel an average, reasonable
worker to quit and become unemployed rather than remaining
in the employment.
Id., subd. 3(a) (2014). Generally, an employee encountering an adverse working
condition must complain to the employer and give the employer “a reasonable
opportunity to correct the adverse working conditions before that may be considered a
good reason caused by the employer for quitting.” Id., subd. 3(c) (2014). “A breach of the
employment contract constitutes good cause to quit.” Baker v. Fanny Farmer Candy
Shops No. 154, 394 N.W.2d 564, 566 (Minn. App. 1986). And if the employee is subject
to a significant unilateral change in the terms of employment, such as a significant
reduction in hours, and quits without first complaining to the employer, that employee
may retain eligibility for benefits. Thao v. Command Ctr., Inc., 824 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn.
App. 2012).
Shah argues that IMI’s breached her employment contract, giving her good reason
to quit, because it scheduled her to work on Fridays twice, once in May and once in June,
contrary to her employment agreement. As to the fact that IMI’s actually never required
her to work on a Friday, Shah responds that scheduling her to work on Fridays
constituted the breach, with the actual harm and damage occurring when IMI’s
employees harassed her for insisting that IMI’s honor the terms of their agreement,
causing her to suffer health problems, requiring a leave of absence, and giving her good
reason to quit.
8
Shah seems to argue that this “breach” may never be corrected and still provides
her with good reason to quit under Thao, but this claim has no legal support. Thao is
distinguishable because Shah did not quit immediately when she learned she was
scheduled to work on a Friday; instead, she successfully complained to IMI’s both times
that she was scheduled to work on a Friday, and IMI’s corrected its actions. See id. And
Baker is distinguishable because in that case, the employer did not respond to the
employee’s complaints about being scheduled to work nights, and the employee
ultimately quit because of the schedule change. See 394 N.W.2d at 565, 567 (holding that
employee, who had been hired on condition that she would work only days and
complained to employer after being scheduled to work nights, had not waived good cause
when she worked nights as scheduled and did not quit until some eight months later). In
contrast, IMI’s responded to Shah’s complaints and did not require Shah to work on the
two Fridays on which she was scheduled. In fact, an assistant general manager testified
that, because of a shortage of available employees, she worked an extra day to cover a
Friday for Shah.
Shah makes the alternative argument that IMI’s committed an anticipatory breach
of the employment agreement when it scheduled her to work on two Fridays, even though
she did not actually have to work them. See Drydal v. Golden Nuggets, Inc., 689 N.W.2d
779, 785 n.4 (Minn. 2004) (describing anticipatory breach). That doctrine is not
applicable under these circumstances, for the same reason that Shah’s arguments above
were rejected—namely, because IMI’s corrected its actions.
9
Shah argues that the average, reasonable employee would quit if forced to choose
employment over the free exercise of her religion. See Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(a)
(requiring, among other things, that reason must be one that would compel average,
reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed rather than remaining in
employment). Shah contends that IMI’s insistence that she work on Fridays required her
to choose between her employment obligations and her religious obligations, in violation
of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. I; Hobbie v.
Unemp’t Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 146, 107 S. Ct. 1046, 1052 (1987)
(concluding that denying unemployment benefits to employee who had to choose
between his religious belief and continued employment violated his free exercise of
religion). But this presupposes that IMI’s forced Shah to make this choice; the facts show
that IMI’s did not force Shah to make this choice because it never required her to work
on a Friday. In addition, Shah continued working for three weeks after filing her EEOC
complaint, and she acknowledged that she was not scheduled to work on a Friday during
that time. Finally, in the settlement agreement, she expressly acknowledged that she had
entered into the settlement agreement knowingly and voluntarily, without duress or
coercion, and that no employee or agent of IMI’s had forced her to sign it. No evidence
shows that IMI’s forced Shah to choose between employment and the free exercise of her
religion.
