State of Minnesota v. Alexis Elview Hancock ( 2016 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1997
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Alexis Elview Hancock,
Appellant.
Filed October 17, 2016
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-14-32114
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jean Burdorf, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Ross,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges her conviction on a charge of depriving her child’s father of
his parental rights, arguing that the state failed to present sufficient evidence. Because
there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the conviction, we affirm.
FACTS
When their daughter L.P. was born in 2009, appellant Alexis Hancock and R.P.
were in a romantic relationship. The relationship ended in 2013, and the district court
issued an order providing that appellant and R.P. would have joint legal and physical
custody of L.P., who would spend from January 1 to June 30 of each year with appellant
in Missouri and from July 1 to December 31 with R.P. in Minnesota. Appellant, who had
moved to St. Louis, MO, with L.P., would be responsible for transporting her.
Prior to July 2014, R.P. was incarcerated for a brief period because of a DWI. He
was scheduled for release on July 5 and arranged for his mother to care for L.P. from her
arrival on July 1 until July 5.
But appellant failed to bring L.P. to Minnesota on July 1, as required by the 2013
court order, and appellant did not appear for a scheduled hearing later in July 2014. R.P.
notified the district court that appellant was not in compliance with the 2013 order.
In late August 2014, R.P. went to St. Louis to find L.P. He contacted appellant by
phone; she said she was then in Illinois but would bring L.P. to R.P. in St. Louis. But she
did not bring L.P. to St. Louis or come there herself, and R.P. returned to Minnesota.
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Because of appellant’s noncompliance with the 2013 order, R.P. was awarded
temporary full legal and physical custody of L.P. in September 2014, and law enforcement
was directed to look for her. In November 2014 , U.S. marshals located L.P. in St. Louis.
R.P. went to St. Louis and was reunited with her.
Because R.P. did not have L.P. from July to November, appellant was charged with
deprivation of parental rights in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.26, subd. 1(3) (2014).
Following a bench trial, the district court found her guilty. She was placed on probation
for three years. She challenges her conviction, arguing that the district court’s conclusion
that she intended to deprive R.P. of his court-ordered parenting time is not supported by
sufficient evidence.
DECISION
A person may be charged with a felony who “intentionally . . . fails to return a minor
child . . . to the parent in violation of a court order, where the action manifests an intent
substantially to deprive that parent of rights to parenting time or custody.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.26, subd. 1(3) (emphasis added). Intent is a state of mind and is “generally proved
circumstantially by drawing inferences from a defendant’s words and actions in light of the
totality of the circumstances.” State v. Moua, 678 N.W.2d 29, 39 (Minn. 2004).
“Circumstantial evidence used to form [intent] is entitled to the same weight as other
evidence and will be sufficient to sustain a conviction as long as the circumstances proved
are consistent with a hypothesis of guilt and inconsistent with any rational or reasonable
hypothesis other than guilt.” Id. at 40.
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Appellant was cross-examined during her bench trial.
Q. [Y]ou knew based on that [2013] family court order that
you were obligated under the law to bring your daughter
back to Minnesota on July 1st, 2014 and transfer
custody to [R.P.], correct?
A. Yes, [R.P.].
Q. And you are aware of the fact that that order says that
the mother, you, are responsible for transportation,
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. You did not bring your daughter back to Minnesota on
July 1st, 2014, did you?
....
A. Oh, 2014. Oh. No.
Q. You didn’t bring her back in August of 2014?
A. No.
Q. You didn’t bring her back in September of 2014?
A. No.
Q. You didn’t bring her back in October of 2014?
A. No.
Q. In fact, you never brought her back, did you?
A. No.
Q. You acknowledge the fact that [R.P.] came to St. Louis,
looking for your daughter?
A. Yes.
Q. And you never gave custody of your daughter to him?
A. Yeah. I was at work. He didn’t wait.
Q. Do you see anywhere in that court order that says, this
depends on [M]om’s work schedule?
A. No. I never looked at – I just looked at the court order
and I never look—That’s my child.
Q. You have an obligation to transfer custody of your
daughter to [R.P.]. You did not do it, correct?
A. Correct.
The district court concluded:
[Appellant] claims that she retained and failed to return their
daughter . . . because [R.P.] was incarcerated in July . . . and
she had just started a new job in July so she could not drive the
child back to Minnesota where [R.P.] lives. However, [under
the court order, appellant] had to provide transportation for her
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daughter to send her back to [R.P.]. Even if she was unable to
do so for various reasons in July, she still could have done so
in August, September, October, or November. [R.P.] was
available during those months. He had made arrangements
with day care and his mother to care for his child. [Appellant]
was no longer new at her job and could have made
arrangements—whether driving the child herself or
transporting the child another way—so that she could comply
with [a court] order she previously had been [obeying]. She
also made no effort to return the child when [R.P.] came to her
in St. Louis. Moreover, based on [appellant’s] testimony,
demeanor, and attitude, the court does not find that she
intended to return the child to [R.P.] at any point because it was
“her child.”
This court will “defer to the district court’s credibility determinations.” Lewis v.
Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 737 N.W.2d 591, 594 (Minn. App. 2007). Based on appellant’s
own testimony, the district court found that, from July to November 2014, she did not
intend to comply with the court order and return L.P. to R.P.
Appellant argues that “[her] conduct is not consistent with that of an individual who
has the requisite intent or purpose to deprive another parent of their child,” but, as the
district court found, failing to bring L.P. to Minnesota during the first five of the six months
the court had ordered L.P. to spend with R.P. “manifests an intent substantially to deprive
that parent of rights to parenting time [and] custody” in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.26,
subd. 1(3). Sufficient evidence supports the district court’s conclusion that appellant
manifested an intent substantially to deprive R.P. of his right to parenting time and custody.
Affirmed.
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