Shah contends that IMI’s offer to transfer her to another store was not a reasonable
accommodation, especially when IMI’s allegedly told her that she still would have to
work some Fridays at that location and other drawbacks existed. See Rootes v. Wal-Mart
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Assocs.’s, Inc., 669 N.W.2d 416, 419 (Minn. App. 2003) (“[T]he legislature has
unambiguously provided that, absent employee misconduct, an employee may quit for
good reason caused by the employer if there was a substantial adverse change in wages,
hours or other terms of employment.”). Again, in light of the fact that IMI’s did not
require Shah to work on the Fridays in question, we need not reach the issue of whether
another option was a reasonable accommodation.
Shah challenges the ULJ’s decision that she quit employment to accept the
settlement and did not quit because of religious discrimination.2 We have addressed
similar situations in caselaw. In Kehoe v. Minn. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., this court determined
that an employee did not have a good reason to quit caused by the employer when he
voluntarily resigned in order to receive early retirement with an incentive. 568 N.W.2d
889, 891 (Minn. App. 1997). As in the present case, the employee argued that the facts
showed that he had an independent good reason to quit. Id. at 890. This court determined
that none of the reasons cited amounted to a significant adverse action by the employer.
Id. at 890−91(responding to employee’s assertions that some duties had been given to
other agencies, his advancement possibilities had been quashed, he had thought he would
be laid off if he did not resign, and there had been economic pressure to accept the offer).
The fact that Shah had been scheduled to work on two Fridays does not show good
reason to quit under the circumstances, because, after Shah complained, IMI’s did not
2
There are no facts in the record showing that Shah’s religious beliefs are anything other
than sincere, and we would not in any event accept DEED’s concession in its letter in lieu
of a respondent’s brief that the record was not adequately developed as to this point.
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require her to work those Fridays and, after she filed her EEOC complaint, IMI’s no
longer scheduled her to work on Fridays.
This court reaffirmed its position from Kehoe in Edward v. Sentinel Mgmt. Co.,
611 N.W.2d 366, 368 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 2000). There,
the employee suffered a work-related injury but was still able to perform his job for
several years. Id. at 367. He and the employer negotiated a settlement of his workers’
compensation claim under which he agreed to voluntarily resign in exchange for a
payment of $30,000. Id. This court noted that the employee had had two options: he
could resign and take the settlement offer, as he did, or he could have continued to work
and pursue his claim. Id. at 368. The employee chose to resign because he found the
continuing workers’ compensation case stressful and he did not like the person handling
his claim. Id. As this court noted, “A good personal reason does not equate with good
cause.” Id. (quotation omitted). Likewise, Shah’s decision to quit employment and
release any and all claims in return for payment of the settlement amount may constitute
a good personal reason to quit, but it did not give her good reason to quit employment
under unemployment-insurance law.
Shah nevertheless asserts that she was not sure and could not predict whether she
would have been scheduled to work Fridays in the future, had she returned to work. We
have no way to predict what would have happened, but we must examine the facts in the
record, which show that after Shah’s complaints to IMI’s management and filing of the
EEOC complaint, IMI’s did not make Shah choose between working and suffering
12
religious discrimination; IMI’s corrected the adverse terms of employment.3 See Minn.
Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(c) (requiring that in case of adverse working conditions,
employee must complain and give employer opportunity to correct conditions before they
will provide good reason for employee to quit). Here, rather than quitting immediately,
Shah chose to complain, and she obtained the results she sought. Although she contends
that IMI’s subjected her to unfair treatment and a hostile environment as a result of
religious discrimination, the record shows that the decision to schedule her on Fridays
occurred first in May 2013 and that Shah began voicing her complaints to management
about unfair treatment and hostile environment—without mention of religious
discrimination—in January 2013. Substantial evidence in the record supports the ULJ’s
decision that Shah quit to accept the settlement and not because of religious
discrimination.
II.
Shah also asserts that IMI’s constructively discharged her because IMI’s offered
her a choice between remaining in employment without a guarantee that her religious
preferences would be respected, or signing the confidential settlement agreement and
receiving a $25,500 settlement. The concept of constructive discharge is similar to a quit
for good reason caused by the employer: the employer is responsible for doing something
adverse to the worker that would cause “an average, reasonable worker to quit and
3
We also reject DEED’s concession in its letter that the ULJ failed to develop the record
adequately as to whether IMI’s was willing to accommodate Shah’s request to not work
on Fridays.
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become unemployed rather than remaining in the employment.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095,
subd. 3(c).
An employee is discharged from employment “when any words or actions by an
employer would lead a reasonable employee to believe that the employer will no longer
allow the employee to work for the employer in any capacity.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095,
subd. 5(a) (2014). Here, the record does not disclose such a harsh posture by IMI’s.
Because our prior analysis of according the employer the opportunity to correct the
adverse working conditions applies equally to Shah’s constructive discharge claim, we
reject this claim.
Affirmed.
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MINGE, Judge (dissenting)
I respectfully dissent. The record is clear that when Ms. Shah was employed as an
optician, she stated that Fridays were her religious-observance day and that she did not
wish to work on that day of the week. The employer, IMI’s MN, Inc. d/b/a Pearle Vision
(IMI), was apparently aware that Ms. Shah is a member of the Muslim faith and agreed at
the commencement of her employment that she would not be expected to work on
Fridays. This arrangement was observed for over two years. In May 2013, Ms. Shah’s
supervisor scheduled her to work on a Friday and did so again in June. Both times Ms.
Shah objected. Although IMI otherwise ultimately covered those Friday assignments,
Ms. Shah was told that she was subject to being scheduled for Friday work in the future.
At this point, Ms. Shah filed a complaint with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC). After June 21, 2013, the date of filing the complaint, Ms. Shah
continued to work for IMI as an optician for three weeks and then was granted a medical
leave of absence that extended to her ultimate resignation. During those last three weeks
of work (after the EEOC complaint), IMI did not schedule Ms. Shah to work on a Friday.
After July 14, Ms. Shah never returned to work. Ultimately Ms. Shah and IMI settled, it
paid her $25,500, and she released it from all claims and resigned her employment. The
issue is whether Ms. Shah had a good reason to quit caused by IMI. If so, she is eligible
to receive unemployment benefits.
Minnesota law defines “[a] good reason caused by the employer” as follows:
Subd. 3. Good reason caused by the employer
defined. (a) A good reason caused by the employer for
quitting is a reason:
D-1
(1) that is directly related to the employment and for
which the employer is responsible;
(2) that is adverse to the worker; and
(3) that would compel an average, reasonable worker
to quit and become unemployed rather than remaining in the
employment.
Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(a) (2014).
In this appeal the crucial questions are: Did IMI accommodate Ms. Shah, and was
her resignation for reasons other than being scheduled to work on Fridays? The ULJ
found that the employer so accommodated Ms. Shah and that she did not resign because
of religious discrimination but rather because of her medical condition. The support in
the record for this accommodation finding is that IMI covered for Ms. Shah’s absence on
the two Fridays for which she had been scheduled, IMI had not actually scheduled her for
a Friday during the three weeks she worked after she filed her EEOC complaint, and that
in response to questioning by the ULJ Ms. Shah testified that she did not know whether
IMI would schedule her for Friday work in the future.
The record is also clear that when the EEOC proceeding was pending and there
was mediation, Ms. Shah experienced aggravated anxiety that affected her physically and
that her doctor recommended that she take a medical leave of absence. There was
evidence at the hearing of a variety of work-place conflicts that Ms. Shah had with her
supervisor going back to January of 2013. Ms. Shah testified that her aggravated anxiety
and resulting medical situation developed in the context of the EEOC proceeding and was
related to the tension that she was experiencing in asserting her refusal to work on
Fridays, and the half-year conflicts with her supervisor were related to her religion and
D-2
not working on Friday. The ULJ never made any findings related to the underlying
causation of the medical problems or of the workplace conflict.
At an early stage of this appeal, the attorneys for DEED urged that this court
reverse and remand, stating that
[t]he record is undeveloped on several critical facts that are
necessary to determine whether Shah is eligible for
unemployment benefits. It is unclear whether Pearle Vision
was willing to accommodate Shah’s request to have Fridays
off; nor is there any finding by the ULJ as to the sincerity of
Shah’s religious beliefs.
The resolution of these facts is necessary to determine
whether Shah had a good reason for quitting her employment
with Pearle Vision. Reversal is not appropriate because the
evidence doesn’t clearly show that Shah was denied
reasonable accommodation of her sincerely-held religious
beliefs; we simply don’t know what happened at the final
mediation.
Apparently, DEED abandoned this position because the remand request was not made in
the DEED brief or at oral argument.
I concur with DEED’s initial request. During the ULJ proceeding, the ULJ asked
Ms. Shah whether, if she had returned to work, she expected to be scheduled for Fridays.
Essentially, Ms. Shah answered that she did not know, but was concerned about the
possible Friday scheduling because IMI had done so earlier. The ULJ did not ask IMI the
same question. The ULJ’s failure to ask IMI whether it would again schedule Ms. Shah
for Friday work leaves a gap in the record. Although in the hearing before the ULJ in the
proceeding under review IMI said that it would “try” to accommodate Ms. Shah’s Friday
day of worship, the record indicates that IMI’s last position about Friday scheduling was
D-3
communicated in June 2013 when it told Ms. Shah that she would be scheduled for
Fridays, as needed. This is a weak and, I would conclude, insufficient effort at
accommodation. Although there was a three-week period during the EEOC proceedings
when IMI did not so schedule her, that was a short time frame, and a Friday-work
requirement for its Muslim employee was the central issue in a legal matter that could
give rise to damages. Arguably, the most logical explanations for not scheduling Ms.
Shah for Friday work during those three weeks were either to minimize exposure to
damages or because no advance schedules were being released. The record is silent.
I note two considerations that counsel this court to proceed cautiously in this case.
First, the case involves the religious freedom of a Muslim person, an adherent to a
minority faith in our community. The United States Supreme Court has decided that a
state-run unemployment compensation program cannot deny benefits to an employee
who declines to work on his holy days. Hobbie v. Unemp’t Appeals Comm’n of Florida,
480 U.S. 136, 136, 107 S. Ct. 1406, 1406 (1987) (syllabus). Second, although there is no
“burden of proof” in determining eligibility for unemployment benefits, our statutes
provide that
This chapter is remedial in nature and must be applied in
favor of awarding unemployment benefits. Any legal
conclusion that results in an applicant being ineligible for
unemployment benefits must be fully supported by the facts.
In determining eligibility or ineligibility for benefits, any
statutory provision that would preclude an applicant from
receiving benefits must be narrowly construed.
Minn. Stat. § 268.031, subd. 2 (2014).
D-4
Based on this record and these legal considerations, I would remand for the ULJ to
determine: whether the employer, IMI, had made a commitment to accommodate Ms.
Shah’s religious beliefs by not scheduling her for Friday work, and whether the
difficulties Ms. Shah experienced over her Friday day of worship were a material cause
of the health problems that led her to accept the quit settlement with IMI. I recognize that
in its letter requesting a remand, DEED also states that the ULJ should make a finding
that Ms. Shah sincerely held a religious belief as a basis for her Friday-day-of-worship
position. Although potentially of relevance, this question never arose in the proceeding.
The sincerity of her religious belief has apparently been assumed. On remand, I would
direct the ULJ to address that question if deemed necessary or if raised by a party. I
would direct the ULJ to reopen the record if needed to address these matters.
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